- A representative sample of documents in the MCCLL repositories on Afghanistan operations that may be of interest to Marines scheduled to deploy to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).

- Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society: The Marine Corps' expert on tribal culture has written an excellent pamphlet on COIN and irregular warfare operations in a tribal culture.

- The results of Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in-theater collection (with MCCLL participation) that addressed the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) mission in Iraq.

- A report from the MCCLL representative to Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 5

concerning his attendance at the Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leader's Course at the COIN Center for Excellence in Taji, Iraq.

- The results of a survey of forward-deployed Marines and Sailors soliciting their opinions on the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV).

- The results of an in-theater collection effort to document lessons and observations concerning Fixed Wing Marine Aerial Refuel and Transport Detachment Operations.

Gates' speeches to AUSA and his subsequent "soft power" speech at Kansas State University indicate a turning point in U.S. defense thinking since the neo-isolationism of the "pre-emptive warfare" strategies of the early Bush administration. In many ways, the secretary's call to empower our allies to defend themselves returns to a consistent theme of U.S. foreign policy first employed in the early days of the Cold War, with the Marshall Plan, the Van Fleet advisory mission to Greece and the beginnings of foreign military assistance to U.S. allies.

For the military services, this should be nothing new. Since 1947, U.S. military assistance and advisers have been deployed to wars in Greece, Korea, the Philippines, Southeast Asia, Central America and now Southwest Asia, and in hundreds of almost-wars around the globe. American uniforms have been seen, and still are seen, in mud-hut villages and on river deltas worldwide, where individual soldiers or small teams of sweating GIs work alongside local forces to reinforce shaky new nations. But in fact, for the mainstream military generation raised since the end of the Cold War, this is new, since advising foreign armies, providing military assistance and working in harness with the State Department have been out of style for the top leadership of the services for decades.

The defining events, of course, have been the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the failure of the U.S. to plan adequately for the rebuilding of Iraqi and Afghan security forces put us at a grievous disadvantage for the first several years of warfare in those two countries, a disadvantage that is only now being made up by the hard work and sacrifices of dedicated men and women in recently created advisory jobs. Much more remains to be done, but the reconstruction of Iraqi and Afghan security forces is finally on firmer ground.

Iraq and Afghanistan are worst-case examples of "enabling and empowering" allies. The secretary's real thrust — and the topic of debate in Washington, D.C., today — is how to merge military power with other government agencies to support allies in emerging states before events reach crisis proportions, and to help our friends manage their own affairs without U.S. conventional forces. This is a challenge the U.S. has successfully faced before, yet the Washington policy establishment appears singularly ill-informed about how to go about it. Here are some fundamentals...

Read the rest at Armed Forces Journal.

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

... After 18 months of research, RAND submitted a report in the summer of 2005 called "Rebuilding Iraq." RAND researchers provided an unclassified version of the report along with a secret one, hoping that its publication would contribute to the public debate on how to prepare for future conflicts.

But the study's wide-ranging critique of the White House, the Defense Department and other government agencies was a concern for Army generals, and the Army has sought to keep the report under lock and key.

A review of the lengthy report - a draft of which was obtained by The New York Times - shows that it identified problems with nearly every organization that had a role in planning the war. That assessment parallels the verdicts of numerous former officials and independent analysts...

Next up - the following released by RAND today:

Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006) by Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell.

This monograph outlines strategic considerations relative to counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns; presents an overview of the current conflict in Iraq, focusing on COIN; analyzes COIN operations in Iraq; presents conclusions about COIN, based on the U.S. experience in Iraq; describes implications from that experience for future COIN operations; and offers recommendations to improve the ability of the U.S. government to conduct COIN in the future. For example, U.S. COIN experience in Iraq has revealed the need to achieve synergy and balance among several simultaneous civilian and military efforts and the need to continually address and reassess the right indicators to determine whether current strategies are adequate. The need to continually reassess COIN strategy and tactics implies that military and civilian leaders must have not only the will, but also a formal mechanism, to fearlessly and thoroughly call to the attention of senior decisionmakers any shortfalls in policies and practices, e.g., in Iraq, failure to protect the civilian population, as well as overreliance on technological approaches to COIN. The Iraq experience is particularly germane to drawing lessons about COIN. In essence, the conflict there is a local political power struggle overlaid with sectarian violence and fueled by fanatical foreign jihadists and criminal opportunists - a combination of factors likely to be replicated in insurgencies elsewhere.

War by Other Means - Building Complete and Balanced Capabilities for Counterinsurgency by David C. Gompert, John Gordon, IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns and Robert E. Hunter.

The difficulties encountered by the United States in securing Iraq and Afghanistan despite years of effort and staggering costs raises the central question of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study: How should the United States improve its capabilities to counter insurgencies, particularly those that are heavily influenced by transnational terrorist movements and thus linked into a global jihadist network? This capstone volume to the study draws on other reports in the series as well as an examination of 89 insurgencies since World War II, an analysis of the new challenges posed by what is becoming known as global insurgency, and many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report's recommendations are based on the premise that counterinsurgency (COIN) is a contest for the allegiance of a nation's population; victory over jihadist insurgency consists not of merely winning a war against terrorists but of persuading Islamic populations to choose legitimate government and reject violent religious tyranny. The authors evaluate three types of COIN capabilities: civil capabilities to help weak states improve their political and economic performance; informational and cognitive capabilities to enable better governance and improve COIN decisionmaking; and security capabilities to protect people and infrastructure and to weaken insurgent forces. Gompert and Gordon warn that U.S. capabilities are deficient in several critical areas but also emphasize that U.S. allies and international organizations can provide capabilities that the United States currently cannot. The authors conclude by outlining the investments, organizational changes within the federal government and the military, and international arrangements that the United States should pursue to improve its COIN capabilities.

Countering Insurgency in the Muslim World by David C. Gompert, John Gordon, IV, Adam Grissom, David R. Frelinger, Seth G. Jones, Martin C. Libicki, Edward O'Connell, Brooke K. Stearns and Robert E. Hunter.

This research brief summarizes a RAND report that analyzes insurgencies such as those in Afghanistan and Iraq and calls for a major shift in investment priorities to give the United States the capabilities it needs for effective counterinsurgency.

SWJ Editors Links

Classifying Criticism - Abu Muqawama

Discuss at Small Wars Council

By Seaman William Selby, USN

Special to American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, Feb. 9, 2008 -- U.S. troops found a diary belonging to an al Qaeda in Iraq leader that has Coalition forces believing the terrorist organization is "on its heels," a senior military official in Baghdad said this morning.

Soldiers of the 101st Airborne Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team on Nov. 3, 2007, captured a diary belonging to Abu Tariq, an al Qaeda emir in control of five battalions within two sectors, U.S. Air Force Col. Donald J. Bacon, a Multinational Force Iraq spokesman, told online journalists and "bloggers" during a conference call.

The soldiers found the diary during a patrol conducted about 15 kilometers south of Balad. Bacon said the 16-page diary contains records about man power, operations, weapons, and finances, and it shows that al Qaeda is hurting badly in the belts of Baghdad.

"There were 600 al-Qaeda members in this sector, now there (are) 20 or less," said Bacon.

In the diary, Tariq describes each battalion's number decline and goes on to describe the 4th battalion as "scoundrels, sectarians and nonbelievers." Tariq attributes his terrorist organization's decline in large part to groups of concerned local citizens, who are also known as the Sons of Iraq.

Many high-ranking al Qaeda members, including Osama Bin Laden, have spoken out about the negative impact that the concerned local citizens groups have had on their organization. As a result, the concerned local citizens are being attacked more frequently by the terrorists, Bacon said.

Nevertheless, Bacon said the numbers of concerned local citizens are growing, which indicates that they are less afraid of al-Qaeda.

"Right now there (are) approximately 77,500 CLC's with 135 different initiatives, and more and more are being hired," Bacon said.

Bacon said he believes the diary is also in part a will of sorts, in case anything was to happen to Tariq.

"He wanted to keep a clear record," Bacon said.

Bacon said he believes the diary is indicative of some other areas in Iraq but not all of Iraq. He cautioned that al Qaeda is still a dangerous enemy.

"We still believe they are our number one threat," said Bacon.

"There is a 90 percent decline of violence in Anbar but we are still fighting them in Diala," he added. "They still have the capacity and the will but we have the momentum."

Bacon noted, however, that "overall levels of violence in Iraq are down, and we are seeing positive trends."

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SWJ Editors Links

DoD Blogger's Roundtable audio with U.S. Air Force Col. Donald Bacon

Al-Qaeda Diary English translation.

Al-Qaeda Dairy original Arabic.

Diary of an Insurgent In Retreat - Sudarsan Raghavan, Washington Post

Al Qaeda Diary Shows Lost Cause - Christian Lowe, Military.com

Insurgent Diaries and the IO Campaign - Abu Muqawama

Al Qaeda in Iraq Under Pressure - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal

U.S. Spotlights al-Qaeda in Iraq Weakness - Sam Dagher, Christian Science Monitor

Al-Qaeda Leaders Admit: 'We are in Crisis - Martin Fletcher, London Times

From the General Assessment:

After a year at the Embassy, it is my general assessment that the State Department and the Foreign Service is not competent to do the job that they have undertaken in Iraq. It is not that the men and women of the Foreign Service and other State Department bureaus are not intelligent and hard-working, it is simply that they are not equipped to handle the job that the State Department has undertaken. Apart from the remarkable achievements of Coalition forces in the pacification of Iraq, the few civilian accomplishments that we are presently lauding, including the debathification law and the staffing of PRT's are a thin reed. It was regrettable to see the President recently grab on to it.

The purpose of the Surge, now one year old, was to pacify Iraq to allow the GOI to stand up. The State Department has not done its part coincident with the Commanding General's effort. This is not the fault of intelligent and hard working individuals skilled at the functions of the "normal embassy." The problem is institutional. The State Department bureaucracy is not equipped to handle the urgency of America's Iraq investment in blood and taxpayer funds. You lack the "fierce urgency of now."

Foreign Service officers, with ludicrously little management experience by any standard other than your own, are not equipped to manage programs, hundreds of millions in funds, and expert human capital assets needed to assist the Government of Iraq to stand up. It is apparent that, other than diplomacy, your only expertise is your own bureaucracy, which inherently makes State Department personnel unable to think outside the box or beyond the paths they have previously taken.

Bill Gertz in Washington Times' Inside the Ring has more.

A State Department official this week issued a blistering critique of Foreign Service bureaucrats at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad for undermining civilian stability efforts in Iraq.

The Feb. 5 memorandum to U.S. Ambassador to Iraq Ryan C. Crocker stated that the military surge is working, but State Department support for civilian efforts to pacify the country is a disaster due to bureaucrats' "built-in attention deficit disorder."

The Associated Press reports that Miranda was a Republican Party activist and former top GOP congressional aide who worked at the U.S. Embassy in Baghdad and the State Department said Miranda was "entitled to his opinions" but that they were not shared by President Bush or Secretary of State Rice..

A full copy of Miranda's assessment is here.

Many thanks to all who have contributed content, and to those of you out there who are reading it. We continue to be amazed at the quantity and quality of interest and participation in the Small Wars community of interest.

This is very much an ugly "pardon our dust" phase on the SWJ Magazine. Published authors generally get the support of editors, graphics folks, etc. To date, most of ours haven't even gotten the thank you note they richly deserve, because our hair is on fire trying to keep up. But their ideas are solid, and have impressed our peer reviewers to approve the articles on the strength of those ideas and their basic presentation. So we slapped a cover page on the articles and shoved them across the LD with our not-quite-ready new format. We will boot-strap in the appropriate improvements: dressing up the presentation of these interim articles as we continue to build in site features for usability. All the good that is in there is on the authors; all the ugliness is on us. But the alternative -- sitting on quality articles that are meaningful now to our community -- is worse.

To our authors that have content still hanging fire in peer review: sorry, we owe you a sitrep. Yes, we're behind, but now the logjam is broken and things are starting to flow.

Some other notes, in no particular order:

• We are putting out individual articles now, something we didn't do before.
• We will still publish volumes of SWJ Magazine -- compendiums of articles, and some special editions. Stay tuned.
• You can now comment on the articles, just like you do on the blog. Click on the "comment" link. It requires a free and easy TypeKey registration. More info in our Privacy Policy.

By Steven Metz

When I was a young professor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College I joined a small committee responsible for strategy instruction. This was all new to me: I had to learn before I could teach. One of the ideas that most impressed me then—and continues to today—is a simple, elegant, yet powerful way of thinking about strategy: it must be feasible, acceptable, and suitable. Feasibility means that there must be adequate resources to implement the strategy. Acceptability means that the "stakeholders" of the strategy have to buy in. Suitability means that the strategy had to have a reasonable chance of attaining the desired political objectives. This was the most important of all. A feasible and acceptable strategy was worthless if it did not offer a reasonable chance of attaining the desired political objectives. Reading Major General Dunlap's essay on counterinsurgency reminded me of this. His recommendations are feasible and acceptable but short on suitability.

In insurgency the military battlespace is not decisive; the psychological and political ones are (at least so long as the insurgents are not stupid). Insurgents recognize that they are militarily weaker than the state and deliberately shape their movement so that the military battlespace is not decisive. While the state would prefer that the military battlespace be decisive, it cannot make it so. The state can (and often does) dominate the military battlespace but if this does not directly translate into dominance of the political and psychological battlespaces, the state cannot attain strategic success. Hence operational effectiveness is no guarantee of strategic success. William R. Polk provided an elegant and powerful description of this when he described the Northern Ireland conflict in his book Violent Politics: "...the dominant power and the insurgents were fighting overlapping but different wars. The dominant power aimed to destroy the insurgent movement while the insurgents aimed to dishearten the occupying power and convince it that the struggle was too expensive to maintain. The dominant power relied on force and avoided political action, while militants, having limited force, sought to make the struggle political but also violent."

General Dunlap's recommended approach focuses on operational effectiveness—he does not mention strategy—but does not connect this to strategic success. He argues that a greater reliance on precision standoff firepower—particularly airpower—would lower American and civilian casualties and diminish the U.S. footprint. This might help sustain support for continued U.S. involvement—it would be acceptable. Even if true (and the contention that a greater reliance on airpower would diminish civilian casualties is questionable), this may not increase the chances of strategic success—it may not be suitable. The key to counterinsurgency is designing operations with the desired psychological effects, most importantly greater confidence by and in the regime. Simply killing insurgents is not enough.

The question, then, is whether substituting airpower for landpower has this psychological effect. I do not believe that it does. There are several problems. For starters, airpower relies on accurate, timely intelligence gathered from something other than the strike platform. Land forces can be effective in counterinsurgency because the strike platform—the individual soldier or Marine—is its own intelligence source. It can see, hear, even smell the target. This makes the "organic" strike platform better able to make split-second decisions, distinguish between appropriate and inappropriate targets, and identify a wider range of targets including ones difficult to find with technology. It is certainly true that soldiers and Marines sometimes make mistakes—as General Dunlap points out—but the appropriate solution is to better train them, not to replace them with technical systems. Human rights abuses by ground forces are no more inevitable than the bombing of wedding parties by fighter planes.

The bigger problem with substituting airpower for landpower is that airstrikes often do not have the desired psychological effect, particularly the creation of confidence by and in a regime. Airpower theory assumes that strikes can render the enemy physically or psychologically ineffective. Because insurgents do not rely on large military formations and are dispersed among the population, it is impossible to render them ineffective via precision strikes. Dispersion not only erodes the effectiveness of airpower but also makes it uneconomical. It would make sense to attack a small insurgent team with a weapon costing tens of thousands of dollars carried on a platform costing hundreds of millions if doing so had some desired psychological effect that could not be attained with a few dollars worth of bullets. Little in the history of counterinsurgency suggests that it does. Insurgents today make even greater use of dispersion than in the past. Airpower may have a significant psychological effect against an inexperienced or irresolute enemy, but not against a determined one. To create an approach to counterinsurgency which only works against inept or stupid insurgents is the height of folly (even though that is exactly what much of the American revolution in military affairs did).

Even more broadly, substituting airpower for ground forces overlooks a simple truth about insurgency: insurgents win not when a regime is defeated on the battlefield, but when its will collapses. Hence the first and foremost question for any counterinsurgency strategy is: What could precipitate the collapse of the regime's will? Again history suggests that a sense of isolation often contributes to such collapses. For the United States to tell a partner regime that we're —to provide airpower but not to shed blood or commit landpower sends the message that American support is qualified. The psychological effect is to leave a regime feeling isolated. If it does hang on, it will remember that Washington was tepid during its time of need.

A better integration of airpower into the military component of counterinsurgency is a good thing. Substituting airpower for landpower is not. It maximizes acceptability at the expense of suitability. I believe that the United States should only undertake counterinsurgency support in the rarest of cases, perhaps not at all. But if we do, doing so on the cheap may be the worst option, angering enemies without a full commitment to friends. We should either do it right and maximize the chances of strategic success or not do it all. Half way approaches are not suitable.

Dr. Steven Metz is the author of Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy (Potomac Press: Forthcoming).

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Discuss at Small Wars Council.

Job well done and wishing you many years of success. More on AM's birthday and a little history of the blog to boot - here.

"Insurgencies have to be won by local capacity," Mike Vickers, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, told a group of defense reporters in Washington on Feb. 6.

Because "it typically takes a decade or more" to achieve victory in a counterinsurgency, Vickers said, "a key measure of success" for the "supporting country" - in this case, the U.S. - is whether domestic political support for the mission can be sustained for such an extended period.

"Over the longer haul, I still believe that the indirect approach ... irrespective of force levels, is the way we will ultimately succeed [in Iraq]," he said, in answer to a question on reports that he had initially counseled against last year's "surge" of U.S. forces into Iraq.

Naylor, while acknowledging Vickers did not address a recent report by the American Enterprise Institute's Afghanistan Planning Group by name, described the remarks as pouring cold water on AEI's recommendation for an Iraq-like surge for Afghanistan.

Those recommentations (via Army Times) included:

- Deploying an extra U.S. brigade into Kandahar and a Marine battalion into Helmand in 2008 and maintaining that force level through 2009.

- Deploying two extra brigade combat teams into southern Afghanistan in 2009.

- Expanding the Afghan National Army more quickly than currently planned.

- Providing NATO forces in southern Afghanistan, where the Taliban are strongest, with the necessary "enablers" such as engineers, aviation, surveillance and command and control assets.

- Using Commander's Emergency Response Program money to build forward operating bases for Afghan National Army units in eastern and southern Afghanistan.

More on Vicker's remarks:

He acknowledged that "the insurgency has certainly picked up in Afghanistan the past couple of years, and the link with narcotics is a major challenge," but added that he is "still very optimistic about the long haul in Afghanistan."

However, Vickers appeared sympathetic to one AEI recommendation: to grow the Afghan National Army more quickly than called for under current plans.

More here.

Vickers vs. Kagan: The Afghan Rematch - Westhawk

Lingering Arguments for the Small Footprint Model of Counterinsurgency - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Discuss at Small Wars Council.