In an exclusive interview with Military.com from his headquarters in Baghdad, Gen. David Petraeus, the Multi-National Forces-Iraq commander, explained that he'd held close consultations with Central Command chief Adm. William Fallon and Defense Secretary Robert Gates and won them over on keeping troop levels steady after July.

"I've had a chance to talk to most of the members of the Joint Chiefs in recent weeks ... [and] Adm. Fallon was just out and I think we see the world the same way," Petraeus explained. "He endorsed ... the concept of a period of consolidation and evaluation following the substantial withdrawals that will be completed by the end of July, before continuing with further reductions."

Military.com has an exlusive interview with General Petraeus here.

U.S. Army Colonel Stephen K. Scott on U.S. forces ensuring Iraqi Army will have enough equipment and weapons to defend itself.

U.S. Army Colonel Terry R. Ferrell on Coalition forces, Iraqi troops, and "Sons of Iraq" security volunteers working together to rebuild areas south of Arab Jabour, Iraq.

U.S. Army Colonel James J. Galvin, Jr. on creating online communities for soldiers to exchange information through candid digital conversations.

Mr. Joseph A. Benkert, PDASD, Global Security Affairs on how a proposed arms-control treaty that bans the use of cluster munitions and aid to countries that use them could affect U.S. operations with NATO allies.

U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann on the Defense Department announcing it has sworn criminal charges and is seeking the death penalty against six detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. The detainees charged include the alleged mastermind behind the Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.

U.S. Air Force Colonel Donald Bacon on U.S. troops finding a diary belonging to an al Qaeda in Iraq leader that has Coalition forces believing the terrorist organization is "on its heels".

U.S. Air Force Colonel Donald Bacon on Al Qaeda in Iraq increasingly exploiting children, making videos depicting boys training as terrorists and kidnapping other children to raise ransom money for their activities.

More: Audio, biographies and related DoD news articles.

Also see Pressure and Aggression No Longer Guarantee the Achievement of our Goals -- We Must Consider 'Culture-Building' by Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner.

So says the Iranian Intelligence Ministry through its new public service announcement promoting Iranians to report suspicious activity. MEMRI has the transcript and the PSA that ran last week.

The video intends to scare Iranians of American soft power to undermine the regime from within using cultural warfare, which has been "on the back burner in Iran for years." The U.S. cabal, headed by a CGI John McCain, a "senior White House official" who "orchestrates numerous conspiracies" against Iran, is told a plan to make use of leading cultural figures and that a lot has already been achieved through international scientific conferences...

Mentor: A wise and trusted counselor or teacher.

Without waxing poetic - mentors are crucial to leadership development and should a military mentor hall of fame exist - retired US Army Colonel John Collins would be one of the first inductees.

Colonel Collins has given his kind permission to post the following e-mail and attachment (letter to General Robert Kingston) -- a piece of history, a fine example of mentorship as it should be and proof-positive that the requirement for sage advice does not diminish with rank - enough said.

I've accumulated many valued acquaintances since childhood, despite being a loner all my life, but General Barbwire Bob Kingston remains my only close friend. I've missed him every day since he checked out on 28 February 2007, a year ago next Thursday. I was Bob's boss in the 82d Airborne Division when he was a captain and his faculty adviser when he was a lieutenant colonel student at the National War College.

My advice didn't stop after he wore stars. I thought perhaps you might like to review my August 1981 correspondence to Robert regarding the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). It focused primarily on the Persian Gulf after Soviet armed forces invaded Afghanistan, but important parts remain pertinent today (see attached letter, written by hand because I had no secretary and couldn't type). Marine Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley was the first RDJTF commander. The key question was: Who should replace P.X. when his tenure expired? Plans called for amphibious assaults to seize footholds in Iran if required, but Pentagon computers confirmed that no active duty Marine flag officer had ever landed under enemy fire, whereas Major General Kingston had hit the beach as a second lieutenant at Inchon on Korea's west coast in September 1950. Bob got the job and pinned on three stars.

John M. Collins is a retired U.S. Army colonel and a distinguished visiting research fellow at the National Defense University. Collins culminated his military career as the director of military strategy studies and then as chief of the Strategic Research Group at the National War College. He was subsequently the senior specialist in national defense at the Congressional Research Service for twenty-four years.

Note: General Robert Barrow, then Commandant of the Marine Corps, also landed at Inchon during the Korean War but was, at that time, considered too senior for command of the RDJTF. Links were added to Colonel Collins' e-mail for background purposes.

The underlying assumption of strategy is that other competitive entities have interests that they pursue to the best of their abilities. Strategy reflects a choice, a preference for a future state or condition. In an attempt to create this condition, strategy confronts adversaries and unforeseen events beyond one's direct control.

Strategy is about how (way or concept) available power (means or resources) is applied to achieve objectives (end) in support of interests. Experts stress that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished and that only by analyzing and understanding the internal and external environment in which he operates can the strategist develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired end-state. The theory itself highlights the requirement for strategy to ensure an appropriate balance among objectives, methods, and available resources. (The force that balances the objective, methods and available resources is an example of a Center of Gravity and reflects Chinese military thought to first "attack the strategy, then the alliance, and lastly the soldiers themselves").

Discussion of power should not be limited to only two categories; soft and hard power. Power may also be described as potential power. The power to initiate change; applied force to drastically change the existing sociopolitical condition. Initiating fundamental changes in the present with expected benefits to be realized in the future.

Hierarchical versus Networked Strategy

The western way of strategy is based on the premise that strategy is hierarchical and that best case it is both a reflection of national consensus and comprehensive direction. It further purposes that the political leadership both insures and maintains its control and influence through the hierarchical nature of state strategy. (2) Strategy in tribal society on the other hand is of a networked nature. The reason why is found in the way the tribe is governed and administered.

The paramount sheikh of a given tribe is assisted by a number of confidential advisors and principal lieutenants consisting predominantly of senior nobles and a few outstanding commoners. His brothers and paternal uncles, in particular, are everywhere entitled and expected to assist him and thus have special authority over portions of the tribe as a whole. In carrying out his specific duties the paramount sheik, in addition to his immediate family, is also assisted by various grades of local authority. The tribe is therefore administered not so much by the paramount sheikh alone as by the whole of his family and local authority, though as holder of the office he personally has distinctive powers and privileges. In terms of tribal strategy development, all factions represent powerful interests whether based on familial politics, economic or security considerations competing for position and influence.

While the paramount sheikh is the representative and spokesman of the tribe and is responsible for the tribe's external relations, the strategy to care for his people and to promote the tribe's welfare and security is a reflection of various powerful interest groups competing with one another for positions of advantage within the tribe. The outward expression of what we perceive to be strategic consensus at any given moment is the product of adaptation, competition and cooperation within the tribe itself and subject to change as one or another faction gains or loses influence. Much adaptation is intuitive and less based on rational cost-benefit analysis but influenced by traditional rules of behavior that governs competition and cooperation amongst the various factions. A good deal of confusion can result when Coalition Forces are approached by one faction or another trying to improve their relative position within the tribe, or as one local authority seeks to strengthen his specific political, economic or security jurisdiction, and is believed to speak for the tribe as a whole. In this case, if the local authority is successful, his initiative may well be adopted into the overall tribal strategy and the strategy evolves from that point forward. On the other hand, his attempt may fail, regardless of whether he is individually successful especially if he is opposed by a more powerful faction or is unable to attract enough allies to support his effort. As a result, his strategic design reflects a mixture of intuition, flexibility, competition, cooperation and adaptation to local conditions vice a hierarchical design seeking a decisive battle in every encounter. This same dynamic can be observed when political parties compete for power.

Western hierarchical strategy rests on the premise that it must be comprehensive and conducive to facilitating control. It encourages the strategist to think holistically and to reflect on the whole of the strategic environment in his analysis. Analysis is based on comprehensive knowledge of what is happening and the potential first; second, third, etc., order effects at the tactical and operational levels. Strategy is therefore the product of a thorough analysis and knowledge of the situation and environment.

The Achilles Heel of western hierarchical strategy may well be exposed when confronted by a networked tribal strategic design. While there is no disagreement that we must appreciate the situation and achieve an appreciation for the potential first, second, and third effects at the tactical and operational levels, comprehensive knowledge of all the things that might influence the overall strategic design may be a bridge too far. Effects are determined not simply by preceding causes but are part of a continuous process of evolution. These complex interactions are too numerous to predict, identify and observe as they manifest themselves in their various end states along the historical timeline.

Our emphasis on comprehensive knowledge and control and reflected in a rigid strategic design limits our flexibility is the primary cause of much surprise when confronted with unpredicted events. Unpredicted events cause the system to revert to a reactive mode and therefore require time to realign itself so as to focus on the changed condition. Time that is used by an adversary who relies on intuitive, flexible and adaptive behavior to exploit opportunities so as to shape the situation in his favor. As the system realigns itself and is unable to adapt quickly enough to the changed circumstances we are forced to press on with inappropriate tactical and operational level actions so as to maintain momentum regardless of the applicability or desirability of the potential long-term strategic effects we may be initiating with these actions. It took three and a half years of hard fighting in Iraq to begin to change our mental model.

There is no need to change the strategy model. The model works well in structuring the analysis. There is a need, on the other hand, when engaged in a tribal society to adapt our thinking and to accept the fact that how we think is susceptible to exploitation, not necessarily because our opponent is smarter but because he thinks differently. An apt analogy to reinforce this point is to imagine a contest between two strategists. One thinks in terms of chess; the other backgammon. Success in both games is realized through the appropriate application of strategy and skill. But here is where the games diverge. The chess master is faced with diminishing options and opportunities over time. A certain opening gambit locks the strategist into a specific series of combinations that seek to take advantage of an opponent's mistake and to minimize the risk of making a mistake in return. The critical component missing in this relationship is chance. The operational environment is less dynamic for the strategist is focused on initiating the appropriate combination of moves in the attack to reinforce the defense or vice versa. Backgammon on the other hand also combines strategy and skill but the operational environment is inundated with the effects of chance; every throw of the dice in backgammon changes the conditions and by default the operational environment of the game. Just like in the game of chess, the strategist seeks not only to take advantage of an opponent's mistake, but also to exploit emerging opportunities presented with each throw of the dice. The strategist in backgammon therefore is likely to be more flexible, intuitive and opportunistic something that is also reflected in the execution of tribal strategy. This should not come as a surprise since backgammon is the game of choice in the Middle East and an expression of the way people think and act.

The strategist planning for operations in a tribal society must early on gain an appreciation for the historical, cultural, traditional and sociopolitical context of the environment she or he is attempting to shape. He should therefore begin to think in terms of social and cultural operating codes and coordinating messages. The social codes and coordinating messages are the foundation for the existing social contract upon which the existing political formula is based. The political formula in turn greatly influences the form and function of indigenous social institutions and organizations and reflects the accepted norms of behavior between individuals and groups. Although we will never gain a detailed understanding of cultures and societies different from our own, an appreciation for the cultural operating environment will go a long way in achieving political objectives in cooperation or competition with others pursuing their own objectives.

William S. McCallister is a retired Army officer who served in the Middle East in special operations assignments. He is a published author and authority on tribal warfare. Mr. McCallister is currently employed as a senior consultant for Applied Knowledge International in Iraq.

Endnotes

1. H. Richard Yarger, "Towards A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model", http://dde.carlisle.army.mil/authors/stratpap.htm

2. Ibid

Copyright © Jan, 2008 by William S. McCallister

General David Petraeus, the pop culture face of the Iraq War, answers Military.com's questions about progress and morale.. including his own. The general also offers an assessment of his warfighting needs and a peek at his forthcoming testimony before Congress in April. This episode is a 'must listen' for those who want to know what's really going on in Iraq.

Listen to the full podcast here.

Executive Summary

There are 50 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs): 25 in Afghanistan under the authority of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization International Security Assistance Force (NATO/ISAF), and 25 in Iraq.1 Of these, the United States leads 12 in Afghanistan and 22 in Iraq. PRTs have become an integral part of peacekeeping and stability operations; but they have also been criticized for their mixed effectiveness, over-emphasis on military objectives and priorities, failure to effectively coordinate and communicate with the UN and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and differences in staffing and mission.

To date, there has been no comprehensive review of PRT models to evaluate effectiveness or address shortcomings. This report seeks to answer three questions in order to begin filling the knowledge gap:

- Should the United States and coalition partners continue to use PRTs?

- Are PRTs achieving the goals for which they are funded?

- What are the best practices of countries that sponsor and contribute to PRTs?

Because there is very little standardization of mission and operations across PRTs, we used the following assumptions as the basis for our analysis and research.

-Using a variety of models, missions and functions, PRTs initiate progress on reconstruction, security, and development in post-conflict environments.

- The PRT concept is part of a larger set of responses to post-conflict challenges.

- PRTs are part of an evolutionary process of civil-military relations and interagency cooperation.

In the four sections that make up the body of the report, we look at the major issues that arise for PRTs, from their management and funding in contributing countries to the coordination of activities in the field. These four sections are: Politics and Bureaucracy; Civil-Military Relations; Activities and Relationships; and Evaluating Impact. We conclude with recommendations that distill the most relevant action points for the United States government and other countries operating PRTs. Our conclusions are based on broad lessons gathered from research and interviews with stakeholders in the United States, Canada, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, and the United Kingdom. More detailed findings specific to each country can be found in Annexes A through F. A glossary of acronyms is included for reference.

Despite the absence of concrete metrics and unity of purpose, PRTs have reported enough positive feedback to suggest that sponsoring countries should continue funding them and expending energy and resources toward their improvement.

However, there are limitations to their capabilities, and it is increasingly important for policy makers to clearly define PRT objectives. This will help both to guide prioritization of activities in the field and to lay the groundwork for the creation of impact-based metrics to evaluate performance...

Read the entire workshop report here.

By Captain Timothy Hsia

The world today is indeed flat. It is possible now to quickly disseminate and share information globally in seconds rather than days. On today's battlefield, any soldier or insurgent can collaborate with their comrades across the globe in real time to influence or alter future decisions. If intelligence drives operations, then it is paramount that the US military conceal its intelligence capabilities. The digital boom of the past fifteen years is considered a blessing for the majority of people in the world; however it also poses a unique operational security (OPSEC) threat. Today's military leaders in the Middle East face a difficult conundrum concerning how to reduce OPSEC vulnerabilities when planning and executing future operations. The threat the military faces in terms of OPSEC ranges from the profundity of open source information readily available to the problems arising from joint operations can no longer be overlooked as our enemies actively seek to gain the upper hand by closely monitoring our activities.

Military leaders have come to realize that globalization has allowed soldiers to quickly relay information to family members back home by posting thoughts on chat rooms and activities on personal blogs. Today, a common joke deployed soldiers share is the fact that spouses "back in the rear" are probably more discerning of future operations in the unit than they are. The amount of open source news that anyone can retrieve from the internet is simply staggering. Anyone from insurgents to interested family members can essentially create a link diagram of key leaders within a unit. They can read biographies, past assignments, accomplishments, and quotations of leaders from platoon leader and above. Essentially, on the internet there exists an asymmetric amount of information which the enemy can collect on U.S. military units in comparison to the dearth of information we can research about the insurgents we are fighting. Interested observers do not have to be in the unit to know when a unit has displaced. All they have to do is scour the internet and read the latest open source reports regarding the unit in question.

OPSEC has long been a concern of military commanders and the rapid growth of information technology has only exacerbated it. Even General Dwight Eisenhower, Supreme Allied Commander in Europe in World War II, and the planners of the invasion of Normandy practiced OPSEC. Gen. Eisenhower was perhaps fortunate that his soldiers did not have access to the internet or phones. Imagine today an operation of that magnitude and whether or not the enemy would be able to clue in on American intentions. Even the simplest hints to loved ones such as, "I won't be calling home for a couple weeks, we are really busy" to "we are practicing loading and unloading boats for what I can only guess at a beachhead invasion we are preparing for" can have disastrous effects. But the truth today is that such information can be instantaneously leaked. It is not unforeseeable that in the future it will not be the enemy with his bayonet greeting the U.S. military at the beachhead, but instead the media with its cameras. The consequences of this information being leaked would be unpardonable. However this possibility now exists today as deployed soldiers unwittingly pass sensitive information to loved ones back home. The military mantra that "every Soldier is a sensor," is intended to imply that every soldier is an intelligence collection node. In this case, however, the sensor is also an emitter.

OPSEC has become further diminished as intimate relationships have developed between embedded media and senior service members. These relationships between the media and the military require a deep level of trust and understanding. The same journalist that is discussing matters off the record with a Division General could possibly be doing the same with key leaders of the insurgency the next day. How far does the military desire to publicly reach out to the fourth estate, and at what point does a military commander decide to evade answering further questions and refrain from volunteering additional information? The case of Geraldo Rivera leaking military plans detailing a future operation by showcasing a terrain model on the news is not a mere anomaly. The military has opted to allow for transparency in order to paint a more complete portrayal of the U.S. military. But at what point does transparency work against the military? Is the military today sacrificing the element of surprise for the chance to better its public relations? Units in Iraq today often find themselves with an abundance of media personnel right before the initiation of a major operation. This is not merely a coincidence as news reporters have stated that they indeed have been told about the pending operation. Thus, the onus on maintaining OPSEC resides not only at the rifleman level but also at the senior military commander level.

The military's dependence on contractors, US and foreign, also has heightened the OPSEC dilemma. Contractors on military bases in Iraq are often the first to realize that military units are being moved. In this regard they are often the most attentive individuals on the Forward Operating Bases because their jobs usually involve life support functions such as housing and transportation. Contractors do not consist of solely patriotic Americans but our mostly foreign contractors whose intentions and values may not always align with America's military. Like deployed soldiers, these local and third country nationals possess numerous ways to contact the outside world: cell phones, satellite phones, and internet access. Information they intentionally or unintentionally relay to friends and family across the globe has the potential impact of greatly affecting how America's enemies respond to our operations. Given this situation, it is very difficult if not impossible to achieve complete surprise against the enemy for units operating within Iraq.

Joint operations also pose a threat to OPSEC, especially if our partners are Iraqi. It is well known that some elements of the Iraqi Army have been infiltrated by insurgents. Anytime U.S. forces conduct combined operations with their Iraqi counterparts they must share information and synchronize execution at the lowest levels. It is easy to imagine how such operations could be compromised purposely by enemy infiltrators or accidentally through carelessness on either side. Further compounding the problem is that Iraqi units simply do not have secured communication. American commanders can call each other across theater with SVOIP, SIPR email, and satellite FM. In stark contrast, Iraqi units rely on commercial cell phones, or worse, unsecured walkie-talkies at the tactical level. The problem is further compounded at the strategic level, when Iraqi officials announce publicly future joint operations in a certain region to the chagrin of tactical commanders who are planning to have the element of surprise when moving into a certain region.

In the future, the U.S. military must be extremely vigilant at concealing its hand in operations. OPSEC is a problem that will only exponentially increase in complexity as the digital revolution expands and as technology spreads outward from the Western World to Third World countries where future combat operations could occur. As today's operations in Iraq suggest, the digital revolution in information technology is one of the few areas where the US military does not hold a distinct advantage over its adversaries. Tomorrow's adversaries will be less forgiving of our leaked intelligence and the consequences of compromised OPSEC will be far more deadly. A war with the Chinese or Russian military - much more attuned to our OPSEC weaknesses and far more capable at capitalizing on them - would be an inopportune time to rethink OPSEC.

CPT Timothy Hsia is assigned to the 2nd Stryker Cavalry Regiment.