Yep, those of us who have been around a while know some military acronyms, maybe too many. Still, for old hands and young bucks alike - how many times have you sat in on a "way ahead", "new concept" or "thinking out of the box" death by Power Point briefing scratching your head at the mind-boggling array of mumbo-jumbo that repackages old thoughts under a new wrapper or otherwise serves no purpose other than compelling the audience to pull out their buzz-word bingo cards?
One of my pet peeves is commonality of language -- calling a spade a spade and sticking with doctrinally acceptable terms to describe doctrine that is, well, accepted. Before you go changing the language, please do us all a favor and change the doctrine first, ensure the new terminology is better suited than the old, and above all - make sure the new and improved terminology finds its way into the DoD Dictionary of Military Terms.
That's why I commend the attached document -- the Army Doctrine Update that was sent out just prior to the release of Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations. It spells out how NOT to misuse terminology associated or otherwise related to the FM. I haven't seen something like this before and hopefully it will put to bed a lot of confusion.
Some examples from the document:
1. Terms UA, UE, and SUA are out. Use corps, division, and brigade combat team (BCT).
2. Know the difference between maneuver and movement (we don't maneuver networks; we move them).
3. Battlespace is no longer a joint or Army term. Use "operational environment."
4. The operational environment is described and evaluated using the variables of political, military, economic, social, infrastructure, and information with the addition of physical environment and time (PMESII-PT). Use the factors of METT-TC as the categories into which relevant information is grouped for a military operation.
5. Use "civil considerations" (the C in METT-TC), not "human terrain."
6. Don't use colors as shorthand for something else, for example: Red COP for enemy COP; Blue forces for friendly forces.
7. Don't use "red zone" at all; the term is "close combat."
8. The operations process consists of the following activities: plan, prepare, execute, and assess. The shorthand for this process is the verb "conduct."
9. Use relevant information, not relevant combat information.
10. Use common operational picture (COP), not common relevant operational picture (CROP).
11. Use "battle" only in the context of a set of related engagements against an enemy. "Operation" is more inclusive. It is the correct term in almost all other contexts.
12. Full spectrum operations is the name of the Army's operational concept. The operational concept is the foundation for all Army doctrine. Note that civil support operations are only executed domestically and stability operations are only executed overseas.
13. Effects Based Operations: For several years, the joint community has experimented with using effects to better link higher-level objectives to tactical actions. These efforts produced the EBO Concept. The proponent for EBO is the U.S. Joint Forces Command. EBO is designed to improve the planning, preparation, execution, and assessment activities of joint forces at the strategic and operational levels of war. However, EBO is not part of joint or Army doctrine. As defined by USJFCOM, it is not designed for use by Army tactical forces." Bottom line, the Army does not do EBO.
To the uninformed this discussion may seem arcane or silly - but military operations are based on precision and that precision is based on precise terminology. I again commend the Army in taking an important step in ensuring we at least begin each endeavor on the same sheet of music.
Here is soon to be retired US Army lieutenant colonel and Center for a New American Security senior fellow John Nagl's latest for the Washington Post - We Can't Win These Wars on Our Own.
...last year's military successes in Iraq came at a very high price. The "surge" of five brigades and the extension of Army combat tours in Iraq from 12 to 15 months has strained the Army to the breaking point. Neither the Army nor the Marine Corps has a reserve of ground troops to handle other crises. Meanwhile, the Taliban is regaining strength in Afghanistan and the lawless border regions of Pakistan, and the opium production that funds their insurgency hit record highs last year. And the foreseeable consequences of a hasty U.S. withdrawal from Iraq -- instability in the region, an empowered and crowing Iran, a chaotic Iraq wracked by humanitarian catastrophes -- could easily reverse last year's gains and provide a new home for terrorism in the Middle East. The fight is far from won.
For starters, we must shore up Afghanistan. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates recently committed 3,000 more desperately needed Marines to Afghanistan, beginning next month. But it would take an increase of more than 100,000 soldiers and Marines to give NATO commanders in Afghanistan the force ratios that Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, has enjoyed. We don't have the troops.
The best short-term solution is rapidly expanding the Iraqi and Afghan security forces to hold towns cleared by U.S. forces. Local forces, stiffened by foreign advisers, have historically been the keys to success in counterinsurgency warfare. As such, I've been among the serving officers and veterans who've urged the U.S. Army to create a standing Adviser Corps...
... or breakfast, dinner or mid-rats depending on your location. Brown-bag it in the comfort of your office next Wednesday (12 March - 11:00 a.m. -- 12:00 p.m. Eastern) while joining the American Security Project for an online presentation and Q&A on ASP's Are We Winning? An Interim Report concerning our efforts in the war on terror. Registration is free and open to the public.
From the ASP web page:
The American Security project will release its interim report on U.S. progress in the war on terror, Are We Winning? An Interim Report, on Wednesday, March 12 at 11:00 a.m. Eastern during a live online presentation by the study's author, Dr. Bernard I. Finel. The event is free and open to the public.
Dr. Finel is the author of the first analysis that set forth 10 metrics by which to measure U.S. progress in the war on terror. Six months after the release of this groundbreaking report, Are We Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against Violent Jihadism, Dr. Finel looked at changes in these metrics and what they mean for U.S. counter-terrorism policy. He found a metastasizing jihadist threat, a continuing increase in Islamist terrorist incidents around the world, and a largely tone-deaf U.S. policy response due largely to a preoccupation with the apparent success of the Iraq "surge" strategy.
During this online event, Dr. Finel will explore the contrast between the recent drop in violence in Iraq and the increase in worldwide jihadist activity over the same timeframe, and outline some developments that may provide opportunities for the U.S. to refocus its counter-terrorism strategy on the growing threat outside of Iraq.
Participants will have the opportunity to participate in a Q&A following the presentation.
Dr. Bernard I. Finel is a Senior Fellow at the American Security Project and a former professor of military strategy at the U.S. National War College.
...we must accept that the romantic days of the United States Information Agency are gone. So many confuse the USIA and the other information services, such as Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty, of recent decades with the USIA that was engaged in the active psychological struggle that largely ended with détente and the finalizing of the European partition.
Unlike half a century ago, the U.S. military has a clear voice and is arguably our dominant public diplomat. Therefore, simply resurrecting "USIA" without reorganizing our national information capabilities across civilian and military lines would turn it into just another voice struggling to be heard over America's military commanders, spokespersons, and warfighters.
The candidates must look deeper than re-creating an agency and or re-establishing old outreach programs. They must show strong leadership and have a bold vision to rally the government and country to adapt to a world that requires understanding the information effect of action, agile response capabilities, and above all, credibility and trust...
... No astute observer of the campaign in Iraq - especially in Anbar and subsequently in and around Baghdad during the security plan - seeing the high number of intelligence driven raids, heavy use of air power, and kinetic operations against foreign terrorists and indigenous insurgents, can claim that kinetic operations have taken on a secondary or tertiary role to anything. In other words,when the successful practice in the field doesn't comport with the theory in the books, only the disconnected theoreticians can continue the mantras. It was time to update doctrine to recognize the nature of the gains in Iraq. By so robustly enveloping lines of operations and lines of effort within its pages, FM 3-0 may represent a significant advancement in military doctrine over FM 3-24.
... Counterinsurgency doctrine, that is, lines of effort, transnational movements, the trust of the population, robust kinetic operations against the enemy, and logically sequential actions such as take, hold and rebuild, far from being dry doctrine on the pages of a book, is critically important to the present and future campaigns in which the U.S. is engaged and will engage.
In the information overload will get the best of you (especially if you blog first, detail read later) category - this story begins with a fine article posted here at the SWJ Magazine by Jonathan Morgenstein and Eric Vickland titled The Global Counter Insurgency. From the intro:
Sixty years ago, George Kennan penned his landmark Foreign Affairs article that defined American foreign policy for the next half century. Seminal security policy decisions such as the creation of NATO, the blockade of Cuba and the Berlin airlift were all components of the policy of Containment. Today, a radical Islamic ideology seeks our destruction, yet we lack a unifying doctrine on which to base our foreign policy. Al Qaida and its ideological compatriots represent a worldwide insurgency based on religious extremism. At its core it is a political struggle with political aims and in order to defeat it, we need adapt our means to the nature of the struggle. We are not fighting a war on terrorism. We are fighting a global insurgency against an extremist brand of Islam.
To achieve victory in this conflict, we require a comprehensive paradigm that will address global asymmetric threats. We propose that doctrine be based upon a Global Counterinsurgency and that it become the guidepost for all major US Foreign Policy, in much the same way that George Kennan's anonymous proposal became the focal point for US foreign policy during the Cold War.
In the normal course of my duties here at SWJ I send out a 'heads up' e-mail alerting members of an elite Small Wars Community of Interest list (e-mail me to be included) concerning new additions by our esteemed bloggers and magazine authors. I normally include a 'teaser' such as the article excerpt above. Tom Barnett is on that list and he has been a kind soul in directing his readership to SWJ. Tom apparently - in his words - skimmed this piece too quickly and let 'er rip in the post - which led to this posting:
Expect to read a lot of this sort of article that suggests global counter-insurgency is the equivalent of a grand strategy. In our premature excitement over aspects of the surge's success in Iraq, we now see analysts extrapolating wildly, with the same consequences: we view the world through violence, we see states as bulwarks against such violence, the USG is the biggest, inside the USG the Pentagon is the most competent, therefore the U.S. military can spearhead a global counter-insurgency strategy that manages the world.
The long war addresses friction, which is minor compared to the force of globalization's continued expansion. A grand strategy harnessing the latter to address the former, and does not pretend that addressing the friction constitutes addressing the universe of change going on. We don't have the capacity any more to determine an era, just to tilt its trajectory somewhat.
We don't want to go overboard on COIN thinking. It has its place, but it's not the sum total of anything. It is operational and tactical, but extrapolated to the global strategic realm, it simply loses coherence.
Jonathan Morgenstein took exception, as he should, commenting on Tom's post that:
Actually, in our article, we specifically indicate it is NOT the military that should be the lead component in defeating this Global Insurgency. We emphasize time and again USAID, State, a renewed USIA, the CIA, Law Enforcement mechanisms and the Dept of Justice to strengthened rule of law mechanisms around the world. I'm sorry you read into this that "inside the USG the Pentagon is the most competent, therefore the U.S. military can spearhead a global counter-insurgency strategy". Moreover, we wrote the pre-cursor to this article in January 2006 which was published in the Boston Globe around then, so this really reflects nothing of your dismissive "premature excitement over aspects of the surge's success in Iraq".
Definitely my bad. I've been reading a lot of expansive stuff lately on global COIN being the answer and I skimmed this piece too quickly and let 'er rip in the post. This is a mistake I am vulnerable to when I scan too much on my phone and after I spot a pattern in a bunch of stuff people send me, I light into one to make my point.
Here, I just picked the wrong one to light into, and I apologize for the mistake...
Thanks Tom - though I wonder what e-mail pattern I might have been identified with. Here at SWJ we have been labeled COIN-hugging peaceniks by one set and neocon war-mongers by another. I figure we are doing something right - more like a 'big tent' where all reasonable views are considered and debated.
For more on Tom on another issue see Mark Safranski's Zenpundit posting A Barnett in a China Shop - all the intriguing elements here - Tom and Tom (Ricks), Admiral Fallon, Iran and, by extension, civilian control of the military...
...And if Colombia had to risk open warfare against its neighbors, better to do it now rather than a year or two or five years from now. In the medium term, FARC will still be active, Venezuela will likely be richer, and Venezuela's military forces will very likely be better equipped and better trained, perhaps with the assistance of Iranian, Hezbollah, and Chinese advisors. And a change of administration in Washington might mean much less U.S. technical and advisor support for the Colombian military.
If open warfare breaks out today pitting Colombia against Ecuador and Venezuela, Colombia would certainly have the advantage. Colombia's general purpose and special forces units have received years of mentoring from U.S. and U.K. advisors. These forces also have much more field combat experience than any other army in Latin America...
From a position of strength and with quite a bit of justification, USA Today offers up an analogy:
What if the United States had actionable intelligence that a senior al-Qaeda commander was holed up in a terrorist camp just on the other side of the Mexican border? Would it be defensible to strike the location if Mexico had failed repeatedly to remove such camps?
Works for me. Meanwhile, in more from the real world, Westhawk offers up his take on US COIN ops in Pakistan.
Under a plan awaiting final approval by Admiral William Fallon at U.S. Central Command, up to 100 U.S. military trainers and advisors will deploy to Pakistan to train and advise the Frontier Corps, a Pakistani paramilitary organization in the border tribal region. This development, in the works for many months, will prove to be a momentous event in the effort to pacify the Afghan-Pakistan theater...
To Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and the Taliban leadership, this must be a highly disturbing development...
It's a good report; I've high regard for the CRS which on the whole does very solid work--readable, thorough, generally neutral. Most readers will probably skip the first two thirds or more which focus on pre-Surge events (though if you've not already read Packer, Ricks, Gordon and Trainor, Bremer, Diamond, Chandrasekaran , etc and so on, it's not a bad primer) and go straight to the Surge, the probable aftermath, and the discussion of what next?
More on Info Ops concerning 24 and its impact on the U.S. military's view of torture, and the implications for the fight against terrorism from our own (well okay, the Army and CNAS have a claim too) soon to be retired LTC John Nagl in this Foreign Policy video:
And finally, in the somewhat breaking news while I was putting this post together category, the Washington Post is reporting that the Latin American crisis is resolved and Ambasador Crocker is leaving Iraq soon after the departure of General Petraeus.
In what is billed as the First in a Series: The Rise of the Counterinsurgents, Spencer Ackerman of Washington Independent profiles the current debate concerning COIN in The Colonels and 'The Matrix'. The 'colonels' are LTC's Gian Gentile and Paul Yingling...
... Ultimately, the answer to that question will probably be endlessly debated. But the counterinsurgency community—they call it "COIN"—has perhaps the most organized answer. Counterinsurgency is a much-disputed concept, but it refers to methods of warfare used to divide a civilian population's political and sentimental allegiance away from a guerrilla force. From the start of the Iraq war, a cadre of warrior-thinkers in the military has questioned the use of tactics that focus more on killing enemies than giving the Iraqi population reasons not to support terrorists, insurgents and militias. "We don't just talk about the enemy, we talk about the environment," explained Lt. Gen. Ray Odierno, until two weeks ago the corps commander in Iraq, in a lecture Wednesday at the Heritage Foundation. Not all of them assert that the early use of a counterinsurgency strategy could have won the war. But most contend, after the decline in violence in Iraq during the last half of 2007, that a counterinsurgency strategy would have allowed the war to have been less deadly than it is.
This small but dedicated group includes, most prominently, Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of U.S. military forces in Iraq and Marine Gen. James "Mad Dog" Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command. Other luminaries are Petraeus COIN braintrusters like David Kilcullen, a gregarious former Australian Army officer and State Department adviser; Army Col. Peter Mansoor, who will soon teach military history at the Ohio State University; and Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, who helped craft Petraeus and Mattis' much-praised Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, a seminal text for the COIN community known as FM 3-24.
Less visible but highly influential members—many are lieutenants, captains and enlisted soldiers and Marines who came of age in Iraq and Afghanistan—include Janine Davidson, who works in the Pentagon's directorate of Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict; cultural anthropologist Montgomery McFate; Harvard human-rights expert Sarah Sewall (an adviser to Sen. Barack Obama's presidential campaign); and Marine Corps University Professor Erin M. Simpson. The Democratic-aligned Center for a New American Security think tank plays host to many emerging counterinsurgency figures, like Colin Kahl, Nate Fick, Roger Carstens, Shawn Brimley, and, starting in the fall, Nagl. During moments of downtime, the community obsessively reads and comments on the Small Wars Journal and Abu Muqawama blogs...
...the next major debate over U.S. defense policy can be gleaned. Yingling speaks for an ascending cadre of young defense intellectuals, most of whom are Iraq and Afghanistan veterans, who assert that the U.S. military must embrace principles of counterinsurgency if it is to triumph in the multifaceted fight against global terrorism. Gentile, formerly one of those theorist-practitioners, believes the military has already moved too far in the direction of counterinsurgency, which he contends allows analysts to ignore the limits of U.S. military power. Both arguments represent an attempt to answer a searing question: What are the lessons of Iraq?
Over the next 48 hours you may curse the hiccups as our site transitions to its new speedier host. Funny little numbers in the URL if you look there, SWC logins not holding, hiccups on comments, etc.
But at some point when that separation anxiety is past, we will probably look back fondly at the old days of cheesy shared hosting, reminiscing about how quaint it was for our hosting provider to periodically block our legitimate users from accessing our site, and then take plenty of time to load so they could savor the experience in between false IP blocks.
Only in the waning days of our time there, did we come to realize the company we kept on our old box. We were rubbing digital elbows with a virtual Who's Who. Unfortunately we will no longer be as well connected to various quality Latin American medical service providers. We are all too in need of some miscellaneous enhancements, and those nice bariatrics with a slice of pineapple and a little umbrella, but we're a bit further away from that happy place now. It sure seems a great loss we did not get to know Danielle Ganek better when we shared the same stomping grounds. But there will certainly be no love lost for those nasty xxx couples, who just kept up quite a racket with their nastiness.
So we are moving on from our starter home to our own little white picket fence server in the suburbia of the e-world. Our transition is going on right now. It takes the internet about 48 hours to soak up a change in the DNS, so we'll be propagating for a bit. I guess some of the nastiness rubbed off. :) If you see any quirky things, let us know. We hope all will be good and stable by the week end, and on Monday we are firmly positioned to continue to expand to better serve the Small Wars Community of Interest.
Thanks to a couple of guys who have helped us with the tech all along. I don't want to name names, because then everyone will be bugging you for help. But we are in your debt.
The notion as presented in the article by Cullen Nutt "Petraeus's Big Tent" that the construction and writing of the American Army's new counterinsurgency doctrine FM 3-24 was based on wide-ranging debate within the American Army is fallacious.
The outcome of the manual was predetermined by a few key individuals like General Petraeus, General Mattis, retired Lieutenant Colonel Conrad Crane, active Army Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, and neo-conservative analyst Fred Kagan, to name a few. The fact that a conference was held at Fort Leavenworth in February 2006 to "discuss" this pre-determined doctrine and even acknowledging that at this conference there was wide inclusiveness with civilian academics and analysts does not change the fact that the doctrinal outcome of the manual with its narrow use of historical lessons learned, theories, and principles of counterinsurgency warfare was predetermined.
This is not to say that there was not good reason for the outcome of the manual to be pre-determined. The American Army and Marine Corps were at war and needed a revised counterinsurgency doctrine immediately. It did not have the luxury to debate the doctrine extensively over the course of many years.
But to claim that FM 3-24 was built on wide-ranging debate within our institution is fallacious and does not square with the facts. We should call a spade a spade, acknowledge this to be the case, and then move on to a real debate within the Army toward the new COIN doctrine, and more importantly the Army's new operational doctrine, FM 3-0, as well.
Between 1977 and 1982 there were at least 110 articles published in Military Review that fundamentally questioned the Army's operational doctrine that became known as "Active Defense." This true, wide-ranging criticism did not just hover around the edges of the "Active Defense" doctrine but cut right to its core by challenging its assumptions, historical premises, and theories. Emblematic articles from Military Review from this period that come to mind and should be used as models for debate today are:
William S. Lind--"Some Doctrinal Questions for the US Army"--March 1977; this was the first article in Military Review that began the "Great Debate."
COL Robert E. Wagner--"Active Defense and All That"--August 1980; an interesting and strident critique from a serving officer in the field army.
COL Wayne A. Downing--"Maneuver: US Army Operations Doctrine: A Challenge for the 1980s and Beyond"--January 1981; This was an example of the tone of the critique of Active Defense.
Consider the lead sentence to Downing's critique: "The US Army is currently pursuing a general warfare doctrine which is bankrupt--it will not work in practice." Aside from Ralph Peters has there been anything close to this level of criticism of FM 3-24 and the new FM 3-0?
The value of this wide-ranging criticism of the Active Defense doctrine was that it spurred a re-evaluation of the doctrine which ultimately produced the 1986 version of FM 100-5 known as Air Land Battle.
The authors of FM 3-24 provided a valuable service in getting a counterinsurgency doctrine out to the field quickly. But it is necessary now to accept the truth that there was not wide-ranging debate within the Army and from that premise start one over our Counterinsurgency and Operational doctrine that is truly based on wide-ranging criticism in a "big tent." After all, as one of the finest military historians and theorists of our time, Dr. Roger Spiller, has said: "doctrine is how an Army thinks out loud about operations now and in the future"
For years I struggled with many of my peers, trying to convince them that journalists are not the enemy. It was an uphill row to hoe, but a worthy one. Over time most seem to have accepted the proposition that journalists and their editors really do take a lot of time and effort to determine if they should run with a story, particularly one which might damage us, so the terrain shifted. More and more I came to find myself engaging with either veterans or "pro military" civilian bloggers. Their positions are more hardened than those of us serving today. Often this appears to be a byproduct of their politics. (One of the political parties has it as a basic contention that "the mainstream media" is fundamentally anti-military.) Over and over again I've heard the refrain by people of this inclination, that journalists don't give a damn about those of us in uniform and would sell us out for a second if it meant a good story.
Most of these people seem to watch Fox News as well. This is a tad ironic, since Fox News carries far and away the least coverage of, you know, war. (They did, however, lead all news stations in coverage of some 18 year-old blonde girl who went missing in Aruba, and Anna Nicole Smith reports.) (No, I am not kidding.)
It frustrates me to no end to listen to this claptrap, because the evidence points in exactly the opposite direction. Most journalists, and most journalism outlets, actually go pretty far out of their way to make sure that they do not endanger troops, nor spill any beans which might impede upcoming operations.
No, it wasn't American soldiers he put in danger. Those put at risk by Drudge's stupidity and inability to balance newsworthiness with security were British soldiers, particularly those around Prince Harry, who Drudge revealed was in combat in Afghanistan.
You know that your name is mud when you cannot keep a secret that even the notorious blabbermouths of Fleet Street managed to silence among themselves. Yes, there were two teeny-tiny reports earlier. Both occurred in women's fashion/gossip magazines: one in Australia months ago, and one in Germany which speculated that he might be in Iraq. Neither was authoritative. Neither was taken seriously. Both were actually quite vague. Then Matt "I can't keep my big mouth shut" Drudge stepped up to the plate with an "Exclusive," revealing at the top of his lungs that Prince Harry, third in line to the British throne, was doing his duty and fighting in Afghanistan. And apparently, he doesn't care that he blew it for one of our best and oldest allies.
For crying out loud, even the notorious tabloids of Britain managed to keep their mouths shut, though they knew about it the whole danged time. But blabbermouth Drudge has no qualms when he thinks he's got an exclusive, it's all about the hitcount (21st century version of ratings). Nice job Drudge. Way to go. Damage our alliance. Give the US another black-eye over in the UK. Put one of our ally's most valued soldiers (and those around him) in danger, and call it a day, eh?
With "Support the Troops" idiots like this around, who needs enemies?
The Strategic Studies Institute of the US Army War College publishes security and strategic reports and publications which serve to influence policy debate and bridge the gap between Military and Academia.
One of the central difficulties to a right understanding of American civil-military relations is the nature of the U.S. military. Are our armed forces just obedient bureaucracies like most of the Executive branch, or are they vocational professions granted significant autonomy and a unique role in these relationships because of their expert knowledge and their expertise to apply it in the defense of America?
Emerging analysis of the American interagency and intergovernmental processes has underscored the nation's inability to respond effectively and coherently to contemporary national security demands. Modifications to various organizations and the overall interagency process have been recommended. These are clearly required, but there has not been sufficient attention focused on the nonmilitary human capital required to meet the challenges of the 21st century.
Cuba watchers conceptualize five post-Fidel scenarios. From most to least likely, they are: stable succession, stable transition, unstable succession, unstable transition, and chaos. But few people realize that stable succession has already occurred.
If possible, it would be useful to enhance the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) ability to detect and prevent nuclear diversions. This would not only reduce the current risk of nuclear proliferation, it would make the further expansion of nuclear power much less risky. The question is what is possible?
North Korea's nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs have drawn international attention for years. In the early 1960s, Pyongyang began to pursue the capability to produce advanced weapons systems, including rockets and missiles. However, foreign assistance and technology, particularly from China and the Soviet Union, were instrumental in the acquisition of these capabilities.
The Front Page, a popular Washington, D.C., bistro, was an unlikely place for the genesis of a radical new war strategy for Iraq. But on Nov. 7, 2005, over gourmet burgers and beer, an equally unlikely group of military men and Ivy League eggheads sketched out a plan for a new Army and Marine Corps counterinsurgency manual -- on a cocktail napkin...
