Dear Army Soldier:

Congratulations! You have been selected as a member of an Afghan Embedded Training Team (ETT) or Police Mentor Team (PMT). This is a job that requires tactical competence, fierce independence, cultural awareness, and your ability to act as both diplomat and warrior. You have a pulse and have not been selected for command. Congratulations on your assignment! ...

CNAS and Foreign Policy Magazine set out to address some of the most challenging questions facing the U.S. military in the 21st century: What is the actual state of America's military? How healthy are the armed forces? How prepared are they for future conflicts? How confident are they in civilian leaders and government institutions? And what impact have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan really had on them? To find out, Foreign Policy and CNAS teamed up to conduct a groundbreaking survey to find out what America's highest ranking military officials — the very officers who have run the military over the last half century — collectively think about the state of the force, the health of the military, the course of the war in Iraq, and the challenges that lie ahead.

The U.S. Military Index is based on a survey of 3,437 officers holding the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above from across the services, active duty and retired, general officers and field-grade officers. About 35 percent of the participants hailed from the Army, 33 percent from the Air Force, 23 percent from the Navy, and 8 percent from the Marine Corps. The Index focuses on a very elite portion of the military -- the 6 percent of the military ranking Major/Lieutenant Commander and up, the most highly accomplished active duty and retired officers, including 232 flag officers, elite generals, and admirals who have served at the highest levels of command. Approximately one-third are colonels or captains, while 37 percent hold the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. Eighty-one percent have more than 20 years of service in the military. Twelve percent graduated from one of America's exclusive military academies. And approximately two-thirds have combat experience, with roughly 10 percent having served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Participants in the survey were selected by the Center for a New American Security and Foreign Policy. The nonscientific survey was administered online from December 7, 2007, to January 15, 2008.

Foreign Policy Magazine Military Index page:

The health of the Army and Marine Corps, the services that have borne the brunt of the fighting in Iraq, are of greatest concern to the index's officers. Asked to grade the health of each service on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 meaning the officers have no concern about the health of the service and 10 meaning they are extremely concerned, the officers reported an average score of 7.9 for the Army and 7.0 for the Marine Corps. The health of the Air Force fared the best, with a score of 5.7. The average score across the four services was 6.6. More than 80 percent of the officers say that, given the stress of current deployments, it is unreasonable to ask the military to wage another major war today. Nor did the officers express high confidence in the military's preparedness to do so. For instance, the officers said that the United States is not fully prepared to successfully execute such a mission against Iran or North Korea.

A majority of the officers also say that some of the policy decisions made during the course of the Iraq war hindered the prospects for success there. These include shortening the time units spend at home between deployments and accepting more recruits who do not meet the military's standards. Even the military's ability to care for some of its own—mentally wounded soldiers and veterans—was judged by most officers to be substandard.

These negative perceptions, however, do not necessarily translate into a disillusioned or disgruntled force. Sixty-four percent of the officers report that they believe morale within the military is high. Still, they are not without concern for the future. Five years into the war in Iraq, for example, a majority of the officers report that either China or Iran, not the United States, is emerging as the strategic victor in that fight. In an era when the U.S. military is stretched dangerously thin, it's a sign that the greatest challenges may still lie ahead.

Airing on PBS Tuesday, Feb. 19. Check your local listings and make a note. Preview trailers here.

I just finished watching a review copy. If you want to know the basics on this political football, see principal participants and witnesses interviewed — Marines, Haditha survivors, reporters and lawyers — and see extensive private and military video footage and stills of 3rd Platoon, Kilo Company, 3/1 Marines in Haditha before, during and after the Nov. 19, 2005 incident, you'll want to watch this.

Like most Frontline treatments, it is well-documented and painstakingly fair. To the extent it can be in the space of an hour, it is the story of the unit and the military, media and political history of the incident. The high points of the investigation, prosecution and defense are woven through...

Much more at Forward Movement.

From the Frontline press release:

"A U.S. Marine and 15 Iraqi civilians were killed yesterday from the blast of a roadside bomb in Haditha," read a U.S. military press release in November 2005. Four months later, Time magazine would report that it was U.S. Marines—not a roadside bomb—who were responsible for the deaths of unarmed Iraqi civilians. Soon after, Rep. John P. Murtha (D-Pa.) would claim the Marines killed the Iraqis "in cold blood," igniting a media firestorm which labeled Haditha a "massacre" and one of the worst atrocities of the Iraq war. But what really happened that day reveals a far more complex story that gets to the heart of the war troops are fighting.

Through interviews with the highest levels of the U.S. military, personal accounts from Marines involved, documents obtained by FRONTLINE, never-before-seen unmanned drone footage of the actual day's events, and an exclusive television interview with an intelligence officer who watched the day unfold, FRONTLINE investigates what occurred in Haditha.

In Rules of Engagement, airing Tuesday, February 19, 2008, at 9 P.M. ET on PBS (check local listings), FRONTLINE examines how the rules of war are interpreted in theory and in battle and what that says about the war in Iraq...

... No officer or NCO on the ground I spoke with had any illusions about who it is they're dealing with when working with the sheiks or the SOI. "In my mind," Captain Glen Helberg, commanding officer of Charlie Company at Courage told me one afternoon, "the biggest challenge for me is that we're not able to hold together this very loose coalition of IPs (Iraqi police), IAs (Iraqi Army), SOIs, and us. If we're not able to maintain that, then the SOI guys can take their weapons, go home, pull their IEDs out of the garage and go back to what they were doing. We know that there are guys in the SOI who were attacking IPs and coalition forces a year ago. So in my mind the biggest fear is that we can't integrate these guys into the government and into society quick enough."

But they're trying, and finding some success. In my few days at Courage, I accompanied Captain Helberg to several fruitful meetings with SOI leaders, local sheiks, and the area IP commander, all in the name of building trust among the groups...

Paul concentrated on 'boots on the ground' - how Non-Commissioned Officers, Lieutenants and Captains are working with the Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens), Iraqi Police and Iraqi Army. Good stuff.

...over the past 15 months, Odierno has earned a very different reputation. Even some of his critics now say his tenure as the No. 2 military official in Iraq -- a position he handed over this week -- reflects a newfound understanding of counterinsurgency doctrine and the necessity of using nonlethal tactics to reduce violence in Iraq.

"General Odierno has experienced an awakening -- I've now completely revised my impression of him," said retired Army Col. Stuart A. Herrington, who wrote a 2003 report for the military that identified Odierno's unit as "the major offender" in carrying out indiscriminate detentions of civilians. "He recognized that his guys were very, very heavy-handed before and realized tactics had to change."

Odierno's evolution over the past five years is in many ways the story of how the U.S. military has transformed its Iraq strategy and helped to ease back the country from the brink of civil war.

More at Washington Post.

Army Fighting Future Battles in Digital Laboratories Now

By Colonel Mark Forman

From February 11th through February 14th, the US Army's Battle Command Battle Lab at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas conducted the annual "Digital War-fighter Experiment" or "DWE". The experiment involved nearly 190 Soldiers and civilians from various US Army installations across the country, and a contingent from the United Kingdom. The purpose of the experiment was to conduct a corps-level experiment in order to answer specific objectives supporting Army transformation; provide critical observations and insights to the Army.

The military officer students at the Army's Command and General Staff School, also located at Fort Leavenworth, replicated an Army division-level staff, "fighting" a future war using a scenario in a fictitious country. The experiment captured observations for analysis of advances in the decision-making capabilities for future Army Corps-level organizations. Employing changes to network structure and traditional lines of coordination and communication provides insights for the Army on how the Army may operate in the future. The scenario was multi-faceted, portraying a determined, adaptive, asymmetrically fighting enemy and also included many realistic challenges similar to those facing military commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan today. No longer is the "lethal" fight the sole focus of the staff at corps and division level (i.e. destroying the enemy's military and will to fight = victory). Putting battlefield "friction" in a computer model contributes to the validity of the experiment results to application in the field for the conflicts the Army will likely face for the next quarter century. The experiment included variables such as state department imperatives, civilian refugee traffic, local civilian tribal leadership cooperation or conflict, as well as the enemy's use of media as a deliberate misinformation campaign.

An additional benefit of the experiment was the observation of systems interoperability between US and its allies; employing "Command Post of the Future" (CPoF) organization and technology. In the organizational realm, the staff was organized along war-fighting functional lines (maneuver, fires, intelligence, sustainment, protection, etc.). In the technological realm, students were able to meet in "chat rooms" for coordination, and share graphics they were building to represent enemy disposition, current and future plans. A participant in the experiment, who had recently returned from a 12 month combat tour in Iraq, Major John Rainville, had this to say about the event, "DWE tests future systems to make sure the future brigade and division commanders have the best information flow to make the best decisions - decisions that will affect the lives of young Soldiers. My son wants to be an Army officer and will be old enough to be a platoon leader when this technology and organization is in the future Army, so it's important to me that we get it right now."

An additional concept tested during the experiment was that of the "Red Cell." Traditionally, military staffs have formed a Red Cell from the intelligence staff element to portray how they think the enemy will act and react to the plan of maneuver. The new Red Cell concept goes beyond trying to get into the enemy's mindset and decision cycle; it is an organization within the staff that operates independently from the other staff sections in developing possible enemy and friendly courses of action. The Red Cell members receive intensive training in Red Cell roles and responsibilities vice the Red Cell of old which was more enemy-template focused. A major advantage of a dedicated, independent and highly trained Red Cell is to quell "groupthink" within the organization.

Armed with the knowledge gained by this experiment, the Army's leadership can gain an appreciation for how technological systems and organizational structures may meet the needs of the future Army in full-spectrum operations.

Colonel Mark R. Forman, an Infantry officer, is the Deputy Director of the Battle Command - Battle Laboratory a subordinate organization of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

As we approach the 5th anniversary of the fall of Baghdad, where do America and her allies stand in the "Long War" in Iraq, Afghanistan, and around the world? Has "the surge" brought progress, as claimed by the military? Can the Iraqi leadership stabilize the country? How will the revised intelligence assessment affect our course with Iran and its nuclear program? Pakistan is facing a volatile domestic situation, in the aftermath of the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, and Afghanistan is coping with a resurgent Taliban. How do they play into the mix? Join John Callaway and his guests as they analyze the status of the War on Terror on "Front & Center."

Roundtable guests guests include Colonel Daniel Roper, Director of the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; Javed Rathore, Senior Vice President of the Pakistan Peoples Party, USA and a member of the PPP International Human Rights Committee; John Allen ("Jay") Williams, Professor of Political Science at Loyola University Chicago; and Dr. Mohamed Toor, C.E.O. of the Pakistani American Democratic American Forum.

And in the first issue of the new look Survival: Global Politics and Strategy - On War: Lessons to be Learned by Colonel H.R. McMaster.

During the decade prior to the terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, thinking about defense was driven by a fantastical theory about the character of future war rather than by clear visions of emerging threats to national security in the context of history and contemporary conflict. Proponents of what became known as military transformation argued for a 'capabilities based' method of thinking about future war. In practice, however, capabilities-based analysis focused narrowly on how the United States would like to fight and then assumed that the preference was relevant.

Self-delusion about the character of future conflict weakened US efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq as war plans and decisions based on flawed visions of war confronted reality. This self-delusion has not been limited to the United States; many of the difficulties that Israel experienced in southern Lebanon in summer 2006, for example, can be traced to conceptual flaws similar to those that corrupted US thinking about conflict. A thorough study of contemporary conflict in historical perspective is needed to correct flawed thinking about the character of conflict, help define future challenges to international security, and build relevant military and civilian governmental capabilities to meet those challenges...

More than any previous legislation, the new initiatives have the potential to spur reconciliation between Sunnis and Shiites and set the country on the road to a more representative government, starting with new provincial elections.

The voting itself was a significant step forward for the Parliament, where even basic quorums have been rare. In a classic legislative compromise, the three measures, each of which was a burning issue for at least one faction, were packaged together for a single vote to encourage agreement across sectarian lines.

Washington Post's Sudarsan Raghavan and Zaid Sabah explained what this legislative package held for Sunni, Shia and Kurdish political parties.

Sunni politicians wanted the amnesty law because Sunnis make up the vast majority of detainees in Iraq's jails. Adnan al-Dulaimi, head of the largest Sunni political bloc, said the law would "free a huge number of innocent detainees who spent a long time inside the prisons." Iraqi prisoners in U.S. custody, he added, would be transferred to Iraqi prisons so they would be covered by the law.

The Kurds were pleased with the budget because it allocated 17 percent of the nation's revenue to their regional government. Sunni and Shiite lawmakers had sought to lower the Kurds' share to 14 percent, in their belief that Kurds make up as little as 13 percent of the country's population. But the Kurds reacted furiously to the proposal.

Shiites have long wanted provincial elections because they want power to devolve to the provinces and away from the central government. The law passed Wednesday had initially stated that voting would begin Oct. 1. But details on that law, as well as the two other measures, were unclear because last-minute changes had been made to the drafts, officials said.

More at Los Angeles Times, Christian Science Monitor and Voice of America.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, Commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor Regiment at Fort Riley, Kansas and Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling, Commander, 1st Battalion, 21st Field Artillery Regiment at Fort Hood, Texas.

With the U.S. military engaged in what experts consider a state of "persistent conflict," the long-term stability and structure of the armed forces has become a topic of intense debate. While some see a need to keep an eye on conventional threats, others have pushed more radical ideas—like retooling the military to specialize on stabilization and training of foreign security forces.

LTC John Nagl and LTC Paul Yingling are among those advocating change. Both men have served with distinction in Iraq, and both currently command an army battalion. But they've also gone somewhere most uniformed officers seldom tread: They've taken their gripes with army doctrine public. In this podcast interview with CFR.org, Nagl argues the U.S. military must shift from a traditional combat force to one focused on advisory and stability missions. Yingling says a greater burden for war fighting and reconstruction must be carried by others branches of the U.S. government.

Their observations, which have won both supporters and detractors, were first raised in their professional writings. Nagl, who recently announced his retirement from the army (Washington Post), explored lessons from past counterinsurgencies in his acclaimed 2002 book, Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam. Yingling made waves in May 2007 when he directly challenged the army's officer corps with an Armed Forces Journal article blaming the failings in Iraq, like Vietnam, on the shortsightedness of a generation of generals.

Discuss at Small Wars Council