A Report From Iraq - Bing West, The Atlantic

Earlier this month, at the invitation of General Petraeus, Max Boot, a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and I visited 11 of our brigades operating throughout the Sunni Triangle. After returning to areas I had been to repeatedly since 2003, the dominant impression I drew was that of a military campaign systematically breaking al-Qaeda in Iraq's hold on the Sunni population and driving the extremists into smaller and smaller pockets.

We Are Winning, We Haven't Won - Max Boot, Weekly Standard

Nine months ago, when I was last in Iraq, the conventional wisdom about the war effort was unduly pessimistic. Many politicians, and not only Democrats, had declared the surge a failure when it had barely begun. Today we know that the surge has succeeded: Iraqi and American deaths fell by approximately 80 percent between December 2006 and December 2007, and life is returning to a semblance of normality in much of Baghdad. Now the danger is that public opinion may be turning too optimistic. While Iraq has made near-miraculous progress in the past year, daunting challenges remain, and victory is by no means assured.

A Report from Fallujah - Michael Totten, Middle East Journal

At the end of 2006 there were 3,000 Marines in Fallujah. Despite what you might expect during a surge of troops to Iraq, that number has been reduced by 90 percent. All Iraqi Army soldiers have likewise redeployed from the city. A skeleton crew of a mere 250 Marines is all that remains as the United States wraps up its final mission in what was once Iraq's most violent city.

The Next Iraq Phase - David Ignatius, Washington Post

The question is whether this Iraqi renaissance can continue as the United States reduces its surge of combat troops. The Iraqi military is still far from ready to take over the country's security. The military's transport systems won't be finished until the summer of 2009, and it could be two years before Iraq's military can operate fully independent of U.S. forces.

U.S. Commanders in Iraq Favor Pause in Troop Cuts - Thomas Ricks, Washington Post

Senior U.S. military commanders here say they want to freeze troop reductions starting this summer for at least a month, making it more likely that the next administration will inherit as many troops in Iraq as there were before President Bush announced a "surge" of forces a year ago.

There are about 155,000 U.S. troops in Iraq now, with about 5,000 leaving every month; the proposed freeze would go into effect in July, when troops levels reach around 130,000. Although violence is dropping in Iraq, commanders say they want to halt withdrawals to assess whether they can control the situation with fewer troops.

At White House, a Second Look at Iraq Troop Cuts - Sheryl Gay Stolberg and Thom Shanker, New York Times

Within the Pentagon, senior officers have struggled to balance the demands of the Iraq war against the competing demands to recruit, train and retain a robust and growing ground force. That institutional tension is personified by two of Mr. Bush's top generals, David H. Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, and George W. Casey Jr., the Army chief of staff. General Petraeus's mission is to win the war; General Casey must also worry about the health of the whole Army.

Drawdown of U.S. Forces in Iraq Hinges on July Review - Jim Michaels, USA Today

Gen. David Petraeus isn't ready to commit to additional force reductions until after the 30,000 extra troops added last year leave this summer, U.S. military officials say.

Instead, Petraeus will tell Congress and the White House in April what he thinks the overall security situation in Iraq will look like, said Rear Adm. Gregory Smith, a military spokesman in Iraq. Then, Smith said, Petraeus will have to "confirm that assessment" after the initial cuts in U.S. troops are completed in July.

President Bush has said he could accept a recommendation from Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq, that did not include a continuation of the drawdown after July.

U.S. to Expand Outposts Across Baghdad by 30% - Amit R. Paley, Washington Post

The U.S. military plans to boost the number of neighborhood outposts across the capital by more than 30 percent this year even as American forces begin to withdraw, the new commander of U.S. forces in Baghdad said Tuesday.

Baghdad's Housing Boom - Kimi Yoshino and Caesar Ahmed, Los Angeles Times

Soaring prices. Precious few homes. Bidding wars. Sound like Southern California a few years back? Welcome to an unexpected bright spot in global housing: Baghdad. Attracted by news of decreased violence, thousands of displaced Iraqis returning to Baghdad's safer neighborhoods are fueling a bit of a real estate frenzy.

Why Are We Succeeding in Iraq - or Are We? - Herschel Smith, Captain's Journal

For all those readers who care about counterinsurgency - how to wage it, what we have done wrong in Iraq, what we have done (and are doing) right in Iraq, and what the campaign in Iraq does for our doctrine - there is a discussion thread at the Small Wars Journal that in our opinion is the most important one that has been started. Without hesitation and in no holds barred fashion, it became a fascinating and most useful strategic slug-fest of competing ideas and narrative accounts of the campaign in Iraq. If the main stream media reports have become boring and repetitious and the blogs have become outlets for talking points, this kind of discussion is at the same time professional, honest, forthright and intellectually complex, and should be engaged by all professional military who want to learn about both making war and peace.

Death Squads Threaten Surge - Abu Muqawama

As readers of this blog well know, securing the civilian population is at the heart of good counter-insurgency campaigns. Protecting those actively supporting you--and labeled collaborators by opponents--is doubly important. (Which is why our previous clear-but-not-hold strategy meant that we literally lost a generation of moderate Iraqis: nearly all those who worked with us from 2003-2005 were killed because we couldn't provide security.)

What Will the Surge Teach Us? - Westhawk

The received wisdom today is that by sending 30,000 more combat troops to Iraq, in the form of five additional Army brigade combat teams and two additional Marine infantry battalions, the U.S. military in Iraq would then have enough manpower to protect the Iraqi population by being able, for the first time, to staff small combat outposts throughout Iraq's urban neighborhoods. Protecting the population is thought to be an essential counterinsurgency tactic. Once the population sees that the government forces are protecting them against the insurgents, the population will then feel safe enough to give up the rebels hiding in their neighborhoods.

With violence down dramatically and al Qaeda in Iraq now virtually destroyed, few can seriously question the results of Mr. Bush's dramatic January 2007 decision. But what lessons will future American policymakers learn from this episode?

The Mosul Offensive - Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal

Just over one year after the surge officially began Coalition and Iraqi forces continue to pursue al Qaeda in Iraq. After al Qaeda has been driven from its havens in Baghdad and the surrounding belts regions, and most recently in Diyala, the city of Mosul has emerged as the latest battleground.

Al-Qaeda's in Iraq New Sponsor: Libya - Iraq the Model

We shouldn't be surprised to see young Gaddafi being accused of sponsoring terrorism in Iraq, not should we be surprised if he turns out to be actually involved in sponsoring that "battalion" of terrorists. The dictators of the Middle East have a long-established trend of sponsoring terrorism and provoking chaos in any relevant, or irrelevant, part of the world they have access to. The 2nd half of the 20th century was full of examples of this sort; Saddam funding insurgents in Chad, Egypt becoming part of a civil war in Yemen, Tunisia hosting the PLO, Saddam providing shelter for Dzhokhar Dudayev in 1993, and the list goes long.

Spoken - The Belmont Club

One of the persons following the Belmont Club discussion over whether it is necessary to confront political Islam as an anti-Western ideology is a Marine in Anbar province. His email to me has been reproduced in toto below. It is clear and eloquent. I am grateful for it, not in the least because it lends some substance to my hope that "because of the size of the stakes this whole question will be resolved, not by some politician but by the 'decision of crowds'." Here's his email in toto.

William S. McCallister

"It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovations can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: That is to say, whether to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayer or can they use force. In the first instance they always succeed badly and never compass anything, but when they can rely on themselves and use force; then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered and the unarmed ones have been destroyed".

-- Nicolo Machiavelli, The Prince

Background

Ideas as to what constitutes good governance various among individuals, groups and cultures. The current definition of good governance as outlined in a recent report on threats from safe havens and ungoverned areas is a case in point. (1) The report defines governance as the "delivery of security, judicial, legal, regulatory, intelligence, economic, administration, social and political goods and public services, and the institutions through which they are delivered". The definition implies a social service centric function for government emphasizing "delivery" and distribution of social services. It further implies that only democratic institutions are a safeguard against militancy, extremism and terrorism. Not all cultures view the role and function of government in quite the same way. Tribal society, particularly along the North-West frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan judges the role and function of effective government quite differently.

Tribes compete with one another for limited resources and access to influence. The function of effective government in such a sociopolitical system is therefore expressed in another way. Legitimacy is based on the social contract with fighting as a form of negotiation. The social code is the basis for negotiating the social contract and hence "legitimacy" upon which the existing political formula is based. (2) The political formula in turn greatly influences the form and function of indigenous social institutions and organizations and reflects the accepted norm of behavior between individuals and groups.

The application of Pakthunwali or the "way of the Pathans"; requirement to manage competition among the various groups and promote some type of stability in tribal areas has evolved into a distinct sociopolitical system that embodies its own unique mix of social contract and political formula. The sociopolitical system along the North-West frontier is therefore best described as an arena in which groups compete. (3) The government acts as the fulcrum around which the various actors revolve forming, breaking apart, and reforming as warranted in competition for position, influence and authority.

Effective governance ensures that latent and existing hostilities between groups' remains confined within acceptable levels. Its primary role is to enforce traditional codes of conduct in managing violence. The fighting and lawlessness engulfing Afghanistan after the withdrawal of Soviet forces in 1989 may be directly attributed to a lack of controlling agent to enforce a semblance of balance between rival groups. The indigenous population therefore bases its definitions of ungoverned or under-governed areas on quite different criteria.

An ungoverned or under-governed area reflects the inability of the central government to maintain parity between the various groups competing and cooperating for position, influence and authority. A fair government is one that is perceived to maintain all actors equally and balanced against the other "in splendid equilibrium". (4) The central government may be considered "corrupt" if it favors only one particular group or has been co-opted by one or more groups at the expense of all the others. The criterion for illegitimacy along the North-West frontier is therefore judged in the manner in which each group perceives itself to be governed in comparison to other groups and not necessarily because the region is poor and socially chaotic and therefore assumed to be more prone to western concepts of corruption.

Applied Strategy: U.S. and Tribal Perspectives

The differences in mental models, experience and expectations greatly influences our perspective on strategic design processes and strategy in achieving political or military objectives whether in cooperation or competition with other actors pursuing their own objectives. The American cultural legacy fosters a rational interpretation of the world. U.S. strategic design processes are therefore rational and mechanistic. Tribal society, on the other hand, perceives the world from within the confines of its immediate and extended kinship group and territory where competition i.e. winning and losing is literally a matter of life and death. This outlook on life greatly influences behavior. As a result, tribal strategic design processes are more dynamic; flexible, competitive and adaptive in nature.

The western way of strategy is about how (way or concept) available power (means or resources) is applied to achieve objectives (end) in support of interests. Experts stress that the strategist must know what is to be accomplished and that only by analyzing and understanding the internal and external environment in which he operates can he develop appropriate objectives leading to the desired end-state. The theory itself highlights the requirement for strategy to ensure an appropriate balance among objectives, methods, and available resources.

The tribal way of strategy is of a networked nature. The reason why is found in the way the tribe is governed and administered. The paramount leader of a given tribe is assisted by a number of trusted advisors and principal lieutenants consisting predominantly of senior family members and a few outstanding commoners. His brothers and paternal uncles, in particular, are everywhere entitled and expected to assist him and thus have special authority over portions of the tribe as a whole. In carrying out his specific duties the paramount leader, in addition to his immediate family, is also assisted by various grades of local authority. The tribe is therefore administered not so much by the paramount leader alone as by the whole of his family and local authority, though as holder of the office he personally has distinctive powers and privileges. In terms of tribal strategy development, all factions represent powerful interests competing for leverage and influence in support of familial political, economic or security objectives.

While the paramount leader is the representative and spokesman of the tribe and is responsible for the tribe's external relations, the strategy to care for his people and to promote the tribe's welfare and security is a reflection of various powerful interest groups competing with one another for positions of advantage within the tribe. The outward expression of what we perceive to be strategic consensus at any given moment is the product of a process of adaptation, competition and cooperation within the tribe itself and subject to change as one or another faction gains or loses influence. Adaptation to changing conditions is intuitive and less based on rational cost-benefit analysis than shaped by traditional rules of behavior that governs competition and cooperation amongst the various factions.

Discussion of power should not be limited to only two categories; soft and hard power. Power in tribal terms may also be described as latent power. Targeted violence, or fighting as a form of negotiation, is a means to initiate change; applied force to change the existing sociopolitical condition in one's favor. Initiating hostilities seeks to test the present relationship and to create the conditions for even greater benefits to be realized in the future.

Strategic Risks Considerations Along the North-West Frontier

There are a number of risks considerations that must be addressed prior to involving ourselves in the sociopolitical arena along the North-West frontier. First and foremost is the risk of engaging an opponent whose strategic calculus differs so markedly from our own. U.S. strategic development processes are rational, mechanistic and as a result hierarchical so as to facilitate control. In order to maintain the perception of control we seek comprehensive knowledge over all facets of the environment and operation.

Tribal strategy development processes, on the other hand, are intuitive and the product of a process of competition, cooperation and adaptation. Tribal strategy does not seek to create comprehensive knowledge but only to gain local advantage at a specific point in time and space. It is opportunistic due to its intuitive character. This characteristic differential between western and tribal strategic design is a key point of consideration. While there is no disagreement that we must understand the situation and gain an appreciation for the potential first, second, and third effects at the tactical and operational levels, comprehensive knowledge of all the things that might influence the situation may be a bridge too far. Effects are determined not simply by preceding causes but are part of a continuous process of evolution. These complex interactions are too numerous to predict, identify and observe as they manifest themselves in their various end states along the historical timeline.

Our emphasis on controlling every potential strategic effect limits our flexibility in exploiting windows of opportunity and is the primary cause of much surprise when confronted with unpredicted events. Unpredicted events cause execution to revert to a reactive mode. Valuable time is lost as the strategic plan is realigned so as to focus on the changed condition. Time that is used by an adversary who relies on intuitive, flexible and adaptive behavior to exploit opportunities so as to shape the situation in his favor. In the meantime, unable to appreciate the cultural nuance and adapt quickly enough to the changed circumstances we are forced to press on with inappropriate tactical and operational level actions so as to maintain momentum regardless of the applicability or desirability of the potential long-term strategic effects we may be initiating with these actions. The Achilles Heel of our hierarchical strategic design and execution process is exposed when confronted by an opponent executing an intuitive, opportunistic and adaptive tribal strategy.

The second risk lies in the language we use in assessing the operational environment. Considerations of long and short-term factors such as causes of conflict, competing demands for resources, economic realities, legal and moral implications, and international interests are expressed in language. Implicit theories and interpretations are embedded in the vocabulary and subconsciously shape our perceptions and understanding of the world and our interaction with it. Widely held beliefs live on implicitly in words or phrases and therefore are likely never to be explicitly challenged or subjected to criticism. Descriptions of the operating environment are a case in point. Although much time is spent in defining the types of conflict in which we engage i.e. conventional or unconventional and its forms i.e. insurgency or counterinsurgency, we are not yet mentally flexible enough to describe our opponent accurately. Our terminologies to describe conventional or unconventional conflicts tend to brand the participants as conventional military or guerilla fighters, terrorists or criminals. When the opponent are tribal organizations, generally accepted terms such as insurgents, guerillas, terrorists or criminals do not necessarily provide the best description nor accurately describe the conflict in question. Language laded with interpretations or theories about our surroundings will profoundly shape the questions we ask and solutions we develop. Common terms by design seek to foster corporate concepts and shared understanding but if generally accepted terms describe the situation poorly, diplomatic and military initiatives based on this vocabulary are likely to deal poorly with the situation.

Insurgency or Irregular Warfare

Insurgency is currently defined as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through the use of subversion and armed conflict". (5) This definition, if applied along the North-West frontier may be too narrowly circumscribed. The definition does not take into consideration the social contract i.e. tribal relations with the central government or challenges to its authority. A particular tribal "dust-up" may not necessarily be aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government but may only seek to limit its control over a partial area of its declared sovereign territory. In essence, the tribe is engaged in renegotiating the social contract between itself and the central government. In this case, hostilities might be initiated to only limit government encroachment into territory inhabited by the tribe. Tribal fighters may employ subversion and direct attacks against government organizations yet compliment the effort with participation in the traditional governance process i.e. jirga system. (6) It is therefore important to avoid the temptation to simply label groups as "insurgents", "terrorists" and "criminals"; definitions that embody unquestioned assumptions contained in the language itself and cause us to respond reflexively in our own stylized forms of diplomacy and fighting.

Irregular warfare is defined as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population". (7) In tribal terms, irregular warfare is fought employing the tribe's diplomatic, economic, informational and martial instruments of tribal power.

The importance of description is highlighted in the following paragraphs. The scenario illustrated below should be familiar to all those currently engaged in fighting extremists in Afghanistan or along the frontier with Pakistan. The narrative reflects many "modern" concepts of insurgency and revolutionary warfare.

A religious personality proclaims a movement and declares himself Amir. Adherents of the movement swear a baiat or oath of religious allegiance to him and an advisory and planning council consisting of a vice-regent and supporters is established. Supporters are appointed as regional emirs and administrative officers such as religious tax collector. A highly sophisticated propaganda campaign is launched to promote the Amir and the movement.

The movement is sophisticated but remains largely covert in the early stage. Developing a district network usually begins with a religious missionary seeking out a suitable base where he can establish himself, often marrying into the local Muslim community. He then sets himself up as a religious teacher or mullah and gains a following in the district. He expands the administrative network by appointing three lay figures to act as general manager, tax-collector and postmaster. The great majority of recruits are poor, illiterate and unskilled young men, while those selected for further training and indoctrination are invariably older and better educated.

Once the administrative network is established, these four local representatives act independently of each other; the mullah teaches and proselytizes, the tax collector gathers funds, the postmaster arranges for communication of messages and movement of recruits, and the general manager co-ordinates the overall effort. Compartmentalization of duties avoids detection and the attention of authorities. The mullah may be investigated and called before the authorities to account for his seditious preaching, but will likely be permitted to continue his activities because he appears to be working in isolation.

In time, local groups are linked through a number of regional centers while the regional center is linked to the frontier through a network of routes and safe houses, which enable messengers, supplies and recruits to be moved up and down the line in secrecy and safety. Security measures such as giving each member a nom de guerre and establishing communication codes are established. As the organization expands it evolves into a highly effective organization for Islamic revival and revolution with branches throughout the support and target area and sustained by a large popular constituency.

A disciplined, small group of hard-core of fighters or ghazis are raised and led by a dedicated chain of command. They are well armed, trained and supplied by members or supporters of the movement. Many pious Muslims contribute to their upkeep including members of a number of leading Muslim houses throughout the Islamic world.

Since jihad should only be launched from territory where sharia prevails or recognized as dar al-Islam (house/abode of peace), the movement decides to establish itself in the mountainous territory of the North-West Frontier. The Islamists may be welcomed initially as a potential ally against a rival tribe but since being called upon by God to liberate the land from the infidel oppressor a jirga (8) composed of the elders of one tribe or a loya jirga composed of a number of tribes and sub-tribes may be convened to tender their armed support to the holy warriors. They are promised nanawati or hospitality that cannot be denied even to a criminal or enemy. The tribe is now obligated to honor badal i.e. the right of revenge or vendetta if they are killed by an outsider. The Islamists may marry into the local tribal community and could be offered a permanent home and a plot of land in perpetuity to support the impending jihad. This area becomes the movement's spiritual and worldly fortress from which to wage holy war against the infidel. The process of building social networks begins anew as mullahs begin teaching and proselytizing in the target area. Madrassas draw the youngest for further indoctrination. Once established in the mountains, the Amir and his closest disciples may issue a formal summons calling on all Muslims to join in holy war.

The Islamists exploit traditional methods of tribal governance and commence organizing local shura. Funds continue to flow into the tribal area as the Islamists ability to attract and create patronage relationships begin to bear fruit. District and regional shura may be formed to continue proselytizing new tribes attracted by increased revenues and religious sentiments. In time, a Greater Shura whose members include the Islamists' inner circle, elders and religious leaders from all the provinces and districts may be summoned. The Greater Shura serves to engage and reduce tensions between rival tribes ready to challenge the rising power of the emergent alliance. Rival tribes may form their own shura feeling ignored, threatened or in perpetual blood feud with tribes that are members of the Islamist gathering.

The jirga now calls for all out war against the infidel. Tribal levies or laskhkar are raised for the campaigning season. (9) The small elite group of dedicated, hard-core fighters forms the vanguard of the Salafi ghazi or war party. It fights along side the tribal levies under the Amir's personal command. The ghazis are afforded prestige and special privileges and are the envy of the levied tribal fighters who now strive to be accepted as members of this special band.

The lesser jihad is initiated by attacking the weakest opponent first. Ambassadors are sent calling on the opponent to convert before the ghazi are ordered to attack. If the tribe is too powerful a non-aggression pact may be concluded until strong enough to engage directly. Guarded against engaging the opponent if he is strong, they wait until he is too weak to defend himself and only then conduct raids into neighboring territories that look more like pillaging expeditions than war. They hesitate at the first sign of resistance, flee if pursued and pursue if the opponent withdraws. Surveillance is conducted for days on end until an opportunity to surprise and slaughter an opponent without great danger to themselves presents itself; the tribal art of war instructs that the greatest victory lies in destroying everything without incurring any losses yourself. The opposing tribe relies on a system of arbakai militias, bands of local men who take up arms at times of danger to protect themselves and their territory. It too adheres to the same tribal warfare tenets as its opponent.

In 1827-8 a very different kind of threat appeared along the Frontier. His name was Syed Ahmad. He is credited by British authorities as the founder and first of the Hindustani Fanatics. Syed Ahmad was a disciple and follower of al-Muwahhidun (Unitarians) or Wahhabism. From 1828 onwards Syed Ahmad's message of Islamic reform was heard in Sunni mosques and meeting places across northern India. His "path of Muhammad" network worked in secret, swore oaths of loyalty to their leaders, followed their own code of morality and believed themselves to be God-fearing. The Syed Ahmad's strategy to wage lesser jihad against British authorities applied the tactics, techniques and procedures summarized above eventually culminating in the Sepoy or Indian Mutiny of 1857.

Syed Ahmad's activities spread the message of al-Muwahhidun among the tribes along the present day North-West Frontier. To the British authorities his followers were known as the Hindustani Fanatics. A generation later the message reappeared in Arabia calling itself Al-Ikhwan or the Brotherhood. It later mutated into Salafi ideology or "followers of the forefathers" and in our own time is known as the Taliban or al-Qaeda. (10)

Recent news in the popular press asserts that the Pentagon is "ready, —and able" to send U.S. troops to conduct joint operations with Pakistan's military in the tribal areas. (11) The Los Angeles Times reports that "American officials remain skeptical of the Pakistani army's counterinsurgency abilities and want to find more ways to help the army become more efficient." (12) One can't but help sense an air of arrogance in our skepticism in the Pakistani army's ability to properly execute counterinsurgency (COIN) or irregular warfare operations in a tribal society. The reason for skepticism may be more about value judgments than reality.

Much thought should be given to what we are about to do. Syed Ahmad's approach to irregular war preceded by approximately 180 years Lenin's What is to be done, Mao's treatise on guerilla warfare, Che Guevara's foci theory, Carlos Marighella's Mini-manual of the Urban Guerilla, David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice and the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency. His organizational blueprint and those of present day jihadist operating in the tribal areas are based on much older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior. It is easy to draw analogies between our own revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency experiences but quite another to believe it just as easy to template this experience wholesale upon tribal culture. We have to accept the fact that the use of analogical reasoning can oversimplify inherently complex problems. People tend to use analogies on the basis of surface similarities rather than in-depth examination of the situation at hand. Top down or "theory driven processing" describes the tendency to immediately fit new information into the established analogy and causes decision-makers to dismiss other similarities for more detailed study and comparison. The result is perseverance or the phenomena of persistently believing in the applicability of the analogy even in the face of contradictory information. (13) Perseverance is something that we must guard against, especially when dealing with a culture as challenging as the Pathan living along the North --West Frontier. Much wisdom is passed on through words, phrases and analogies but also much folly that is difficult to correct once it gains momentum.

Operational Planning Considerations

Operational planning should consider the following as we prepare to assist the Pakistani army and execute COIN and irregular warfare operations in a tribal society. First, shame and honor not hearts and minds governs individual and group behavior along the North-West Frontier. We are not going to win hearts nor change minds. Study and gain a detailed appreciation of Pakthunwali, the honor code of the Pathans, in order to effectively communicate intent, whether kinetic or non-kinetic, within the target audience's cultural frame of reference.

Appreciate the tendency of tribes to segment. This organizing principle is expressed in groups allying themselves against an external threat, economic or political necessity even though they may be potentially hostile toward one another or involved in open conflict. The segmentation principle applies to tribes, religious movements, military units, etc. British experience along the frontier provides for numerous example of this principle. Although an area may be divided into numerous tribes and clans that are constantly at each other's throats, the moment an outsider so much threatens to encroach these same tribes and clans put aside their feuds and unite under one banner. The tribes resisted the best efforts of the Great Mughal, British and now the Pakistanis in this manner for ages. (14)

The third consideration is patronage. Patronage is the guarantor of the "social contract." It supports establishing and articulating relationships between individuals and groups that share solidarity and origin. Therefore, it is closely linked to segmentation. Patronage reflects a two-way exchange. In exchange for someone's patronage, the patron is responsible for providing something in return i.e. protection, economic and or political assistance, etc. A patronage relationship is not easily entered into. The decision to do so reflects a strategic decision and a commitment by two parties to maximize a "kindred" strategy or long-term relationship.

The last consideration is territory. Every piece of terrain is considered owned or controlled by some tribe or clan. Territory will be defended by force. The extent of territorial control is determined by the state's ability to project power and influence and challenge ownership. Tribal law is in effect.

Study the tribesman and his culture. In the words of T.E. Lawrence "their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises. There is nothing unreasonable, incomprehensible or inscrutable [about the Pathan]. Experience of them and knowledge of their prejudices will enable you to foresee their attitude and possible course of action in nearly every case." (15)

Be clear as to who and what it is that we are really fighting. Is it the tribe, or the social code of Pakthunwali itself, is it the disciples or followers of al-Muwahhidun (Unitarians) better known as Wahhabism or Hindustani Fanatics, Al-Ikhwan, Salafi ideology, Taliban, al-Qaeda, the global jihad, the entire Islamic world or the Islamic faith? We need to be honest with ourselves and accept the fact that after 9 generations of exposure to Islamic revivalism many tribes in the frontier region embody the ideology of al-Muwahhidun and that no amount of statesmanship, salesmanship or wishful thinking is going to change the situation. Not even the dangling bright-shiny object of representational government or promises of an efficient social services distribution system.

Empowering moderate forces in the tribal areas is not a defense against extremism and terrorism. (16) Neither is extending the government's control over and imposition of good governance upon the inhabitants of the North-West Frontier. The acceptance of western rule of law may very well be achieved in the near-term with the imposition of civil and political authority into the tribal areas but government presence will in time be perceived as occupation no matter the arguments to the contrary. The tribes will inevitably rise in rebellion to challenge perceived tyranny and slip back to fighting as a form of renegotiating the social contract. Western notions of legitimacy and good governance are unlikely to resonate with individual tribesmen since they do not share our cultural heritage and appreciation for the implied wisdom these concepts embody.

Before we embark on pacifying a given tribal area we must have a clear appreciation whether the military campaign is in our vital or national interest or a matter of national prestige. Many a "cool points" have been lost by other great powers of their day tangling with mountain tribesmen. There is no win-win in these situations. If I win a little; you lose a little. Secondly, once we embark on chastising rebellious tribes we must accept that we are in a personal relationship; an ongoing conversation. Treaties of friendship and concessions will be honored until they are broken. Unless we are —to "brother up" we will always be the outsider, foreigner or infidel. If by remote chance we decide to literally marry into the tribe we must understand that we will incur the enmity of all those tribes presently unfavorably disposed to our new relatives and extended family. We must therefore maintain constant situational awareness of tribal politics for tribal relationships will change and adapt as alliances are renegotiated, allowed to lapse or sought with tribes that were until recently considered hostile.

We will leave aside for now a detailed analysis of Pakistan's strategic interests in the region. In its simplest terms, Pakistan lacks strategic depth vis-í -vis its primary competitor India. Pakistan therefore seeks to improve its position by fixing Indian forces in Kashmir. (17) To do so, it must maintain a dynamic balance in the tribal areas and Afghanistan. Pakistan's shaping operations consist of simultaneously supporting Islamic Pashtu proxies inside the tribal areas and Afghanistan i.e. the Taliban while at the same time checking Pashtu ethnic nationalism. (18) It is therefore likely, in order to retain U.S. support, that Pakistan will be —to sacrifice AQ in the tribal areas so as to continue to exploit the potential of the Afghan Taliban and Kashmiri groups against India in the future. Suffice it to say, Pakistan is the fulcrum that seeks to manage and shape the orbit of tribal competition to achieve its own vital interests.

All effects desired in tribal irregular warfare are short-term. There is no military campaign to end all military campaigns nor will the imposition of good governance withstand the vagaries of time. Before our skepticism in the Pakistani army's ability to properly execute counterinsurgency (COIN) gets the better of us we may wish to study the Pakistani army's operational design in dealing with martial tribes instead of basing our opinion strictly on tactical failures in execution. There is no doubt that we will win every tactical engagement against tribal fighters but still lose the military campaign.

Military campaigns in tribal areas may be better served if seizing, holding and clearing terrain is not the envisioned end-state. A more appropriate mission design may be to divide and isolate the tribe from its existing social network in order to destroy the elite group of dedicated, hard-core fighters that form the vanguard of the embedded Islamist movement or war party. The hard-center will be protected by a concentric ring of tribal levies or laskhkar that should not be the primary target. Aside from the vendetta obligation that this would incur on the part of the tribe, the same tribe is a future potential ally when campaigning against one of its rivals.

A given tribe is perceived by others by virtue of its social network, alliances, patronage relationships and martial prowess. The "force" that balances the objective, methods and available resources of the tribe is an example of a Center of Gravity (COG) and reflects Classic Chinese military thinking to first "attack the strategy, then the alliance, and lastly the soldiers themselves". In tribal terms, methods and available resources are a reflection of the tribal leader's ability to attract (segmentation), maintain (patronage) and defend (territory) allies. Each method and the available resources to implement a given strategy signifies an attractor or force that potentially serves as a balancing mechanism between the objective, methods and available resource and therefore represents a potential decisive point for targeting.

Tribal power is dependent upon their connections and influence. If a tribe's power is diminished few will want to ally themselves. Tribes that feel isolated may overreact in desperation--which isolates them even further. Tribal diplomats will attempt to create the impression that an opponent is losing his connections. This will be done indirectly for if done directly the attacker may become entangled in an open fight. Attempts to divide the opponent from his power base (connection and prestige) are intended to make him appear to be weak.

No tribal leader will declare his ambitions until certain of success because of the risk of exposure, antagonism and mobilization of more powerful opponents against his tribe. Instead he intrigues, he influences as best as he may, he conspires. If he is to win he has to enlist or neutralize challengers.

Within any tribe people naturally form smaller factions based on mutual self-interest. The primary desire is to find strength in numbers. These sub-groups form power-bases and if left unchallenged will threaten the status-quo of the tribe, alliance or confederation as a whole. The formation of factions within the tribe is a leader's greatest threat for eventually these factions will work to secure their own interests before those of the tribe, alliance or confederation. Before launching an overt attack attempts will be made to first weaken the opponent by creating as much division in his ranks as possible. An example may be targeting an opponents leadership structures outside the tribal area and crediting success to assistance received from select members of the same movement. The desired shaping strategy is therefore to divide and isolate before initiating any military action.

When the decision is made for military action it must be short and decisive. The unit must not linger in tribal territory longer than necessary. Cultural messaging requires that other tribes clearly understand that the cost of challenging the status quo is not worth the consequences. Successful combat action must be followed up immediately with negotiation/mediation to establish the parameters for peaceful coexistence until the next dust up. It is during this phase that "hearts and minds" projects may be negotiated. All projects must be negotiated on a quid pro quo basis and never out of compassion or sympathy. Pakthunwali will not condone condescension.

Conclusion

Military operations along the North-West Frontier are far more intellectual than a bayonet charge. The sociopolitical environment in tribal areas differs greatly from our experience. Legitimacy is based on the social contract with fighting as a form of negotiation. The social code is the basis for negotiating the social contract and hence "legitimacy" upon which the existing political formula is based.

Perspectives as to implementation of strategy differ. Western designs are rational and mechanistic. Tribal designs are dynamic, intuitive, flexible, competitive and adaptive in nature. Although easy to draw analogies between our own revolutionary warfare and counterinsurgency experiences words, phrases and analogies mean different things to different people and cultures.

The social code of "Pakthunwali" governs individual and group behavior in the tribal areas. The cultural operating codes that provide the framework for causal processes are shame and honor, segmentation principle, patronage and territory.

Military campaigns in tribal areas differ from our own doctrinal insurgency and counterinsurgency templates. Political and military planners must therefore take into account that the overall tribal sociopolitical blueprint and those in use by present day jihadist operating in the tribal areas are based on much older concepts of community and traditional codes of behavior.

William S. McCallister is a retired military officer. He has served extensively in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. Mr. McCallister is currently employed in Iraq as the senior analyst for Applied Knowledge International (AKI), a consulting company specializing in human factors and cultural terrain modeling in support of II MEF operations in Anbar province.

Endnotes

1. "Ungoverned Areas and Threats from Safe Havens", Final Report of the Ungoverned Areas Project, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, January 2008.

2. Pakthunwali" also the "the honor code of the Pathans" is based on melmastia (hospitality), nanawati (hospitality cannot be denied even to a criminal or enemy), and badal (the right of revenge or vendetta). The greatest tests of honor involve zar (gold), zun (women) and zamin (land). Punishments and settlements are derived from narkh (tribal precedent); the jirga can impose strong sanctions and punishments, including punishment of a noncompliant person or clan, confiscation or girvi (mortgage) of property, fines and formation of a laskhkar (tribal militia) to punish the accused party. The social code governs behavior between individuals and groups in the tribal areas of the North-West frontier.

3. The Islamic law of nations (siyar) defines a "nation" as a group of related individuals.

4. "The tribes are at their best when in splendid equilibrium". Attributed to Gertrud Bell while describing the Arab tribal system in early 20th-century Iraq.

5. JP I-02, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5.

6. The Afghan jirga or "council of elders" serves a similar function as a shura and is generally defined as a decision-making council. The main difference between the Jirga and a shura is that whereas a leader can reject the recommendations of a shura; the Jirga has decision making authority. Shura are a traditional method of community governance in tribal and Islamic cultures. It provides a mechanism to reach consensus among the disparate factions represented in the larger community. Shura are consultative in nature; they do not decide issues but provide leaders a means of receiving input from the population. Specialty shura are formed to address diplomatic, economic or martial issues. The leadership is not bound by the recommendations of the shura but may authorize or delegate decision-making powers to the body if desired. Shura are formed and disbanded as required.

7. IW JOC version 1.0 Jan 07

8. Loya Jirga is an inter-tribal assembly.

9. "Laskhkar" are Afghan tribal militia. The Laskhkar system is a social institution and should not be considered a functioning military organization from a professional military perspective.

10. Charles Allen, God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad", Little, Brown, 2006, pages 14, 20, 30, 37, 41, 50.

11. Ann Scott Tyson, "U.S Troops 'Ready' to Aid Pakistan, Washington Post, January 25, 2008.

12. Julian E. Barnes, "Gates Offers Troops for Joint Efforts with Pakistan", January 25, 2008.

13. P.J. Ridderhof, LtCol, USMC, "Reasoning by Analogy", 23 Dec 2003, WAR ROOM REPORT 2-04, dated 9 January 2004.

14. Charles Allen, God's Terrorists: The Wahhabi Cult and the Hidden Roots of Modern Jihad", Little, Brown, 2006, page 8.

15. T.E. Lawrence, "27 Articles", The Arab Bulletin, 20 August 1917.

16. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants", Crisis Group, Asia Report Number 125 -- 11 December 2006, page 27.

17. Mark J. Roberts, "Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence Directorate: A State within a State?", JFQ, Issue 48, 1st Quarter 2008, page 107.

18. "Pakistan's Tribal Areas: Appeasing the Militants", Crisis Group, Asia Report Number 125 -- 11 December 2006, page 2.

19. Courtesy of T.E. Lawrence: "Irregular Warfare is far more intellectual than a bayonet charge."

-----

SWJ Editors Links

Operating in Pakistan's Tribal Regions - Abu Muqawama

How To: Wage a Tribal War in Pakistan - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

Discuss at Small Wars Council

... The question is whether this Iraqi renaissance can continue as the United States reduces its surge of combat troops. The Iraqi military is still far from ready to take over the country's security. The military's transport systems won't be finished until the summer of 2009, and it could be two years before Iraq's military can operate fully independent of U.S. forces.

Gen. David Petraeus and other top military officials have begun debating what the post-surge level of U.S. troops should be. The commanders want a pause for assessment after July, when the last of the five additional combat brigades that made up the surge is withdrawn and the U.S. troop presence returns to its prior level of 15 brigades, or about 130,000 soldiers.

The debate centers on how long this pause should last and whether it should be followed by more troop cuts. Petraeus, who as field commander doesn't want to risk losing his hard-won gains, is said to favor an assessment period of more than three months, and perhaps leaving the full 15 brigades in place through the end of 2008. President Bush, who would like to leave office next January with Iraq as secure as possible, may also oppose further troop reductions after July...

By Bing West and Max Boot, Los Angeles Times

... A staggered Al Qaeda is steadily losing one redoubt after another because, in the most important shift in the war, the Sunni people turned against the terrorists and aligned with the American soldiers. Over 80,000 men (mainly Sunnis) have joined neighborhood watch groups that the U.S. calls Concerned Local Citizens. Essential in last year's battles to drive Al Qaeda out of Baghdad, the CLCs also provide Sunnis with a defense against Shiite militias.

Now, victory is within our grasp -- if only the Iraqi government could effectively reach out to Sunnis and Shiites alike who are fed up with violence and sectarian divisions.

Yet the perverse political system stymies such an outcome. In 2004, U.S. and U.N. officials pushed through an electoral process that resulted in votes for parties rather than individual candidates. This left party bosses in Baghdad free to appoint hacks who do not answer to any local constituency and face no penalty for failing to provide essential services. Water, electricity, garbage collection and job creation are in terrible shape, especially in Sunni areas, because the government is run by Shiites.

American battalion commanders have stepped in. Officers trained to attack cities, not run them, have temporarily assumed the duties of city managers, cadging resources and hounding Iraqi officials to disburse hoarded funds.

This situation cannot last indefinitely. American officers cannot take the place of the missing government of Iraq. The CLCs must be incorporated into the police. But the government headed by Nouri Maliki is moving with agonizing slowness, running the risk that civil war may be reignited...

More at the LAT

... U.S. military leaders, including Rumsfeld's successor, Robert M. Gates, now recognize that the nature of warfare itself is changing, from conventional conflicts between nations to "small wars" — counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, religious and ethnic strife — and that the Army must change with it.

The new doctrine, spelled out in publications such as the newest Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in late 2006, is that the Army must be prepared to wage all types of warfare but focus much more of its attention on irregular, guerrilla conflicts like that in Iraq.

This is a fundamental change that will drive most other decisions within the Army — from recruitment to equipment — and will permeate every defense debate for the foreseeable future.

In fact, it already has. Military journals are full of articles and commentary on counterinsurgency. Last summer, eight months after the Army field manual appeared, the Air Force rushed out its own doctrine on the subject.

For the Army, the new doctrine means a seismic culture shift. It will still have guns and tanks, but it will also need more people skilled in languages, public affairs, economic development, even anthropology. Instead of grudgingly accepting the task of nation building, as it did in the Balkans and in Iraq at first, the new Army for the most part will have to embrace the role. In this way, the high-technology, smart-weapons "revolution in military affairs" that has captivated Pentagon strategists for decades is becoming a revolution beyond military affairs.

Though it is too early to tell precisely what the ramifications might be in general defense policy and the budget, most experts think the Army will not get a big budget increase, but will have to reorder its priorities, shifting money from, say, high-tech hardware to personnel...

Much more at CQ...

More here too, at Abu Muqawama

Reprinted with permission of the Marine Corps Gazette.

Speaking at the International Seapower Symposium on 17 October 2007, General Conway discussed the Marine Corps' role in the new maritime strategy. Looking from the present to the years 2020-2025, the Commandant echoed oft repeated trends: that the average age in developed nations will continue to grow older while underdeveloped nations will grow younger, creating a population of military age males for whom employment opportunities will be scarce; that 75-80% of the world's population will move towards an "urban sprawl" adjacent to a sea coast; and that state conflicts will continue to grow more rare as transnational and regional conflicts increase in scope and frequency. Largely due to these trends, the Commandant also spoke about the continuing likelihood of Marines being involved in complex irregular wars or what multiple experts have begun calling "hybrid" wars. (1)

As we enter the seventh year of "The Long War" the implications of these trends seem particularly significant, especially when, as the Commandant stated, one appreciates that a lot of "blue" exists on the map around the "Arc of Instability." It may be that the fight ahead will include many "Small Wars," fought amidst the remains of the old Islamic Caliphate. In the face of such a potential challenge, there has never been a more acute need for a "hybrid warrior," possessing a mind capable of operating in timeless environments, conventional and irregular.

Since the start of Operations' Enduring and Iraqi Freedom, the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) has continually sought to train officers capable of leading Marines in the complex combat environments that they've found themselves in only months after graduation. Students now execute PALMFEX, a fifteen-day field exercise in the Mojave Desert, which is the culminating event in the IOC Program of Instruction (POI). There, students train in dismounted and mechanized day and night live-fire attacks, utilizing fire support assets organic to the infantry battalion as well as the integration of armor, artillery and air. Block III blank and live fire urban training is conducted utilizing the excellent urban facilities available only at Marine Corps Base (MCB) Twenty-Nine Palms. Additionally, students have executed a Small Wars Package designed to teach specific Small Wars tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP), many of them lessons learned in the hard school of combat. By the flight home, students have been instructed and evaluated in the capabilities needed to lead Marines across all spectrums of conflict.

A Learning Organization and IOC's Small Wars Package

No successful organization ever rests on its laurels. Catalyzed by feedback from the Operating Forces and Marines' performance in combat, the IOC Staff's continuous review of the POI recognized that a gap still existed in the Small Wars Package. Preparation to fight and win a Small War required more than a "kit bag" of TTP but also the development of a mind able to think counter-intuitively, bridging the gap between conventional and irregular conflicts. As a result, a guided discussion was added to the POI for David Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. An additional Decision-Making class, tied to the "Combat Hunter" initiative and focused on the "orient" phase of the Observe-Orient-Decide-Act loop was included in the POI, along with a Counterinsurgency / Irregular Warfare professional military education session from Lieutenant Colonel Julian D. Alford, USMC. For all these adaptations, it became increasingly apparent that the only way to educate students how to think through the complex problems routinely encountered in Small Wars was through the creation of a realistic "timeless" Small Wars environment.

Observation of exercise MOJAVE VIPER in June 2007 led instructors to realize that there was no need to completely "reinvent the wheel" to achieve their goal. Rather most of the elements required were already present in the exercise. Most prominent in the minds of the IOC Staff were two showpieces of MOJAVE VIPER: the integration of contracted role players and the battlefield effects simulations (BES). Contracted role players provide the cultural and language barriers of an indigenous population. BES give a force and reality to the training, punctuating the human factors aspects of Small Wars. Ranges 200 and 215 at MCB Twenty-Nine Palms, where MOJAVE VIPER is executed, are unmatched in their size and realism. All the pieces needed to create the Small Wars environment were already there, it was simply a matter of putting them together.

Following discussion of role player and BES integration by the IOC Staff, the decision was made to conduct a proof of concept Small Wars training exercise at Range 200 from 2-6 September. The lane training structure of the pre-existing Small Wars training exercise was maintained. (2) Contracted role players from TATITLEK would be employed and BES would come from STRATEGIC OPERATIONS. Predominant in the minds of the IOC Staff was whether the addition of these assets would significantly enhance the Small Wars Package.

Preparation

Preparation began with coordination between IOC / The Basic School (TBS) and the Center for Advanced Operational Culture Learning, Training and Education Command, Program Manager for Training Systems at Marine Corps Systems Command, and multiple personnel aboard MCB Twenty-Nine Palms. Interaction with TATITLEK management was straightforward and it became quickly apparent that TATITLEK's employees, mostly retired and former Marines, were dedicated to providing the best and most realistic training for Marines soon to deploy to combat. Role players were divided into two tribes, identifying tribal leaders, school teachers, a doctor and an imam. Fourteen Marines from Instructor Battalion, TBS, were to augment the contracted role players as a dedicated opposition force. Tactical control measures and a demographic geography were applied to Range 200.

Student preparation for the revised package included reading chapters on combat mindset, urban patrolling, and cordon and search operations from the Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Counterinsurgency and the Tentative Small-Unit Leader's Guide to Urban Operations. Additionally, David Kilcullen's "Twenty-Eight Articles" was read and discussed. The students then received three classes, "Satellite" Patrolling, Cordon and Search Operations, and a class taught on best practices for site exploitation in combat. These readings and classes were designed to serve as the foundation of the Small Wars mindset. Practical application in a realistic environment would fill in the rest.

Conduct

Every training scenario conducted during the Small Wars Package was based on the focus points identified in Figure 1. All IOC instructors were briefed on the focus points and had detailed guidance on how the lane scenarios intended to bring them out. Stating how important the 57 contracted role players were in bringing out the focus points—and ultimately the student learning points—cannot be overemphasized.

Day 1

Training began with a Small Wars transition brief, designed to reorient the students to the other two blocks of the three block war following three days of high kinetic urban training. Following the brief, students rotated through a series of lanes: shoot/no shoot scenarios, a combat operations center and urban navigation class; a squad-sized "satellite" contact patrol lane without role player involvement; and a vehicle checkpoint class. Key learning points for the first day included the "Strategic Corporal" and small unit leader decision-making, "Every Marine a Collector," the creation and use of a common operating graphic for navigation and the use of contact points in satellite patrolling. At the conclusion of the lanes, students received a company operations order that served as the base order for training scenarios executed during the next three days.

Day 2

The training for this day was built around progressive lane scenarios, involving "satellite" contact patrols and urban ambushes. Patrols were tasked with collecting information from a worried and reticent populace such as names and addresses of authority figures, infrastructure and past enemy activity. This was most students' first experience in a realistic third-world urban operating environment—and it showed. (3) Figure 2 shows a picture of one squad during its initial patrol being overwhelmed by civilians on the battlefield. Ambush lanes were conducted at night near historical improvised explosive device (IED) sites and were designed to ensure students understood the importance of maintaining a hunting mindset. Students were also introduced to the challenges involved in conducting an ambush when the only good option for an ambush position is someone's home. (4) As Figure 3 demonstrates the ambush lane also allowed the students to practically apply what they learned in their site exploitation class.

Day 3

Students graduated to platoon level operations on this day. Platoon-sized "satellite" contact patrols were tasked to continue building relationships with the people specifically through information operations (IO) messages. Machine-gun vehicles were attached and a quick reaction force was on standby during each mission to increase the command and control challenge on patrol leaders. Enemy contact increased as well, with fire-team reinforced ambushes including IEDs and rocket propelled grenades. This was the first time the students experienced BES. The difference in intensity of the students' reactions due to the BES, in both trying to hunt down and kill or capture the enemy, as well as in taking care of their wounded Marines was profound. The realism offered by the BES brought the training intensity much closer to that which the students will feel in combat.

Day 4

This day focused on cordon and search operations. The specifics of each cordon and search were dictated by the platoons' successes and failures in previous lanes. Initial operations were intentionally simple. Students were often required to conduct reconnaissance patrols to verify intelligence prior to execution. The role player population continually tested the Marines' security. Follow-on cordon and searches tested students' "dry hole" drill procedures and introduced potential enemy most dangerous courses of action. Enemy attacks included Suicide Vehicle Borne and Human Suicide IEDs. The pyrotechnics and moulage kits from the BES and the superbly orchestrated reaction of the role players created a chaotic environment in which students' decision-making and ability to cope with human factors were pushed to the limit. Additionally, insurgents with access to cameras and computers took pictures of the operations and developed IO products that forced students to evaluate the total effect of their actions. Figure 4 demonstrates an enemy IO product that significantly frustrated the students. The scenario involved a human suicide IED detonating and wounding multiple Marines, along with a civilian. Cut from the picture in the enemy IO product is the corpsman treating the civilian. This scenario left the students with a thorough appreciation for the 21st Century reality that sometimes what matters most is not what you actually did, but what people perceive you did. (5) At the conclusion of the day lanes multiple students were visibly and mentally shaken as a result of the intensity and realism of the BES. One lieutenant even admitted as much in writing when stating, "upon contact with the amputee victim, a state of shock came upon me. I had to reconfirm out of fear that it was not real." (6)

The final lane involved a night cordon and "knock" operation on a meeting of key tribal, civil, and former police and army leaders. As both platoons left friendly lines it was obvious that most students expected—and wanted—enemy contact so that they could take out their aggression built up from their previous patrol. The lane was intentionally built to not allow this to happen. For this reason, when the students knocked on the tribal leader's door, they were invited inside to meet the current and former power brokers and also asked to join in their feast. Given the intensity of enemy and civilian contact in the previous lane, the main focus of this lane was to challenge the students to develop a mindset that could employ a diplomatic approach yet be ready to execute Block III TTP in an instant.

Day 5

The final day involved a guided de-brief with students, instructors and role players. Two role players who had served as tribal sheiks answered student questions. Both gentlemen lived in Iraq for at least thirty years and provided invaluable perspective on interaction with an indigenous population.

Exploitation

Immediately following the de-brief, 77 IOC students (76 lieutenants and 1 staff sergeant) spent thirty minutes filling out a thirteen-question post-training after action report (AAR). 1 Infantry Officer and 13 of the Enlisted Marines who augmented TATITLEK's role players also responded to a similar survey. The student and instructor responses were invaluable for three reasons.

First, the responses validated that the exercise did achieve thorough student learning, specifically in those focus points that were extremely difficult, if not impossible to replicate previously without contracted role player support. Second, they identified the immense value students and instructors placed on this type of training, particularly in light of current real world operations. Third, in concert with the theme of IOC operating as a learning organization committed to meeting the needs of the Operating Forces, numerous recommendations were included to take future Small Wars training to the next level.

Student responses were uniformly detailed and eye-opening in many respects. When asked about their estimate of the value of the training, the following three quotes summarize the students' answers:

- "This was the best training I've received to date. It was the most applicable,

the most realistic, and had the most decision points on all levels of any training to date."

- "Overall this was the best, most realistic training to date, with casualty

play, effects and civilians... just having people there create a distraction at the very least for simple security and then learning to talk simple (Arabic) phrases... this led me to have a much more serious hunger for knowledge about the culture and language and provided me a real good wake-up call as to how little I know."

- "The phrase 'situationally dependent' became real for once instead of just a phrase. Decisions were made on the fly in a real environment. Training became reality NOT JUST training. It was like football practice and instead of having dummy bags that didn't move we had a scout team so we were forced to make the same decisions we will have to make on Saturday—during game time. So absolutely affected my decision-making cycle."

Perhaps the strongest evidence of student appreciation for the training came when asked to rate the importance of including role players in future IOC Small Wars training. On a scale of 1-5, 70 students responded by circling 5; 2 students responded 4; and 5 students created their own scale, 2 circling a 6 and 3 circling a 10. Many students also added remarks next to the question to further reinforce their thoughts. Here are a few examples of the remarks:

- "Absolutely necessary"

- "Critical. They (future lieutenants) need this."

- "Need more role players."

- "Never thought about the civilian casualty aspect until this package (10 ½ months into the officer training pipeline)

- "This is a must... actors made the training."

- From a former infantry fire team leader in Iraq, ".... more eventful and thought-provoking than my actual deployment."

An unintentional training windfall came by virtue of the 14 Marine instructors who augmented the role players. All but one of these Marines has served two or more combat tours in Iraq or Afghanistan with varying levels of pre-deployment training in Small Wars. Throughout the exercise TATITLEK provided these Marines with language and culture classes and coached their reactions in each scenario. Their responses to a similar survey were equally eye-opening:

- "Outstanding training! I can only hope that you (IOC) will continue to allow weapons platoon Marines to participate; we learned an incredible amount."

- From a Sergeant just back from his third Iraq deployment, "this is the best training that I have ever seen or done."

- From another Sergeant with two combat tours, "BEST training I have experienced."

- From a soon-to-be Staff Sergeant, "this was a great experience for not only the students but for myself. I am thankful to have experienced this."

While most every AAR comment was positive, suggestions were offered to improve the training. First, many students and even a few of the instructors asked for more training time for Small Wars. Second, most AARs asked for more role players. Third, almost all AARs identified a need for a range the size of Range 200 if not larger. The general trends in the student and instructor responses were summed up well by one lieutenant when he wrote, "It would be a great detriment to future classes if any of this were removed, if anything I believe it should be expanded upon with more role players and utilize Range 215 (this range is approximately four times the size of Range 200)."

To ensure that the inexperience of many IOC students in real world Small Wars operations did not skew the results of the AAR, a copy of the training plan was sent as a litmus test to a rifle platoon commander weeks removed from Iraq. His response is perhaps the greatest testament to the necessity of the training:

"The Small Wars POI looks awesome- first because I have never seen anything like it- nor an attempt at an organized thought process to COIN training- this will be an awesome template to use next year. Second- I think you hit all the things to get the THOUGHT process going- Looking back- I wish I had this opportunity before going to Iraq- additionally this kind of exercise gets us out there in the kind of situations that really happen...." (8)

Conclusion

When discussing the training required to prepare military forces for war in the 21st Century in The Sling and the Stone, Col T.X. Hammes, USMC (Ret.) wrote,

In addition to [these] known training methods, we must examine innovative approaches. One such approach is a platoon-level exercise conducted for the lieutenants at the Marine Corps' Basic School. In this exercise, the lieutenants move into a real town to assist the "local authorities" with security against an insurgent group. The town is the exercise site, and the townspeople are part of the play. Needless to say, the exercise is free play and presents lots of surprises to all involved. (8)

Three years after this book was published, IOC's proof of concept Small Wars exercise brought precisely this type of training to the Corps' next generation of infantry officers.

IOC wants to continue this training and also wants to make it better. Critical needs to make this happen are at least another 50 role players, more BES and a readily available urban facility comparable to Range 215. Another critical element in this process is to have an organization such as TATITLEK remain available and responsible for providing role players. TATITLEK's on-site supervisors understood IOC's intent for training, adjusted scenarios when necessary to meet this intent, and exceeded expectations to ensure that the students received the best training possible.

The question now is where do we go from here? Will funding continue for contracted role players and BES for the months and years to come? Will realistic urban training facilities be available for IOC—and the rest of the Corps— to use in properly training today and tomorrow's "strategic lieutenants"?

While many of these answers are still to be determined, what must weigh heavily into the decision-making process as the Marine Corps goes forward in preparing for 21st Century conflict are comments made by her most talented warriors. One such Marine, a superb staff sergeant that participated in the proof of concept exercise and also proved his mettle while serving with a rifle company in Ramadi in 2004-2005, commented in his AAR, "[the Small Wars package was] great training with fantastic support from role players.... made me want to go back to Iraq and win this WAR." This same Marine also commented that when he returns to being an instructor at Infantry Unit Leader Course after graduation from IOC among his top priorities is to figure how to incorporate a similar exercise for the Corps' "strategic staff sergeants".

The Marine Corps is an organization that preaches the importance of "training as you fight." The proof of concept exercise definitely met this intent. Although this training is expensive due to transportation, contracted role players, Hollywood effects, etc., not having it would prove—and has proven—significantly more expensive in the price of mission accomplishment and the lives of Marines. One lieutenant made precisely this point in his AAR:

If the first time that I had interaction with these (Iraqi) role players was MOJAVE VIPER I would not have enough time to train myself first to learn their culture/language customs. And, I would have no time to then turn around and train my Marines. This experience over the last 3 days will save lives of my Marines because I and my Marines will be better prepared.

We must find a way to give this vital training a permanent home at IOC.

Captains Cuomo and Donlon are instructors at the Marine Corps' Infantry Officers Course at Quantico, Virginia.

Endnotes:

1. For more on "hybrid" wars, see Lieutenant General James N. Mattis, U.S. Marine Corps and Lieutenant Colonel Frank G. Hoffman U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Retired), "Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars," Proceedings, November 2005, pp. 18-19.

2. While contracted role players and BES were the most significant changes to the exercise, there were also changes made to the baseline order and scenario construct, which included linking all scenarios so that the exercise gave the students a continuous field exercise "feel" despite the exercise being built around nine different lanes.

3. While at the Basic Officer Course (BOC), lieutenants do execute two very limited field exercises that include Small Wars-type scenarios. The initial scenario is a two-hour vehicle patrol that turns into a cordon and search in a small combat village; the second scenario is an hour-long dismounted urban patrol. Historically, both scenarios have incorporated enlisted Marine role-players and were very limited in nature. In the immediate future, both exercises are scheduled to have contracted role player support. To a limited degree, IOC's POI does build off the basic skills taught in both of these scenarios.

4. For an example of a scenario similar to that created for this lane view a Marine rifle squad conducting ambush operations North of Fallujah located at: http://www.nytimes.com/packages/html/world/20061102_MEDIC_FEATURE/blocker.html (click on icon "Politics").

5. The idea for this IO product was generated from enemy actions taken against the 2nd Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in Baghdad, Iraq, as described in Col Ralph O. Baker, "The Decisive Weapon: A Brigade Commander's Perspective on Information Operations," Military Review, May-June 2006. For more information on how our enemy is using tactical military engagements for strategic IO purposes, see Michael Moss and Souad Mekhennet, "An Internet Jihad Aims at U.S. Viewers, New York Times, 15 October 2007; located at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/15/us/15net.html and accessed 31 October 2007. For videos that demonstrate the enemy's IO capabilities in greater detail, including the use of an American citizen in North Carolina to create and disseminate such products, view the "The Internet Jihadi" and "The Jihadi Trainer" at the same World Wide Web link.

6. Multiple student and instructor after action report (AAR) comments will be cited in this article. Please contact IOC for further details on any information in the AARs or about the Small Wars Package in general.

7. Quote taken from an e-mail discussion between authors and 2ndLt Phil Peacock on 25 September 2007, less than two weeks after he departed Anbar Province. Lt Peacock served as a rifle platoon commander in Eastern Anbar Province with Battalion Landing Team 3d Battalion, 1st Marines.

8. Hammes, T.X. The Sling and The Stone, Zenith Press, Saint Paul, MN, 2004, p. 240-241.

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Links

Big Changes for Big Army - Abu Muqawama

Here, the Air Force uses the jargon of modern warfare to discuss its competition with the Army and Navy. Usually, it is China that U.S. officers describe as a "peer competitor" -- that is, a real or potential adversary. But in these briefing slides, it is the other services that the Air Force is targeting...

More:

The U.S. Air Force Declares War! - Abu Muqawama

U.S. Army Colonel Edward J. Kornish on Afghan Police Force training. The Regional Police Advisory Command-South is making steady progress building a professional Afghan police force in Afghanistan's austere South region.

U.S. Army Colonel Wayne W. Grigsby, Jr. on combating extremism south and east of Baghdad. The Army 3rd Infantry Division's 3rd Heavy Brigade Combat Team, deployed since February 2007, is fighting extremism in areas south and east of Baghdad, Iraq.

U.S. Army Brigadier General Edward Cardon on local security gains influence national action in Iraq. As Iraqis continue to organize at the local level to help with security, they are creating pressure on Iraq's national leaders to build on momentum.

U.S. Navy Rear Admiral Gregory J. Smith on Iraq still in Al Qaeda's grip. The coalition's success securing Baghdad and Iraq's Anbar province from al Qaeda will need to be repeated in other parts of Iraq.

U.S. Marine Corps Lieutenant Colonel David L. Coggins on Iraqi Navy progress. Over the past year, NATO members have been working to train the Iraqi navy and its petty officers.

U.S. Army Major General Rick Lynch on Iraqis continuing to move forward. More than 31,000 citizens are now providing security assistance to coalition forces south of Baghdad and southern provinces.

U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Cy Bartlett on Iraqi Air Force 'coming on strong.' Iraq's new air force passed its infancy in 2007 and will continue to grow over the next few years.

U.S. Army Colonel John S. RisCassi on U.S. forces eliminate al Qaeda sanctuary in Baghdad. A Baghdad neighborhood formerly overrun by al Qaeda has been cleared of the enemy and is starting to thrive again.

Mr. Louis P. Lantner, Provincial Reconstruction Team Leader, on micro-grants helping to rebuild Iraq's economy. Small grants to help Iraqi businesses rebound are paying dividends, as improved security has benefited economic recovery.

More: Audio, biographies and related DoD news articles.

Corps Creates Intel Cells at Rifle-company Level -- Kimberly Johnson, Marine Corps Times

A need for more intelligence analysts in the Corps is forcing infantry operations to get a whole lot smarter, under a new initiative that is for the first time pushing battalion-level intelligence know-how down to the rifle-company level.

The Corps is creating company-level intelligence cells — called C-LICs — in an attempt to plug the hole and curb the loss of valuable intelligence that often goes missing when units pass the baton on the battlefield, Marine officials said...

The C-LIC initiative, launched under the direction of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in Quantico, Va., will soon be battle-tested by California-based 3rd Battalion, 4th Marines, on its next Iraq deployment, slated for early 2008.

Today's irregular warfare, with its lack of a uniformed enemy, makes intelligence gathering vital for enemy identification. To adapt to the emerging threat, infantry companies often create their own versions of ad hoc intelligence cells, said Vince Goulding, director of experimentation plans at the Warfighting Laboratory. But those individual efforts have been piecemeal, because the Corps had no standard training or equipment available, he said.

The new initiative for pushing intelligence analysis know-how down to the lower echelons, however, is about to change all that. Rifle companies will now be able to assess, analyze and disseminate information that they typically had relied on battalion or regimental command to produce...

Preparation for how units approach intelligence collection on the distributed battlefield has been as varied as the units themselves, said Capt. Gabe Diana, project officer for C-LIC at the Warfighting Laboratory.

"Databases were normally made by somebody in the companies, so what you'd see is five different databases within a battalion. Then come [relief in place] time, five more databases and there's just loads of information that's just lost," Diana said.

Rifle companies use the databases for vital intelligence procured from the local area, which can help avoid much of the time lost sending intelligence requests to the battalion or regimental level, Dickey said.

"If we can train ourselves at this level, we can produce the intelligence we're asking for," which could save days of waiting for responses over the duration of a unit's deployment, he said.