I spend a lot of time trying to convince my colleagues in the Army and the Marines that the media are not the problem. I cite chapter and verse of the history of our relationship -- the dysfunctional periods, propaganda phases, the development of the ethics of good responsible American journalism -- and I'm usually able to demonstrate that while what passed for mid-19th century journalism truly was enough to drive one to distraction, in the 20th and thus far in the 21st, journalists really have been at least as professional as we, and quite often more so.

This self-appointed task, unfortunately, often remains an uphill battle, as many soldiers, Marines and their officers are convinced a media bias exists against the military in general and the ground forces in particular.

I wage my little internal struggle because I think it is right, and that my peers are often blowing small things out of proportion and seeing a bogeyman where there is none. I try to show them how this is part of a narrative that periodically recurs in military circles (the German army after WWI, the American army after Vietnam). I also try to demonstrate to them how they have been conditioned to accept the narrative as true without being critical of the assertions.

In short, I argue for journalists and journalism all of the time, and passionately.

And then the editors of the New York Times dig themselves a nice deep pit, fill it with slime and muck, and dive in headfirst.

Two weekends ago, the Times fronted a lengthy article that generally portrayed returning veterans from Iraq and Afghanistan as Post Traumatic Stress Disorder-ridden killers. The story's central theme was based on research by the newspaper that uncovered 121 cases of returning veterans who had killed (murder, manslaughter and in some cases DUI). '

The article's authors noted that these 121 cases might not be all such examples and that collectively, they drew an unfortunate picture. "Individually, these are stories of local crimes, gut-wrenching postscripts to the war for the military men, their victims and their communities. Taken together, they paint the patchwork picture of a quiet phenomenon, tracing a cross-country trail of death and heartbreak."

I must say, the article stunned me -- not because people in the 18- to 34-year-old demographic, some of whom are service members, commit murder. That is not really news, is it? What threw me was fact that the NYT referred to this as a "quiet phenomenon," which is -- what -- two steps down from "subtle epidemic?" Yet it did so without noting that the 121 killings came from a population (of veterans of Iraq/Afghanistan) of about 700,000.

Even that number is probably a low estimate of the total who have served in Iraq or Afghanistan. For the record, the Department of Defense says 1.7 million individuals have been through the Central Command area (which includes the surrounding countries and lovely spots such as the Horn of Africa). Unfortunately, though, nobody seems to have exact numbers for Iraq/Afghanistan alone.

It isn't tough to extrapolate a decent number: Since we have had more than 115,000 in Iraq alone (and sometimes as many as 160,000) for almost five years, these numbers are extremely reasonable even counting multiple deployments into the mix. (A single Air Force "tour" in combat is four months long, the Navy now sends people for six months, while Marines stay for seven. The Army, as of one year ago, switched to 15-month combat tours from their previous norm of 12 months.)

So, using the lowest of the lowball numbers -- 121 acts of mayhem out of 700,000 veterans spread over six years -- yields a rate of 17.28/100,000 veterans overall. Spread over six years (I am a historian, but even I can do that math.) that is 17.28/6 = 2.88 per 100,000 per year. Mind you, that is if you stick with the probably low 700,000 number of total Iraq/Afghanistan vets.

Now, go to the Department of Justice and get the stats. I used 1999 as a good pre-war year. For 18- to 34-year-olds, I totaled up the averages of homicide offenders (which do not include all the categories, such as a DUI that resulted in a death or suicide, i.e., that the NYT used) per 100,000 members of the public. Then I divided the sum by the number of age groups I considered: The result was an average of 19.4 homicide offenders in the 18- to 34-year-old age groups per 100,000 civilians in the general U.S. population -- more than six times as high as the combat veteran average, even when you include all possible acts of violence that result in death.

But the NYT didn't mention anything like this. It did not mention how many people had been to war and therefore how astonishingly small these numbers really are when placed in that context. They did not mention what the civilian average rate of murders in the 18-34 year old age range might be.

Think about that. Even if the Times was a full 100% off, and there were twice as many murders committed by veterans in that period, that still only works out to a little over 5 per 100,000 combat veterans per year. However, the paper does engage in a wee bit of bottom covering. In explaining its methodology, the paper drops in a minor de facto swing at the military as well: "The Pentagon does not keep track of such killings, most of which are prosecuted not by the military justice system but by civilian courts in state after state. Neither does the Justice Department."

No, the Pentagon does not have ready numbers on the acts of civilians. Is not that something that we fight against in other realms? Moreover, what is a man or woman after they get out of the military? They are civilians. Therefore, DoD does not track their behaviors. The number of active duty miscreants is doubtless determinable, but is undetermined.

The authors also defend their methodology in another way: "The Times used the same methods to research homicides involving all active-duty military personnel and new veterans for the six years before and after the present wartime period began with the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. This showed an 89 percent increase during the present wartime period, to 349 cases from 184, about three-quarters of which involved Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans. The increase occurred even though there have been fewer troops stationed in the United States in the last six years and the American homicide rate has been, on average, lower."

But there are two really obvious flaws in the way they collected the "increase" statistics. Most obviously: during peacetime it is not very likely that anyone's military status would factor into a news story unless there was some obvious peg -- that person committed a crime in uniform, for example. So to assume that a crime story subject's military affiliation was as consistently referenced before Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom as it was after seems unreasonable. Further, since the Times queried only for "active duty" crimes for the six prior years, but for all Iraq-Afghanistan veterans, it is misrepresenting the de facto size of the military: the "Afghanistan-Iraq" numbers include a big number of National Guard and Reserve service members. Reporters now note when somebody is a veteran, much more often, even if that fact does not appear directly relevant to the story.

In effect, the authors compared an artificially low result of 184 from purely active duty group, with 349 cases from an "activated" group that was much larger.

PTSD is real. Problems with returning veterans are real. But fear-mongering and drawing specious conclusions from incomplete data is no help. The story could have just as easily, and more accurately, been headlined, "Military Service in a Combat Zone Reduces Incidence of Homicide." Actually, that would be a logically flawed conclusion as well -- but you get the point.

Surely, the Times employs veterans and people with a basic understanding of the statistics involved, with whom it could have checked these numbers?

This story, and the apparent series of which it is a part, ought to see some editor demoted. It is just sloppy thinking, and that does not help anyone.

You can write to LTC Bob Bateman at R_Bateman_LTC@hotmail.com.

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

COIN of the Realm: U.S. Counterinsurgency Strategy (Seminar Report) - Dr. Steven Metz and Ralph Wipfli.

Participants at the seminar developed these key insights: Regardless of whether counterinsurgency (COIN) will be the dominant form of military activity in the future or simply one of several, the United States needs an effective national strategy which explains when, why, and how the nation should undertake it. The basic assumptions of the current approach need revisited, especially those dealing with the role of the state, the strategic framework for American involvement, and the whole-of-government approach. Given the demands placed upon the armed forces by the current campaigns, most of the effort has been on tactics, training, and doctrine. Ultimately strategic transformation is at least as important, if not more so. Rather than thinking of counterinsurgency and warfighting as competing tasks, the military and other government agencies must pursue ways to integrate them, thus assuring that the United States can address the multidimensional threats which characterize the contemporary security environment.

A Contemporary Challenge to State Sovereignty: Gangs and Other Illicit Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCOs) in Central America, El Salvador, Mexico, Jamaica, and Brazil - Dr. Max G. Manwaring.

Another kind of war within the context of a "clash of civilizations" is being waged in various parts of the Americas, Africa, Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and elsewhere around the world today. Some of the main protagonists are those who have come to be designated as first-second-, and third-generation street gangs, as well as their various possible allies such as traditional Transnational Criminal Organizations. In this new type of war, national security and sovereignty of affected countries is being impinged every day, and gangs' illicit commercial motives are, in fact, becoming an ominous political agenda.

Pakistan's Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War - Mr. Henry D. Sokolski.

This book, completed just before Pakistani President Musharraf imposed a state of emergency in November 2007, reflects research that the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center commissioned over the last 2 years. It tries to characterize specific nuclear problems that the ruling Pakistani government faces with the aim of establishing a base line set of challenges for remedial action. Its point of departure is to consider what nuclear challenges Pakistan will face if moderate forces remain in control of the government and no hot war breaks out against India.

Development and Reform of the Iraqi Police Forces - Major Tony Pfaff.

Despite 4 years of millions of dollars in aid, equipment, education, and advisors, Iraqi police force development lags far behind the military. Numerous reasons are offered to account for this gap: corrupt practices left over from the previous regime, infiltration by militias, weak leadership, competition by better armed and organized criminal and militant groups, and so on. However, the military is also subject to these same influences, thus none of these explanations by themselves or in combination are satisfactory. The author argues that the poor political and security environment impacts social, political, and cultural factors in ways that are predictable, understandable, and, with external help, resolvable. The author offers valuable insights into the creation of such programs as well as a number of policies and practices advisors may adopt to best facilitate the creation of a just and effective Iraqi police force.

Rebalancing Our National Power - Dr. Joseph Collins

... since 2003, while Iraq has been "Job One" for the Bush administration, it took four years to give its commanders the manpower and to develop the operational charter they needed to make meaningful progress. The Bush team has compounded those errors by funding the war through deficit spending.

All of this is spilt milk, some of which has been sopped up by the skill and determination of General David Petraeus, Ambassador Ryan Crocker, and their team in Iraq. We should not, however, be complacent. The early phases of the war in Iraq have exposed numerous decision-system or organizational problems that the next President will ignore at his or her peril...

The New Face of War - Dr. Arthur Obermayer

The conflict in Iraq is the new face of war. The last protracted U.S. war where there were clearly demarked battle lines with uniformed soldiers separating the two sides was the Korean War, over a half century ago. Since then, it has been difficult to distinguish friend from foe, and victory has become more elusive. Today, the U.S. has the most sophisticated and strongest military might in the world, but that alone is not enough to prevail. The conflict in Iraq is only the most recent example of this trend, and it provides important lessons for American policy makers and the public to consider...

It Takes a Country to Fight a War - Brigadier General Stephen A. Cheney, USMC (Ret.)

In the spring of 2003, our military demonstrated that it is unequaled at traditional warfare. Our forces performed superbly in taking down Saddam Hussein's government quickly and with relatively few casualties. But the uncoordinated efforts to rebuild Iraq have fallen well short of the mark. This is a monumental task that, regrettably, has principally fallen to the Department of Defense, and the shortcomings of this effort should serve as a lesson that wars of national liberation require strong interagency coordination...

No More Iraqs - Dr. James Miller

Although the final chapter on the Iraq War has not been written, it is already clear that one of the preeminent lessons will echo that of the Vietnam War; that is "No More Iraqs." This bumper sticker maxim, however, will have widely divergent interpretations. Some will probably be right, several will certainly be wrong, and for some it is simply too soon to tell...

How We Leave Matters - Vice Admiral Lee Gunn, USN (Ret.)

I hate this war and believe we should not have invaded Iraq. But this war, and the way we end it, will have profound implications for America's future use of force and our exercise of political will in the world. When we leave Iraq, we must do so in a way that protects American military power and manages other's perceptions of that power in order to avoid unintended -- and potentially bloody -- consequences in the future.

Instead of seeking to draw lessons from the Iraq experience that we may apply to future conflicts, my goal is to consider how we can apply what we already know to the current situation in Iraq in order to ensure that we draw this conflict to a close in a way that does not further endanger U.S. security...

More ASP lessons learned essays...

Overview

Experience gained from the 9/11 attacks, combat in Iraq and Afghanistan, disaster assistance during and after Hurricane Katrina, and the ongoing war on terror provides the basis for amending our anachronistic national security structures and practices. Many analysts and officials have called for a second generation version of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to address the array of organizational and management challenges that we face. Some argue that the new security environment requires even more fundamental change, similar to what was enacted after World War II. The principal legislation that emerged from that era was the National Security Act of 1947. Goldwater-Nichols aimed to fix inter-Service problems by streamlining the chain of command and promoting "jointness" but did not fundamentally alter the structure of the U.S. military.

These earlier efforts attempted to strike a balance between those who wanted to unite bureaucracies to improve efficiency (primarily resource considerations) and produce more effective outcomes and those who opposed potentially dangerous concentrations of power and desired to preserve their heart-and-soul missions (as well as congressional support for their strategic view and related combat systems and force structures). Today, the debate rages a new with the security of this nation dependent on the outcome.

This paper explores two options for reorganization: unification and coordination. We investigate each against the backdrop of the two previous attempts at reorganization in the context of the Madisonian political culture that constitutes part of who we are as a nation. Finally, each option is judged against its ability to contribute to the development and implementation of the kinds of strategies and operations needed to wage the new kind of war and peace in the emerging global security environment.

CNAS Press Release: John Nagl Joins Center for a New American Security

WASHINGTON, DC, January 22, 2008 -- The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) is pleased to announce that John Nagl will join CNAS as a senior fellow in July 2008.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl, U.S. Army, currently serves as commander of the 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas where he teaches U.S. soldiers how to train and advise Iraqi and Afghani forces. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Anbar province in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate from Oxford University, taught national security studies at West Point, and served as a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense.

He is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam (University of Chicago Press, 2005) and helped write the U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual published in December 2006. Nagl has also written or co-authored numerous articles and reviews, including the first CNAS issue paper, "Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for a Permanent Army Advisor Corps." He frequently discusses national security issues in various national media venues.

On 17 January SWJ conducted a phone interview with Brigadier General Edward Cardon, Deputy Commanding General (Support), of Multi-National Division - Center (3rd Infantry Division / MND-C). MND-C arrived in-country last March as part of the "the surge" and the new population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy directed by General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force -- Iraq (MNF-I). MND-C's area of responsibility are the security zones located along the southern edge of Baghdad and scales from the border of Saudi Arabia to the border of Iran.

The interview covered a wide-range of topics to include trends in security, training and employing Iraqi security forces, economic development, essential services and governance.

Highlight bullets from the interview follow.

Overview

BG Cardon is currently on his third deployment to Iraq. When he returned in March of '07 the situation was significantly worse than when he last left in January of '06 - just after the national elections. That said - he is amazed at the positive change between March and today as the Division's mission transitions from combat to reconstruction and believes this is attributable to four things.

1. A group of company commanders (with one or more previous tours in Iraq) who really understand the local dynamics to include the local population itself, the quality of the Iraqi security forces and the local governance apparatus.

2. The Concerned Local Citizens effort that basically slipped across into MND-C's AOR as a result of events ("Tribal Awakening") in Al Anbar Province. This is significant as the Concerned Local Citizens organization rejected extremists (not just al-Qaeda, but Sunni extremists in general) and forced them out of their tribal areas.

3. The events of 27 -- 28 August '07 in Karbala (fierce clashes between Muqtada al Sadr's Mahdi Army and the mainly Shiite Iraqi security forces, leaving hundreds of Shiite pilgrims dead or wounded) resulting in Sadr proclaiming a cease-fire which provided the local population some energy and breathing-room to reject the Mahdi Army.

4. The growing strength of Iraqi security forces is very impressive -- especially the Iraqi Army. Though still suffering from some equipment issues, the Army is now composed of experienced and capable personnel as well as effective commanders. The Division is also beginning to see improvements in the Provincial police forces - though the police are not as far along as the Army. Here, a bottom-up approach is underway that includes training (both army and police personnel) and converting members of Concerned Local Citizens groups over to the police.

Lines of Operation (LOO)

1. Brigade-sized (supported by Division) operations that utilize patrol bases combined with Concerned Local Citizens checkpoints is a tactic that is working well. This includes working all LOO (not just security) to include economic development and political initiatives -- after a brigade moves in and establishes patrol bases and the Concerned Local Citizens organization is launched a political effort is established consisting of a group or groups (local government) that can connect to other local and provincial political organizations and the media. The focus of main effort is linking these efforts (local government) together. More here at the Division's web page.

2. BG Caldron is a big believer in Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) -- not just in Iraq, but anywhere US forces deploy. The EPRTs (embedded) work the local governance piece the best -- even 3-4 people can be very effective. The use of microgrants is one of the most effective PRT tools. In Jurf as Sakhr, the Division's strategic model community, $14,000 helped to open 48 shops in less than a month. An example of the Division's use of microgrants can be found here.

3. Iraqis are quite capitalistic and if provided security a lot of positive economic activity begins on its own or with some aid from basic grass-roots programs.

4. Other initiatives with great potential include the Inma Agribusiness Program designed to support the development of agribusinesses and agricultural markets and Task Force Business Stability Operations (TF-BSO) which intends to get state-owned enterprises up and running and then spin them off to the private sector. The premise here is that it is easier to privatize a functioning enterprise than one that is just standing idle. Moreover, interest in investing in Iraq by non-Iraq companies may be rising as the security situation stabilizes and corporations look at "getting in on the ground floor".

5. While economic, essential service and governance improvements are critical -- education remains a top priority with many Iraqis.

6. While the Division is working hard at the Provincial-level along all LOO, a bottom-up approach appears to be taking hold -- and working -- this includes security, economic, essential services and governance.

7. Concerning what is often called 'strategic communications' -- Iraq is a country of personal relationships and, arguably, it is the most important aspect of any communications outreach. The success the Division has seen at the company and above as well as the PRT levels is a direct result of the relationships formed by commanders and leaders with Iraqi counterparts. The importance of these relationships cannot be overstated.

8. The Iraqis are also learning the importance of the media -- the Division now has an Iraqi media section that is responsible for getting Iraqi media stories out and interviewing Iraqis. This is still a work in progress as a 'free-press' is a relatively new phenomena in Iraq and there are pressures that still need to be overcome.

SWJ hat tip to Grim of BlackFive for setting up the interview. Grim notes that blogs with a history of blogging about counterinsurgency and Iraq issues are welcome to request interviews - please send along your request via e-mail to grimbeornr@yahoo.com.

The Pentagon is considering Gen. David H. Petraeus for the top NATO command later this year, a move that would give the general, the top American commander in Iraq, a high-level post during the next administration but that has raised concerns about the practice of rotating war commanders.

A senior Pentagon official said that it was weighing "a next assignment for Petraeus" and that the NATO post was a possibility. "He deserves one and that has also always been a highly prestigious position," the official said. "So he is a candidate for that job, but there have been no final decisions and nothing on the timing."

The question of General Petraeus's future comes as the Pentagon is looking at changing several top-level assignments this year. President Bush has been an enthusiastic supporter of General Petraeus, whom he has credited with overseeing a troop increase and counterinsurgency plan credited with reducing the sectarian violence in Iraq, and some officials say the president would want to keep General Petraeus in Iraq as long as possible...