Sustaining the Peace after Civil War. Authored by Dr. T. David Mason.

Since the end of World War II, there have been four times as many civil wars as interstate wars. The introduction of peacekeeping forces, investment in economic development and reconstruction, and the establishment of democratic political institutions tailored to the configuration of ethnic and religious cleavages in the society also affect the durability of peace after civil war. In applying these propositions in an analysis of the civil war in Iraq, what can be done to bring the Iraq conflict to an earlier, less destructive, and more stable conclusion?

Overcoming the Obstacles to Establishing a Democratic State in Afghanistan. Authored by Colonel Dennis O. Young.

The author outlines potential solutions to the problematic and challenging situation in Afghanistan today. The difficulties facing U.S. and international forces in Afghanistan are endemic and will require a long-term commitment of time, money, and resources to overcome these obstacles in order to stabilize and democratize this nation.

Jordanian National Security and the Future of Middle East Stability. Authored by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill.

The United States and Jordan have maintained a valuable mutually-supportive relationship for decades as a result of shared interests in a moderate, prosperous, and stable Middle East. In this monograph, the author highlights Jordan's ongoing value as a U.S. ally and considers ways that the U.S.-Jordanian alliance might be used to contain and minimize problems of concern to both countries.

Intrepidity... And Character Development within the Army Profession. Authored by Dr. Don M. Snider.

How many Army soldiers, particularly Leaders, who just read the title of this opinion piece, knew the meaning of the first word; how many brought to their reading an accurate understanding of the term? More importantly, how many Army Leaders could place a true meaning of the word into the context of the Army as a unique profession producing, for the security of the American people, fighting forces for effective land combat? Where does intrepidity fit in what the Army produces and how does the profession develop such a thing?

Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorist's Perspective. Authored by Dr. Roger B. Myerson.

This monograph is a short nontechnical introduction to the use of game theory in the study of international relations, focusing is on the problem of deterrence against potential adversaries and aggressors. The author uses game models to provide a simple context where we can see more clearly the essential logic of strategic deterrence.

In-sourcing the Tools of National Power for Success and Security

Matt Armstrong

Military operations may neutralize immediate kinetic threats and strategic communications may make promises, but enduring change comes from systemic overhauls that stabilize unstable regions. Security, humanitarian relief, governance, economic stabilization, and development are critical for ultimate democratization. (1) These are the real propaganda of deeds. Without competent and comprehensive action in these areas, tactical operations are simply a waste of time, money, and life.

Bullets and bombs represent short-term tactical responses to a much larger strategic dilemma. Any text worth reading on insurgency or counterinsurgency recognizes and emphasizes the operational and strategic center of gravity is the people. Failing to address grinding poverty and disillusionment in regions creates fertile breeding grounds for extremists, terrorists, and insurgents to attack the national interests of the United States.

The U.S. must in-source the tools of national power that support and compliment reconstruction and stabilization efforts to pacify and stabilize regions. The National Security Strategy declares the need to bring all of the elements of America's national power to bear to build the "infrastructure of democracy" and to be a champion of "human dignity". But, instead of consistent, coherent, and coordinated, operations, the U.S. relies on ad hoc reconstruction and stabilization solutions heavily dependent on outsourcing in lieu of any substantial internal capacity. This outsourcing of national power also relies on ad hoc solutions as companies quickly assemble teams that too often operate outside of existing military and other governmental operations in the region. We all know this is a fundamental requirement, even if we do not realize it. Consider the discussions surrounding the "Phase IV" planning for Iraq that recalled the Marshall Plan for post-war Europe. Too frequently lost in those discussions was the strategic and operational planning by the U.S. in the years prior to the collapse of Germany, as well as the civil and humanitarian aid that followed the American and British forces in the march to Germany.

Today the U.S. State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) is a solution to address the structural problems of America's response to unstable regions. Based on a "whole of government" approach, this office will in-source the most essential tools of national power while centralizing the ability to effectively partner with private sector providers. However, this civilian-based requirement of "winning" the post-conflict struggle cannot move forward because of a combination of misunderstanding and domestic posturing.

What is S/CRS

Established by former Secretary of State Colin Powell just over a year after the invasion of Iraq, S/CRS was intended to provide a permanent capability for planning and executing civilian stabilization and reconstruction operations, the lack of which plagued U.S. efforts to prevail in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. The mission of S/CRS is to lead, coordinate, and institutionalize U.S. Government civilian capacity to prevent or prepare for post-conflict situations, and to help stabilize and reconstruct societies in transition from conflict or civil strife, so they can reach a sustainable path toward peace, democracy and a market economy.

A recent editorial by Senator Richard Lugar and Secretary of State Condeleezza Rice described the broad and bipartisan support for S/CRS: the President, the State Department, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and both the civilian and military leadership of the Pentagon support the expansion of S/CRS. But, the most public component of S/CRS, the Civilian Reserve Corps, it is just one part of the larger solution to in-source the tools of national power.

Last month, I sat down with Ambassador John Herbst, the Coordinator for (S/CRS) (2), to discuss a new approach based in the State Department. This approach is intended to in-source critical tools of national power to compel and secure conflict and post-conflict regions, including failed and failing states. As the Coordinator, Ambassador Herbst is responsible for coordinating and harmonizing a "whole of government" approach to bring the tools of America's national power that integrates with the military as required but can also operate independently to manage and support reconstruction and stabilization operations. Our conversation stemmed from the desire to get the word out about S/CRS and to cut through the misconceptions that have emerged around one element of its expeditionary capability, the Civilian Reserve Corps.

Ambassador Herbst discussed the architecture envisioned by S/CRS for use in future stability operations. At the top the Country Reconstruction and Stabilization Group (CRSG), a senior-level policy coordination body which includes the S/CRS Coordinator, State's regional assistance secretary and the relevant NSC senior director, and is supported by a staff secretariat. This secretariat is stood up on demand and controls the flow of information, manages top level implementation, and writes the civilian plan. It is run by S/CRS but all relevant agencies participate.

Below this is the Integration Planning Cell (IPC) staffed by civilian planners from all relevant agencies. Operating at the theater level, it is deployed to the Combatant Commander's headquarters to harmonize military and civilian planning.

The next level is the Advance Civilian Team (ACT). The interagency ACT implements the CRSG-approved strategic plan. The ACT operates under Chief of Mission authority if the country has a functioning U.S. embassy or could help establish a more permanent U.S. mission in the absence of an embassy.

However how the deployable components of S/CRS will be staffed has attracted the most attention by the public. There are three expeditionary components of S/CRS to meet the needs of non-functioning governments. The skill sets in these pools range from typical State Department roles like crisis negotiation and economic analysis to those more typical of other government agencies (and state and local governments and the private sector) like engineers, rule of law (police, judges, lawyers), economists, public administration, health administration, port administration, city planners, agronomists, and so on to work on sewage, water, electricity, waste disposal and other infrastructure requirements of a stable region.

The first of the three levels of mobilization is the Active Response Corps (ARC). Currently at 10 people, the Lugar-Biden Bill (S. 613) would upsize this to 250 people. The ARC would be composed of dedicated civil servants from across USG, mostly from the State Department, USAID, but also from the Justice Department, the Agricultural Department, and others. The ARC is a quick reaction force, ready to deploy within 48 hours. When they are not deployed, they are training with or on temporary duty assignment, or TDY, to military and other USG elements, including the Defense Department, to train, build skills, and create linkages for global deployments. They will team and be integrated with military units as required. Today, S/CRS has personnel on TDY to the new Africa Command (AFRICOM) and works closely with other combatant commands including U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) and Joint Forces Command (JFCOM).

The second element is the Stand-By Response Corps (SRC). The SRC members will come from virtually every agency and to augment the ARC. There will be about eight SRC members for each ARC member. Lugar-Biden would fund about 2,000 members. Unlike the dedicated personnel of the ARC, SRC members are full-time employees in other USG Agencies and this means they are not as available as ARC members and only train several weeks a year. Only 10-25% of the force is deployable at any one time with a 30-60 day call up period. Like ARC, SRC members are civil servants or Foreign Service Officers.

The third and most discussed element of S/CRS is the Civilian Reserve Corps (CRC). President George W. Bush referred to the CRC in the 2007 State of the Union speech. According to Ambassador Herbst, the CRC will be staffed with 500 "as soon as feasible" with the eventual goal of 2,500 members. Right now the CRC only exists on paper.

The President's mention of CRC caused some to fear this was a move to outsource more of America's national power when the reality is the opposite: unlike contracted resources in use today, this in-sourcing makes the CRC directly integrated with and accountable directly within the USG command and control. This corps is modeled after the military reserve system with four year "enlistments" and a to-be-determined number of weeks of training each year. Members will be deployable up to one year, but only up to 25% of the corps will be deployable at any given time. Unlike the other elements, the CRC requires a Presidential decision to deploy.

Problematic is that CRC members are not civil servants, Foreign Service Officers, or members of the military or National Guard. They are private individuals not under the protections of the Soldier-Sailor Relief Act and would acquire Civil Service status only when called up for a deployment. Even without details like pay scales and benefits worked out, however, Ambassador Herbst said that after the 2007 State of the Union, S/CRS received calls from over 70 people who sought out, found, and actually phoned S/CRS looking for a job.

In the words of Ambassador Herbst, CRC will tap into a "wellspring" of adventurous spirits wanting to change the world for the better. They are trained as civilian teams and work alongside the military. They will have area expertise, including regional and language skills. Lost in the hullaballoo over CRC is that it is really a quick reaction force of only up to 125 people to bring much needed skills to bear in post-conflict situations for strategic success.

Ambassador Herbst is confident that within one year of getting funding for CRC, he could have the CRC online and ready to serve. Ironically, due to inter-personnel management details agreed to on paper but still needing to be worked out, staffing the SRC is another story.

When it was created, S/CRS had 20 people. Two years later they were at 64. Today, they're over 80. If the FY08 appropriation comes through, could jump to over 100. Funding issues do not impact their central staff, just project funding. Today, in some of the worst countries on the planet the U.S. is represented by S/CRS members already deployed.

The concept of S/CRS is a plug-n-play capability for quick and seamless integration of civilian reconstruction and stabilization experts with military commanders as needed. Conceptually similar to Tom Barnett's SysAdmin, S/CRS creates a "blended" organizing entity with its own skills. It can extend American national power directly by hitting the ground running in post-conflict and conflict operations, but it can also deploy independently of the American military, such as on United Nations missions.

Why not contract out? The constant training and teamwork with all elements of USG is a significant advantage over reliance on outsourcing. Beyond crisis response and "preventative action" by S/CRS, there is an active acculturation of S/CRS by co-location and co-operation already underway.

"Americans have the wristwatches, but we have the time"

There exists a "Golden Hour" when the major combat operations have subsided or stopped and when the people are most ready for change. This is when reconstruction and stabilization operations begin to be felt by the host population (similar opportunities are evident in disaster relief operations). However, hastily organized operations like the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) and the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) scrambled to not only understand their mission, but stumbled through or simply bypassed integration and teaming with other government agencies and the military, and most notably in the case of the CPA, failed to focus on the fundamental needs the people. Operating in the Golden Hour is less costly, in terms of money and lives, than if we wait, but it takes foresight and commitment. (3)

Reconstruction and stabilization is not a new concept. In 2003, OHRA was created, followed several months later by the CPA. In 2004, S/CRS was stood up, and in 2005, the Defense Department issued Directive 3000.05 to guide "Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction Operations." In the same year, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) opened their military liaison office. By the end of 2007, behind the scenes negotiations finally put S/CRS as the frontrunner to become the coordinator of reconstruction and stabilization. Despite this, after five years of false starts, the U.S. still lacks a clear mechanism to address the requirements of preventing and overcoming instability.

The title of the editorial co-written by Senator Lugar and Secretary of State Rice was no coincidence: A Civilian Partner for Our Troops. Beginning with his speech at Kansas State University, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates campaigned for a more civilian face on national security with an integrated approach to wielding national power. Secretary Gates made the "case for strengthening our capacity to use 'soft' power and for better integrating it with 'hard' power." S/CRS is the hub that makes this possible.

The basic ingredients for enduring success include economic development, institution-building, the rule of law, good governance, and basic human services. U.S. reconstruction and stabilization efforts must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy encompassing all efforts of the U.S. through its various departments and agencies, and private sector, to maximize effectiveness. Measuring success is challenging, but fundamental progress on the foundation, not margins, of the pyramid of human needs will go far in denying extremists the support necessary to maintain their campaigns of hate and intimidation. The enemy knows this and targets reconstruction and stabilization efforts accordingly. Too often our response has been to drop these efforts instead of reinforcing, promoting, and integrating them into our strategy and local communication that builds buy-in and participation. We cannot buy support. We must link our success to the success of the local population and vice versa.

This is not about building 'nations' but creating structural capacity that leads to enduring institutions that will lead to a stable state that has a chance to become prosperous while denying sanctuary and ideological support to terrorists, insurgents, and extremists. Don't build this capacity and the enemy will simply wait us out. Mao had shadow governments prepared to take over the administration of towns and villages when they were captured. These officials were designated for the task long before the take-over. (4) The Taliban makes it clear they are watching and will wait ten years if necessary to take control and carry-out retribution. If we fail to build the necessary capacity and structures and buy-in, the lives of our servicemen and women toward "victory" will be for naught.

Al-Qaeda and other groups have seen the inability of the U.S. to follow through on the promises of a better life in contested spaces. They attacked reconstruction efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan because those were the most effective tools of public diplomacy in the struggle for the minds and wills of the population, the real propaganda of deeds.

The militarization of humanitarian aid does more than reinforce an image of a militaristic America it builds distrust in receiving populations. Allies are unlikely to support or participate in otherwise worthy missions if the U.S. only puts in its combat boots. In Africa, we can see the impact of a military-led engagement model. Promoting "our common goals of development, health, education, democracy, and economic growth in Africa" through the Pentagon's AFRICOM is a step in the right direction.

Combatant Commands are looking to emphasize civil-military cooperation and maximize the "civilian face" of U.S. engagement. AFRICOM and SOUTHCOM in particular recognize the value of S/CRS in this area.

What's the challenge?

By in-sourcing, the U.S. builds and exploits a reach-back capability to not only capture and institutionalize best practices but to draw in and leverage other USG-wide experts. Reliance on outsourcing continues and even promotes the ad hoc responses, inhibiting or preventing required institutional learning and connections.

What happens if funding for CRC falls through? Not surprisingly, the Pentagon is prepping for its own standing service in case CRC falls through, but Secretary Gates has emphasized he wants more civilian participation not more military control. A Center for Strategic and International Studies roundtable report remarked S/CRS is a response to the failure of the Pentagon to properly prepare for future operations the U.S. is likely to face. A Pentagon solution is better than nothing, but a civilian face is required. We must appreciate the perceptions created by leading with our combat boots. Secretary of Defense Gates noted the over reliance on hard power and hard power assets. When will the rest of USG realize it?

The Congressional Budget Office estimates S. 613 will cost less than $85 million in 2008 and $629 million over the 2008-2012 period. While this would be lost in the petty cash drawer of the Pentagon, it is a noticeable amount for State and a source of resistance by those opposed to expanding what many see as a dysfunctional department. However, S/CRS is positioned as a new entity that could help push State into a new model of engagement.

It is nearly a universal given that the bureaucracy of State could prevent the flexibility S/CRS requires, but there is hope. Ambassador Herbst reports directly to the Secretary of State and has the ear and interest of Secretary of Defense and others across USG. He is also more aware of what he must do as well as his limitations than say another former direct report to Secretary of State Rice who was charged with shaping the perceptions of the U.S. and recently returned home to Texas. Secretary Rice sees S/CRS's mission as a legacy issue and apparently stands behind it.

Prominent House support comes from Representatives Sam Farr (D-CA) and Jim Saxton (R-NJ). In the Senate, Senators Richard G. Lugar, Joseph R. Biden, and John McCain are behind it.

Only Senator Tom Coburn (R-OK) is opposed to it, although it seems his opposition is based only on the grounds that more government spending is bad. This narrow-minded view puts America in further danger and risks marginalizing lives already lost.

If Mao's aphorism that the "richest source of power to wage war lies in the masses of the people" (5) is true, then the converse is also true. The population is more than a force multiplier against the "spoilers" of security and peace, they are the front line offence and defense required for implementing and protecting the solution. Information campaigns mean nothing without America's demonstration of support for the people.

As a standing office, S/CRS not only brings skills, relationships, and high level attention to solutions, but would also monitor and direct attention to failing states. As a preventative action, this can help shore up failing states or S/CRS can design strategies that ensure a timely, effective USG response. In other words, the existence of S/CRS will allow for timelier and smarter interventions that can either prevent or mitigate a crisis. In brief, S/CRS will enable us to act in a more proactive manner and with a greater array of tools.

The U.S. needs to take a systematic, holistic "whole of government" approach to reconstruction and stabilization that puts the focus on meeting the basic needs of the people in these countries. This shouldn't be about what the U.S. needs or wants, but what the people of the country in question need and want. Basically, when people are safe, secure, full (not hungry), engaged and comfortable, they have no need to fight or support terrorists. Terrorists work by instigating and sustaining instability, fear, and discomfort (disillusionment) and if the USG fights buys-in to this approach by fighting back with hard-power only, it just perpetuates the cycle.

The United States cannot afford to ignore the importance of reconstruction and stabilization operations and needs to champion these efforts now.

Matt Armstrong holds a Masters of Public Diplomacy and publishes the MountainRunner blog.

Endnotes:

1. This list is adapted from the list in James Dobbins, The Beginner's Guide to Nation-Building, Rand Corporation Monograph Series (Santa Monica, CA: RAND National Security Research Division, 2007). The only change is a re-ordering of the last two items.

2. http://state.gov/s/crs/.

3. For more on this, see Anthony C. Zinni and Tony Koltz. The Battle for Peace: A Frontline Vision of America's Power and Purpose. 1st ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.

4. David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 2005 Reprint ed. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), 56.

5. Mao Tse-tung, Selected Military Writings of Mao Tse-Tung, 2nd (Second Printing) ed. (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967).

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

Foreign Policy: These days when you speak about the surge, you always highlight positive developments but you also appear very cautious. What are your concerns?

Gen. David Petraeus: We are trying to be cautious as we describe the progress that is taking place in Iraq. It has been substantial. We have seen a consistent reduction in the level of violence—a reduction of 60 percent since June, really to a level not seen since the spring of 2005. There has been a corresponding reduction in the loss of civilian lives, Iraqi, and coalition force casualties. Having said all that, it is a fragile achievement, and there are a number of concerns that we do have. We feel as if we've knocked al Qaeda to the canvas, but we know that, like any boxer, they can come back up off that canvas and lend a big, right-hand punch. We also have concerns about the militias and the elements of the [Mahdi Army] militia that have not been honoring Moqtada al-Sadr's cease-fire pledge...

Next - The Belmont Club on recent trends concerning U.S. and Iraqi war casualties.

US deaths in Iraq are at the lowest 3 month total ever . The three month total for October, November and December 2007 is 93. It's also the first time a 3 month total has dropped below 3 digits.

More at both links.

Next - Jules Crittenden (Forward Movement) on casualties and the Gen. Petraeus Q&A in his post Blood Dividend.

... Fewer Americans and Iraqis are dying. The American and Iraqi deaths and injuries in the first half of 2007 bought this calm. Security within which political solutions may be arrived at is achieved in this manner. It is no frivolous accomplishment and nothing to be dismissed or frittered away, because it was bought with the blood of our people. The bitter lesson of history is that walking away ultimately will cost more, whether in Iraq or elsewhere...

Finally - Small Wars Council member LTC Gian Gentile in an Army Times op-ed that provides another view of the Surge.

A group of battle-hardened enlisted infantrymen from the 82nd Airborne Division wrote an opinion piece for The New York Times recently that provided an assessment of the effectiveness of American operations and prospects in Iraq, based on more than 15 months of hard fighting at the local level.

Their view of the situation on the ground in Iraq was essentially the opposite of other assessments that have come out of Baghdad over the last few months...

The Winter 2007 - 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Afghanistan: Regaining Momentum by Ali A. Jalali

On the sixth anniversary of the US-led military invasion, Afghanistan is faced with its worst crisis since the ouster of the Taliban in 2001. There are increasing concerns, both internationally and domestically, that Afghanistan faces the distinct possibility of sliding back into instability and chaos. The country is challenged by a revitalized Taliban-led insurgency, record rise in drug production, deterioration of the rule of law, and weakening national government in the regions outside the major cities.

New Challenges and Old Concepts: Understanding 21st Century Insurgency by Steven Metz

From the 1960s to the 1980s stopping Communist-backed insurgents was an important part of American strategy, so counterinsurgency was an important mission for the US military, particularly the Army. Even when most of the Army turned its attention to large-scale warfighting and the operational art following Vietnam, special operation forces preserved some degree of capability. In the 1980s American involvement in El Salvador and a spate of insurgencies around the world linked to the Soviets and Chinese sparked renewed interest in counterinsurgency operations (as a component of low-intensity conflict). By 1990 what could be called the El Salvador model of counterinsurgency, based on a limited US military footprint in conjunction with the strengthening of local security forces, became codified in strategy and doctrine.

US COIN Doctrine and Practice: An Ally's Perspective by Alexander Alderson

Until very recently, the four and a half years of military operations in Iraq appeared to have created an obstacle in people's minds. Rightly or wrongly, reality has subsumed theory, and because of the media coverage Iraq has received, counterinsurgency is now seen as nothing but an indescribably bloody, draining, protracted, and arduous business which makes tremendous demands on popular support, political resolve, and the resources required to sustain the fight. History shows this has always been the case, but perhaps the initial incidences of rapid, decisive, conventional operations misled the public. The fact remains: The cost of counterinsurgency is high. It always has been, depressingly so, and it is largely unrefundable. There is now more than a glimmer of hope, a detectable, increasingly palpable feeling that something may be changing, that there is now what can be best described as "a reasonable degree of tactical momentum on the ground."

Strategic Realignment: Ends, Ways, and Means in Iraq by Bruce J. Reider

Four years into the war in Iraq, the debate rages over whether there are enough troops deployed to accomplish the mission. Congress and the White House continuously argue over resources and the conduct of the war. Meanwhile, American and Iraqi casualties persist at an unacceptable rate. America's political and military leaders suggest progress is being made and we should stay the course; after all, it generally requires eight to ten years to defeat an insurgency. From a historical perspective, they are correct. But the situation in Iraq is not just an insurgency, and labeling it as such is a gross oversimplification of the challenges we face.

The Military and Reconstruction Operations by Mick Ryan

The post-Cold War trend of convergence between military and nonmilitary tasks has accelerated over the past six years as western nations seek to defeat the insurgencies in Afghanistan and Iraq. One result of this convergence is an increased role for military forces in the conduct of humanitarian missions previously viewed as the sole preserve of nongovernmental organizations. This transition is reflected in a greater emphasis on reconstruction activities by the military in contemporary operations.

Disarming Rogues: Deterring First-Use of Weapons of Mass Destruction by David Szabo

The United States and its allies invaded Iraq in 2003 with the declared intention of removing Saddam Hussein's regime. Although it was determined after the war that Iraq did not possess weapons of mass destruction (WMD), removing a regime believed to be in possession of WMD raises the possibility that the post-9/11 US security policy is more —than previously believed to tolerate the risk of precipitating a WMD exchange. In future crises, policymakers may conclude the risk of WMD use during a preemptive attack or disarming strike is lower than the risk of a terrorist attack utilizing such weapons.

Stabilization and Democratization: Renewing the Transatlantic Alliance by Zachary Selden

The transatlantic disagreement over how to deal with the regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 gave rise to a spate of warnings about the imminent demise of NATO. To some extent it is easy to discount many of those predictions based on the endurance of the alliance and its ongoing expansion. But there is an underlying concern that should not be ignored: The original mission of the alliance disappeared 15 years ago and nothing has completely taken its place. Throughout the Cold War, NATO was seen as absolutely essential to the core security interests of its members. Regardless of the disagreement, nothing undermined the fundamental necessity of the alliance.

The Moral Equality of Combatants by Carl Ceulemans

According to the Just War tradition a war can only be just if two sets of principles are satisfied. First there is the jus ad bellum. These principles tell us when it is just to start a war. There has to be a good reason or a just cause in order for a war to be morally permissible (self-defense, defense of others, putting a stop to human rights violations). The decision to go to war has to be taken by a legitimate authority. Those who wage war need to be motivated by good intentions (desire to promote a more stable peace). War should not only be a last resort (necessity), it must also offer a reasonable chance of success. Moreover, the good the warring party hopes to obtain should outweigh the evil caused by the war (proportionality). The second set of principles, the jus in bello or the right in the war, focuses on the moral constraints that need to be observed during hostilities. Noncombatants must never be the intentional target of military actions (discrimination), and the military utility of a particular act of war has to outweigh the damage it will cause.

Editor's Shelf

Review Essay

Book Reviews

Sneak Preview: Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy by Dr. Steven Metz.

Preface

Writing a book is an adventure. To begin with, it is a toy and an amusement; then it becomes a mistress, and then it becomes a master, and then a tyrant. The last phase is that just as you are about to be reconciled to your servitude, you kill the monster, and fling him out to the public.

-- Winston Churchill

Like most Americans, I thought little about Iraq before the summer of 1990. Having spent my entire adult life teaching and writing about national security I could not, of course, ignore it entirely. I knew a horrific war took place there in the 1980s but its most intense images were of slaughtered Iranian youth, not the bluster of mustachioed Iraqi generals. Like most Americans, I was perplexed that a regime like the one in Teheran, inured to suffering and driven to barbarity by religious fervor, could exist in the modern world. It was so out of place, almost surreal, an echo of a different time. As a student of the Third World, though, I found Saddam Hussein lamentably familiar and, in Hannah Arendt's word, "banal." I knew of many more like him, from Mobutu to Ceausescu. They littered the world. But even this perception—as wrong as it turned out to be--was only a passing thought. I remained immersed in other regions, other issues, other problems. Iraq was peripheral, best left for Middle East experts (which I am not).

Then for the second time in a decade, Iraq invaded a neighboring state, bullying its way to the attention of the world. As Operation Desert Storm unfolded, I was on the faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College. Not only did CNN make the war unusually vivid—I remember working in my garage, listening to play-by-play combat coverage on the radio as if it were a sporting event—the fact that some of my former students and current friends were in harm's way also made it personal. For a few months, at least, Iraq mattered greatly to me. But afterwards, it faded again. I returned to other projects.

As another major war between the United States and Iraq approached in the late winter of 2003, I joined a study team from the U.S. Army War College. Our mission was to enter Iraq as soon as possible after combat subsided and undertake an initial strategic assessment. For a career academic, being issued military gear, fitted for uniforms (to the extent that the word "fitted" applies to the way the Army issues clothing), trained on chemical protection equipment, and inoculated against anthrax and a slew of other nasty things was strange but exciting. Our team established a base in Kuwait then made five trips into Iraq. It was electrifying to see the country that had so dominated the headlines for the previous year, experience the immediate aftermath of a major war, and talk to military leaders and soldiers from both sides while their memories were fresh. The sight of exhausted U.S. soldiers, the jumble of feelings from relief to smoldering hatred on the part of Iraqis, nights spent in looted palaces, high-speed drives through liberated (or conquered) cities with absolutely no public order or security, and, in general, traversing a landscape littered with the detritus of war, much still smoking, was something few scholars experience.

My role in the study team was to analyze what was then called the "post-conflict" period. This was an afterthought to our project, added by a senior Army general after approving the study. Little did he or anyone else know that there would be more conflict in the "post-conflict" period than in the conventional war. As events in Iraq unfolded, the complexity of the project exploded beyond control. I worked frenetically just to keep abreast of breaking developments. My office filled with notes, articles, maps, briefing slides, reports, and transcripts. I could not finalize the report. Each draft was obsolete before I could distribute it.

Still, this was the right issue for me at the right time: I was one of a handful of scholars or analysts who studied insurgency and counterinsurgency during the previous decade. This served me well as the insurgency in Iraq grew. But the idea that that I would spend a few months on the Iraq project and then return to my normal research and management concerns collapsed under the onslaught of events. Iraq became my life. From the spring of 2003 until now I have worked on it nearly full time, collecting tens of thousands of pages of material. Clearly it was time to capture this in a comprehensive format.

Dozens of books and hundred of articles have been written about America's conflict with Iraq, the bulk since 2003. These cover a range of topics from policymaking to military tactics. But almost all share one feature: they concentrate on what the conflict has done to Iraq rather than what it has done to America. That realization inspired this book. The conflict with Iraq has changed us. A part of what we are, how we see the world, and how we define our role in the global security environment was born in this conflict. We must understand how and why. We must know whether Iraq has changed us for better or worse. We must use Iraq as a portal for introspection, use it to learn about the American approach to strategy. As such, it has much to offer.

I will undertake this in six primary chapters. The first, entitled "Ascent of an Enemy," will examine how Iraq became a threat to the United States and thus a strategic paradigm. The second is "The Test of Battle." It will cover Operation Desert Storm and the struggle of the first Bush Administration to overcome the Vietnam syndrome and adjust the role that armed force plays in American strategy. This phase of the conflict demonstrated that the American military, honed through a decade of reform and improvement, was an effective tool of strategy, at least to the degree that the American strategic culture and zeitgeist would allow. This combination of effectiveness and constraints led to a strategy which could generate battlefield success but not ultimate strategic victory.

The third chapter, called "Containment and Transformation," will assess American strategy toward Iraq and the process of military "transformation" between the two major wars. The "revolution in military affairs" plays a starring role here as the notion of quick and low cost applications of military force was deified. But as Saddam Hussein's stubbornness demonstrated, this construct had severe limitations. The fourth—"Terrorism and Force"-- will deal how the September 11 attacks affected American strategy, particularly with the concepts that propelled the Bush administration to adopt a new, aggressive mode of American global leadership relying heavily on military force and then to intervene in Iraq. The fifth chapter is an assessment of the decision to invade Iraq, the Bush administration's efforts to mobilize support for this, and the military campaign to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The symbolism here is dialectical: as the United States attained perhaps its most impressive battlefield victory, the contradictions and shortcomings of the Bush grand strategy became evident. The sixth chapter is entitled "Counterinsurgency." Again, I will focus on placing the U.S. efforts in their broader strategic context, stressing the peculiarly American approach to counterinsurgency as it was reborn in Iraq after a decade's hibernation.

I will end with conclusions about with the process of selecting, interpreting and using paradigms to drive American strategy, including an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of this process and some ideas on how it made be made more effective.

Where to get thoughtful and balanced analysis and information in the chaos? The international newspapers are timid and getting second-hand info at best. Many of the blogs are obviously partisan.

Kenyan Jurist is a legal practitioner in Kenya with a superbly thoughtful set of posts on the legal reasons and implications of President Kibaki's haste to be re-sworn in, past election cases and the politicization of the courts, legality of media bans, and other legal aspects of the electoral process (here too). This blog is at the top of my reading list this week. (HT: Shakara)

Several of the bloggers on Kenya Imagine are clearly making efforts to see both sides, even when they fall into one camp or the other. Daniel Rubia points out that Raila's behavior has been less than statesmanlike, and it is not helping. Kamale T pleads with Raila and his party to share publicly their evidence of rigging.

The Daily Nation's coverage is demonstrating the strength and independence of the Kenyan media. Let's hope they keep it up. An editorial asks both leaders to come to their senses. Macharia Gaitho tells Raila what he can do to help stop the violence.

Yale graduate student Ryan Sheely has thoughtful daily insights.

Thinker's Room has some interesting commentary on and background to the violence.

Kumekucha is very pro-ODM, but this post is worth viewing for its allegedly doctored vote tally sheer.

Very interesting piece in Friday's Washington Post concerning a central figure in Charlie Wilson's War. Ann Scott Tyson profiles the young ex-Green Beret officer who was the brains behind the Afghanistan Mujahedin strategy while working for Gust Arakotos at the CIA. Sorry, Charlie. This Is Michael Vickers's War is a good read on Vickers's next big challenge -- "working to implement the U.S. military's highest-priority plan: a global campaign against terrorism that reaches far beyond Iraq and Afghanistan".

... Vickers, a former Green Beret and CIA operative, was the principal strategist for the biggest covert program in CIA history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan in the 1980s. The movie "Charlie Wilson's War," released last weekend, portrays Vickers in that role, in which he directed an insurgent force of 150,000 Afghan fighters and controlled an annual budget of more than $2 billion in current dollars.

Today, as the top Pentagon adviser on counterterrorism strategy, Vickers exudes the same assurance about defeating terrorist groups as he did as a 31-year-old CIA paramilitary officer assigned to Afghanistan, where he convinced superiors that with the right strategy and weapons, the ragtag Afghan insurgents could win. "I am just as confident or more confident we can prevail in the war on terror," Vickers, 54, said in a recent interview, looking cerebral behind thick glasses but with an energy and build reminiscent of the high school quarterback he once was. "Not a lot of people thought we could drive the Soviets out of Afghanistan."...

Vickers joined the Pentagon in July to oversee the 54,000-strong Special Operations Command (Socom), based in Tampa, which is growing faster than any other part of the U.S. military. Socom's budget has doubled in recent years, to $6 billion for 2008, and the command is to add 13,000 troops to its ranks by 2011.

Senior Pentagon and military officials regard Vickers as a rarity -- a skilled strategist who is both creative and pragmatic. "He tends to think like a gangster," said Jim Thomas, a former senior defense planner who worked with Vickers. "He can understand trends then change the rules of the game so they are advantageous for your side."

From Michael Vickers's OSD Bio Page: Vickers was confirmed by the U.S. Senate as the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities) on 23 July 2007. He is the senior civilian advisor to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense on the capabilities and operational employment of special operations forces, strategic forces, and conventional forces. He is also the senior civilian advisor on counterterrorism strategy, irregular warfare, and force transformation.

Prior to his appointment as ASD (SO/LIC&IC), Vickers served as Senior Vice President, Strategic Studies, at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA). In this capacity, he provided advice on Iraq strategy to President Bush and his war cabinet. He also was a senior advisor to the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, and Executive Director of the QDR "Red Team," which provided an assessment of the QDR for the Deputy Secretary and Vice Chairman. In late 2005, Vickers conducted an independent assessment of special operations forces ("The Downing Report") for the Secretary of Defense. He is the author of numerous publications, among which is "The Revolution in War" (2004).

From 1973 to 1986, Vickers served as an Army Special Forces Non-Commissioned Officer, Special Forces Officer, and CIA Operations Officer. During this period, he had operational and combat experience in Central America and the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Central and South Asia. His operational experience spans covert action and espionage, unconventional warfare, counterterrorism (including hostage rescue operations), counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense.

During the mid-1980s, Vickers was the principal strategist for the largest covert action program in the CIA's history: the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviet army out of Afghanistan. Vickers oversaw a major change in U.S. strategy, provided strategic and operational direction to an insurgent force of more than 300 unit commanders, 150,000 full-time fighters, and 500,000 part-time fighters, coordinated the efforts of more than ten foreign governments, and controlled an annual budget in excess of $2 billion in current dollars.

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Links

Michael Vickers is a Busy Man - Westhawk

Charlie Wilson (Mike Vickers Bonus Edition) - Abu Muqawama