-----

SWJ Links

Charlie Wilson's War - Abu Muqawama

Real Charlie Wilson Was Even More Outrageous - PrairiePundit

Some Correct Thinking Prevails in Hollywood - Democracy Project

Table of Contents

Introduction.............................................................................2

Text.......................................................................................3

Glossary..................................................................................5

Introduction

You are students. This means you are supposed to learn things. Read this and learn it.

There will be a test. There are only two grades: "win" or "lose".

Come back with your shield, or on it.

I.M. Mean

General

Soldier-in-Chief

FM 3-0 Operations for SAMS Students

1. The world is full of bad people. Mind you, not everyone is bad, but there are enough of them out there that we have to arm ourselves. Over the years, we've done a pretty good job of that. When the bad people scare us or hurt us, we have to whack them. This is hard, because you want to try and whack the bad people where they live and not where we live. Naturally, the bad people don't want to get whacked, and they feel pretty smug because we aren't mean enough to whack all of them at once. So we have to go over to where they live and whack them carefully. That's why we have an Army and not just a Navy and an Air Force with trillions of dollars worth of super weapons. We don't get such expensive weapons, because we break them a lot more rapidly. Even worse, the bad people can get close enough that they can whack Soldiers even though they get whacked a lot more.

2. Whacking bad people is dangerous. It's also hard. It's easier and safer to whack the bad people if you do it from the air or the ocean. That's because the bad people can't afford the super weapons that do stuff from there. That's why we have to be nice to the Navy and Air Force; so they will whack bad people with great enthusiasm. Unfortunately, sometimes the Navy and Air Force get too enthusiastic at whacking people and they hurt Army Soldiers and other not so bad people that ended up in the wrong place. That's why we have to spend a lot of effort telling them where we are and what we need them to do. We also try to stay out of their way when they are too busy whacking cities and countries and stuff. We also have to do a lot of explaining to civilian bureaucrats about what they need to do to clean up after the bad people get whacked. This is called Unified Action but it's really like going over to the neighbors to apologize for breaking their window.

3. What makes this really hard is sorting out the not so bad people from the bad people. We try to whack the bad guys and miss the good guys. Of course, the not so bad people are all upset that we are over there whacking people. They want us to go back to where we live and leave them alone, unless the bad people are whacking them as well. They tend to go postal unless we help them keep their families alive and well. The best way to do that is to let their politicians and police do it while they stay out of our way. Unfortunately, their politicians and police screw this up a lot so we have to take time out from whacking the bad guys (or tricking the Air Force and Navy into doing that) and help out the not so bad people around us. Even though they won't like us, sometimes they help us to find the bad people. This also helps us calm down the Air Force guys who would whack everybody at once. This is called Full Spectrum Operations.

4. Even though we don't get the super weapons that the Air Force and Navy get, we still have a lot of stuff and Soldiers. This is called Combat Power. None of this stuff is worth a nickel if somebody isn't in charge. Hopefully they know what they are doing. When they do, it's called leadership and it's really important because most Soldiers just want somebody intelligent to take charge and get them back home in one piece. Inside the Army, we squabble about which part of the Army gets the most stuff. After a while, some really important general comes down and tells us to knock it off and "cooperate". If we don't, the bad people will whack us and even the Air Force won't be able to bail us out. This is called Combined Arms.

5. The Army has a lot of processes that it is still trying to figure out. Don't worry about these things. Just be happy if somebody actually gets you an order that you can understand in time for you to do something about it. If not, at least you can blame the higher headquarters. Most of the time, Soldiers are happy if they get fed, occasionally get some sleep and a shower and things aren't too SNAFU. Soldiers also tend to be lazy unless they are motivated. This is Battle Command.

6. Really important generals are Soldiers too. They just get less sleep than the ordinary Soldiers. They have to try and figure out how to straighten out the big mess that all the politicians made. At the same time they have to decide how to whack the bad people and keep the not so bad people from going postal. If they do a good job, they get sent to the Pentagon. You don't want to be one of them. This is called Operational Art.

7. Dealing with information is hard. The bad people don't play by the rules and they lie... a lot. One screw-up on our part and all the not so bad people get all upset because the bad people make a big deal about it. We need to spend a lot of time telling the not so bad people why we are different than the really bad people. Usually they don't get it. Meanwhile the media people are busy trying to uncover the giant government conspiracy that we are supposed to be running. Also every hacker and pedophile out there is trying to screw up our computers and radios. This makes it really hard. Meanwhile the Air Force and Navy are wondering what's wrong, since it's not so hard for them. Once in a while, somebody on our side figures out what we should be doing. This is called Knowledge Management.

The End

Glossary

Bad People: People that need whacking.

Battle Command: Motivating Soldiers with a cigar in your mouth.

Combined Arms: Using all of your combat power at once and surviving it.

Full Spectrum Operations: Careful whacking combined with lots of explaining.

Operational Art: Getting the Air Force or Navy to deal with the bad people before Soldiers have to.

Not so bad people: Anybody in the area of operations that is not a bad person or a Soldier.

SNAFU: A Twentieth Century term for land operations.

Soldier: Individual speaking in expletives and wearing cool-looking digital camouflage that doesn't blend in with anything.

Unified Action: The opposite of SNAFU.

Whacking: The redistribution or impairment of biological functions intended to eliminate intercellular cooperation within a sentient organism.

Back Cover

This means it doesn't say anything.

-----

Discuss at Small Wars Council

By Clint Watts

Afghan and Arab fighters defeated the Soviet Union by pursuing a strategy that mobilized tribes to entangle a foreign occupier in a hostile land. In rugged terrain, Soviet conventional forces lost their initiative to a ruthless insurgency campaign. Through a decade of fighting, the Soviets ultimately died from a thousand cuts. They entered Afghanistan a world power and returned home demoralized by Muslim guerrillas, hastening the collapse of their regime.

In the 1990s, Osama Bin Laden decided to use a similar strategy against the United States. Spurned by his homeland of Saudi Arabia and vexed by the presence of infidels on holy soil, Bin Laden hoped to provoke the United States into a protracted entanglement in the Middle East. This entanglement, he thought, would increase al-Qa'ida's prestige and recruitment, unify all Muslims, and ultimately exhaust the United States and lead to its withdrawal from the region.

In Somalia, Bin Laden's first attempt to mobilize tribes on his own against the United States failed. While headquartered in Khartoum, Bin Laden deployed advisory teams to Somalia from 1992-1994. Through training, finance and religious indoctrination, al-Qa'ida's insurgency cadres attempted to align the Muslim tribes of Somalia in a common effort to repel Western aid and military intervention. Instead of waging jihad on Westerners, however, al-Qa'ida found itself engulfed in an entanglement of its own, squandering precious resources and trapped in a chaotic morass of state failure.

Al-Qa'ida's venture in Somalia failed for three reasons. First, al-Qa'ida did not understand the local tribal power structure. Bin Laden's cadres found themselves trapped in a web of overlapping alliances in which Somali clans and militias routinely switched sides and were far more interested in focusing on the 'near enemy' of a rival clan over the 'far enemy' of the west. For African Somalis, simply surviving in a failed state took primacy over an ideological battle between outside Arabs and unknown Westerners. Second, al-Qa'ida's brand of Salafi Islam clashed with the local variant of Sufi Islam. Somalis were uninterested in the oppressive Salafi preaching of Arab outsiders over the mystic Sufi strain of Islam worshipped in their society for centuries. Third, al-Qa'ida underestimated the costs of supporting an insurgency in interior Africa. Time and again, al-Qa'ida operatives failed to marshal sufficient resources—water, equipment, weapons—to maintain the loyalty of Somali tribes.

Al-Qa'ida has lost Iraq for the same reasons. First, Iraqi Sunni tribes have turned against the foreign fighters since their presence sustains the U.S. occupation. Second, Iraqi Sunnis were turned off by the restrictive practices of Salafi Islam which al-Qa'ida members implemented in areas they controlled. Third, with the shift in U.S. strategy, the increased intelligence and military action from Sunni tribal alliances, and the more stabilizing efforts of surrounding countries in the region, it has become logistically difficult for al-Qa'ida to maintain a fighting force in Iraq.

Recent U.S. success in defeating al-Qa'ida in Iraq has prompted policy makers and military planners to export this strategy to other theaters, specifically the tribal areas of Pakistan. However, the U.S. should ask itself three questions before continuing: Will the tribes of Pakistan's frontier provinces turn on al-Qa'ida? Probably not. Unlike Somalia and Iraq, al-Qa'ida has operated in the tribal regions of Pakistan for more than two decades and today it is part of the region's fabric, not an outsider. Will the ideology of al-Qa'ida clash with Pakistani tribes? In the past it may have, but today there is a greater overlap between the Deobandi strain of Islam that the Taliban follows and the Salafism of al-Qa'ida. Third, will financial and military inducements to Pakistani tribes translate into pressure on al-Qa'ida's logistics? Unlikely. The tribes in Waziristan have already withstood six years of pressure from Musharraf and al-Qa'ida has more than twenty years worth of supply networks in the region.

The U.S. is correct to seize upon any opportunity to dislodge al-Qa'ida from Pakistan's tribal regions, especially if it involves the use of surrogates. However, it should not use a blanket strategy of alliances with al-Qa'ida's hosts if the social, cultural and geographic conditions make its chances of success unlikely. If it does, U.S. forces might be the ones entangled, stretched logistically, and in conflict with the local ideology. As al-Qa'ida in Somalia and Iraq has learned, this is a bad place to be.

Clint Watts is a former US Army Infantry Officer, FBI Special Agent and Executive Officer of the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. He is Co-editor and Co-Author of Al-Qa'ida's (Mis) Adventures in the Horn of Africa and Program Manager for the FBI-Combating Terrorism Center Education Initiative and Combating Terrorism Center Harmony Program which declassifies and publishes studies based on al-Qa'ida's internal documents captured on the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq.

-----

SWJ Editors Links

Winning Ways - The Belmont Club

Discuss at Small Wars Council

These reports are submitted to Congress pursuant to the section entitled "Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq" of House Conference Report 109-72 accompanying H.R. 1268, Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005, Public Law 109-13.

Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction - Proceedings Report

Organized at the request of Major General (sel.) John F. Kelly, Commanding General of I MEF (Fwd), this senior level roundtable was held over the course of two-days at Quantico, VA on September 19 and 20, 2007. It focused on interagency issues and private sector engagement. The roundtable featured an address by General James Conway, Commandant of the Marine Corps, a briefing on the current status of II MEF (Fwd) from Major General (sel.) John Allen, Deputy Commanding General of Multi National Force -- West, and a private sector initiatives address by Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation, Paul Brinkley. The roundtable also included presentations from the U.S. Departments of Defense, State, Commerce, Treasury, and Justice, the U.S. Agency for International Development, the NGO and IO community, and Washington Post reporter and author of "Fiasco" Tom Ricks.

Strategy Making Iraq Safer Snubbed for Years -- USA Today

A change has swept across Iraq, and attacks using improvised explosive devices, or IEDs, have declined steadily for eight months. Casualties from the bombs are at their lowest point since 2003, the first year of the war. Troops have seized twice as many weapons caches this year as they did all of last.

2007 Person of the Year Runner-up -- Time Magazine

General David Petraeus has not failed, which, given the anarchy and pessimism of February, must be considered something of a triumph. The sketchy progress he has made is the result of equal parts luck and skill. The Sunni tribal revolt against the violent grip of Salafist extremists (most notably, al-Qaeda in Iraq) was already under way when Petraeus arrived. But he was smart enough to encourage and fund the Anbar Awakening, even though Iraq's Shi'ite-dominated central government was opposed. The pacification of Anbar, the most violent province in 2006, has been the signal success of 2007.

Officer Retention: The Army's Other Crisis -- Washington Monthly

In the last four years, the exodus of junior officers from the Army has accelerated. In 2003, around 8 percent of junior officers with between four and nine years of experience left for other careers. Last year, the attrition rate leapt to 13 percent. "A five percent change could potentially be a serious problem," said James Hosek, an expert in military retention at the RAND Corporation. Over the long term, this rate of attrition would halve the number of officers who reach their tenth year in uniform and intend to take senior leadership roles.

The Bottom-Line, an Operational Assessment

Violence Down Dramatically -- The struggle for stability in the Iraqi Civil War has entered a new phase with dramatically reduced levels of civilian sectarian violence, political assassinations, abductions, and small arms/ indirect fire and IED attacks on US and Iraqi Police and Army Forces.

Al Qaeda Tactically Defeated and Trying to Regenerate -- AQ has been defeated at tactical and operational levels in Baghdad and Anbar, but are trying to re-constitute in the north and along Syrian frontier. The Iraqi people have turned on AQI because it overreached trying to impose an alien and harsh practice of Islam inconsistent with the more moderate practices of the Sunni minority. (16% of the population.) The foreign jihadist elements in AQI (with their enormous hatred of what they view as the apostate Shia) have alienated the nationalism of the broader Iraqi population. Foreign intervention across the Syrian frontier has dropped substantially. Most border-crossers are suicide bombers who are dead within four days while carrying out largely ineffective attacks on the civilian population and the Iraqi Police.

Iraqi Security Forces Key Factor in Successful Internal Security -- The ISF is beginning to take a major and independent role successful role in the war. The previously grossly ineffective and corrupt Iraqi Police have been forcefully re-trained and re-equipped. The majority of their formerly sectarian police leadership has been replaced. The police are now a mixed bag--- but many local units are now effectively providing security and intelligence penetration of their neighborhoods. The embedded US training teams have simply incredible levels of trust and mutual cooperation with their Iraqi counterparts. Corruption remains endemic. However, much remains to be done. This is the center-of-gravity of the war.

Central Government Does Not Work -- There is no functional central Iraqi Government. Incompetence, corruption, factional paranoia, and political gridlock have paralyzed the state. The constitution promotes bureaucratic stagnation and factional strife. The budgetary process cannot provide responsive financial support to the military and the police---nor local government for health, education, governance, reconstruction, and transportation. Mr. Maliki has no political power base and commands no violent militias who have direct allegiance to him personally---making him a non-player in the Iraqi political struggle for dominance in the post-US withdrawal period which looms in front of the Iraqi people. However, there is growing evidence of the successful re-constitution of local and provincial government. Elections for provincial government are vitally important to creating any possible form of functioning Iraqi state.

Population and Refugees in Misery -- 4-million plus Iraqi refugees, many of the intelligentsia and professional class have fled to Syria, Jordan or further abroad. In Iraq, medical care is primitive, clean water and adequate food is lacking, and security and justice for the individual Iraqi is weak. There is widespread disbelief that the Iraqi government can bring the country together. The people (and in particular the women) are sick of the chaotic violence and want an end to the unpredictable violence and the dislocation of the population.

Economy Showing Signs of Coming Back -- The economy is slowly reviving, although there is 50% or more unemployment or under-employment. The electrical system is slowly coming back--- but it is being overwhelmed by huge increases in demand as air conditioners, TV's, and light industry load the system. The production and distribution of gasoline is increasing but is incapable of keeping up with a gigantic increase in private vehicle and truck ownership. The Iraqi currency to everyone's astonishment is very stable and more valued than the weak US dollar. The agricultural system is under-resourced and poorly managed---it potentially could feed the population and again become a source of export currency earnings.

U.S. Combat Forces Now Dominating the Civil War - These combat forces have become the most effective counterinsurgency (and forensic police investigative service) in history. LTG Ray Odierno the MNC-I Commander and his senior commanders have gotten out of their fixed bases and operate at platoon level in concert with small elements of the Iraqi Army and Police. Their aggressive tactics combined with simply brilliant use of the newly energized Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT's -- Superb State Department leadership and participation) for economic development have dramatically changed the tone of the war.

Sunni Arabs Want Back In, Before U.S. Forces Depart - The Sunnis Arabs have stopped seeing the US as the enemy and are now cooperating to eliminate AQI -- and to position themselves for the next phase of the Civil War when the US Forces withdraw.

Shia Arabs Holding in Ceasefire, Struggle for Internal Power - The Shia JAM militia under the control of Mr. Sadr have maintained their cease-fire, are giving up rogue elements to be harvested by US Special Operations teams, and are consolidating control over their ethnic cleansing success in Baghdad---as well as maneuvering to dominate the Iranian affiliated Badr brigade forces in the south. However, Sadr lost great credibility when his forces violently intervened in the Holy City of Najaf ---and were videoed on national TV and throughout the Arab world carrying out criminal acts against the pilgrims and protectors of the Shia population.

Dominance of Criminal Elements - There is no clear emerging nation-wide Shia leadership for their 60% of the Iraqi population. It is difficult to separate either Shia or Sunni political factions from Mafia criminal elements-- with a primary focus on looting the government financial system and oil wealth of the nation. In many cases neighborhoods are dominated by gangs of armed thugs who loosely legitimize their arbitrary violence by implying allegiance to a higher level militia.

The Kurds, an Autonomous Successful Region - The Kurds are a successful separate autonomous state with a functioning and rapidly growing economy, a strong military (Both existing Pesh Merga Forces and nominally Iraqi-Kurdish Army divisions), a free press, relative security, significant foreign investment, and a growing tourist industry which serves as a neutral and safe meeting place for separated and terrified Sunni and Shia Arab families from the south.

The Way Ahead

The Central U.S. Military Focus Must be to Create Adequate Iraqi Security Forces - The Iraqis are the key variable. The center of our military effort must be the creation of well-equipped, trained, and adequately supported Iraqi Police and Army Forces with an operational Air Force and Navy. We have rapidly decreasing political leverage on the Iraqi factional leadership. It is evident that the American people have no continued political commitment to solving the Iraqi Civil War. The US Armed Forces cannot for much longer impose an internal skeleton of governance and security on 27 million warring people.

The U.S. Army is too Small and Poorly Resourced to Continue Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan at the Current Level - An active counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq could probably succeed in the coming decade with twenty-five US Brigade Combat Teams. (Afghanistan probably needs two more US combat brigades for a total of four in the coming 15 year campaign to create an operational state--- given more robust NATO Forces and ROE). We can probably sustain a force in Iraq indefinitely (given adequate funding) of some 10+ brigades. However, the US Army is starting to unravel.

Healing the Moral Fissures in the Armed Forces - The leadership of Secretary Bob Gates in DOD has produced a dramatic transformation of our national security effort which under the Rumsfeld leadership was characterized by: a failing under-resourced counter-insurgency strategy; illegal DOD orders on the abuse of human rights; disrespect for the media and the Congress and the other departments of government; massive self-denial on wartime intelligence; and an internal civilian-imposed integrity problem in the Armed Forces---that punished candor, de-centralized operations, and commanders initiative.

Admiral Mullen as CJCS and Admiral Fallon as CENTCOM Commander bring hard-nosed realism and integrity of decision-making to an open and collaborative process which re-emerged as Mr. Rumsfeld left office. (Mr. Rumsfeld was an American patriot, of great personal talent, energy, experience, bureaucratic cleverness, and charisma---who operated with personal arrogance, intimidation and disrespect for the military, lack of forthright candor, avoidance of personal responsibility, and fundamental bad judgment.)

Secretary Gates has turned the situation around with little drama in a remarkable display of wisdom, integrity, and effective senior leadership of a very complex and powerful organization. General Petraeus now has the complete latitude and trust in his own Departmental senior civilian leadership to have successfully changed the command climate in the combat force in Iraq. His commanders now are empowered to act in concert with strategic guidance. They can frankly level with the media and external visitors. I heard this from many senior leaders -- from three star General to Captain Company commanders.

The End Game

It is too late to decide on the Iraqi exit strategy with the current Administration. However, the Secretary of Defense and CENTCOM can set the next Administration up for success by getting down to 12 + Brigade Combat teams before January of 2009 ---and by massively resourcing the creation of an adequate Iraqi Security Force.

We also need to make the case to Congress that significant US financial resources are needed to get the Iraqi economy going. ($3 billion per year for five years.) The nation-building process is the key to a successful US Military withdrawal---and will save enormous money and grief in the long run to avoid a failed Iraqi state.

Clearly we must continue the current sensible approach by Secretary of State Rice to open dialog with Syria, Turkey, and the Iranians---and to focus Arab attention with Saudi leadership on a US diplomatic offensive to mitigate the confrontation between Israel and the Arab states. We must also build a coalition to mitigate the dangers of a nuclear armed Iran.

The dysfunctional central government of Iraq, the warring Shia/Sunni/Kurdish factions, and the unworkable Iraqi constitution will only be put right by the Iraqis in their own time---and in their own way. It is entirely credible that a functioning Iraqi state will slowly emerge from the bottom up...with a small US military and diplomatic presence holding together in loose fashion the central government. The US must also hold at bay Iraq's neighbors from the desperate mischief they might cause that could lead to all out Civil War with regional involvement.

A successful withdrawal from Iraq with the emergence of a responsible unified Iraqi nation is vitally important to the security of the American people and the Mid-East. We are clearly no longer on a downward spiral. However, the ultimate outcome is still quite seriously in doubt.

SWJ Note: The AAR, page 7, states that there are "still 3,000-plus attacks on U.S. forces each month". The number of attacks against all Coalition forces during November 2007 was 1,034. The total for all security incidents to include Coalition and Iraqi Security forces was 2,475. The later has not been seen consistently in Iraq since the summer of 2005.

-----

Read the entire After Action Report

After Action - Jules Crittenden Forward Movement

McCaffrey is Great - Thomas P.M. Barnett Weblog

More on Iraq - The Belmont Club

General McCaffrey Looks at Iraq - PrairiePundit

Discuss at Small Wars Council

The Winter 2007 - 2008 editon of Air and Space Power Journal has been posted and contains several articles that address the use of air power and Air Force capabilities in a Counterinsurgency / Irregular Warfare environment. The first article, by Dr. Conrad Crane, addresses the base-line principles and imperatives for combating insurgency.

COIN / IW

Minting COIN - by Dr. Conrad Crane.

The world became aware of the existence of a coherent body of theory about insurgency as a result of the revolutionary upheavals accompanying the deterioration of empires following World War II. Along with the propagation of ideas from Mao Tse-tung, Ernesto "Che" Guevara, Carlos Marighella, and Vo Nguyen Giap came a corresponding attempt by counterinsurgents to develop their own set of practices and principles. The tenets of these mostly British and French writers were a product of many years of struggle in theaters from Algeria to Malaya to Vietnam, along with observation of many case studies. David Galula, Frank Kitson, Robert Thompson, and Roger Trinquier still have much useful information for current practitioners of counterinsurgency (COIN). Of recent note for anyone trying to learn about COIN from history is the comprehensive work of the Naval Postgraduate School's Kalev Sepp, who looks at scores of historical cases to develop his own list of best and worst practices for COIN.

Air Power and COIN / IW

New USAF Doctrine Publication - Michael Dietvorst.

As Airmen, we have a unique war­fighting perspective shaped by a century-long quest to gain and maintain the high ground. We must be able to articulate Air Force capabilities and contributions to the irregular warfare [IW] fight, with its unique attributes and requirements. Employed properly, airpower (to include air, space, and cyberspace capabilities) produces asymmetric advantages that can be effectively leveraged by joint force commanders in virtually every aspect of irregular warfare." So reads a portion of the foreword by Gen T. Michael Moseley, chief of staff, to the new Air Force doctrine publication: Air Force Doctrine Document (AFDD) 2-3, Irregular Warfare, 1 August 2007.

Air-Minded Considerations for Joint Counterinsurgency Doctrine - Maj Gen Charles J. Dunlap Jr., USAF.

As thorough a job as FM 3-24 / MCWP 3-33.5 - Counterinsurgency does in reviewing previous conflicts involving nontraditional adversaries, it does not incorporate the implications of the psychological dimension of today's airpower. This is not a discussion about the much-debated effect of airpower on civilian morale but about how current precision capabilities influence the morale of combatants. It concerns the targeting of insurgents' "hearts and minds." Understanding how airpower drove the Taliban and their al-Qaeda allies from power in Afghanistan, for example, is essential to designing the effective use of the air weapon in future COIN operations.

Accomplishing this feat proved a considerable challenge. Afghanis, numbered among the world's most fearsome fighters, have enjoyed that reputation for thousands of years. The Soviets sought to tame them with an enormous application of raw combat power but ultimately failed. Yet, the United States managed to oust the Taliban and al-Qaeda from power in a matter of weeks. How? By inflicting helplessness as only the newest developments in airpower can.

What Do We Do Next Time? - Lt Col Rob Levinson, USAF.

According to Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 3-33.5, Counterinsurgency, airpower plays primarily, if not exclusively, a supporting role in counterinsurgency operations such as the ones we are currently conducting in Iraq and Afghanistan. This is not to say that the Air Force's contributions are not significant—only that the Army and Marine Corps do the bulk of the killing, bleeding, and dying. Such is the nature of warfare against small-scale irregular forces, particularly in urban environments. Although we maintain complete air dominance over the battlespace, that alone clearly does not guarantee victory. Rather, the success or failure of the guys wearing muddy boots on the ground will determine the outcome. In the future, however, airpower may become the force of choice—if not by design, then by default.

To Bomb or Not to Bomb? - Maj Jason M. Brown, USAF.

Since the "banana wars" of the early twentieth century, airpower has played an important role in counterinsurgency campaigns. Armed forces have used all forms of airpower—airlift; close air support; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); and so forth—in counterinsurgency campaigns to gain advantages over insurgents. Airpower in the form of air strikes occurring independently of ground operations has proven controversial in small wars. We now call such strikes "dynamic targeting."

Historically, this type of targeting has generally been counterproductive in counter­insurgencies due to real or perceived collateral damage. Yet, the US military and others have good reasons for using airpower for these operations. First, as marines in Al-Anbar Province have seen, kinetic operations are necessary to remove determined extremists in order to conduct security, social services, and economic development. Thus, in certain situations our forces—like NATO's in Afghanistan—will need the advantages airpower brings. Second, in well-publicized cases, air strikes have generated good results for government forces, such as the air campaign against Hamas leaders and the elimination of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Third, the combination of using high-fidelity ISR feeds and guided weapons has given militaries a limited ability to distinguish insurgents from the population and strike them with precision, while mitigating collateral damage.

Irregular Warfare and the US Air Force - Col Robyn Read, USAF, Retired.

Discussion published in a variety of media sufficiently establishes the history of IW as well as the successes and failures of COIN. Pertinent literature has similarly dissected the distance between the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and today. Therefore, using the 2007 Air Force Symposium on Counterinsurgency as a primary source, this article looks to the future and attempts to outline an airpower profile for combating terrorism and insurgency in the continuing long war.

Two fundamental observations drove much of the discussion at the conference. First, the USAF has operated with some success in COIN environments before but has lost the peculiar capacities associated with COIN following drawdowns or conversions after each conflict. This is an unsurprising result, given the fact that budgets for unused tools are a luxury not easily afforded in any era. But the extended lead times required to essentially relearn COIN each time it becomes necessary have significantly affected the USAF's ability to effectively contribute early in the fight. Second, we need to change the USAF's mind-set from fighting COIN to enabling a partner to fight COIN. In the absence of every other alternative, the USAF may actually become the fighter in COIN, but even at that point, the service should adopt the mind-set that it will conduct a holding action while the supported partner spins up its own capacity.

The Paradox of Irregular Airpower - Maj Benjamin R. Maitre, USAF.

The United States Air Force entered the twenty-first century as the most capable purveyor of airpower in history. Following the success of the air campaign in Operation Desert Storm, airpower seemed likely to become a dominant force in all future conflicts. Yet, recent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have called that assertion into question. Today, technologically superior air assets face significant challenges in engaging dispersed and oftentimes unseen opponents. The Department of Defense has directed the creation of an "irregular warfare" capability to operate within the scope of contemporary conflict. The Air Force must determine how modern airpower can successfully engage an irregular opponent.

The Coalition Air Force Transition Team - Maj Gen (sel) Robert R. Allardice, USAF and Maj Kyle "Brad" Head, USAF.

One of the most effective means of fighting and winning the military element of a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment involves training and fielding a competent host-nation security force. Doing so has the dual effect of increasing the legitimacy of the host-nation government, while simultaneously diminishing the requirement for international/coalition forces, whose presence often only exacerbates the situation. The Coalition Air Force Transition Team (CAFTT) has the responsibility for assisting the GOI in fielding and employing an air force capable of helping it fight and win the current conflict while laying the foundation for the air force it will need to defend its national sovereignty well into the future. An incredibly complicated process in itself, building an air force in the middle of a war becomes infinitely more complex.

Other COIN / IW Considerations

Dawn of the Cognetic Age - Lt Col Bruce K. Johnson, USAF.

This article introduces the term cognetic, coined by the author from the root words cognitive (relating to thought process) and kinetic (relating to, caused by, or producing motion). Currently, the term lacks a single, accepted meaning. I intend to use it in a unique way in order to define the essence of today's fast-moving, unrestrained, nonstop global media (the Internet and transnational television) and their effect on public opinion and behavior. To be cognetic is to put thought in motion with impact. Thought takes the form of messages created by specific arrangements of images, sounds, and words. Motion signifies the global media's unrestrained and rapid movement of messages to a target audience. Impact represents the effect on public opinion and behavior caused by perceptions generated by the message. Violent public reactions in the Muslim world to the publication of cartoons depicting Muhammad in the Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten and to Pope Benedict XVI's remarks about Islam epitomize the term cognetic—putting thought in motion with a global impact. Unlike bombs and bullets—the effective conventional weapons of the Industrial Age—imagery, sounds, and words serve as the effective ideological weapons of the Cognetic Age.

Reply to "Defining Information Operations Forces - Lt Col Kenneth Beebe, USAF.

Anyone who has spent time with IO in the joint environment knows that every service thinks about it a little differently. For the Air Force and the Navy, IO deals with networks, especially the global information grid. For the Army, IO has to do with influence, which to that service means psychological operations (PSYOP). In a business that values words, we have chosen to use a vague and ambiguous phrase (information operations) to describe what we do. Perhaps it is time to use terminology that means something specific—and I believe that "influence operations" does a better job of identifying our objective than "information operations." The technical arts known as EW and computer network operations have their primary effects in the physical domains. PSYOP, military deception, and operations security (OPSEC)—the remaining "pillars" of IO—aim to have their primary effects in the cognitive domain. The term "influence operations" succinctly captures those three activities.

Author's Reply to Lieutenant Colonel Beebe's Comment - Maj Paul D. Williams, USAF.

I appreciate the insightful comments made by Lt Col Kenneth Beebe in the preceding article. When we wrote "Defining Information Operations Forces: What Do We Need?" (Summer 2007), my coauthors and I focused on the process of transitioning from how to build an IO force to how to build a cyber force, concentrating on network warfare as the most badly broken piece. We have since served on a team directed by Headquarters USAF to tackle the holistic cyber-force development effort, which involved treating electronic warfare (EW); space; intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and command and control/battle management as having the same importance as network warfare (NW). The Air Force will use NW and EW forces as the defensive and offensive shooters it provides to combatant commanders as cyber capabilities. We agree with Colonel Beebe's view that EW needs to transform to maximize the individual and integrated effects of EW and NW that we can deliver.

Other

Israel's Failure: Why? - Lt Col J. P. Hunerwadel, USAF, Retired.

Israel's 34-day campaign against Hezbollah in the summer of 2006 had people lining up to place blame for its failure even before it ended. Indeed, Hezbollah's survival and increased influence in Lebanon does seem to indicate that Israel suffered at least a partial strategic defeat in that conflict, despite its claims to the contrary. Regardless, many think there is plenty of blame to spread around. Some believe that Israel's overreliance on airpower contributed to the apparent defeat. Commentators such as Phillip Gordon and Ralph Peters concluded, as summarized by analyst William Arkin (who does not share their views), that "airpower can never be decisive in a war, that an airman cannot command an army, and that airmen live with a pernicious desire to win wars at the exclusion of ground forces."

One of the bugbears that airpower's critics trot out to scare the faithful is the concept of the effects-based approach to operations (EBAO), which they also blame for the failure of the campaign. A number of individuals in the antiairpower crowd represent EBAO as a reductionist model of warfare and claim that its supporters believe it can yield magic answers that eliminate the fog and friction of war.

Deeply concerned about the prospect of failure in Afghanistan, the Bush administration and NATO are conducting three top-to-bottom reviews of the entire mission, from security and counterterrorism to political consolidation and economic development, according to American and alliance officials.

The reviews are an acknowledgment of the need for greater coordination in fighting the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan, halting the rising opium production and trafficking that finances the insurgency and helping the Kabul government extend its legitimacy and control.

The article, in drawing a comparison with last year's Iraq review, stated the likely outcome of the Afghan reviews would not be the infusion of additional combat troops as there are none readily available to fill the void. Rather, the likely recommendations will include the appointment of an "international coordinator" to oversee synchronization of NATO's International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) operations and adjustments in ISAF's counterinsurgency strategy to include "soft power" that addresses problems in security, governance and economic aid.

While a "new Afghanistan strategy" will not likely include a surge in combat personnel comparable to the increase seen earlier this year in Iraq, the Washington Post reported Monday that U.S. military commanders in Afghanistan are looking for several additional battalions, helicopters and other resources to confront a resurgent Taliban movement.

Another problem that will hopefully be addressed by the renewed emphasis on Afghanistan operations, and one that could decrease the requirement for additional U.S. military personnel beyond those reported by the Post, is the caveats many NATO countries have placed on their ISAF forces. Various sources have reported that up to a quarter of ISAF's forces maintain up to 50 caveats that seriously restrict missions deemed acceptable and limits the areas of operations these forces will deploy to. The most common complaint is the restrictions these caveats place on locking forces into irrelevant missions in the relatively peaceful north while ISAF forces in the south fight a steadily growing and capable insurgency.

While national caveats are almost impossible to eliminate in any multi-national operation -- it would be nice if ISAF nations could see fit in adjusting the limitations that have placed most of the counterinsurgency burden on U.S., Australian, British, Dutch, and Canadian forces. At the 2006 NATO Riga Summit member nations agreed to lift caveats in a time of emergency, however what constitutes an emergency remains an item of debate.

Hopefully, the reviews will also make recommendations on increasing non-military capabilities essential to any successful counterinsurgency campaign to include those needed to address the governance and economic problem areas mentioned above. While intended as a temporary, transitional asset and often comprising a military component, any increase in the capabilities of the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program would be welcomed. That said, just as there are limits in available U.S. military forces that preclude a significant Afghanistan buildup, shortages in personnel and resources limit a major surge in non-DoD department and agency capabilities.

Turning to COIN blog Abu Muqawama -- AM rightly believes that improvements in resources and strategy are only part of the equation. What brings it all together is a leadership that understands counterinsurgency, ensures subordinates understand, and provides the structure to implement COIN best practices.

While SWJ has little-to-no knowledge concerning the current leadership climate concerning COIN in Afghanistan (and would be reluctant to pass arm-chair generalship opinion even if we did) we do agree with AM on this:

If the senior leadership -- specifically, the senior commander on the ground -- understands counterinsurgency, units on the ground stand a much better chance of executing a coherent COIN strategy. The reason the U.S. military has been able to develop an effective COIN strategy in Iraq -- regardless of whether or not that strategy ends up being successful (it all depends on how the domestic Iraqi political process plays out) -- is simply because Petraeus "gets" it. In David Petraeus, George Bush has found the first capable field marshal of the War on Terror.

Concerning subordinates - from commanding general down to squad leader - we offer up the following quote on why success depends on more than just the guy at the top "getting it" and more than merely getting it at all levels.

"[This] is a political as well as a military war...the ultimate goal is to regain the loyalty and cooperation of the people."

"It is abundantly clear that all political, military, economic and security (police) programs must be integrated in order to attain any kind of success."

- Gen William C. Westmoreland, COMUSMACV, MACV Directive 525-4, 17 September 1965

The quote, swiped from a briefing given by former Petraeus advisor Dr. David Kilcullen using our Vietnam experience as a vehicle for discussion, emphasizes that understanding by leaders is not enough; everyone needs to understand, and we need a framework, doctrine, a system, processes and structures to enact this understanding.

On recent operations in Afghanistan as well as a summary of U.S. expectations -- particularly in regards to NATO we turn to Herschel Smith at The Captain's Journal. On the recapture of Musa Qala Smith asks -- okay, now what?

While it is a positive sign to win back Musa Qala, the operation required heavy air power, and the city was deserted of families after the battle. The battle for Musa Qala is a poster child for the Afghanistan campaign, with the British having entered into a gentleman's agreement with tribal leaders to prevent the return of the Taliban (in agreement for British force departing the area), when the tribal leaders clearly lacking the means to enforce their end of the agreement. Adequate troops didn't exist to perform reconstruction or constabulary operations for Musa Qala, and the question remains how either Afghanistan or NATO will now have the forces necessary to maintain order in Musa Qala when they did not before.

On U.S. expectations:

Defense Secretary Robert Gates sharply criticized NATO countries Tuesday for failing to supply urgently needed trainers, helicopters and infantry for Afghanistan as violence escalates there, vowing not to let the alliance "off the hook."

Gates called for overhauling the alliance's Afghan strategy over the next three to five years, shifting NATO's focus from primarily one of rebuilding to one of waging "a classic counterinsurgency" against a resurgent Taliban and growing influx of al-Qaida fighters.

"I am not ready to let NATO off the hook in Afghanistan at this point," Gates told the House Armed Services Committee. Ticking off a list of vital requirements - about 3,500 more military trainers, 20 helicopters, and three infantry battalions - Gates voiced "frustration" at "our allies not being able to step up to the plate."

More at The Captain's Journal - Review and Analysis of Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Campaign.

Discuss at Small Wars Council