

Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction



REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

Ellis Hall
Marine Corps University
MCB Quantico, VA

September 19-20, 2007



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INSTITUTE
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REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS

I MARINE EXPEDITIONARY FORCE (FORWARD)

EXECUTIVE ROUNDTABLE FOR ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

September 19-20, 2007

Prepared by:

Institute for Defense and Business
Center for Stabilization and Economic Reconstruction
336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, North Carolina 27517-7518
(919) 969-8008
www.IDB.org
www.ctrser.org

Table of Contents

Introduction	i
Agenda	iii
Proceedings – Day One	
• Administrative Remarks – <i>Mr. Mark Cramer</i>	1
• Welcome Aboard – <i>BrigGen (sel.) Larry Nicholson</i>	1
• Introduction – <i>MajGen (sel.) John Kelly</i>	2
• Department of State Update – <i>Amb. Joseph Saloom</i>	2
• Press and Media (Working Lunch) – <i>Mr. Tom Ricks</i>	4
• MNF-W Update – <i>MajGen (sel.) John Allen</i>	6
• USAID Update – <i>Mr. Tom Baltazar</i> ,	9
• DoD Initiatives – <i>BrigGen Joseph McMenamin (Ret.)</i>	10
• S/CRS Perspective – <i>Mr. Larry Sampler</i>	10
• TF BSO Update (Dinner Keynote) – <i>Mr. Paul Brinkley</i>	11
Proceedings – Day Two	
• Capital Availability for Reconstruction – <i>Mr. Marc Chandler and Mr. Russ Diehl</i>	13
• Reconstruction and NGO Community – <i>LTG William Boykin (Ret.)</i>	15
• NGO & IO Panel – <i>LTG William Boykin (Ret.) (Moderator), Ms. Dana Graber, Mr. Michael Khambatta, Mr. Rabih Torbay, and Dr. Ron Johnson</i>	16
• PRT and USAID Update (Working Lunch) – <i>Mr. Marc Chretien and Mr. Thomas Staal</i>	18
• Commandant’s Remarks – <i>Gen James Conway</i>	20
• Interagency Panel on Iraq – <i>Amb. Joseph Saloom (Moderator), Mr. Richard Albright, Mr. Sean Reilly, Ms. Karen Mathiasen, Mr. Ross Kreamer, and Mr. Kevin Taecker</i>	22
• Concluding Remarks – <i>MajGen (sel.) John Kelly</i>	25
• Participant Roster.....	26

INTRODUCTION

As an adjunct to the military and security dimensions of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the U.S. Government has been engaged in a wide-ranging effort to revive the governmental and economic infrastructure in Iraq. The U.S. Department of State is the lead agency for the U.S. Government in working with the Iraqi Government in developing and reconstructing the Iraqi economy. The I Marine Expeditionary Force (Forward) (I MEF (FWD)) provides support to the U.S. Department of State and other civilian agencies, such as the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), by carrying out operations in the areas of economic development and governance. In addition to providing security and supporting these agencies, I MEF (FWD) also conducts civil-military operations that materially contribute to the military and economic mission in the commanders' areas of responsibility.

I MEF (FWD) will soon deploy to the Anbar Province in relief of Multi-National Force - West (MNF-W), which has been there since late 2006. The Roundtable was an opportunity for the I MEF (FWD) Commanding General and his Staff to benefit from the insights and perspectives of the wide range of individuals and organizations involved – including MNF-W – in economic development in Iraq. The roundtable format provided an opportunity for discussion and debate and fostered a sharing of knowledge and experience.

The following organizations and offices participated in Roundtable discussions:

- U.S. Department of Defense
- DoD Office of Special Operations / Low Intensity Conflict
- Business Transformation Agency
- U.S. Joint Forces Command
- U.S. Central Command
- The Joint Staff
- U.S. Marine Corps
- Multi-National Force -West
- U.S. Army
- XVIII Airborne Corps
- U.S. Navy
- U.S. Air Force
- U.S. Army Corps of Engineers
- U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute
- Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
- U.S. Department of State
- USAID
- Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
- U.S. Department of Commerce
- U.S. Department of the Treasury
- U.S. Department of Agriculture
- International Organization for Migration
- International Committee of the Red Cross
- International Medical Corps
- Research Triangle Institute
- Brown Brothers Harriman
- Agility
- Amerivest Group

This strategic level Roundtable included presentations, luncheon speakers, panel discussions, and opportunities for robust question-and-answer sessions throughout the conference. This organizational structure proved effective, and the roundtable accomplished the following primary objectives:

- The I MEF (FWD) senior leadership was presented with a wide range of information on the challenges of and approaches to economic operations in Iraq by a number of the key governmental, non-governmental, and private sector organizations that are engaged in the effort, including a case study briefing from MajGen (sel.) John Allen, Deputy CG, Multi-National Force-West;
- Specific economic development plans, programs and initiatives were discussed, examined, and debated;
- Lessons learned from prior economic development activities in Operation Iraqi Freedom were shared and discussed;
- Regulatory, administrative, and financial impediments to the effective conduct of those economic development activities were identified and actions were initiated to address those issues; and
- Relationships were established among the participants that will facilitate later follow-up on specific items, reach back after deployment, and a continuing interchange of information.

The Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction was supported and funded by the Business Transformation Agency (BTA), Warfighter Support Office, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. The leadership of I MEF (FWD) and the BTA asked the Institute for Defense and Business (IDB) to organize and manage the Roundtable. The IDB is a nonprofit education and research organization that specializes in bringing together the military, the private sector and academia for a variety of educational programs. The venue for the Roundtable, held September 19-20, 2007, was Ellis Hall, Marine Corps University, at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia.

Please note that the following Report of Proceedings is not a verbatim transcript of the event. The contents of this report are not authorized for attribution or citation.

AGENDA

Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction

Wednesday · September 19, 2007		
TIME	TOPIC	SPEAKER
0900-1000	Registration at Ellis Hall	
1000-1005	Administrative Remarks	Mr. Mark Cramer , President, Institute for Defense and Business
1005-1010	Welcome Aboard	BrigGen (sel.) Larry Nicholson , DCG, MCCDC
1010-1020	Introduction	MajGen (sel.) John Kelly , CG, I MEF (FWD)
1020-1115	Department of State Update	Ambassador Joseph Saloom , Advisor to Amb. Satterfield, Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for Iraq
1115-1130	Break/Transit	
1130-1300	Lunch Speaker	Mr. Tom Ricks , Senior Pentagon Correspondent, The Washington Post
1300-1315	Break/Transit	
1315-1500	MNF-W Update	MajGen (sel.) John Allen , DCG, Multi-National Force-West
1500-1515	Break	
1515-1615	USAID Update	Mr. Tom Baltazar , Director of Military Affairs, USAID
1615-1655	DoD Initiatives	BGen Joseph McMenamin , USMC (Ret.), Principal Director, Stability Operations Capabilities, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
1655-1725	S/CRS Perspective	Mr. Larry Sampler , Deputy Coordinator, State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
1730-1800	Transit	Movement to National Museum of the Marine Corps
1800-1900	Tour (optional)	National Museum of the Marine Corps
1830-1930	Reception	
1930-2030	Dinner	
2030-2115	TF BSO Update (Dinner Keynote)	Mr. Paul Brinkley , Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Business Transformation) and Director, Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations in Iraq

Thursday · September 20, 2007		
TIME	TOPIC	SPEAKER
0700-0800	Registration and Continental Breakfast at Ellis Hall	
0800-0915	Capital Availability for Reconstruction	Mr. Marc Chandler , Sr. VP for Global Currency, Brown Brothers Harriman and Professor of Finance, NYU
		Mr. Russ Diehl , Executive Director, Amerivest Trust Group
0915-0930	Break	
0930-1000	Reconstruction and NGO Community	LTG William Boykin , USA (Ret.), Former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (Panel Moderator)
1000-1130	NGO & IO Panel	Ms. Dana Graber , IDP Monitoring, International Organization for Migration
		Mr. Michael Khambata , Deputy Head of Regional Delegation, International Committee of the Red Cross
		Mr. Rabih Torbay , VP of International Operations, International Medical Corps
		Dr. Ron Johnson , Senior VP for International Development, RTI International
1130-1300	PRT and USAID Update (Working Lunch)	Mr. Marc Chretien , former Anbar PRT Advisor
		Mr. Thomas Staal , Director, Office of Iraq Reconstruction, USAID
1300-1400	Commandant's Remarks	Gen James Conway , Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps
1400-1530	Interagency Panel on Iraq	Ambassador Joseph Saloom (Panel Moderator)
		Mr. Richard Albright , Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Department of State
		Mr. Sean Reilly , Chief of Staff for Market Access and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce
		Ms. Karen Mathiasen , Director for the Middle East and North Africa, Department of the Treasury
		Mr. Ross Kreamer , Assistant Deputy Administrator, Foreign Agricultural Service, Department of Agriculture
		Mr. Kevin Taecker , Senior Advisor for International Assistance Cooperation, Iraq Assistance Office, Department of State
1530-1545	Concluding Remarks	MajGen (sel.) Kelly , CG, I MEF (FWD)

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Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction
Marine Corps Base Quantico
Quantico, Virginia

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and Business. Mr. Cramer thanked the speakers and participants for their attendance. He encouraged them to take advantage of the unique opportunity to interact with those from different agencies and backgrounds and to ask challenging questions of their peers.

Day 1
September 19, 2007
Welcome and Administrative
Remarks

*Mr. Mark Cramer, President,
Institute for Defense & Business*

Mr. Cramer called the conference to order and welcomed everyone to the Roundtable and to Marine Corps Base Quantico. Mr. Cramer noted that this Executive Roundtable would be markedly different from the three previous Roundtables held for I MEF (Fwd), 1st Cavalry Division and II MEF (Fwd), given the more senior audience and the more strategic level of review. He recognized the Warfighter Support Office of the Business Transformation Agency in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for its sponsorship of this Roundtable and other important activities in stabilization and economic reconstruction. He cited specifically a reachback website for deploying units that is available through the BTA's website (<https://reachback.bta.mil>) that is managed by the Institute for Defense



Welcome Aboard
*BrigGen (sel.) Larry Nicholson,
Deputy Commanding General,
Marine Corps Combat Development
Command*

BrigGen (sel.) Nicholson praised the recent progress that has been achieved in Al Anbar Province and noted the significant change in the direction of the military's mission in Iraq under the leadership of GEN David Petraeus. In earlier phases, the Marine Corps' mission in Al Anbar was merely to contain the insurgency, which did not promote a sustainable future in the province. Under the current strategy, he said, the accomplishments in Al Anbar have exceeded expectations. The



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governing institutions, coalition forces, and tribal leaders have aligned their efforts to oppose the insurgency and rebuild the province, and the “sheikh’s revolution” has helped build capacity within the local government from the bottom up. Today, he said, Al Anbar is being heralded as a success and a case study for achieving stability from turmoil and extreme insecurity, as those in Al Anbar today report relative calm and growing optimism. On a personal note, BrigGen (sel.) Nicholson reported that his son, who is currently serving Al Anbar, has not heard a gunshot in three months.



Introduction

*MajGen (sel.) John Kelly,
Commanding General
I MEF (FWD)*

MajGen Kelly credited the efforts of all “interagency” team members as contributing to a greatly improved situation in the Anbar Province, but he said that the area remains a work in progress. As recently as 2006, Al Anbar was untamed territory, with a typical one-hour drive from Ramadi to Fallujah routinely encountering several IED strikes and sporadic gunfights.

MajGen Kelly noted that some people at both the State Department and in the Marine Corps were concerned with how

the State Department’s role in the Iraq reconstruction effort would be addressed by speakers at the Roundtable. While participants were able to work through the concerns, it was used as an example of how meetings like this Roundtable were part of a larger effort to dissolve barriers between government officials who should be aligned on the same side of the interagency effort.



Department of State Update

*Ambassador Joseph Saloom,
Advisor to Ambassador Satterfield,
Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State
and Coordinator for Iraq*

Ambassador Saloom noted the great opportunity that was presented by opening this Roundtable only a few days after GEN Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker testified before Congress. Ambassador Saloom had been the head of the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (IRMO) before it became the Iraq Transition Office, and he noted the significant change that had come as a result of the new office. From a reconstruction perspective, he said, there had been a shift in how projects are viewed, from building structures for Iraqis to building the capacity within its leadership and governance structure. He noted that this represented a key step in promoting the sustainability of local governance.

Civil-military operations with a “one-team, one-mission” mentality were identified as imperative. Ambassador Saloom encouraged military participants to rely on their PRTs as a valuable resource that can help find sources of funding for a variety of different needs and projects. Ambassador Saloom noted that the State Department had recruited PRT members to meet specific demands, and he encouraged the military personnel present to be as specific as possible when communicating their needs back to the State Department, as those communications serve as a guide to their recruiting and hiring.

Ambassador Saloom noted that relationships between the military and civilian agency counterparts are usually a product of needs and circumstances in the field but need to be cultivated early on. He recognized the Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction (ERER) as an excellent opportunity for building relationships among agencies and organizations. Ambassador Saloom suggested that the agencies and the military need to get to where they train, study, and work together before going into the field. He saw this as an indispensable component to successful reconstruction missions in the future and noted that it needed to be written into military and agency doctrine.

The Ambassador then turned to the Iraqi perspective, recognizing budget execution as Iraq’s top priority. He noted that the local governments have encountered great difficulty spending the money allocated to them, and he challenged those present to help the Iraqis spend their money effectively on capital projects. In planning and

executing these budgets, he urged the audience to plan for the worst and be willing to do what was necessary to keep projects going. He also noted that promoting a culture that was supportive of preventive maintenance would significantly improve the capacity of government institutions.

Ambassador Saloom closed by noting the importance of learning how to cross organizational cultures and coordinate effectively. He urged the military officers to lean on their PRT counterparts as conduits to local and national governments and a source for funding.

Comment/Question: What can the military do to build and instill sustainability?

The military can help the Deputy Prime Minister set up monitoring units and keep the people at the national level informed about what is taking place in the provinces. Also, USAID can provide assistance to the various ministries with project management, particularly with respect to contracting and procurement. It was noted that the concept of decentralized provincial governance is new in Iraq, and that supporting the idea of local responsibility and solutions is a tangible means to increase capacity.

Comment/Question: What are the primary sources for funds for reconstruction projects?

It was noted that in addition to locating familiar sources of funding, PRTs could help find nontraditional funding sources, such as International Organizations or Non-Governmental Organizations.

Comment/Question: What is being done to grow the next generation of leaders in Iraq?

Education is considered a key to developing the next generation, and a program by the Department of Agriculture to place Iraqis in U.S. universities was cited as a good start. It was noted that this program has encountered problems, including threats and kidnappings upon students' return to Iraq.

Comment/Question: Where is there room to expand efficiency at the PRT and ePRT level?

The concept of PRTs is relatively new, and it continues to evolve to meet needs on the ground. While there is room for improvement and efficiencies to be gained, it is up to those in the field to cooperate in sorting such issues out and build synergy among the military and PRT members.

Press and Media

*Mr. Tom Ricks,
Senior Pentagon
Correspondent,
The Washington Post*

Mr. Ricks opened with a discussion of the role of a journalist. As one who writes regularly about Iraq and the consequences the U.S. military faces by being there, he said it was important to note that reporters measure conflicts with different metrics than the military. As an example, he cited a 2004

incident in Ramadi in which an action the military considered a success also resulted in the death of 12 Marines. Despite the military's sense that it was a tactical victory, the media portrayed it as a defeat. Mr. Ricks instructed those present that through the eyes of the world, success or failure is determined purely from a political perspective not the tactical military perspective.

Mr. Ricks urged the military personnel to assist reporters by providing context and background to place tactical events within the context of a complex war. For example, while transporting a reporter, it would be valuable to explain why a certain military objective is important or what the relationships between tribes are and how they affect planning. Mr. Ricks explained that in a broader but very real context, the media is part of the battlefield. Managing the media is as important as other things that fall within the military's purview. Mr. Ricks presented the idea that embedded reporters represent an opportunity to provide education to the media and the public, but cautioned that some reporters



have hidden agendas. To avoid these complications, he urged the commands to work with their Public Affairs Officers to identify and screen out non-neutral reporters. Time is a reporter's most important resource, so a reporter will be agitated by waiting for flights that do not arrive or are repeatedly rescheduled. Also, placing restrictions on where they can go will hinder their ability to do their jobs. Bad experiences can be

reflected in subsequent articles.

Mr. Ricks predicted that the spring of 2008 would be the most interesting and telling time in Iraq. Mr. Ricks speculated that presidential candidates from the United States may visit Iraq, which means that media interest in Iraq is unlikely to decrease.

Comment/Question: Is the mainstream media telling the truth?

The media has been more accurate than the United States Government or the military, which have been too optimistic in their reports. However, it is important to keep in mind the different terms on which the groups assess the war and measure success. He noted that reporters are pessimistic by nature, and their collective skepticism has been heightened by reports of “steady progress” over several politically difficult years. As a result, the media has become reluctant to report progress. Educating reporters and embeds by providing background information and contextual reasons for different missions will greatly improve the quality of reporting that comes from the AOR. This sort of information is invaluable to reporters and it will have a cumulative effect on the quality of reporting because well-informed articles will push others to higher standards.

Comment/Question: What impact does the purchase of certain news corporations have on politicizing news reports?

We are seeing the “Europeanization” of American media, which historically has been nonpartisan. Rupert Murdoch damaged the notion of a nonpartisan

U.S. media with the New York Post’s rightward tilt, and further by giving Fox television a platform for conservatives. CNN experienced lowered ratings and responded with a left-leaning platform.

Comment/Question: Could you comment on the “General Betray Us” ad in the New York Times? (Note: The New York Times ran an advertisement with a headline, “General Petraeus or General Betray Us? Cooking the books for the White House.”)

This would not have been acceptable in U.S. political discourse 15 years ago. The U.S. likes to put its military professionals on a pedestal, and this ad was an attempt to chip away at that image. Unfortunately, the pedestal of professionalism has been eroded more significantly by the retired general officers going on the news shows to offer their positions on the war and where they supposedly stood prior to the war. This is bad for the military, particularly in the sense that it drags the military into the political arena, an area they are not expert in and will ultimately lose every time to the professionals who are.

Comment/Question: How can the military moderate the tendency of the mainstream media to turn tactical events into events of more strategic importance? For example, a bomb that explodes at a checkpoint is a clear success in the military sense because the suicide bomber did not get through to a marketplace, but a reporter simply tallies the explosion from the perspective of casualties, and then notes that bombs are still exploding in the capital.

Mr. Ricks said this exemplified the importance of providing strategic context to operations and that to an informed reporter the significance of the bomber's failure to enter the marketplace could be identified as an improvement in the security environment. While a reporter's failure to understand the broader context is not the military's fault, it is the military's problem. Mr. Ricks stressed the importance of educating reporters at every opportunity. Mr. Ricks noted that reporting on tactical events is relatively straightforward for most reporters, but that it takes experience to cover events from a more strategic perspective. He observed that he has not seen an emergence of the next generation of "great" reporters in Iraq like there was in the World Wars and Vietnam.

Comment/Question: What traits have you noted in units that are successful versus those that are not as successful?

Successful commanders tend to come from top universities and have more than one university degree. A university education pushes students to think critically, so when these people encounter situations that have played out unfavorably in the past they are more likely to recognize gaps in the standard military solution set. Another quality of successful commanders is "tactical patience," or the ability to recognize that if something is not working, then doing more of the same may not be the best course of action. It is also critical that military

officers learn to examine operations critically and perform Clausewitzian-like analyses of what's going on.

Comment/Question: Did the military shirk part of its mission in Iraq?

Absent critical pre-war debate, and given the separate command structures driving the Marine Corps and the Army, the military and political body in the U.S. ended up with inadequate planning for what to do after initial kinetic operations. There is no field manual for conducting revolutionary operations, and that gap in training, planning and preparedness allowed some commanders to stray from the difficult tasks that were facing them and instead turn to more familiar duties such as patrols and searches.

Multi-National Force-West Update

*MajGen (sel.) John Allen,
Deputy Commanding General
Multi-National Force-West*

MajGen (sel.) Allen opened his presentation by reiterating the value of "tactical patience" that the previous speaker Tom Ricks had discussed. MajGen (sel.) Allen then proceeded to identify three essential roles that the governments at all levels in Iraq must learn to fulfill: 1) passing and enforcing laws; 2) possessing the monopoly on power; and 3) managing the flow of resources from Baghdad to the provinces. MajGen (sel.) Allen advocated a bottom-up



strategy for building capacity, both within the government and the economy. In this context, he noted the extreme importance of electricity and reliable sources of fuel, then commented on how the absence of these resources in Al Anbar had created numerous problems. MajGen (sel.) Allen mentioned that new criminal courts had finally been established earlier this year and judicial officials in the appropriate ministries were identifying prosecutable cases. This is an important milestone in establishing the three governmental roles previously discussed.

MajGen (sel.) Allen then addressed some of the issues that keep him up at night.

The first, he said, was a glass ceiling to economic progress in Anbar caused by a lack of electricity that prevents much more real progress from occurring. As an example, He said that there was one area that had a potential demand for 138 tankers of fuel every three days, but it received only 100 tankers three times a month. This is due in large part to the fact that a poor security situation requires large convoys to escort fuel trucks. Pipelines are not an option, because at this point all the pipelines are inoperative, and are difficult to protect in any case. He then expressed concern that the drawdown of U.S. forces may occur more rapidly than can be covered by the growing capacity of Iraqi Security Forces. While the numbers of ISF forces have increased greatly and are approaching the estimated required levels, he said, the leadership structure and professionalism of the officer corps, as well as logistic capacity, still have a long way to go. In this area, he noted

that “transition” remains “job one” for MNF-W.

He next identified a permanent, constructive economic connection between Ramadi and Baghdad as a necessary development that may not materialize. He also noted that the concept of the Rule of Law taking hold in Iraq will be a great challenge, as there is little tradition to support such structure. Finally, he expressed concern over what might become of the six provinces that surround Baghdad, and the prospect of other states or groups in the region viewing Anbar as a buffer between a failed Iraq and its neighboring countries of Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Syria.

MajGen (sel.) Allen next began to discuss the population dispersion in Anbar and the great importance of becoming familiar with the tribal history of the area. He suggested that a sound understanding of tribal relationships was of paramount importance. He also said that it was critical that incoming units have some way of receiving information on tribes from the outgoing units at all levels. He noted the complexities of tribal claims to land and the different channels for conflict mediation that date back thousands of years. He said U.S. forces need to be sensitive to such history.

MajGen (sel.) Allen noted that building relationships and making friends within the Iraqi leadership structure could prove very beneficial. Patronage, he said, is a concept, known within II MEF as one of the four elements of the tribal ethos that must be mastered by the units. If pursued correctly, it could result in the tribal leadership owing a significant and

lasting debt of honor to the USMC for what it had done and could deliver. MajGen (sel.) Allen mentioned an effort to establish an Anbar-wide Tribal Council by the sheikhs, consisting of approximately 65 members, as a promising development. It's their effort to redefine themselves beyond the purely security effort that had largely driven their across-the-province cooperation, to a provincial relationship poised to leverage economic opportunity and governmental advances.

Comment/ Question: We have heard of the success of the "Anbar model." How "exportable" is this model?

Anbar is a unique province, as it does not suffer from many of the sectarian issues that complicate the political landscape elsewhere. He advised that meeting sheikhs be the first order of business in all municipalities. In addition to their leadership roles, many have construction companies that will be involved in reconstruction projects, both from a business standpoint and the political standpoint. He counseled that Iraqis want to be led by sheikhs but governed by technocrats. Coalition leaders have to carefully balance that reality. He suggested working to facilitate the process of bidding on construction contracts and building capacity for retail and the security and infrastructure to support predictable supply chains. Predictability is requisite for all aspects of stability.

Comment/ Question: What is the level of proficiency in police departments?

In Ramadi and Fallujah, police patrol regularly, rather than sit in the stations. Philosophically, we seek for the police

station to be a place from which they work out of, rather than in. He said that walking a beat is important, as it provides a visible indication of the government's monopoly of force and helps build trust between police and civilians. In Habbaniyah, he said, there is a Ministry of Interior-sanctioned 10-week training program that accepts 750 student police per class, while other police departments in the province allow a two-week course to get the police into the force. The expectation is all police will eventually cycle through the 10 week program at the Habbaniyah Police Training Center. In the interest of building capacity, oversight on the police training programs is being routed through the Ministry of the Interior. Where there is opportunity to advance the experience, responsibility and legitimacy of government institutions, every measure should be taken to further that transition from the coalition to the Government of Iraq. Difficulties in perception and roles of police still persist, as it is difficult to overcome the habit of merely providing order to take on a mission of serving the civil society. He closed by commenting that insurgencies are won by police, not conventional forces.



USAID Update

*Tom Baltazar,
Director of Military Affairs,
USAID*

Mr. Baltazar began his presentation by noting that USAID has evolved significantly in the last five years, largely as a result of its engagement in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Office of Military Affairs is evidence of this evolution. Counterinsurgency (COIN) and counter-terrorism missions present unique opportunities for USAID and the organization is learning a great deal in Iraq and Afghanistan.

PRTs are more prepared than they have been in the past and are growing more synchronized with their partners. USAID has placed a renewed focus on its personnel efforts, especially in their recruiting, hiring and training for specific needs. It has worked to build a closer relationship with DoD through several initiatives and joint training opportunities. Noting that the pending presidential elections make new legislation unlikely, Mr. Baltazar asked that the military be candid with the Department of State and USAID when communicating their needs to the agencies and when describing difficulties encountered when working with the agencies. He said that an open relationship between the military and the

agencies would provide a foundation for legislation that would formalize such relationships.

Mr. Baltazar pointed out the large differences between the cultures of the military and USAID. He described USAID as being project oriented, typically with a much longer timeline than the military is accustomed to. USAID is concerned with the five-to-ten-year outcomes, whereas the military's deployment schedules mean that each unit wants to achieve tangible progress on its watch. He echoed Ambassador Saloom's message that continuity and capacity building must be the ultimate goal for projects. To illustrate this, he cited the experience of top-of-the-line power generation projects deteriorating quickly due to a lack of maintenance and high-grade fuels. This example highlighted the fact that Iraqi maintenance standards are different than American standards, and demonstrated that planners must develop projects that favor Iraqis by following their interests and priorities. Mr. Baltazar expanded upon Mr. Ricks' emphasis on "tactical patience," adding that actions that do not further an overall strategy are probably better left undone.

Comment/ Question: DoD directive 3000.05 and its civilian counterpart, NSPD-44, are intended to confront many of the cross-cultural differences that have so far been discussed. Please comment on what those directives have done to meet their stated goals.

Mr. Baltazar noted that managing those directives consumes much of his work and the implementation of these directives has been two years in the making. While much progress has been

made, the full extent of their charge has yet to be realized. He noted that there is some continuing friction over where responsibility lies for some reconstruction tasks.



**DoD Office of Stability Operations/
Low Intensity Conflicts Update**

*BrigGen Joseph McMenamain (Ret.),
U.S. Marine Corps, Principal Director,
Stability Operations Capabilities,
Special Operations and
Low Intensity Conflict (SO/LIC)*

BrigGen McMenamain picked up where Mr. Baltazar left off in the discussion about Department of Defense directive 3000.05, explaining that it was intended to help the armed forces move from shock and awe to rebuilding and managing low intensity conflicts. Some of the most difficult questions are how to rewrite doctrine to affect desired results. It was suggested that the Joint Staff and “interagency personnel” be called upon to write that language.

SO/LIC also seeks to put things into what BrigGen McMenamain called “Human Terrain Terms”, which he described as the demographic component to



any engagement. He reiterated MajGen (sel.) Allen’s comments regarding the complex nature of tribal structures and the need for sensitivity to such issues, also the need for a mechanism to transfer tribal knowledge to incoming units at all levels.

BrigGen McMenamain then noted that SOLIC/IDC’s hope was to work themselves out of business in Iraq within five years. He explained this as helping to align efforts from all available sources into a parallel manner rather than sequential manner. The key to making this happen is to better integrate the “interagency piece” with the military and get to where plans and operations for all parties involved are drawn up on the same sheet of paper.

**U.S. Department of State Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization Perspective**

*Mr. Larry Sampler, Deputy Coordinator
State Department's Office of the
Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization (S/CRS)*

Mr. Sampler noted that while security is a necessary prerequisite for achieving stability, it is insufficient by itself. Mr. Sampler discussed the vision for S/CRS operations and training, in which operations would be driven by one of three levels, based upon the scope and needs dictated by the situation. Central to these S/CRS operations would be an active response corps deployable within 48 hours, supported by a medium-term response corps

available for deployment on a six- to eight-week notice and a civilian response corps in reserve. All of this is organized within the context of the need for long-term capacity building economic projects combined with short term infrastructure building projects.



TF BSO Update

Mr. Paul Brinkley

*Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
(Business Transformation)*

*Director, Task Force to Improve
Business and Stability Operations in
Iraq*

Mr. Brinkley opened by thanking the Marine Corps for its hard work in a difficult Iraqi province that had been all but written off as lost only a short time before. He attributed much of this success to the efforts of a few key leaders who shaped the direction of the Marine Corps' efforts in the Anbar Province.

Mr. Brinkley then moved to economic issues, noting the severe discontent that arises from unemployment. He argued that during the post-WWII years, America's collective memory of joblessness and despair during the Depression prompted Americans to promote the Marshall Plan as a way of helping Europe recover from WWII.

Mr. Brinkley suggested that America is not as enthusiastic about a contemporary Marshall Plan in that most Americans are so prosperous that they cannot relate to the major problems caused by the high unemployment levels experienced today in Iraq. Security is difficult to achieve in an environment where success seems unavailable to most people. Mr. Brinkley indicated that he shares a similar view of the world as described in Thomas P.M. Barnett's *The Pentagon's New Map*, where countries are defined as "haves" and "have nots," and access to information plays a central role to the overall prosperity of a state.

Mr. Brinkley described the activities of the Business Transformation Agency and the OSD and certain economic programs support the military mission in Anbar. Mr. Brinkley said the Task Force is working to reinvigorate a moribund industrial base and seeks to increase the available pool of jobs as a means both to distinguish people who violently oppose American interests from those who do so primarily to provide for their families, and to jump start the manufacturing and industrial sectors of the economy. Mr. Brinkley suggested that Iraq has untapped wealth in agriculture, industry, and raw materials, and believes that jobs associated with these sectors are the key to stability in Iraq.

Mr. Brinkley described the work at the Marine Corps University's Institute for Lessons Learned as integral to building the base of information necessary for recovery in Iraq. He ended by noting his belief that it is time for businesses to take the kinds of bold actions that will pay significant dividends in the future. He compared the situation in Iraq to that

of China in 1985, when risky endeavors resulted in handsome rewards for those who could cultivate the necessary relationships and navigate the challenges of an uncertain environment.



MajGen (sel.) John Allen describes MNF-W's activities in the Anbar Province to two Executive Roundtable participants at the National Museum of the Marine Corps.



MajGen Donald Gardner (Ret.) (right) talks with Robert Love, Director of Operations, Task Force to Improve Business and Stability Operations, and Mark Cramer, President of the Institute for Defense and Business, before dinner at the National Museum of the Marine Corps.



The participants mixed with their peers at the Museum for dinner.



The National Museum of the Marine Corps in Quantico, Virginia.

Day 2
September 20, 2007

Capital Availability for Reconstruction

*Mr. Marc Chandler
Senior Vice President for Global
Currency,
Brown Brothers Harriman, and
Professor of Finance,
New York University*

Mr. Chandler opened by noting that the United States has spent \$2.3 trillion on international aid projects since the 1950s, even though no research proves that public aid is the best investment. He said that he believed that some of the most successful aid programs had ignored policies set by the International Monetary Fund, United Nations and World Bank. Mr. Chandler said he did not mean to undercut the importance of public resources, but he said that he wanted to be clear that it was his belief that the combined results of public and private investments can be more effective than both types of funds operating independently.

Mr. Chandler spoke of the need to invest wisely and noted the difference realized today from comparable education investments made in South Korea and Brazil. South Korea focused its investments on education at the primary levels instead of at universities and has seen a much higher return on investment than Brazil. He views education as central to change, and added that teaching women to read and write is one of the most



revolutionary steps that can be taken. In their role as primary caretakers, he said, women will teach their children and literacy will proliferate at a much higher rate.

Mr. Chandler said the main lesson to be learned from most failed aid efforts is that people are responsive to incentives. He suggested that Feedback, Accountability and Transparency (FAT) be guiding principles in designing an incentive structure in new projects. Capital markets intuitively require these elements, and provide flexibility and creativity to the marketplace.

Mr. Chandler acknowledged that working within the confines of Middle Eastern and Islamic legal and banking structures can be incredibly difficult. From the legal perspective, certain laws should be revised to provide the opportunity for more personal risk and allow the possibility of failure. Similarly, they must provide a means to recover from failure and begin anew. On the banking side, creative people have managed to work within an Islamic structure for many years, this can be difficult to grasp from a western perspective. Mr. Chandler reiterated the importance of tactical patience, reminding everyone that even in the U.S. it took many years for laws supportive of entrepreneurship to evolve.

Mr. Russ Diehl
Executive Director, Amerivest Trust

Mr. Diehl noted that the priorities for project management must be to complete projects and establish the means to maintain a facility and its assets, such as machinery. This begins in the budgeting phase, when the cost to complete a project must be followed by identifying the costs of maintenance and where such funds will come from. This is a significant part of building capacity, as it is easier to maintain than to build.



Mr. Diehl suggested that an enterprise fund of \$50 million would be a tremendous help in Iraq. He recognized identification of money sources as being extremely valuable and encouraged the military personnel to lean on various agencies for help with both fund identification and also in working with Iraqis on budget creation. He noted that enterprise funds in Poland and Hungary had been very successful, but added that these countries had significant prior experience with capital markets and an understanding of how money works. Other cultures are very different, in part because some cultures have no sense of the “time value of money,” and therefore it is ignored.

Comment/ Question: This comes back to building capacity within the Iraqi

Government, which has been the focus of the 2007 operations. Right now, pushing money out throughout the country is a difficult job, and one that the Marines would like to transfer to provincial governments. To reach this objective, we involve Iraqis at every level and at every possible opportunity. To date, we have provided funds for sound plans, regardless of their origin. Such proposals often came from the sheikhs. The Marine Corps will no longer approach funding projects in this manner, as proposals must now be vetted through the provincial government. Giving Iraqis responsibility for this process, as well as oversight on the resulting projects, is the only way to train the government to govern. This transition will be a large focus of I MEF’s mission in 2008.

Comment/ Question: In Iraq, a significant hurdle is the time required to open a business. What can be done in the U.S. in a week can take three months in Iraq.



Reconstruction and NGO Community

LTG William Boykin (Ret.)

United States Army

Former Deputy Under Secretary of

Defense for Intelligence

(Panel Moderator)

LTG Boykin pointed out that successful COIN operations hinge on providing more for the populace than the insurgency in every phase. He cited Hezbollah's success in this role, in that it provides essential services and relief, a key to building general support. Essential to successful COIN is the recognition that an insurgency exists, which the U.S. was slow to grasp in Iraq. A key lesson from Vietnam was that soldiers should go to local leaders and ask first what the military could do to enhance daily life, and then move forward with larger-scale projects. In Iraq, tribal leaders were engaged early on and asked to stay out of the fight in return for being beneficiaries of the reconstruction process. The passing of time has frayed those relationships, so it is important that the United States deliver even modestly for now.

LTG Boykin proposed the establishment of a "cell" of personnel from varying backgrounds to build working relationships across the NGO, private sector, military and Iraqi groups. Iraq's private sector has great potential if it can

be mobilized. LTG Boykin estimated that there was \$1.3 trillion available through corporations who have interests in the region, but he noted that figuring out how to put those dollars to work was going to be a challenge.

LTG Boykin then moved his discussion to the utilization of information. He noted that there was no comprehensive national intelligence framework in place. He stated that paying close attention to situations and their meaning within an overall context could play a large role in the minds of observers. Exercising patience is important, as truthful information directed at the right place and time can be the most effective weapon. LTG Boykin suggested that the United States is losing the intelligence war in that we have not been using what we know as effectively as the enemy has. As one example, he said, insurgents have won a battle in the information campaign regarding suicide bombers. Despite longstanding religious beliefs that oppose the taking of innocent life, he said, suicide bombings have become an honorable path to heaven. LTG Boykin stressed that when used properly, information campaigns can be a substantial force multiplier.



NGO & IO Panel

*Ms. Dana Graber
Internally Displaced Persons
Monitoring,
International Organization for
Migration (IOM)*

Ms. Graber emphasized the importance of NGOs maintaining independent positions in any region where NGOs are engaged. IOM's mission includes providing medical assistance and occasionally moving individuals out of a country so they can receive necessary medical services. IOM plays a role in helping displaced persons (DPs) find employment and mitigate the dangers and uncertainties that are closely tied to populations that have been displaced by conflict. She discussed some factors that make life difficult for DPs, such as the exodus of trained medical personnel and the difficulty of finding employment in new homes in cities where even long-term residents struggle to find work. The IOM seeks to mitigate these risk factors by supplying simple emergency supplies like food, water, gas cans, and medical supplies.



*Mr. Michael Khambatta
Deputy Head of Regional Delegation,
International Committee of the Red
Cross*

Mr. Khambatta expanded on Ms. Graber's theme of the importance of independence to the IO/NGO community. Noting that he did not expect his comments to be well received by the Marines, he said that his organization is not on anyone's side, but instead provides assistance where needed. ICRC will provide medical assistance wherever it is needed, with its primary goal being ensuring the availability of medicine to civilians. He noted that the ICRC views injured or wounded individuals as non-combatants, and therefore they also are entitled to treatment, even if they are in fact the enemy. Mr. Khambatta again stressed that organizations like the ICRC or IOM must maintain a neutral stance to have a chance at doing their jobs while operating in the difficult environments in which they are called to serve.

Having firmly established the need to remain neutral, he described the ways that this position impacts the ICRC's relationship with military organizations. Communications tends to be one way between the military and IOs because of that neutrality requirement. While IOs may offer limited assistance in certain

circumstances, they have to know when an open relationship would be damaging. In those circumstances, it is best to keep communications private and often one-way. He said that IOs are particularly interested in what would happen to them and their efforts when PRTs and troops withdrew from a particular area. He extended an invitation for collaboration to those present.

Comment/Question: A military participant responded by noting that there was a significant need to discuss such matters, and that it was in their mutual interest.

It was noted that the difficulties encountered by Iraq's central government creates significant problems, as efforts to provide assistance through national Ministries have been unsuccessful. There were comments that Regional Ministries play a more direct role in administering funds and supplies on a local level.



*Mr. Rabih Torbay
Vice President of International
Operations, International Medical Corps*

International Medical Corps has been in Iraq since early 2003 as a provider of humanitarian aid relief. Each IO or NGO is different. Some organizations will avoid all contact with the military,

some are divided on the issue, and others are willing to work with the military. Mr. Torbay noted that effective communication with NGO/IO groups requires sensitivity to the independence issue and an understanding that their representatives do not like to be bundled with or confused with the UN or Civil Affairs Groups. They do not like to be referred to as “force multipliers,” as it provides a conceptual link to the military and thereby makes their jobs more difficult. Mr. Torbay then described the strengths inherent to most NGO/IO groups, such as the fact that their representatives are very grassroots and do hands-on work with local populations. These organizations have personal relationships throughout their territories, and as a product of this culture, they are most responsive to others when engaged on a personal level. Establishing personal relationships with NGO/IO members can go a long way towards building effective working relationships between organizations.



*Dr. Ron Johnson
Senior Vice President for International
Development, RTI International*

RTI is a USAID contractor that has been working in Iraq since 2003. RTI's mission includes building capacity within government and acting in a manner to support government

operations. Their experience has taught them that trying to change a governmental structure from a centralized government to a democratic one is very difficult both psychologically and structurally. There is merit to showing Iraqi leaders what the benefits are to creating this type of government.

RTI has been involved in this effort through the Local Governance Program, which can be found online at www.LGP-Iraq.org. This program focuses on building capacity through fiscal education. Budgeting, moving money, and executing budgets are the foundations of a functioning government and there is a long way to go in Iraq, however, history indicates that if these functions can be met, other functions of governance familiar to the developed world will follow by necessity.

Comment/Question: MajGen (sel) Allen thanked the panel for their participation in the EREER and extended an invitation to improve future relations with these groups, in part because of their shared objectives. He noted that it is potentially damaging to have the military involved in all the roles it has been in the past year. He cited the role of building inspector as one that the military would like to avoid and that it is now being delegated to Iraqis, sometimes with the help of U.S. agency personnel.

Comment/Question: What changes can be made to allow for better synergy between the U.S. government and NGOs and IOs?

IOM has received requests in the past from USAID to work with PRTs, providing information on the efforts of

other organizations. IOM representatives are comfortable sharing information regarding IOM's activities, but like most other IOs and NGOs, it does not feel comfortable providing information to the military regarding the activities of other organizations.

Comment/ Question: How do you communicate with commanders?

The panelists agreed that they occasionally communicate through the PRTs, but more often they will simply try to go straight to the Commanding General in a certain area. If that is not possible, they will utilize different strategies for communicating with a command, and simply see which ones are effective.



PRT and USAID Update (Working Lunch)

*Mr. Marc Chretien
former Anbar PRT Advisor*

Mr. Chretien noted the importance of recognizing that PRTs are organized differently from the military, following a flat and collegial structure rather than a hierarchical one. Cultural differences in organizations result in many PRT members not understanding the military's organizational structure, despite the fact that the two are

intimately tied to one another. He noted that PRTs are dependent upon the military for security and other types of support, but prefer to operate as independently as possible.

PRT representatives focus on creating relationships, which is critical in dealing with a local populace. An Iraqi is not going to do something for you because you are a colonel or a major. Instead, he said, they will do favors based on friendships. Developing these sorts of relationships takes months, which requires investing a large amount of time getting to know people on the ground.

Mr. Chretien emphasized the value of returning favors. While noting that detainee releases are controversial, he suggested that they can go a long way towards creating goodwill with a community. Mr. Chretien also addressed the state of the Iraqi government. He said it was his belief that, at this stage, it is critical that provincial governments simply function, even if in an inefficient or incomplete manner. The main function of the national government for now should be distributing oil revenues fairly to the provinces.

Mr. Thomas Staal
Director, Office of Iraqi Reconstruction,
USAID

Mr. Staal reiterated a theme heard from several speakers, that there is a need to focusing on fostering Iraqi capacity and instilling in them a sense of ownership in the projects that the Coalition is coordinating and paying for. He also suggested that the Coalition needed to reprioritize its projects, based primarily on the needs of the Iraqi people.

Mr. Staal told the audience that USAID, through the interagency personnel in the PRTs, brings a remarkably valuable set of capabilities for use by units deployed to Iraq. These capabilities include the Community Stabilization Program, which concentrates efforts on employment and training and has a grant component to support additional work in this area.

Mr. Staal provided another reference to the value of patience in such operations, as he noted that initiatives that have been undertaken over the last four years are just now starting to bear fruit in the Anbar Province.





Commandant's Remarks

*Gen James Conway, Commandant,
U.S. Marine Corps*

Gen Conway described at length his understanding of Al Qaeda's strategy, by which it hopes to force everyone to convert to its version of Islam. He outlined his concept of the threat that Al Qaeda still poses to Western interests. Al Qaeda has phased operations that include removing all Western influence from the Middle East, turning its followers against Middle Eastern governments that have been dealing with Western governments, bankrupting the U.S. economy, destroying or controlling all oil in the region, destroying Israel, and finally, attacking Western Europe and the United States.

The Commandant expressed his growing concerns relating to Iran's influence in Iraq. Iran's Hezbollah model is being exported to Iraq and Afghanistan, which enables Iran to use proxies against Coalition forces. Gen Conway noted that Iran's President has also been increasingly vocal about his intention to fill any void left by a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq or Afghanistan.

Improving the economic situation in Iraq is the Coalition's next achievable step and is one of the essential components of national and regional stability. As a

general rule, Gen Conway said, the necessary components of a stable society are economic growth, sufficient arable land, access to water, people who can be educated, products that can be exported, and political leadership. He noted that Iraq has all of these components.

Gen Conway then noted that there had been considerable discussion and planning regarding the pacing of a U.S. troop drawdown from Iraq whenever that takes place. While the Joint Staff has considered many possible scenarios, he said that in his view, the most likely one would be expected to take approximately 20 months. He remarked that the extended war is causing significant strain on the military, and there is a strong desire to transition much of the responsibility for Iraq to Iraq's security forces.

Of the many lessons learned from operations in Iraq, Gen Conway noted that one of the most important is the need for additional interagency personnel who can take responsibility for jobs that should not belong to the military. These lessons will be central to the development of AFRICOM, which he foresees will become a combatant command divided between interagency personnel and the military.

Looking to future Marine Corps operations, the Commandant said that several possible scenarios are being considered. He said that he favors a significant change in the "stance" of the Marine Corps by moving the Marine Corps out of Iraq totally and into Afghanistan, where the Marines Corps' ability to maneuver and operate in difficult terrain would be put to the best use.

The Commandant concluded by pointing out that whatever plans and decisions are made at this time, they must be designed to survive the upcoming change in administrations, without regard to the possibility that this change will include a change in the control of the government by political parties.



Gen Conway and Ambassador Saloom discuss unity of effort and cross-cultural issues that the Department of State and the Marine Corps deal with in theater.



Participants mingle prior to the Commandant's talk.



Panelists from left to right: Amb. Joseph Saloom, Mr. Richard Albright, Mr. Sean Reilly, Ms. Karen Mathiasen, Mr. Ross Kreamer, Mr. Kevin Taecker

Interagency Panel on Iraq

Ambassador Joseph Saloom

Panel Moderator

Advisor to Ambassador Satterfield,

*Senior Advisor to the Secretary of State
and Coordinator for Iraq*

(Panel Moderator)

Ambassador Saloom introduced the panel and stated that its purpose was to discuss the role of the various U.S. government agencies active in Iraq.

Confusion over the role of the “interagency effort” is highlighted by the fact that there is no such entity as the “interagency,” he said. Many speakers and participants in the Roundtable had referred to the “interagency” as though it were its own entity.

A major difficulty in obtaining the cooperation of various agencies, he said, was the fact that there is no person or organization that serves in an overall administration and coordinating role. Instead, he said, the missions are more like pickup games, with each agency pitching in its piece when necessary or when called upon. He noted that there are some aspects to the way things work currently which need to change,

particularly the fact that agencies need to have sections that are more expeditionary in nature.

Comment/Question: Why is there no “interagency”?

Answer: While there is a lot of interaction that takes place among the various agencies, there is no one ultimate source of power or decisions. Ambassador Saloom said that he knows that there are approximately a dozen meetings each week, as various agencies operating in Iraq try to coordinate things through his office. In the broader context, however, there is no central source of authority that controls this interagency effort.

*Mr. Richard Albright,
Bureau of Population,
Refugees and Migration,
Department of State*

Mr. Albright provided an overview of the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration, noting that its focus is on civilian conflict victims. He said that there are 2.2 million internally displaced persons and 2.2 million refugees. Most of these people, he said, have been displaced due to sectarian violence, and most of them are from Baghdad.

The impact of these refugees is enormous, creating instability in the region due to the strain they place on the relations between Iraq, Syria, and Jordan. Burdened by the great inflow of refugees, both Syria and Jordan have closed their borders to more refugees, creating chaos at the borders. This leads to more internally displaced persons, which drains Iraqi resources.

Mr. Albright urged those present to be sensitive to the security concerns of all parties involved in the Iraq War, especially the civilians who are providing assistance. He also suggested that people who are planning new projects consider the impact of the project on displaced people. For example, he said, the demolition of a public building that is damaged beyond repair but nonetheless occupied by squatters may not be the preferred course of action. He asked that the priorities of all parties be kept in mind and noted that displaced persons often have no one to speak for them.



Mr. Sean Reilly, Chief of Staff for Market Access and Compliance, International Trade Administration, Department of Commerce

The objective of the Commerce Department's Market Access and Compliance office is to eliminate foreign barriers to trade and obtain market access for American firms and workers. As a component to this mission, the Department of Commerce wished to maintain an independent status similar to the NGO and IO community. He explained that commercial independence from military operations is important to thwart efforts by propagandists to foster the concept that the U.S. or any other

nation has been engaged in the war as a means of profiteering.

Mr. Reilly said that re-establishing trade is vital to creating stability in Iraq, both today and in the future. He invited input from those in the military regarding commercial opportunities and promised help wherever available. His department hoped that the military can become more involved in encouraging private sector businesses to contribute from an economic standpoint to the U.S. effort in Iraq. Progress has been made in this arena by the TFBSO's initiative to reopen several of the SOEs, but Mr. Reilly noted that the private sector could be doing more.

Ms. Karen Mathiasen, Director for the Middle East and North Africa, Department of the Treasury

The Department of Treasury was very involved in Iraq in the early phases, helping to reconcile many of Iraq's financial matters that were of immediate concern. She said that the fall of Saddam's regime meant there were a number of important things which needed to be done. Some were as simple as reprinting and exchanging old currency, while others were as complicated as moving tons of currency around the country to provide liquidity to the Iraq economy. She said that all of the old currency had Saddam's image, so printing new currency and keeping a lid on inflation required intervention from financial experts. She said that the Treasury Department contributed its knowledge on fiscal policy matters, so it feels that it has a positive relationship with the Department of Defense.

Ms. Mathiasen noted that there is much work still required on issues related to capacity building. Moving money through the Iraqi bureaucracy is not as efficient as it needs to be, so the Treasury Department is helping build capacity and enhance efficiencies in budgeting, transferring, and spending money.

Finally Ms. Mathiasen noted that she was quite familiar with Mr. Brinkley's Task Force and its mission to open many State Owned Enterprises (SOEs). While the Treasury Department initially had been opposed to the concept of restarting SOEs, OSD personnel had done a good job of identifying operations that could contribute to the employment picture while operating at a profit, instead of simply draining national resources as some SOEs had in the past. While the Treasury Department does not believe that SOEs present a long-term solution, it recognizes that certain projects meet specific short-term needs.

*Mr. Ross Kreamer,
Assistant Deputy Administrator,
Foreign Agriculture Service,
Department of Agriculture*

The Iraqi agriculture sector is an incredibly viable part of the economy. It is the second largest contributor to GDP at 7% and employs 25% of the population, making it the largest single employer. These numbers allow room for growth, and therefore demand attention and proper management. The

Agriculture Department's strategy is to build the industry towards global market integration, which he said requires much more than simply growing crops. Attention must be paid to the regulatory framework supporting the industry and awareness of trade policies.

The USDA has launched the Iraq Agricultural Extension Revitalization Project (IAER) with the objective of building capacity around university training and stakeholder responsibility and cooperation. The IAER also supports specialized training opportunities and is working with the ministries and other regional partners to expand the industry. USAID has also been active through the PRTs and plans to have 25 agriculturally oriented advisors deployed by the end of 2007.

*Mr. Kevin Taecker,
Office for UN Political Affairs,
Department of State*

Mr. Taecker commented on the difficulty of mobilizing regional aid and investment resources due to the poor perception and weak support that President Maliki's government has in the region and abroad. While capacity-building missions are vital to unleash some of Iraq's investment potential, the challenge that many prospective donors

face is that their desire to positively impact the population will be undermined by corruption or a perception that they have unacceptable political agendas or alignments. These fears represent risks



that many are unwilling to accept with their investments. For this reason, it is important that the capacity to govern competently be created within the Iraqi government, and further that this competence be transmitted to other regions in order to rebuild investor confidence in Iraq. Mr. Taecker noted that an ancillary benefit to investment from outside Iraq is that the infusion of money would serve as a strong counterweight to the actions of those who continue to seek instability in Iraq. As more people throughout the region have a financial stake in the success of Iraq, the consequences of instability will become more severe, and fewer individuals and organizations will be sympathetic to disruptive actors and causes.



Closing Remarks

*MajGen (sel.) John Kelly,
Commanding General,
I Marine Expeditionary Force
(Forward)*

MajGen (sel.) Kelly thanked MSTP and those who participated in the Executive Roundtable for their involvement. He considered the Roundtable a success and was impressed by the questions and interaction among all the groups present. He closed by noting that the military, by its nature, tends to be the proverbial 800-pound gorilla in a room, and that given its deep-seated assertive culture, the military can be hard to get along with. MajGen (sel.) Kelly acknowledged that at times the military had been less than gracious and accommodating in dealing with personnel from U.S. agencies in earlier phases of the Iraq War, and he urged all of the Executive Roundtable participants take whatever lessons they could from the “other side.”

MajGen (sel.) Kelly closed by noting that all participants owed those who have died in Iraq their best efforts to win the war, and that the military needs the agencies and NGOs in order to accomplish that objective.

Executive Roundtable for Economic Reconstruction PARTICIPANT ROSTER

Mr. Richard A. Albright

Director
Office of Assistance for Asia and the
Near East, Bureau of Population,
Refugees, and Migration
U.S. Department of State
Suite L-505
2401 E St. NW
Washington, DC 20522
Phone: (202) 663-1063
Fax: (202)663-1061

BGen Randolph D. Alles

U.S. Marine Corps
Assistant Wing Commander
Third Marine Aircraft Wing
P.O. Box 452038
MCAS Miramar
San Diego, CA 92145
Phone: (858) 577-7299
anthony.goode@usmc.mil

BG Daniel B. Allyn

U.S. Army
Chief of Staff
XVIII ABN CORPS and Ft. Bragg
2175 Reilly Road
AFZA-CS
Ft. Bragg, NC 28310-5000
Phone: (910) 396-3201
daniel.allyn@conus.army.mil

Mr. William T. Anderson

Senior Defense Analyst
Battelle
Phone: (540) 850-4213
binche57@yahoo.com

Maj Jennifer Anthis

U.S. Marine Corps
Coordinator
Civil Military Operations
3094 Upshur Ave
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 784-1356
jennifer.anthis@usmc.mil

MAJ Michael B. Bailey

U.S. Army
Aide-de-Camp to the CG
USACAPOC(A)
2929 Desert Storm Drive, Stop C
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9110
Phone: (910) 432-7561
Fax: (910)432-7121
baileymi@soc.mil

Mr. Thomas P. Baltazar

Director
US Agency for International
Development
1300 Pennsylvania Ave
Washington, DC 20523
Phone: (202) 712-5040
Fax: (202)216-3122
tbaltazar@usaid.gov

Mr. Jason Barber

Research Associate
Institute for Defense & Business
336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone: (919) 969-8008
barber@idb.org

LtGen Buck Bedard (Ret.)

U.S. Marine Corps
Senior Mentor
Joint Warfighting Center,
Joint Forces Command

LtCol Grady A. Belyeu
U.S. Marine Corps
Comptroller
I MEF (FWD)
Phone: (760) 763-6677
Fax: (760)763-6676
grady.belyeu@usmc.mil

LTG William Boykin
U.S. Army (Ret.)
Former Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Intelligence

Mr. Paul A. Brinkley
Deputy Under Secretary of Defense
for Business Transformation
Task Force to Improve Business and
Stability Operations in Iraq
3600 Defense Pentagon
Room 3D136
Washington, DC 20301-3600
Phone: (703) 695-9715
jennifer.denmon@osd.mil

Mr. Ted Edward Bratrud
Senior Director
Counterpart International (NGO)
Phone: (703) 242-2644
Fax: (202)296-9679
tbratrud@counterpart.org

LtCol Robert V. Carr
U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy
Civil Military Operations
3094 Upshur Ave
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 432-4753
Fax: (703)784-4074
robert.v.carr@usmc.mil

Mr. Marc Chandler
Senior VP, Brown Brothers Harriman
Associate Professor, NYU
Phone: (212) 493-8800
marc.chandler@bbh.com

Mr. Marc Chretien
Former Senior Consultant
IRMO/ITAO
Phone: (703) 528-7024
marc-chretien@msn.com

LtGen George R. Christmas (Ret.)
U.S. Marine Corps
Senior Mentor
MSTP and JWFC
Phone: (540) 720-2216
Fax: (540)720-6008
gchristmas@aol.com

Capt Scott M. Clendaniel
U.S. Marine Corps
Aide-de-Camp to Commanding General
I MEF (FWD)
I MEF, Box 5553000
Camp Pendleton, CA
Phone: (760) 725-9102
scott.clendaniel@usmc.mil

Gen. James T. Conway
U.S. Marine Corps
Commandant of the Marine Corps

Mr. Mark C. Cramer
President
Institute for Defense & Business
336 Meadowmont Village Cir
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone: (919) 969-8008
Fax: (704)943-9393
cramer@idb.org

Col Lewis A. Craparotta
U.S. Marine Corps
CO, RCT-1
I MEF (FWD)
Phone: (760) 763-2191
lewis.craparotta@usmc.mil

Maj. Drew Cukor
U.S. Marine Corps
Iraq Analyst
Marine Corps Intelligence Activity
2033 Barnett Ave.
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 432-7234
dcukor@mcia.osis.gov

Col Raymond C. Damm
U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Director
MAGTF Staff Training Program
2042 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 432-4720
Fax: (703)432-4719
raymond.damm@usmc.mil

1stLt Jeremy Davis
U.S. Marine Corps
Aide-de-Camp DCG
I MEF (FWD)
Box 5553000
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 846-3732
jeremy.s.davis@usmc.mil

LtCol Jeff S. Devlin
U.S. Marine Corps
CENTCON Liaison
USAID
Phone: (484) 554-3862
jdevlin@usaid.gov

Mr. Russell R. Diehl
Executive Director
Amerivest Trust Group
Phone: (949) 955-2000
russ@amerivestrust.net

Col Daniel A. Donohue
U.S. Marine Corps
MAGTF Staff Training Program
(MSTP)
2042 South St
Quantico, VA 22406
Phone: (301) 283-6414
daniel.a.donohue@usmc.mil

CDR Richard Dromerhauser
Branch Chief
J-5, Joint Staff
The Pentagon
Washington, DC 20318-5000
Phone: (703) 697-0497
richard.dromerhauser@js.pentagon.mil

COL Peter Edmonds
U.S. Army
Fire Support Coordinator
XVIII Airborne Corps
HQ XVIII Abn Corps
Fort Bragg, NC 28307
Phone: (910) 432-9918
peter.edmonds@conus.army.mil

LtCol James E. Elseth
U.S. Marine Corps
JIACG DC LNO
CENTCOM
Phone: (202) 622-8231
james.e.elseth@do.treas.gov

Col James Neal Flowers
U.S. Marine Corps
G-4
I MEF (FWD)
PO Box 555300
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 703-6817
Fax: (760)763-6827

LTC Mark Freitag
U.S. Army
Military Assistant to the DEPSECDEF
Office of the Deputy Secretary of
Defense
1010 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
Phone: (703) 693-7983
Fax: (703)697-7374
mark.freitag@us.army.mil

Col Donald Gleason
U.S. Air Force
Chief, Readiness Plans and Emergency
Management Division
Office of the Air Force Civil Engineer
donald.gleason@pentagon.af.mil

Mr. C. D. Glin
Vice President
Citizens Development Corps
1726 M St NW #205
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-530-7673
cdglin@cdc.org

LtCol David G. Goulet
U.S. Marine Corps
G-3 Current Operations Officer
I MEF (FWD)
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: 843-252-8177
david.goulet@usmc.mil

MAJ William J. Gray
U.S. Army
BDE Civil Affairs Officer
30th HBCT
101 Armory Road
Clinton, NC 28328-9730
Phone: (919) 359-1188
Fax: (919) 220-5527
william.gray2@us.army.mil

Col Tim A. Green
U.S. Marine Corps
G-3 Iraqi Security Forces Coordinator
I MEF (FWD)
Building 210721
2nd Floor, Room 216
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 763-6825
tim.green@usmc.mil

Dr. Peter Groves
Research Analyst
Center for Naval Analyses
4825 Mark Center Drive
Alexandria, VA 22311
Phone: (703) 824-2736
grovesp@cna.org

Mr. Andrew S. Haeuptle
Director
Warfighter Support Office
Business Transformation Agency
Phone: (703) 693-0402
andrew.haeuptle@bta.mil

LtCol Bradley Hall
U.S. Marine Corps
Bn CO
2/11 (Prov CAG)
2d Bn 11th Mar
Box 555524
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5524
Phone: (760) 725-1883
bradley.r.hall@usmc.mil

Col Roy D. Harlan
Director, Marine Operations
U.S. Army Peacekeeping and Stability
Operations Institute
49 Mel-Ron Court
Carlisle, PA 17015
Phone: (717) 245-4634
Fax: (717) 245-3279
roy.harlan@us.army.mil

Col Brian Hearnberger
U.S. Marine Corps
Engineer
I MEF (FWD)
Phone: (760) 846-3703
brian.hearnberger@usmc.mil

LTC Charles Heatherly
U.S. Army
G9
XVIII Airborne Corps
2175 Reilly Road, Stop A
Fort Bragg, NC 28310
Phone: (910) 396-6717
Fax: (910) 396-8938
robert.ashley.jones@conus.army.mil

Maj Steven W. Hodge
U.S. Marine Corps
Director
TRT, 1st MLG
1st MLG, G-3 TRT
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: 760-725-5993
steven.hodge@usmc.mil

LtCol Chris Hughes
U.S. Marine Corps
Public Affairs Officer
I MEF (FWD)
C/O IMEF (FWD)
Camp Pendleton, CA 90001
Phone: (760) 763-4674
chris.hughes@usmc.mil

Mr. Carl Johnson
U.S. Marine Corps
Joint Exercise Designer
MAGTF Staff Training Program
2042 South St
Quantico, VA 22406
Phone: (703) 784-0287
Fax: (703) 432-4719
carl.j.johnson2@usmc.mil

Dr. Ronald W. Johnson
Executive Vice President
RTI International
3040 Cornwallis Rd.
Research Triangle Park, NC 27709
Phone: (919) 541-6346
rwj@rti.org

MajGen (sel.) John F. Kelly
U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General
I MEF (FWD)
Box 5553000
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 725-9102
john.f.kelly4@usmc.mil

Mr. Jerry H. Jones
Special Assistant to the Secretary of
Defense
Room 3D719
Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301
Phone: (703) 692-7017
jerry.jones@sd.mil

Mr. Michael Khambatta
Deputy Head of Regional Delegation
International Committee of the Red
Cross
1100 Connecticut Avenue, NW
Suite 500
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 587-4616
Fax: (202)587-4696
washington.was@icrc.org

Mr. Ross Kremer
Assistant Deputy Administrator
U.S. Department of Agriculture
1400 Independence Ave SW
Mail Stop 1081
Washington, DC 20250-1081
Phone: (202) 720-4055
ross.kremer@fas.usda.gov

Col Bruce D. Landrum
U.S. Marine Corps
Staff Judge Advocate
I MEF (FWD)
Phone: (760) 725-5972
bruce.landrum@usmc.mil

Mr. Michael A. Levett
President & CEO
Citizens Development Corps
1726 M St NW #205
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: 202-530-7662
Fax: 202-8720923
mlevett@cdc.org

Mr. Robert E. Love
Director of Operations
Task Force to Improve Business
and Stability Operations in Iraq
3600 Defense Pentagon
Rm 5C842
Washington, DC 20301
Phone: (703) 692-6249
Fax: (703)695-4050
Robert.Love@osd.mil

COL Greg A. Lusk
U.S. Army
Commander
30th HBCT
101 Armory Road
Clinton, NC 28328-9730
Phone: (910) 793-4444
matthew.stapleton@us.army.mil

Col Patrick J. Malay
U.S. Marine Corps
CO, RCT-5
I MEF (FWD)

Col Alan F. Mangan
U.S. Marine Corps
Chief, Interagency Integration Branch
The Joint Staff, J-5
Phone: (410) 349-9640
Fax: (410)349-9640
alan.mangan@js.pentagon.mil

Ms. Karen Mathiasen
Director, Middle East and North Africa
Department of the Treasury
1500 Pennsylvania Ave
Washington, DC 20015
Phone: (202) 622-7144
karen.mathiasen@do.treas.gov

CPT Michael A. McClelland
U.S. Army
Aide-de-Camp
XVIII Airborne Corps
2175 Reilly Rd.
AFZA-CS
Ft. Bragg, NC 28310-5000
Phone: (910) 396-3201
michael.a.mcclelland1@conu.army.mil

CAPT Joe McCoy
U.S. Navy
Military Assistant
Business Transformation Agency
Phone: (540) 341-8561
joe_mccoy@yahoo.com

BGen Joseph McMenamin
U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Principal Director
Stability Operations Capabilities,
SO/LIC
2500 Defense Pentagon
Washington, DC 20301-2500
Phone: (703) 697-5606
joseph.mcmenamin@osd.mil

MG David A. Morris
U.S. Army
Commander
USACAPOC(A)
2929 Desert Storm Drive, Stop C
Fort Bragg, NC 28310-9110
Phone: (910) 432-6210
Fax: (910)432-7121
morrisd@soc.mil

Col Michael F. Morris
U.S. Marine Corps
G-3 Plans
I MEF (FWD)
CG, I MEF(FWD)
Attn: A/CS for Gov/Econ
PSC Box 555300
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 725-9157
Fax: (760)725-9249
michael.f.morris@usmc.mil

Col Nicholas F. Nanna
U.S. Marine Corps
ACS/G-2
I MEF (FWD)
Phone: (703) 967-9069
nicholas.nanna@osd.mil

COL Douglas E. Nash (Ret.)
U.S. Army
Civil Affairs and Civil Military
Operations Analyst
Civil-Military Operations Branch,
SCETC
Phone: (703) 505-7081
douglas.nash@usmc.mil

BrigGen (sel.) Larry Nicholson,
U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Commanding General
Marine Corps Combat Development
Command (MCCDC)

Gen. William L. "Spider" Nyland
U.S. Marine Corps (Ret.)
Executive Fellow
Institute for Defense and Business
336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone: (919) 969-8008

Mr. Leonard T. Petruccelli
Director, Business Development
Agility Defense & Government Services
P.O. Box 25418
Safat, Kuwait
Phone: (965) 498-1133
lpetruccelli@agilitylogistics.com

Capt Kevin B. Poole
U.S. Marine Corps
Action Officer
Business Transformation Agency
Warfighter Support Office
1851 S. Bell Street, Suite 1000
Arlington, VA 22241
Phone: (703) 607-2505
kevin.poole@bta.mil

BGen Martin Post
U.S. Marine Corps
DCG
I MEF (FWD)
Box 5553000
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 846-3732
martin.post@pacom.mil

Mr. Sean M. Reilly
Chief of Staff, Market Access and
Compliance
Department of Commerce
14th Street and Constitution Ave, NW
Washington, DC 20230
Phone: (202) 482-4703
Fax: (202)482-5444
sean.reilly@mail.doc.gov

Mr. Tom Ricks
Senior Pentagon Correspondent
The Washington Post
1150 15th Street, NW
Washington, DC 20071
pentagon@washpost.com

LTC Randolph Rosin
U.S. Army
Division Chief
JCISFA
425 McPherson Ave
Ft Leavenworth, KS 66027
Phone: (913) 684-3647
randolph.rosin@conus.army.mil

BGen Robert R. Ruark
U.S. Marine Corps
Commanding General
1st Marine Logistics Group
I MEF (FWD)

Mr. Larry Sampler
Deputy Coordinator
S/CRS
U.S. Department of State

Ambassador Joseph A. Saloom
Senior Advisor for Iraq Transition
Office of the Senior Advisor to the
Secretary
U.S. Department of State

Mr. Mark Seeley
Exercise and Training Specialist
(Interagency)
USJFCOM JWFC
Joint Warfighting Center
Phone: (757) 203-5328
mark.seeley@jfc.com.mil

Col Robert O. Sinclair
U.S. Marine Corps
AC/S, G-3
I MEF (FWD)
Phone: (760) 763-4663
robert.sinclair@usmc.mil

Mr. Thomas Staal
Director
Office of Iraq Reconstruction, USAID
1300 Pennsylvania Ave.
Washington, DC 20523
Phone: (202) 712-4716
Fax: (202) 216-3872
tstaal@usaid.gov

Col Glenn T. Starnes
U.S. Marine Corps
Director
MSTP
glenn.starnes@usmc.mil

LTG Carl A. Strock
U.S. Army (Ret.)
Executive Fellow
Institute for Defense and Business
336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone: (919) 969-8008

Mr. Arthur T. Sturgeon, Jr.
Program Director
Institute for Defense & Business
336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone: (919) 969-8008
sturgeon@idb.org

Mr. Kevin Taecker
Senior Advisor for International
Assistance Cooperation
Iraq Assistance Office
U.S. Department of State

COL William H. Taylor, III
U.S. Army (Ret.)
Program Analyst
Business Transformation Agency
Warfighter Support Office
Phone: (703) 607-2151
william.taylor@bta.mil

Col David Terando
U.S. Marine Corps
G-6
I MEF (FWD)
I Marine Expeditionary Force
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055-5300
Phone: (760) 763-3882
david.terando@usmc.mil

RDML Michael Tillotson
U.S. Navy
Deputy Commander
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command
1575 Gator Blvd
Norfolk, VA 23521-3024
Phone: (757) 462-4316
robert.cornwell@navy.mil

Mr. Rabih Torbay
VP, International Operations
International Medical Corps
1313 L. St., N.W.
Suite #220
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: (202) 828-5155
Fax: (202)828-5156
rkleinberg@imcworldwide.org

Col Dwight E. Trafton
U.S. Marine Corps
Director
Security Cooperation Education
and Training Center
3094 Upshur Ave
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 784-4959
Fax: (703)784-4074
dwight.trafton@usmc.mil

LtCol William Vivian
U.S. Marine Corps
G-3 Economics Planner
I MEF (FWD)
Camp Pendleton, CA 92055
Phone: (760) 725-5130
william.vivian@usmc.mil

Mr. John H. Wadsworth
Executive Assistant
Institute for Defense & Business
7301 Carmel Executive Park
Suite 320
Charlotte, NC 28226
Phone: (704) 341-3212
Fax: (704) 943-9393
wadsworth@idb.org

Col Michael E. Wagner
U.S. Marine Corps
Civil Military Operations
SCECT
3094 Upshur Ave
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 784-1351
Fax: (703)784-4074
michael.e.wagner@usmc.mil

Mr. David T. Watters
Senior Associate
Institute for Defense & Business
336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Phone: (919) 787-4896
Fax: (919) 573-1819
watters@idb.org

Col James Welsh
U.S. Marine Corps
Chief of Staff
I MEF (FWD)
I MEF, Camp Pendleton, CA, 92055
Phone: (760) 763-3381
james.l.welsh@usmc.mil

Mr. Courtney Whitney
U.S. Marine Corps
Portfolio Manager
BlackRock
Phone: (609) 282-0717
courtney.whitney@blackrock.com

Mr. Jerre W. Wilson
VP Academic Affairs
MCU
2076 South St
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 432-4851
frederick.badke@usmc.mil

Col Randle L. Yarberry
U.S. Marine Corps
Operations Officer
Task Force to Support Business and
Stabilization Operations in Iraq
Phone: (703) 693-0382
lee.yarberry@osd.mil

Maj Eric K. Yingst
U.S. Marine Corps
C2SB Branch Head
MAGTF Staff Training Program
2042 South Street
Quantico, VA 22134
Phone: (703) 784-4972
eric.yingst@usmc.mil

Ms. Jennifer Yopp
Analyst
Center for Naval Analyses (CNA)
Phone: (703) 509-4667
jennifer.yopp@usmc.mil

★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★ ★
INSTITUTE
FOR DEFENSE
& BUSINESS



336 Meadowmont Village Circle
Chapel Hill, NC 27517
Tel: 919-969-8008
Fax: 919-969-6792
www.idb.org
www.ctrser.org