The Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and Foreign Policy magazine set out to address some of the most challenging questions facing the U.S. military in the 21st century: What is the state of America's military? How healthy are the armed forces? How prepared are they for future conflicts? How confident are they in civilian leaders and government institutions? And what impact have the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had on them? To find out, CNAS and Foreign Policy teamed up to conduct a survey to find out what senior retired and active duty officers — the very people who have run the military over the last half century — collectively think about the state of the force, the health of the military, the course of the war in Iraq, and the challenges that lie ahead.

SWJ Blog entry here.

Learn more: CNAS Fact Sheet | Questions and Data

Methodology

The U.S. Military Index is based on a survey of 3,437 retired and active duty officers holding the rank of major or lieutenant commander and above from across the services. About 35 percent of the participants hailed from the Army, 33 percent from the Air Force, 23 percent from the Navy, and 8 percent from the Marine Corps. The Index focuses on a very select portion of the retired and active duty military, including 232 retired general and flag officers, elite generals and admirals who have served at the highest levels of command. Approximately one-third were colonels or captains, while 37 percent held the rank of lieutenant colonel or commander. Twelve percent graduated from one of America's exclusive military academies. Approximately two-thirds had combat experience, with roughly 10 percent having served in Iraq, Afghanistan, or both. Over 95 percent of participants had served in the military for fifteen years or more, 81 percent more than twenty years, and some 17 percent had served more than thirty years. Nearly 30 percent were either active duty or retired within the last ten years, with current active duty personnel accounting for over 8 percent of respondents. Participants in the survey were selected by the Center for a New American Security and Foreign Policy magazine. The nonscientific survey was administered online from December 7, 2007, to January 15, 2008.

Release Event Information:

CNAS and Foreign Policy Magazine launched the results of this survey on February 19, 2008.

The release event also involved a panel discussion with:

Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales, Jr., USA (Ret)

Maj. Gen. Scales served more than 30 years in the U.S. Army, including as commandant of the United States Army War College. He is a Fox News Channel military analyst and the president of Colgen, Inc.

Lt. Gen. Greg S. Newbold, USMC (Ret.)

Lt. Gen. Newbold served more than 30 years in the Marine Corps, including as director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He currently serves as the managing director of Torch Hill Capital.

Lt. Col. John A. Nagl, USA

Lt. Col. Nagl is commander, 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He was deployed to Iraq in 2003, helped write the Army's counterinsurgency field manual, and is the author of Learning to Eat Soup With a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya to Vietnam.

CNAS Clarification:

February 22, 2008--Since the February 19 release of a Center for New American Security (CNAS) and Foreign Policy (FP) magazine survey of retired and active duty officers on the state of the U.S. military, we have heard concerns from several people we respect about the manner in which its findings have been presented. CNAS takes these concerns very seriously. We regret that some of our findings were presented without the proper context and caveats for which we take full responsibility. We wish to clarify here what this index is and what it is not. We have updated our website to address these concerns. CNAS is committed to addressing this issue openly and directly.

The FP article summarizing the survey's results noted that it was "nonscientific," and that it included both "active and retired" personnel. While we continue to believe that the CNAS/FP survey provides many useful insights, it has become evident that its limitations require more explanation and clarification.

1. Nonscientific survey. Like many surveys conducted by the media and other organizations, including past FP indexes on terrorism, the CNAS/FP effort was not a randomized poll. Instead, emails were sent to thousands of individuals, mostly members of the Military Officers Association of America (MOAA), but also to additional active duty personnel currently serving in fellowships or at senior service schools, as well as to several hundred retired general and flag officers who were selected for their long service and extensive experience. Those who participated spent about twenty minutes online to complete the survey, sometime during the period between December 7, 2007 and January 15, 2008.

2. Predominantly retired officers. When we sent out the survey, we were unsure what mix of retired and active officers would respond, particularly through MOAA. As it turned out, although 285 active duty personnel responded, the response from the retired community was much larger, so that 92 percent of the 3,437 total respondents were retired. Some 700 participants had retired within the past 10 years, so that 29 percent of survey respondents were active duty or retired within the last ten years, while 71 percent had retired more than 10 years ago. Finally, and as noted in the FP article, more than two-thirds of respondents had combat experience and 10 percent had operational experience in Iraq and/or Afghanistan.

3. Did not consider junior officers or enlisted personnel. The survey's purpose was to ascertain how a very select group -- retired and active duty officers who had served at the highest level of command, Major/Lieutenant Commander and up, assessed the current state of the military and a number of related issues. The survey was not designed to "take the pulse" of the entire military. In particular it did not attempt to assess the views of company-grade or noncommissioned officers, who play a pivotal role in leading today's military and who will become senior leaders in the future. More broadly, it did not attempt to assess the views of enlisted personnel, who make up 84 percent of the active duty military. We hope that future surveys focus on these groups, but also believe that retired and active duty officers represent a very knowledgeable and influential group whose perspectives were of particular interest.

Both CNAS and Foreign Policy magazine posted the results of the survey online, including demographic data about the participants, the day that the article was released. However, while we provided the relevant information to the public, CNAS regrets not doing so more directly and effectively.

In presenting survey results at a public event on February 19, we noted several areas where retired and active duty officers surveyed seemed to have significant differences. For example, 44 percent of active duty officers and those retired for a year or less believed the military was weaker than it was five years ago, compared to 60 percent of respondents overall. On the other hand, for many questions, the results for officers who were either active duty or retired within the last year were similar to those of the overall group surveyed. We regret that we did not communicate both areas of difference and concordance more effectively. For those interested in further comparisons, we have posted results for this sub-group (active duty and retired for a year or less) on the CNAS website along with overall results for all 3,437 respondents.

We have updated the description of the survey methodology and results on the website, and hope that these changes and this clarification help to address any concerns regarding the survey. Our goal is to incorporate lessons learned into our future work, and we would appreciate your feedback (info@cnas.org).

JCISFA's current mission statement: Institutionalize lessons and best practices from security force assistance (SFA) operations to better prepare U.S. and partner nation forces to rebuild security infrastructure during stability, security, transition, and reconstruction operations. Serve as the DOD Center of Excellence and U.S. Armed Forces focal point to provide advice and assistance for international security force assistance mission.

Appropriately, much like the SFA effort it supports, JCISFA achieves much of its mission through influencing, and you influence by providing good analysis and suggestions, good products that help the operational and institutional JIIM community get its arms around things, and by being right more often then being wrong. Because of the scale of the advisory mission, there is a great deal of related activity, numbers of centers (Riley is not the only Advisory training center in the JIIM community), and as the advisory mission becomes more accepted as something which will not only endure in Iraq and Afghanistan, but may become a key tenet of a greater "Indirect" strategy which focuses on building partner capacity, there has been more senior leader interest into how SFA fits into the "Full Spectrum" construct. SWC member and blogger Dr. Jack recently mentioned the SFA symposium hosted here at Fort Leavenworth where fora week in Jan, senior uniformed and civilians associated with SFA came into discuss strategic and policy level questions -- there are still some due outs regarding the symposium that JCISFA is working on, but the important thing here is the issues were discussed if not by the decision makers themselves, then by those who directly influence how SFA will develop. I was not there -- as I'd mentioned we touch allot of things, and that week we also had to send folks to participate in the Army's TMAAG conference, and to the event I attended -- the JFCOM J9's Military Support to the Rule of Law workshop with the greater JIIM community up at Gettysburg, PA. I did review some of the video and presentations that were made at the SFA Symposium and SWC member Old Eagle was there, and I think they wrestled with the tough, high yield problems. I'd say in that regard, progress was made -- just in getting a common understanding of the problems associated with SFA.

What is SFA?

The definition of Security Force Assistance (SFA): Unified action by the joint, interagency, intergovernmental and multinational community to generate, employ, sustain and assist host nation or regional security forces in support of a legitimate authority. SFA is a broad framework that spans the spectrum of conflict focused on assisting foreign security forces in support of US and Coalition interests regardless of operating environment.

Within that definition the conduct of a SFA effort the functions of Generate, Organize, Train, Equip, Rebuild, and Assist could be seen a required lines of effort that might be seen from both sequential and simultaneous perspectives -- e.g. although you have to start somewhere, the effort itself might be so large that within the partner's greater security sector, various components (army, police, border, etc.) might be more or less mature then the others, its also worth considering that if conducting SFA under conditions where there is greater rather then less stability, and where there is already a mature insurgency, then the possibility exists that you might wind up with two steps forward and one step back, or worse, one step forward and two steps back for reasons that my be beyond your capability to effect.

Considering SFA from the Tactical to the Operational to the Strategic

A political objective of using military force to conduct SFA might be described as a way to build partner capacity to the point where it can gain and sustain capability and capacity in its security sector against internal and external threats for the purposes of allowing the government to establish and sustain Rule of Law (RoL). RoL as a concept provides the physical and perceptual underpinnings that citizenry can point to as ensuring their safety and protection, provide the basis for law and order and the perception of justice as administered by the state (this does not necessarily exclude competing forms of cultural justice -- each government must decide for itself how and if non-secular and secular ideas of justice can co-exist.)

Each partner we would like engage with in SFA is likely to have differing conceptual security challenges, but within their challenges will have both internal and external security threats. Even in the United States we have both internal and external threats which can both be further considered as domestic and foreign components. The connectivity between the internal and external threats has grown comparably as have the forms, functions and frequency of communications that have provided increased access between individual and groups who look for advantages and opportunities to undermine state security.

SFA then should be considered from a holistic view point if the threats are to be identified and defeated, because to focus solely on one aspect can create an advantage for the enemy; e.g. in a modern city with an airport that sits astride some line of communication, be it for commercial, government or religious travelers who pass through its gates for purposes in addition to, or outside of the business to be conducted within that city, the potential exists that illicit activity which undermines that city's authority, the authority of the larger province or state and potentially the region might be conducted. If the conditions support that activity, meaning there is not a strong "anti" or "counter" capability to deter it, then that city is likely to provide some incentives to conducting business there. If that city is a target, because conditions there offer a tactical, operational or strategic advantage to one or more individuals or groups (to include foreign states) e.g. the police or the intelligence there are weak, and the population offers some degree of support, or is not in active support of the government, then that city may become more then just a safe haven, or place to plan operations, conduct meetings and conduct training.

This is where we must scope out and consider not only the activities which go on inside the city or destination, but the connected activities which deter and make more difficult for individuals and groups to enter, conduct and support those activities which threaten the state. This is a significant challenge inside Iraq and Afghanistan where even within a single city there are multiple efforts and units tasked to conduct SFA, given the size of the effort and the multiple LOEs (Lines of Effort) such as the police, the army, the local governments, the correctional system, etc., building a common operation picture that ensures unity of effort is daunting, particularly when an active and adaptive enemy is looking for ways in which to retard, or delay the effort so that it can establish itself as the political authority and wear out U.S. public will over time -- its view is it does not necessarily have to win decisively right now, just prevent the Iraqi government from becoming strong enough to win. In Iraq and Afghanistan we are engaged with SFA tasks at the tactical, operational and strategic levels.

To understand the threat to a city, the best place to start may be looking at what makes a city a city. Such an investigation might include asking the questions of: why did people decide to establish a city here?; who lives here?; why do they stay? What does this city produce?; who else comes here besides the residents and why? From there, you can start to consider what opportunities present themselves to both the enemy(s) and to the security forces who must operate there. While not exactly the same in terms of form, or in terms of authority, our own model of layered security can provide a functional model of reverse engineering to consider how the threat goes about gaining entry to, and establishing operations with a given location. From there, you should be able to go back and look at the security sector gaps which have allowed the enemy to conduct operations. This is not limited to the physical barriers, agencies, units and personnel which form part of the security sector, but also the types of law governing and regulating all other types of intercourse. I am "not" advocating "mirror imaging" of our security sector -- what I am advocating is that SFA practitioners need to see the threat in the context of the greater security sector and that a holistic effort is required or the threat will retain freedom of movement within a system he understands better then you -- the parts of the security sector (police, military, paramilitary, border guards, coast guard, intelligence, EPS, etc.) must be seen as somewhat inter-dependent (based on the threat), and as such our efforts to help them build capacity need to recognize and support that. This can quickly raise SFA from the tactical to operational level.

This leads you from the tactical SFA to the Operational SFA to the Strategic SFA. One of the presentations I wrote an EXSUM for based of the slides and the video was LTG Dubik's, the MNSTC-I CDR. Without going into too great a detail, LTG Dubik has taken an Enterprise approach to his efforts. He has recognized that in order to eventually sustain itself independent of external assistance, the Iraqi security sector is going to have to have sufficient bureaucratic institutional depth to perpetuate itself, and to resist the whim of domestic policy. This is not only important when considering reliance on U.S. support, but in order to stand independently from having to enter into collective security arrangements because it was unable to sustain itself -- it provides the state with a security sector capable of supporting its own domestic and foreign policy objectives.

SWC member Cavguy, aka MAJ Niel Smith, had asked me to consider writing about what JCISFA is, what its role is, and the broader topic of SFA. This last bit is probably as important as the discussions on the many discussions as to how best we should organize to conduct SFA. If you don't have an idea of what you might be trying to do, or why you are doing it, then trying to describe how best to organize for it is probably short sighted. There are multiple ways to go after an objective, once you have identified what the objective is, and why you want to do it. There are some great JCISFA contributions already out there (the SFA Planner's Handbook -- already out to the JIIM community, the SFA CDR's HB -- soon to be released) and several other good pieces of work to help SFA practitioners be they advisors, BCTs, CDRs, uniformed or civilian leadership, etc. JCISFA as a center is working to improve our capability and capacity to conduct SFA.

Trying to become predators instead of prey, Marines headed to Iraq will go through training built on advice from big-game hunters, soldiers of fortune and troops who grew up around firearms in the woods or the inner city.

Combat Hunter, a program begun at Camp Pendleton and now being rolled out nationwide, is designed to help Marines stalk and kill insurgents by using their senses and instincts. It emphasizes keen observation of Marines' surroundings and meticulous knowledge of their foes' habits...

White House Ties Troop Levels to Iraqi Elections - Doyle McManus and Julian E. Barnes, Los Angeles Times

The Bush administration believes a halt in troop reductions in Iraq after July is needed in part to ensure a large enough force is present to provide security for local elections, a senior administration official said Friday.

By tying troop levels to Iraq's provincial elections, officials in effect established a new milestone to guide U.S. policy during President Bush's last months in office. And by linking them to the elections, the administration is increasing pressure on the Iraqis to actually hold the balloting...

US Casualties Down 30% in February - Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard

American forces suffered 29 casualties in February, 25 of which were from hostile fire. This represents a drop of roughly 30 percent from the month prior. Good news, right? Wrong. Think Progress reports today...

It's strange how when American casualties are up, that's all we hear about, but now, suddenly, the left is overwhelmed with concern for the Iraqi people (what do they think will happen if American troops withdraw?). So what if American casualties have gone down and stayed down. So what if Iraqi civilian casualties have dropped for six straight months. They're up this month, and this is the worst possible spin one could put on the current situation, so that's what the left will report. It's instructive, however, to go back to that excellent piece in the Small Wars Journal last summer by David Kilcullen, COIN advisor to Gen. Petraeus..

U.S. COIN Doctrine Meets the Korengal Valley - Westhawk

Published in today's New York Times, Ms. Elizabeth Rubin has chronicled her stay last autumn with a U.S. rifle company fighting a nasty insurgency in the Korengal Valley in Afghanistan's Kunar province. The focus of Ms. Rubin's piece is Captain Dan Kearney, USA, a company commander in the 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team who, in Ms. Rubin's telling of the story, is struggling to maintain the morale and discipline of his soldiers. Just five months into a 15-month combat tour, the company had lost seven killed and dozens wounded; by Ms. Rubin's reckoning, the frustrated and isolated soldiers are on the verge of snapping.

At the same time Ms. Rubin was at Captain Kearney's forward operating base researching her story, Colonel Chip Preysler, USA, commanding officer of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, gave an interview by video-conference with the Pentagon press corps. The transcript of the interview confirms Ms. Rubin's descriptions of challenging mountainous terrain, a determined enemy, and hard fighting. As to the mental state of his soldiers, Colonel Preysler keeps his own counsel...

GEN Casey, Meet LTG Caldwell - Charlie, Abu Muqawama

As our regular readers know, Charlie likes to spend her spare time looking for a pike to put the Marine Commandant's head on. But it's time to share the love a bit.

On the one hand, we have LTG Bill Caldwell doing a full court press on the Army's new FM 3-0, Operations...

Bush Elbows NATO for Troop Relief - Jon Ward, Washington TImes

President Bush today called on European nations who are part of the NATO-led mission in Afghanistan to place more troops in major combat areas, and said he will push for commitments on that at a summit in Romania next month.

"We expect people to carry a heavy burden if they are going to be in Afghanistan," Mr. Bush said, during a press conference at his ranch in Crawford, Texas, with Danish Prime Minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen.

Afghanistan will be a primary issue at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization summit, planned for April 2-4 in Bucharest...

U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces - Eric Schmitt and Thom Shanker, New York Times

The United States military is developing a plan to send about 100 American trainers to work with a Pakistani paramilitary force that is the vanguard in the fight against Al Qaeda and other extremist groups in Pakistan's restive tribal areas, American military officials said.

Pakistan has ruled out allowing American combat troops to fight Qaeda and Taliban militants in the tribal areas. But Pakistani leaders have privately indicated that they would welcome additional American trainers to help teach new skills to Pakistani soldiers whose army was tailored not for counterinsurgency but to fight a conventional land war against India...

Turkish Troops Leaving N. Iraq - Sudarsan Raghavan and Ellen Knickmeyer, Washington Post

Turkey announced Friday that it had pulled its troops out of northern Iraq, ending an eight-day invasion to pursue Kurdish guerrillas that raised tensions with the Iraqi government and fears of a regional conflict. The withdrawal came one day after both President Bush and U.S. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates urged a swift end to the offensive.

Turkish officials denied they had been pressured into ending their country's most extensive operation in northern Iraq in more than a decade. They said they had completed their objective of weakening the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or PKK, which for decades has fought for Kurdish rights and autonomy in Turkey from mountain bases in northern Iraq...

The Patton of Counterinsurgency - Frederick W. Kagan and Kimberly Kagan, Weekly Standard

Great commanders often come in pairs: Eisenhower and Patton, Grant and Sherman, Napoleon and Davout, Marlborough and Eugene, Caesar and Labienus. Generals David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno can now be added to the list.

It's natural to assume that successful pairs of commanders complement each other's personalities (the diplomatic Eisenhower and the hard-charging Patton, for example) or that the junior partner is merely executing the vision of the other (Sherman seen as acting on Grant's orders). In reality, the task of planning and conducting large-scale military operations is too great for any single commander, no matter how talented his staff. The subordinate in every successful command pair has played a key role in designing and implementing the campaign plan...

Israel Takes Gaza Fight to Next Level - Steven Erlanger and Taghredd El- Khodary, New York Times

Israeli aircraft and troops attacked Palestinian positions in northern Gaza on Saturday, killing at least 54 people and wounding more than 100 in the deadliest day of fighting in more than a year. Two Israeli soldiers were killed and seven wounded, the military said.

The Israeli attacks, mostly from the air on a clear, bright day, were aimed at stopping rocket fire from Gaza into Israel, especially after Ashkelon, a large city 10 miles from Gaza, came under fire from more advanced, Katyusha-style rockets smuggled in from Iran...

Public perceptions of the situation in Iraq have become significantly more positive over the past several months, even as opinions about the initial decision to use military force remain mostly negative and unchanged.

The number of Americans who say the military effort is going very or fairly well is much higher now than a year ago (48% vs. 30% in February 2007). There has been a smaller positive change in the number who believe that the U.S. will ultimately succeed in achieving its goals (now 53%, up from 47% in February 2007).

Opinion on the critical question of whether the U.S. should keep troops in Iraq is now about evenly divided, the first time this has happened since late 2006. About half of those surveyed (49%) say they favor bringing troops home as soon as possible, but most of these (33%) favor gradual withdrawal over the next year or two, rather than immediate withdrawal. Similarly, just under half (47%) say that the U.S. should keep troops in Iraq until the situation has stabilized, with most of these (30%) saying that no timetable should be set.

The full report can be found here.

This publication is nested within A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, the Naval Operations Concept 2006 (NOC), and Marine Corps Operating Concepts For A Changing Security Environment, 2nd Edition. The focus of this concept is the establishment of a global, persistent forward presence tailored to build partnership capacity for security, while adapting existing forces and creating new capabilities for an uncertain future. Through these efforts we will enable multinational partnerships to address existing regional challenges, while mitigating the conditions that allow irregular threats to proliferate.

The development of this employment concept outlines the Marine Corps' strategy for combating irregular enemies in support of the requirements of the NDS. The NDS identifies "uncertainty" as the defining characteristic of the present and future strategic environment.

The Defense Intelligence Community remains convinced that a direct, large-scale military confrontation between the United States and another nation is unlikely for the foreseeable future. Few countries will seek comparable "full-capability" military forces, with most armed forces seeking asymmetric alternatives to functional capability. The US military preeminence in traditional forms of warfare, which we will continue to maintain, has driven our adversaries to irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive methods to further their aims. Together, these methods will comprise a pattern of complex irregular warfare...

From the linked Danger Room blog entry:

The Air Force is tightening restrictions on which blogs its troops can read, cutting off access to just about any independent site with the word "blog" in its web address. It's the latest move in a larger struggle within the military over the value -- and hazards -- of the sites. At least one senior Air Force official calls the squeeze so "utterly stupid, it makes me want to scream."

The updated version of Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 Joint Operations (with Change 1) has also been publicly released by JFCOM today. (H/T Norfolk at Small Wars Council)

By Cavguy

This is news the world doesn't hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious "Sunni Triangle," is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

- - Ullrich Fichtner, "Hope and Despair in Divided Iraq," Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007.

Colonel Sean MacFarland and I teamed up to provide a firsthand account of the "Anbar Awakening" in this month's issue of Military Review. The article details the efforts of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq from June 2006 to February 2007. Transferring from Tal Afar into the most violent city in Iraq at the time, the Ready First designed a campaign plan that sought to set the conditions for a tribal alliance, and rapidly exploit success through developing local governance and security forces. Supported by the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force leadership, the plan was successfully executed and achieved results beyond anyone's expectations. This success in execution was carried forward to greater success by the actions of our follow-on unit, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The article describes the key facets of the plan -- population security through combat outposts, combat operations against Al Qaeda insurgents, tense negotiations with tribal sheiks, and a few key individuals and decisive combat actions that shifted the tide of conflict and began the transformation of the nation.

Many recent opinion pieces speculated on the reasons for the Awakening, or the wisdom of supporting a Sunni tribal movement that has the potential to destabilize the central government. Others have attributed its existence to the success of the "surge" of additional troops into Iraq. Others simplify the narrative to some form bribery or protection money paid to sheiks to stop the killing of American soldiers. There are grains of truth in each, but each is mostly inaccurate in its characterization of what happened in Anbar.

One common narrative, championed by retired Colonel Douglas McGregor, throws stones at the execution of the Awakening. Those who support this narrative thus far have been unable to articulate realistic alternative plan executed under the resources and political climate present in mid 2006. Some worry about the impacts of an organized, financed, and equipped tribal based organization providing the backbone of security in Anbar province. Those deriding the entry of the US into alliance with local leaders should approach the following questions. Is Iraq less secure with a stable Anbar than one in chaos, dominated by Al Qaeda in Iraq fanatics? Are the Iraqi people and Anbari citizens less secure? Is there less potential for national reconciliation with a Anbar temporarily secured? Do we have fewer options at every level -- strategic, operational, and tactical, than we did in Fall 2006? In my opinion, the answer to all of these questions is a resounding "no". The Awakening is not and was never envisioned to be an endstate, but a means to provide the stability necessary for progress at the national level to reconcile grievances and develop legitimate local institutions.

Likewise, the major actions that enabled the "Awakening" pre-date the execution of the surge, publication of FM 3-24, and the arrival of General Petraeus to Iraq. Attributing the success in Ramadi to the "surge" would be erroneous. However, the change to population centric tactics, patrol bases, and local security alliances that the Ready First and some other units had used in 2006 were systemically spread and adapted to local conditions throughout Iraq under the leadership of General Petraeus and General Odierno. The additional forces in the surge coupled with new tactics and doctrine enabled the transformation of Baghdad and several other provinces. The actions of the Ready First in Ramadi and 3d Armored Cavalry in Tal Afar were validation and prototypes for the change in tactics that accompanied the surge, and validated the principles that now embody FM 3-24.

Finally, those who allege the Anbar sheiks were simply "bought off" are guilty of the worst form of oversimplification and lazy analysis. While monetary incentives were certainly (and appropriately) used, the Awakening was at its core borne out of the frustration of the Anbari people with three years of war, chaos, and a growing Al Qaeda fundamentalist organization that terrorized the local populace into submission. Anbari homes are now safe with security provided by and from the local population, backed with American and Iraqi government training and assistance. The monetary support to this effort involve is a fraction of the alternative cost in lives, equipment, food, fuel, and ammunition to fight a violent insurgency.

Ultimate success of the Awakening will be determined far outside the scope and influence of military units, and its long-term viability is directly tied to the fortunes and future of Iraq. Most units in Iraq are now operating along the concepts used by our Brigade in Ramadi to great success. I hope this article can depict the ground level view of how we watched the Awakening unfold, and provide some insight as to how it was facilitated by the unit on the ground.

As a final thought, the evolution of this article's content sprang from a discussion on Ramadi on Small Wars Council last September. The community here was critical to refining the ideas that brought together this final product. Thanks to the SWJ editors for providing such a useful and interactive forum for ideas.

Cavguy is the Small Wars Council screen name of Major Niel Smith, of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He currently is assigned to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center as an operations officer. He has served almost 29 months in Iraq during two tours with 1/1 AD and 2-37 Armor, serving as a company commander, battalion staff officer, and brigade staff officer in Baghdad, Najaf, Tal Afar, and Ramadi. The opinions stated in this post and this are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Combined Arms Center or the Department of Defense.

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