ABC News has procured Taliban video of the 2008 attack on COP Wanat.

For background, see here, here, and here.

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The great folks at the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center have launched their completely revamped Counterinsurgency Leaders Workshop, which runs through Thursday. They've lined up an impressive array of speakers for the event, including General James Mattis, reporter Trudy Rubin, and Major Ali Iqbar (Pakistani Army), among others.

The local FOX news affiliate covered the opening day of the conference, featuring comments by Canadian exchange officer and deputy director Lieutenant Colonel J.J. Malevich and branch chief Lieutenant Colonel "Storm" Savage, both of whom have recent Afghanistan experience.

While you're at it, the COIN Center Blog has taken an edgy move with some controversial posts, if you haven't visited it in awhile, check it out.

Continue reading "Fort Leavenworth Counterinsurgency Center Seminar Begins" »

In the comments section of this SWJ post, Phil Rittendorf highlights a very interesting and disconcerting article in the Indian Defence Review containing lessons learned from Sri Lanka’s defeat of the LTTE this year. The principles articulated in this article stand in almost complete opposition to the conceptualization of counterinsurgency articulated in FM 3-24. From the article:

“In the President’s Office in Colombo officials talk about the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ (of fighting terror). “Broadly, win back the LTTE held areas, eliminate the top LTTE leadership and give the Tamils a political solution.” Sunimal Fernando, one of Rajapaksa’s advisors, says that the President demonstrated a basic resolve: “given the political will, the military can crush terrorism.” This is not as simple as it sounds. Like most poll promises he did not have plans to fulfill his promise to militarily defeat the LTTE. Eelam I to III were miserable failures. So the ‘Rajapaksa Model’ evolved, it was not pre-planned.”

Continue reading "Sri Lanka’s disconcerting COIN strategy for defeating the LTTE" »

Taking inspiration from Dave’s “Back Off” post, I was disturbed to read this Huffington Post commentary highlighted at the always readable Abu Muqawama. The assessment comes from a human rights researcher in Kabul asserting the Taliban effectively control Kandahar outside the gates of our bases. It would be presumptuous to rule on the accuracy of the claim, but the assessment (echoed elsewhere) sparks an interesting set of questions about our potential courses of action in Afghanistan.

Noted classical counterinsurgency author and Vietnam War veteran Jack McCuen argued in his excellent book The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War that chasing guerrillas around the countryside while leaving the critical provincial and national population centers uncovered played into the hands of the insurgent. McCuen argued allowing the insurgent to establish networks, shadow governments, recruitment cells, and support networks in the cities created a far greater risk than the loss of rural hamlets. Motivated by McCuen’s book and some other reads, I suggested consideration of a city based approach in a Small Wars Council thread about a year ago. COIN savant David Kilcullen suggested the same strategy in a New Yorker interview not long thereafter. Kilcullen articulated the problem far better than I:

“Meanwhile, the population in major towns and villages is vulnerable because we are off elsewhere chasing the enemy main-force guerrillas, allowing terrorist and insurgent cells based in the populated areas to intimidate people where they live. As an example, eighty per cent of people in the southern half of Afghanistan live in one of two places: Kandahar city, or Lashkar Gah city. If we were to focus on living amongst these people and protecting them, on an intimate basis 24/7, just in those two areas, we would not need markedly more ground troops than we have now (in fact, we could probably do it with current force levels). We could use Afghan National Army and police, with mentors and support from us, as well as Special Forces teams, to secure the other major population centers. That, rather than chasing the enemy, is the key.”

Although some have disputed his eighty percent figure, the question remains – should the bulk of our forces conducting “clear, hold, build” efforts be spread among outposts in the Korengal Valley and Helmand province, or focused on securing the cities while conducting precision raids on the outside?

The disruption of security in the capital and major cities is a major information narrative victory for those who oppose the government. After all, if a government cannot secure its own provincial capitals and government officials, can it reasonably be expected to gain the allegiance and confidence of its citizens? We saw a major confidence setback in the infamous daylight Kandahar prison break last year, which shook the confidence of the entire nation. The Taliban have increasingly mounted multiple suicide attacks in the major cities to undermine confidence in the government. When combined with the rampant corruption alleged in Kandahar, is it any wonder the Taliban are gaining ground?

On the flip side, one can argue that a defensive orientation doesn’t win wars. Such a discussion is beyond this blog post, but I was impressed with the statement from Lieutenant Colonel Chris Cavoli in Chapter 2 of the Accidental Guerrilla that “defensive” COIN operations were the best way of seizing the initiative from the enemy. (p. 96) Would we better off with a “cities first” COIN strategy, or does the rural character of Afghanistan demand our main effort focus in the rural areas? Sound off in the comments or at the Council.

Image credit and background - U.S. Army Sgt. Robert Newman, Bravo Company, 1st Battalion, 4th Infantry Regiment, U.S. Army Europe, watches the sunrise after a dismounted patrol mission near Forward Operating Base Baylough, Zabul, Afghanistan, March 19, 2009. (U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Adam Mancini/Released)

Continue reading "Secure the cities first?" »

Our friends at the USA and USMC COIN Center have made locating recent COIN doctrine easy. FM 3-24 is even available in Dari and Arabic for those needing to work with host nation counterparts. Follow the links below for direct download or browse their Knowledge Center for additional information.

• FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (English)
• FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (Arabic)
• FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (English and Arabic)
• FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency (English and Dari)
• FM 3-24.2 Tactics in Counterinsurgency
• FM 3-07 Stability Operations
• FM 3-07.1 Security Force Assistance

Continue reading "Get Your Small Wars Doctrine Fix!" »

How the West Was Won

By Cavguy

This is news the world doesn’t hear: Ramadi, long a hotbed of unrest, a city that once formed the southwestern tip of the notorious “Sunni Triangle,” is now telling a different story, a story of Americans who came here as liberators, became hated occupiers and are now the protectors of Iraqi reconstruction.

- - Ullrich Fichtner, “Hope and Despair in Divided Iraq,” Der Spiegel, 10 August 2007.

Colonel Sean MacFarland and I teamed up to provide a firsthand account of the “Anbar Awakening” in this month’s issue of Military Review. The article details the efforts of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Ramadi, Iraq from June 2006 to February 2007. Transferring from Tal Afar into the most violent city in Iraq at the time, the Ready First designed a campaign plan that sought to set the conditions for a tribal alliance, and rapidly exploit success through developing local governance and security forces. Supported by the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Force leadership, the plan was successfully executed and achieved results beyond anyone’s expectations. This success in execution was carried forward to greater success by the actions of our follow-on unit, 1st Brigade of the 3rd Infantry Division.

The article describes the key facets of the plan – population security through combat outposts, combat operations against Al Qaeda insurgents, tense negotiations with tribal sheiks, and a few key individuals and decisive combat actions that shifted the tide of conflict and began the transformation of the nation.

Continue reading "How the West Was Won" »