Some time ago I began to consider how our various efforts in the Long War are linked. Many on the Small Wars Council (SWC) have slogged through this with me on threads such as "Stability Operations vs. Irregular Warfare", and many other threads in which we try to establish the linkages between strategy to operations to tactics, or in which we consider policy.

Part of what a "strategist" (and I use the term loosely!) tries to do is to understand and relate the writing, speeches and statements of our elected and appointed officials to our efforts -- or how our policy objectives get implemented into some type of action to realize them. Army strategists are taught the Ends, Way & Means formula, but they are also taught to consider other perspectives on strategy such as if a strategy is complete, feasible, acceptable, and suitable. This is important, because the strategist must consider if the actions or "ways" to achieve the "ends" are within the bounds of our strategic culture, if they do more harm then good, if they are suitable in terms of balancing our foreign policy goals with our ability to sustain domestic will, are the ways supported by the means, etc.? These are all important questions when it comes to devising strategy. A SWC member who has written a great deal about this is Dr. Steve Metz.

At the last SWC get together her at Leavenworth, SWC member "Hacksaw" brought up an interesting point. He posited we were on the "Strategic Defensive" (and you guys thought all we did at the non-virtual gatherings was drink beer!). I chewed on that yesterday, as I thought it provided me an angle I had not considered. He'd also referenced Clausewitz as having stated that the "defense is the stronger form of warfare" -- which also was worth chewing on. While after thinking and talking about it some more, I don't agree with Hacksaw in total, but I do think there is there is merit to the notion of the rationale for pursuing aspects of an indirect approach which coincide with the scale of our policy objectives, and the means available to pursue them.

A related discussion was why one goes on the defensive -- e.g. because they have momentarily culminated, or in order to be decisive in other theaters or Lines of Operation. This is probably where I disagree with the idea of a strategic defensive -- I think a case can be made that Building Partner Capacity (BPC) as an indirect (vice direct) approach is more suitable to the nature of countering instability and insurgencies. Put more simply, BPC may be more suitable to the nature of the larger war, and offer more opportunity to seize and retain the initiative then a direct, purely military approach. BPC has some warts when we start to examine the criteria I'd mentioned for evaluating ways, e.g. it takes time, and sustained political commitment (commitment which is effected by domestic will among other things) - but it may be a more feasible course of action given the nature of the enemy and the conditions which he may advantage himself to.

This is not to say we are not capable of, nor should we have elements of "direct" strategy where possible, and where suitable, just that we don't have the resources to be decisive everywhere. Nor does the subjective nature of the types of wars we are involved in and the nature of our objectives support a purely military strategy. The challenge I've been working through is trying to work through the inter-relationships between a "direct approach" and an "indirect approach", and frame the scope of BPC, so I can get an idea of some of the contingent ideas, and the interdependencies which affect the operationalization of these ideas. This is related to another project I'm working on -- a case study on Security Force Assistance (SFA) with the goal of addressing the complexity and friction of conducting BPC activities while conducting simultaneous combat operations (incidentally this also gets to the highlighted change in U.S. Army Doctrine as articulated by FM 3-0). However, this idea of grand strategy that employs all the elements of national power in the Long War, and across the breadth of the places where stability is challenged.

Attached are the 5 slides I'm using as a framework. Slide 1 speaks specifically to SFA Scope. Slide 2 consider the "Indirect" component of a larger strategy. Slide 3 is about operationalizing an Indirect Strategy. Slide 4 shows how an Indirect component works with a Direct component to achieve the greater political end. Slide 5 talks about why we might have an Indirect component. Caution, these ends, ways and means are not directly drawn from existing documents, and are not policy -- they are theory, that reflects some of our actions and efforts, discussions and dialogue -- and most importantly they are up for debate!

My reason for posting here is as usual not to present something as complete and final, but to foster intelligent discussion abut the way forward and the implications associated with ideas and actions. We've got an intelligent Community of Interest here on the SWJ and SWC, it is diverse and articulate, and we should always leverage its strength to inform the greater community and benefit from the experiences and ideas of the community. I encourage our community to comment and debate at the SWC...

Best Regards, Rob

On 9 February SWJ conducted a phone interview with Brigadier General Jim Huggins, Deputy Commanding General (Manuever), of Multi-National Division - Center (3rd Infantry Division / MND-C). MND-C arrived in-country last March as part of the "the surge" and the new population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy directed by General David Petraeus, Commanding General of Multi-National Force -- Iraq (MNF-I). MND-C's area of responsibility are the security zones located along the southern edge of Baghdad and scales from the border of Saudi Arabia to the border of Iran.

A summary of highlights from the interview follow.

1. We continue offensive operations in the Southern Security Belts. These operations started with the Surge and are methodical, not in any way "whack-a-mole" style. As General Petraeus stated, we cannot "kill our way" through and out of an area, what this meant for us was the Division moving into an area to establish security followed by what is now called Sons of Iraq (formerly Concerned Local Citizens) who assumed security duties for a given area. As background, we believe the formation of SOI / CLC was a direct result of the Surge.

2. An integral part of our offensive operations is a refined intelligence-driven targeting process that has denied AQI sanctuary forcing a dispersion of al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) leadership and some of the Sunni extremists out of our area. The Division is now looking at exactly what this exodus means in terms of AQI capabilities as well as planning for capacity building and tying into overall Corps' operations to further pressure AQI and build on success. Capacity building includes increasing Iraqi security force (Army and Police) capabilities as well as supporting other lines of operations to include governance, rule of law and very targeted projects to build the perception of security in all the small towns and villages -- what we cannot do is 'blow by' areas and leave the Iraqis living in what can be called a 'war zone'.

3. The Sons of Iraq has been an integral part of the improved security. When the Division first arrived AQI attacks averaged about 25 a day, now we are seeing an average of 3 or less as well as a 75% reduction in civilian casualties.

4. On the US side of the house our leadership; brigade, battalion and company commanders, are on their second or third tour and have learned how to do both the lethal and non-lethal aspects of counterinsurgency -- simultaneously. This is important as every one of our soldiers must excel at the lethal even while conducting non-lethal operations because at any time, in a split second, a non-lethal situation may transition to lethal.

5. Turning to the outlook for the remainder of the year, post-surge, the division has given this a lot of thought and unfortunately does not have a crystal ball as far as what a possible draw-down may mean. What we are looking at though, are identifying opportunities -- opportunities based on conditions we see and not on a time-line. The plan currently in place through the summer is doable in the Division's area -- our brigades and the increased contribution of Iraqi Security Forces and Sons of Iraq have shaped the current trend and laid the groundwork.

6. Along non-security lines of operation -- governance, economic, and essential services -- the bottom-up approach seems best suited for the Division's area. The Division's role is to act as a bridge -- facilitating local grass-roots organizations to reach out and up. The key for the long term though is the ability of the National Government to eventually make those hard non-sectarian decisions to ensure Iraq reconciliation.

7. The Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are value added - "the keys to the kingdom" in terms of capacity building. The only down-side is we do not have enough of them.

8. On FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency, unlike older doctrine that dictated "the battle drill' or what to think -- step 1, step 2, step 3..., FM 3-24 conveys "how to think" about COIN as well how to react to complex problem sets and adapt rather than teaching how to react from rote memory. Moreover, FM 3-24 will "morph" in the future as it is informed by our experiences here in Iraq and elsewhere.

Related Links:

SWJ Interview with BG Edward Cardon - 21 January 2008

DoD Bloggers Roundtable with MG Rick Lynch - 10 March 2008

By Lieutenant Colonel (ret) Thomas P. Odom, of

Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism

By James D. Kiras

Published by Routledge

In Special Operations and Strategy: From World War II to the War on Terrorism, James D. Kiras offers a strategic framework for analyzing the use of special operations forces (SOF) and special operations (SO) to achieve strategic effects as part of a larger conventional war. In doing so, Kiras defines both SOF and SO in a limited sense, excluding elite but more conventional forces by requiring a selection process to decide what makes SOF and SO "special". His strategic framework for analysis is bipolar. On one extreme Kiras offers "annihilation" strategy and reviews it in its many forms. On the other he expounds attrition-based strategy, expanding it to the point where it becomes a near catch-all of strategic thought.

Understanding the differences between annihilation and attrition is central to this monograph. Simply put annihilation theory posits that an enemy can be forced to surrender if struck in a certain way that paralyzes his ability to make war. Think of it as the "silver bullet" or "brass ring" approach to strategy, one that has great attraction to military and political leaders alike. Shoot that silver bullet into an opponent or pull a particular brass ring controlling his war making capacity and his will to fight on will evaporate along with his capacity. Attrition, on the other hand, is not so elegant for attrition means that one accepts war as a contest of morals and materiel, inextricably woven together, that requires time, will power, and blood to achieve victory. Annihilation strategy is therefore seductively attractive, especially when tied to technological advances such as the tank or airpower or the use of SOF against particular vulnerabilities.

Kiras contends that SOF are best used to complement a measured strategy of attrition. He largely dismisses annihilation strategy's quest for strategic paralysis of the enemy as a paralysis of thought. His critical question is what does using SOF in a particular SO achieve in the larger context of an attrition-based war? Kiras uses two case studies to illustrate what he means in asking that critical question. The first is the British effort to collapse the German war-making capacity by "busting" the Ruhr Valley dams. Kiras classifies the dambusting effort by 617 Squadron as a great but costly raid that fell far short of its intended goal to bring the German war machine to a grinding halt. His second case study is the helter-skelter tactical employment of the Special Air Service (SAS) brigade in conjunction with the invasion and liberation of France. Kiras contends that while a coordinated SAS campaign could have greatly assisted and perhaps accelerated the liberation of France, convoluted command and control, personalities, and poor planning meant the SAS paid a heavy price in lives to achieve little in the greater scheme of things. Both case studies are therefore offered as examples of how not to use SOF or mount SO.

I would say Kiras' monograph has great strengths and a few weaknesses. First of all, for the reader looking for a quick review of strategic thought, this book is a real find. Annihilation theory comes across as a bumper-sticker approach to strategic thought. I found his discussion of John Warden's 5-ring model useful, fair, and ultimately damning when judged against the reality of war. Second Kiras offers a broader explanation of attrition-based strategy than one typically hears, especially today when bumper stickers are quite popular. Placing SOF and SO in the context of annihilation and attrition strategies was clearly Kiras' main goal and he did so quite effectively.

As for weaknesses, I would offer but a couple of comments. First of all I would say the book is British-centric in its case studies and in some ways its analysis. Operation Chastise and 617 Squadron were purely British efforts. The SAS brigade's effort in France went through British chains of command until it reached Eisenhower. Secondly and perhaps this is an extension of the first weakness, Kiras is more convincing when he discusses airpower-related subjects than he is on SAS operations. He rightfully criticizes the inflated claims concerning the dambusting effort. Then he makes what I would call inflated hypothetical claims of what might have happened in France had the SAS been properly used. I believe he would have been better served by letting a reader make such leaps alone.

Overall I believe this monograph has great value to policy makers and soldiers, conventional and unconventional. As the author rightly points out, policy makers and SOF warriors have often struggled with the issue of best use. Both have, on occasion, gotten it wrong. James D. Kiras rightly cautions that such use must be governed by a rule of sustained value added to the overall effort of an attrition-based strategy. That certainly is nothing new to students of conventional warfare. Kiras is, in my opinion, warning that SOF and SO must be used in a coherent, comprehensive, and strategic version of combined arms warfare. He is correct and that is what makes his book valuable.

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Colonel Odom retired in 1996. He was a Foreign Area Officer on the Middle East-North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa for 15 years. His last 30 months on active duty were as US Defense Attaché in Zaire and then Rwanda. A historian, Colonel Odom authored Journey Into Darkness: Genocide In Rwanda, Texas A&M University Press, 2005; Shaba II: the French and Belgian Military Intervention in Zaire in 1978, Combat Studies Institute, 1993; and Leavenworth Paper #14, Dragon Operations: Hostage Rescues in the Congo 1964-1965, CSI, 1989. Colonel Odom was also co-author of Certain Victory: the US Army in the Gulf War with then Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr. and Lieutenant Colonel Terry Johnson.

To borrow a quote from Ronald Reagan, "Gian, there you go again."

Gentile's analysis is incorrect in a number of ways, and his narrative is heavily influenced by the fact that he was a battalion commander in Baghdad in 2006. His unit didn't fail, his thinking goes, therefore recent successes cannot be due to anything accomplished by units that came to Iraq during the Surge.

The facts speak otherwise. Gentile's battalion occupied Ameriyah, which in 2006 was an Al Qaeda safe-haven infested by Sunni insurgents and their Al Qaeda-Iraq allies. I'm certain that he and his soldiers did their best to combat these enemies and to protect the people in their area. But since his battalion lived at Forward Operating Base Falcon and commuted to the neighborhood, they could not accomplish their mission. The soldiers did not fail. The strategy did.

The "big base" strategy only changed when General Dave Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odierno came to Iraq and implemented the new counterinsurgency doctrine in the recently published FM 3-24. Few U.S. Army units were implementing that doctrine as early as 2004, as Gentile claims. Some units were moving in that direction, as Colonel H. R. McMaster's accomplishments with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in 2005 attest. But these units were exceptions to the general rule. Most units were still more intent on finding and killing the enemy than they were on protecting the Iraqi people and making it impossible for the insurgents to survive in their midst.

The Surge succeeded on a number of levels. Lieutenant General Odierno brought the operational level of war back into play with his brilliant plan for securing Baghdad and eliminating Al Qaeda-Iraq sanctuaries in the areas surrounding the capital, the so-called "Baghdad belts." If the U.S. Army were doing so well in COIN operations from 2004-2006, as Gentile claims, then why wasn't Baghdad secured earlier? Perhaps it was because our forces were poorly positioned on large bases, unable to protect the Iraqi people, as claimed by "a senior Army officer who was [sic, is] a member of Gen. Petraeus's 'brain trust'."

Gentile's assertion, that we paid the insurgents off, does not stand up to a close reading of recent history. The fact is that the Surge was a success in securing Baghdad (and Al Anbar) well before we began to grant security contracts in large numbers to "Concerned Local Citizens." The sheiks and other community leaders turned against Al Qaeda-Iraq first, due to terrorist depredations on their communities and also due to their belief that they would be supported by U.S. forces —to live among their people to protect them. With this 24/7 support, they could get rid of the terrorists of Al Qaeda-Iraq for good. The additional U.S. forces positioned in their communities meant that the terrorists could not return to enact revenge on those who turned against them.

This scenario played out first in the fall of 2006 in Ramadi in Al Anbar Province, where Colonel Sean MacFarland and my old unit, the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division, conducted a superb campaign to rid the city of Al Qaeda-Iraq. MacFarland positioned his forces in platoon and company strongpoints that slowly squeezed the area under enemy control. He also backed tribal auxiliary forces that supplemented the local Iraqi police. By the late spring of 2007, U.S. Army troopers and Marines along with local tribesmen eventually eliminated the Al-Qaeda-Iraq presence in Ramadi.

The success in Ramadi served as a template for other areas, to include the enemy stronghold of Ameriyah where Gentile and his battalion served. Once the Iraqi populace understood that U.S. forces would live among them, assist Iraqi security forces in battling the terrorists and other irreconcilable insurgents in their neighborhoods, and ensure their long-term protection, then a number of insurgents came forward to turn against their former allies who had gone too far in their intimidation of the local citizenry. Multi-National Force-Iraq applauded when these reconcilable elements of the insurgency offered to turn their weapons against the terrorists rather than continue to use them against us. They did so initially without being paid for their conversion -- that came later.

In short, the turning of the tribes against Al Qaeda-Iraq in Al Anbar came first, then the Surge provided forces to secure Baghdad's neighborhoods and eliminate enemy sanctuaries surrounding the capital, and then a number of insurgents turned against their former allies in Ameriyah, Ghazalia, and elsewhere. Only later did we start to pay money for the security offered by these reconcilable elements of Iraqi society.

The other cause to which Gentile ascribes the reduction in violence is Sadr's freeze on the operations of Jaish al-Mahdi (JAM), which he presents without context. The freeze cannot be understood unless you acknowledge that it came a time when JAM was under tremendous and increasing pressure from U.S. and Iraqi operations enabled by the surge and the new COIN approach. By the late summer of 2007, the Iraqi people increasingly perceived less of a need for JAM to secure their neighborhoods, because U.S. and Iraqi Security Forces had supplanted the role of militias in this regard. The incident in Karbala in August 2007 -- when JAM militiamen killed several hundred people during a Shi'ite religious festival -- jeopardized much of the remaining popular support for Sadr's military organization, which Iraqis increasingly viewed as thugs and criminals operating under the otherwise honorable banner of Sadr's father. Again, the Surge and the operations it enabled came first, and they were causal factors in Sadr's freeze on JAM operations.

Gentile worries that the U.S. Army has lost the capability to conduct conventional warfighting operations. I disagree. The Army has not lost that capability; today's Army is the most experienced, professional, and capable combined arms force in our nation's history. Since 2003 the U.S. Army and Marine Corps have routinely engaged in conventional warfighting. Battles in Karbala, An Najaf, Fallujah, Tal Afar, Mosul, Baqubah, Baghdad, and elsewhere have proven the capabilities of our ground forces to engage in conventional combat operations. Combat units routinely use armor, artillery, mechanized infantry, attack aviation, close air support, and other assets to accomplish their missions. The fact that our units are doing non-kinetic operations doesn't mean they've stopped doing high-intensity kinetic operations or have forgotten how. Gentile also doesn't mention how much more capable our brigades are now in terms of command and control and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance than they were when the war began in 2003.

The larger concern, in my view, would be if our senior leaders allow our newly developed counterinsurgency capabilities to lapse, and like Gentile, focus instead on preparing the Army to fight the next "big one." After all, why worry about fighting real wars in the Middle East and South Asia when we can instead keep our military forces in the United States to fight imaginary ones? Iraq and Afghanistan are a long way from being over. To paraphrase a certain high ranking former official, let's fight the wars we have, rather than the ones we want.

Colonel Peter Mansoor, USA, is the executive officer to General David Petraeus in Iraq. Previously he served on a "Council of Colonels" that assisted the Joint Chiefs of Staff in reassessing the strategy for the Iraq War, as the founding Director of the US Army / Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, and as Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Iraq in 2003-2004. He will retire this summer and assume duties as the General Raymond E. Mason Jr. Chair of Military History at The Ohio State University.

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SWJ Editors Links

Iraq Success: Happy Confluence - Tom Barnett, Thomas P.M. Barnett

Does Iraq Really Prepare the Army for Everything? - Westhawk, Westhawk

Peter Mansoor Weighs In - Charlie, Abu Muqawama

Two Sides of the COIN - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump

Inside the Military's Civil War Over Counterinsurgency - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

Getting the Strategy Right - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Reading Or Misreading The Surge? - Andrew Sullivan, The Atlantic

Discuss at Small Wars Council

March 2008 document (guidebook) from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).

About the document:

Civil-Military Guidelines & Reference for Complex Emergencies is the first collection of core humanitarian instruments developed by the United Nations (UN) and the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) on civil-military relationship in complex emergencies. Its goal is to help promote respect for international law, standards and principles in these situations.

Engaging military support for humanitarian operations is not a new endeavour. In today's security environment, however, the military are ever more involved in the 'direct' provision of aid, while humanitarian actors are often faced with situations where there are no alternatives but to rely on the military, as a last resort, for safety and to access populations in need - at the serious risk of compromising their neutrality, impartiality, and/or independence, and thus their ability and/or credibility to operate.

Combined with the tides toward 'integration' and 'whole-of-government' approaches, as well as the increased propensity of some Governments to deploy mixed civilian-military teams to provide aid as a 'tool' to address security threats, the situation calls for enhanced understandings between the military and humanitarian professionals at all levels.

International law, standards and principles can assist both actors to properly and legitimately discharge their respective missions in far-away lands. Adhering to these and de-conflicting each others' activities can maximise the effectiveness and efficiency of the respective operations. These tasks are crucial when working in the same area.

Written in a practical, user-friendly style that brings together the essential guidance materials on the subject into a single form, the Booklet aims to assist professionals to handle civilmilitary issues in line with such law, standards and principles, in a manner that respects and appropriately reflects humanitarian concerns at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.

A Seminar with the Formulators of Counterinsurgency Doctrine

Sponsored by the Institute for the Study of War

March 13, 2008, 1:00pm to 6:00pm.

Georgetown University Convention Center

3800 Reservoir Road, NW Washington DC

Registration Required

The dramatic success of Coalition counter-insurgency operations in Iraq in 2007 was born in Carlisle, Pennsylvania and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, where teams of experienced officers and civilians developed a new conceptual framework for counter-insurgency. This framework, published as Army Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency, formed the basis for all Coalition efforts in Iraq in 2007, partly because the Commanding General in Iraq, David Petraeus, was also responsible for drafting and publishing the Field Manual. Once in Iraq, Petraeus and his staff and subordinate commanders like Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, put the doctrine into practice—at the same time further refining and improving the intellectual framework with the feedback of real life. Almost all of the most successful revolutions in warfare have resulted from such a process. The American experience in counter-insurgency warfare in Iraq in 2007 provides new opportunities to develop, and perhaps even revolutionize, the practice of counterinsurgency. Join us as we seek to explore how this doctrine came about, how it has functioned, and how it can be advanced in the future.

The educators and specialists who will conduct the lectures and lead the discussions at the March 13 seminar include Dr. Conrad Crane, head of the U. S. Army Military History Institute, who directed the development of the U.S. counterinsurgency doctrine that General Petraeus is now implementing in Iraq; Dr. Paul Melshen, who is the lead for Counterinsurgency Studies at Joint Forces Staff College; and Colonel Craig Bollenberg, who recently returned as a planner for General Petraeus at Multi-National Force-Iraq.

The Institute for the Study of War will host "Moving Forward in Iraq" at the Georgetown University Convention Center at 3800 Reservoir Road, NW Washington DC, on Thursday March 13, 2008, from 1:00pm to 6:00pm. Space is limited to permit the opportunity for questions and discussion, and advanced registration is required for attendance. Email Adriel Domenech at adomenech@understandingwar..org or call at 202-293-5550 to reserve your place.