An excerpt:

When a new president takes office in early 2009, military leaders and politicians will approach one another with considerable suspicion. Dislike of the Democrats in general and Bill Clinton in particular, and disgust for Donald Rumsfeld, has rendered all politicians suspect in the imaginations of generals and admirals. The indictments make for a long list: a beleaguered military at war while the American public shops at the mall; the absence of elites in military ranks; the bungling of the Iraq occupation; the politicization of General David Petraeus by the White House and Congress; an army and Marine Corps exhausted and overstretched, their people dying, their commitments never-ending. Nearly six years of Donald Rumsfeld's intimidation and abuse have encouraged in the officer corps a conviction that military leaders ought to—are obliged to—push back against their civilian masters. Egged on by Democrats in Congress—and well-meaning but profoundly mistaken associates who believe the military must hold political leaders accountable for their mistakes—some flag officers now opine publicly and seemingly without hesitation. Though divided about Iraq strategy, the four-stars unite in their contempt for today's political class and vow not to be saddled with blame for mistakes not of their own making.

Read it all and then tell us 'what say you?' - Comment below or discuss at Small Wars Council.

1) The NATO-ISAF operation poses the most critical test to date of NATO's ability to generate the military forces required to meet its level of political ambition. In several categories, ranging from maneuver battalions to helicopters to C4ISR assets to Operational Mentoring and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) intended to build the capabilities of the Afghan National Army (ANA), Allied nations as a group are not filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR) set by NATO Military Authorities. This allows opposition forces to operate in the space between what NATO-ISAF has and what it requires.

2) There exists a lack of "political will" among Allies whose publics and parliaments are questioning the goals and strategy of the Alliance commitment and, in some cases, are increasingly worried about casualties suffered by their forces and/or incidents of collateral damage affecting Afghan civilians. In addition, numerous Allies lack the required capabilities and/or funding to deploy and sustain their forces, particularly in the more challenging operational environment of Afghanistan. For some Allies, this is complicated further by their competing commitments to other operations (e.g., in the Balkans, Lebanon, and Africa.).

3) Allied governments have underestimated the tasks of simultaneously stabilizing the security situation, dealing with a complex set of opposition forces (Taliban, narco-terrorists, and tribal "warlords"), and developing a basic Afghan governmental capacity in a society wracked by decades of warfare and corruption. That said, there are important, albeit underreported, signs of progress in Afghanistan, and the strategic stakes remain high, for the region as well as the Alliance.

4) Within NATO, a variety of steps are underway to improve Allied individual and collective capabilities to deploy the forces and assets necessary for expeditionary missions, although resource limitations are a significant underlying problem. Within NATO and individual Allied forces, increased emphasis is needed on training military personnel and sharing "lessons learned" for complex and multinational counterinsurgency (COIN) operations with a heavy civilian military component.

5) "Naming and shaming" or "finger pointing" at Allies whose forces are not engaged, for various reasons, in the most dangerous areas will be counterproductive.

6) Serious effort is needed to improve NATO's strategic communications capabilities with the Afghan population.

7) Notwithstanding public perceptions a few years ago that the United States had "lost interest" in NATO, the American commitment to the Alliance remains strong and enjoys broad bipartisan support.

*Hyperlinks inserted by SWJ.

Behind the Bloodshed in Basra - Mohammed Fadhil, Iraq the Model

One of the most notable things about the fierce and bloody confrontation taking place the government and Sadr's militia is the spin on the operation by the commanders and the government; that it is a crackdown on outlaws with emphasis that the operation targets no particular movement or political line.

This generic label, includes the so-called rogue Sadrists. Sadr announced only weeks ago that whoever doesn't uphold the ceasefire would no longer be considered a member of the movement.

Now, Sadr is watching those rogue elements being hit hard by the government forces. Instead of disavowing those who blatantly disobeyed his ceasefire orders we see him call for negotiations and condemning the government, thus once more revealing his real face as a defender of his own version of terrorism.

Basra a Test of America's Exit Strategy - Westhawk, Westhawk

President Bush has called the current battle between Iraqi security forces and Sadr militiamen in Basra "a defining moment." In his mind, President Bush probably likens the Basra battle to America's Whiskey Rebellion, when President Washington had to defend the new constitution against a militia uprising. Of course, many other observers interpret the violence in Basra as Shi'ite factions, some in government uniforms, battling for economic spoils in Basra and the surrounding oil patch.

For the U.S. military in Iraq, the battle for Basra is a defining moment for its exit strategy from the country. Namely, will.

Fighting in Basra - Max Boot, Commentary

I have hesitated to comment on the fighting raging in Basra, which has spilled over into other cities including Baghdad, because the shape of events is so difficult to make out from afar-or for that matter even from up close. The best analysis I have seen is this article in the Financial Times which notes that Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki is taking a major gamble by challenging the power of the Shiite militias--more like criminal gangs-which have seized control of Basra, Iraq's second or third largest city and home to its only major port.

While most news coverage has focused on the renewed fighting as signs of impending doom--or at the very least evidence that the surge isn't working so well--the FT correctly detects a silver lining: "If the prime minister succeeds, the pay-off would deliver a big boost to the credibility of a shaky government, proving that the growing national army is capable of taking on powerful militia."

This gamble is long overdue.

From SNAFU to FUBAR in Basra (Updated) - Phil Carter, Intel Dump

Oh yeah, and another thing. Every time you think of the "adviser model" for Iraq, you should think of this operation in Basra. Because this is the end result of the U.S. advisory effort to date -- which has focused on creating well-trained and equipped units at the tactical level, but has basically failed at the national, strategic level. The leaders of the Iraqi security forces at the ministry level are as bad as they ever were. And the national government is about as bad. Training and advising Iraqi units at the brigade level and below is well and good. But if you fail to properly shape the national command structure, you're handing those units over to leaders who will misuse them.

There is Nothing Prreventing Iraq from Going Right... - AM, Abu Muqawama

Karen DeYoung's article in the Washington Post nicely captures two things: One, how tenuous a situation we have right now in Iraq, and how the gains of 2007 can be wiped out frighteningly quickly, and two, what an absolute mess the British Army left southern Iraq. This is what happens when you march into Basra Province thinking it's an Arabic-speaking Country Armagh. This is what happens when you equate a lack of violence with everything going well -- and ignore the militias who are taking control of the streets. This is what happens when you decide to do peace-keeping rather than counter-insurgency.

Sadr - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club

The attitude of the other factions towards Sadr was manifested when the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance apparently boycotted sessions attended by Sadr's faction. The question of how far Maliki will go against Sadr was partially answered when the Iraqi PM extended the deadline for the militias to lay down their arms. This has led some to suggest that a deal is now in the works.

But it's also possible that Maliki is trying to peel away the less loyal of Sadr's commanders and turn them to his side. Which exactly will be the case the next few days will reveal.

The Lesson of Najaf - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

Leaving armed criminal gangs running half the country was never going to work, anyway. There were reports a few months ago that in some areas south of Baghdad, Shiites were interested in the Sunni experience and wanted to try it themselves. U.S. forces can support and even lead Iraqi troops, but none of it works in the long run until the people decide they've had enough.

The Battle for Basra: U.S. Forces Take the Lead - AM, Abu Muqawama

If Abu Muqawama was leading one of those U.S. units into Sadr City past a bunch of Iraqi Army soldiers hanging out on the outskirts, he would not be happy. He would be asking himself a) why is he the one establishing the authority of the Iraqi state and not the Iraqi Army and b) why is he duking it out with a militia with broad popular support so that another Iran-backed political party can win a bigger share of the vote in the fall?

Now Iraqi Army units are calling for U.S. and UK military units to lend direct support in Basra as well.

Moral Hazard to Infinity and.... Basra? - Marc Lynch, Abu Aardvark

Did the United States have advance notice of Maliki's decision to attack Basra? In a much-blogged story this morning, The Washington Post reported that "Maliki decided to launch the offensive without consulting his U.S. allies, according to administration officials" and that they were all arguing over "who's got the best conspiracy theory about why Maliki decided to act now" (fortunately, they had this handy guide).

Shia Clashes in Basra - Will Hartley, Insurgency Research Group

Al-Jazeera English has a good report on the current fighting in Basra, which offers a more nuanced analysis of events than is provided by most coverage. The report makes clear that underlying the engagement is a struggle for influence in the oil-rich south between the two main Shia factions in Iraq: the Sadrists led by Muqtada al-Sadr, whose armed wing - the Jaish al Mahdi (Mahdi Army) - is the object of the security operation; and the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), whose armed wing - the Badr Organisation - dominates the security forces.

Moqtada al-Sadr's Religious Strategy Complicates Jaysh al-Mahdi Ceasefire - Ramzy Mardini, Jamestown Foundation

As smoke billows from Baghdad's U.S.-controlled "Green Zone" following a series of rocket and mortar attacks thought to have been carried out by members of Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JaM) movement last weekend, important questions have been raised concerning the direction of the movement as its leader becomes increasingly reclusive.

The young Iraqi firebrand and Shiite cleric, Moqtada al-Sadr, recently tried to put to rest the confusion and rumors circulating around his withdrawal from the Iraqi political scene. In a statement posted on the Sadrist al-Amarah website, al-Sadr declared that his absence was due to a decision to pursue religious studies in Qom and Najaf—a path intended to lead to Ayatollah status within Shiite Islam (Gulf News, March 10). Though al-Sadr extended the self-imposed ceasefire on his forces last February, his absence poses serious questions regarding the status of his JaM militia.

Fighting in Baghdad, South Against Mahdi Army Completes Fourth Day - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal

Fighting in Basrah, Baghdad, and throughout much of the South continues as Iraqi security Forces and Multinational Forces Iraq press the fight against the Mahdi Army and other Iranian-backed terror groups. The Iraqi Army has moved additional forces to Basrah as the US and Iraqi military have conducted significant engagements in Shia areas of Baghdad. The Mahdi Army has taken significant casualties. The US military has denied the Mahdi Army has taken control of checkpoints in Baghdad.

Several hundred Iraqis are reported to have been killed during the fighting since the operation began on March 25. A large majority of them are Mahdi Army fighters, according to the press reports. The US and Iraqi military have killed more than 70 Mahdi Army fighters in Shia neighborhood in Baghdad alone over the past three days.

Iraqi Army's Vehicles Stall Out in Basra - Paul McLeary, Ares

While this isn't necessarily a defeat for the IA, it remains to be seen if they can overcome the limitations of their equipment to move through the city to confront the Mahdi Army. For now, at least, it looks like their recon might not have been the best. A "Basra newspaper editor" quoted by the Times told the paper that "it was obvious that the central government had not consulted with local commanders in planning the assault, citing the inability of the armored vehicles to fit through city streets."

When fighting an insurgency that relies on motorcycles and small cars and trucks to move around the narrow streets of a city, bigger isn't always better.

Continued Chaos in Basra - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

In mid-2007 when the British retreated from Basra, they did so while telling the tall tale that since the very presence of the British themselves was causing the violence, it would be better if they just left. In other words, no one would shoot at the British Army if the Army wasn't there. There wasn't a rush of anyone or any faction into Basra. They were already there and had control of the city. The British never had control of Basra, and from the beginning it was left to Shi'a factions, criminal elements, Iranian proxy fighters (Badr, Quds), and the loss of Basra was a constant diminution of civilization up to the point that the British ended up behind barbed wire at the Basra airport, contributing nothing to the Iraq campaign. We have already linked Nibras Kazimi who, in the update to his post, conveys the Iraqi sentiment concerning the British Army. It isn't flattering, and British Colonel Tim Collins knows and has said that the retreat from Basra has badly damaged the reputation of the British Army.

Cutting the Road to Kut, Part I - Jeff Kouba, Peace Like a River

If Iran supports the Mahdi Army, and if Mehran is a source of that support, and if Kut is near Mehran, it stands to reason that Kut will harbor a particularly strong Mahdi Army force.

And so, I'd like to offer up Kut as a metaphor for what is happening inside Iraq. If that road between Kut and Mehran can be "cut," if Iran's support for militants in Iraq who foment violence and discord can be cut, Iraq stands a much better chance of getting on its feet again.

Add additional relevant links to comments below - thanks...

Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (ret) is an experienced veteran of COIN-in-the field; his views are worthy of serious attention. Writing at the Small Wars Journal Blog, Col. Killebrew dismissed LTC Nagl's proposal for a permanent Advisory Corps. Col. Killebrew strongly supports the advisor mission, but wants the whole Army, not a specialized few, contributing to it...

The best argument for the Nagl Advisory Corps plan is how it offers the prospect of preventing large-scale U.S. COIN missions from becoming necessary in the future. By making it a regular practice for small U.S. advisor teams to work in all four corners of the globe, assisting allies with peacetime foreign internal defense preparation (so-called "Phase Zero operations"), the U.S. can prevent crises from happening in the first place. LTC Nagl's Advisory Corps and its associated schoolhouse would ensure that these Phase Zero advisory efforts would be performed by well-trained and highly-prepared teams, employing best-practices tactics, techniques, and procedures.

After five years and over $500 billion, the U.S. military has gotten better at the advisory missions in Iraq and Afghanistan. A long-term commitment to Latin America, and a large presence of the Spanish language and Latin culture inside the U.S., has boosted the U.S. foreign internal defense missions in Latin America...

More.

Update - Part II here.

Iraqi security forces battle the Mahdi Army - Bill Roggio, Long War Journal

The current Iraqi offensive has been in the works for some time. The Iraqi Army and police have been massing forces in the South since August 2007, when the Basrah Operational Command was established to coordinate efforts in the region. As of December the Iraqi Army deployed four brigades and an Iraqi Special Operations Forces battalion in Basrah province. The Iraqi National Police deployed two additional battalions to the province.

The clashes with the Mahdi Army come just weeks after Muqtada al Sadr admitted failure in Iraq. "So far I did not succeed either to liberate Iraq or make it an Islamic society — whether because of my own inability or the inability of society, only God knows," Sadr wrote to his followers...

How Far Against Sadr? - The Belmont Club

The offensive is almost entirely an all-Iraqi show. British forces, though still in Basra are uninvolved. The International Herald Tribune says "U.S. forces also appeared to play little role in the clashes in Baghdad." Maliki himself toured Basra a few days ago. A Time article by Bobby Ghost speculates on whether Maliki will finish off Sadr as a political force, unlike Iyad Allawi, who crushed Sadr with US help in 2004 only to let him off the hook after intervention by Ayatollah Ali Sistani.

But more than Sistani's intervention saved Sadr's position on that occasion. The US was preoccupied in combating what it felt was the primary threat: al-Qaeda in Iraq and the Sunni insurgency. Sadr's political clout after the elections also prevented Maliki from acting against him. But things have changed...

More on Basra (Updated) - Abu Muqawama

... One answer is that the Brits adopted a "peacekeeping" mindset in Basra and never really engaged in a broader COIN or CT effort. That meant that all the myriad Shia groups were able to pursue their (relatively) non-violent political agenda and consolidate control over the political levers of city. There's a chance (albeit not a big one) that our COIN efforts in Anbar, Baghdad, and elsewhere have undercut the political bases of these groups and made a Basra-style breakdown less likely. Time will tell.

Basra Fighting Triggers Baghdad Clashes - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

It's not all that surprising that U.S. and Iraqi forces moved against Shi'ite militias in Basra today: the British essentially abandoned the city months ago; even now, in the middle of these clashes, "there are no British troops on the ground," reports SkyNews. What's disconcerting is that this fighting in southern Iraq appears to have triggered clashes in Baghdad, as well...

Basra: Shi'ite Militias Clash (Updated) - Noah Shachtman, Danger Room

The fight in Basra is being billed as the Iraqi government versus the militias of Shi'ite cleric Moktada al-Sadr. But it's just as much a fight between rival Shi'ite factions...

Brits Bail, Basra Burns (Updated) - David Axe, Danger Room

And where's the British Army during all this? Hunkered at the airport outside Basra, where in December Major General Graham Binns signed documents officially handing over security in the region to Iraqi forces. I was there for the ceremony (videos here and here), and in the aftermath I wrote that the British had effectively surrendered any ability to intervene in Basra. With no forward bases, no intelligence apparatus in the city of Basra, less nimble equipment and no political will to suffer a single additional casualty in Iraq, the roughly 3,000 Brits remaining in the country can do little but wait out the current fighting.

Which means any Western intervention in Basra -- some reports are calling it a planned "surge" for the south -- will have to be mostly manned by U.S. forces. Specifically, U.S. Marines, according to one AFP report...

Wages of Sin, We Keep Paying - Spencer Ackerman, Too Hot for TNR

Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki is giving powerful Shiite cleric Moqtada Sadr's forces three days to surrender in Basra, as clashes between Maliki's security forces and Sadr's Mahdi Army -- in which the U.S. intervenes on Maliki's side -- escalate. But with the U.S. happy about the now-abrogated Sadrist ceasefire, why is the U.S. military getting involved?

Chaos While We're There, Chaos After We Leave? - Spencer Ackerman, Washington Independent

... Withdrawing without any political strategy, as the British did from Basra, leads to a vacuum like the one we're seeing now. Sadr rushes in. The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq rushes in. The Fadhila party maneuvers between the two. Forces ostensibly loyal to the government, pinioned between all sides, find ways to accommodate the existing power on the streets. In other words: chaos.

So to avoid chaos -- and I recognize this is banal and generic -- you can't just pull up stakes...

From SNAFU to FUBAR in Basra - Phil Carter, Intel Dump

.... It's difficult to see how this ends well. This is some of the nastiest intra-sectarian fighting we've seen in Iraq. Second, it looks pretty clear that Maliki is using the Iraqi security forces to consolidate his own power and eliminate his rivals. Third, I can only imagine the trepidation being felt by Sunni leaders who are watching this and wondering whether they're next on Maliki's hit list. For now, the heavy fighting remains limited to Basra, although skirmishes have erupted throughout the country. If this clash in Basra lasts longer than a week, that's going to be really bad for the Maliki government. If the heavy fighting spreads, that's going to be even worse.

Another Theory for the Pile - Marc Lynch, Abu Aardvark

... Me, I wish that Maliki and Bush had paid more attention to Joost Hilterman's prescient analysis when thinking through how to go about extending Iraqi state sovereignty into the south - a good thing! - without violent confrontations with Sadr and without giving the strong appearance of employing the Iraqi Army on behalf of one player in an intra-communal political battle. I'm still trying to figure out whether there are really talks going on behind the scenes to end this or whether Maliki really does plan to push on as he says, and whether there's any truth at all to the stories in the Arab press of widescale defections among government troops (I tend to doubt it, given the sources where thus far these stories have been running).... in between sneezing, coughing, and blowing my nose, that is.

The Enigmatic Second Battle of Basra - Reidar Visser, Histories of Political Imagining

... Perhaps most importantly, there is a discrepancy between the description of Basra as a city ruled by militias (in the plural) -- which is doubtless correct -- and the battlefield facts of the ongoing operations which seem to target only one of these militia groups, the Mahdi Army loyal to Muqtada al-Sadr. Surely, if the aim was to make Basra a safer place, it would have been logical to do something to also stem the influence of the other militias loyal to the local competitors of the Sadrists, the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq (ISCI), as well as the armed groups allied to the Fadila party (which have dominated the oil protection services for a long time). But so far, only Sadrists have complained about attacks by government forces.

The Battle in Basra - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

... The Captain's Journal still doesn't like Maliki. This operation should have been conducted years ago, and one troubling aspect of Maliki's involvement came to light in an ultimatum he issued to the fighters in Basra. "Iraq's prime minister on Wednesday gave gunmen in the southern oil port of Basra a three-day deadline to surrender their weapons and renounce violence ..."

Kazimi has gotten it right. The enemy is comprised of Iranian-sponsored thugs and killers, corrupt Sadrists, and criminals who are after oil money (not to mention the Islamist gangs who have beheaded hundreds of women over the last year). Basra is currently run by a witch's brew of the worst elements on earth. To be fighting them is a good thing. Far from Iraq slipping into chaos, it was always the case that until the Shi'a fighters were taken out like the Sunni insurgents were, there would be no peace in Iraq...

Google News Search: Basra

As the Marine Corps looks beyond Iraq, the question becomes "Where do we go from here?"

That question was asked of the Marine Corps after the two World Wars, Korea, and Vietnam. After each conflict there were many who discounted the utility of the Marines, citing cost-effectiveness, duplication, and myriad other reasons as justification for the elimination or absorption of this singular and peculiar organization. But the Corps survived

and justified its existence through its performance in and out of battle. Nonetheless, it will face renewed scrutiny after Iraq and Afghanistan and the result will be the same—but only if the Corps remains useful and does what it says it can do.

Marines have been almost indistinguishable from the Army for the past five years of the Iraq War. That was also the case in the wars [previously] cited. But the Corps was born to serve on the Seven Seas and that's where its future will again reside...

I sincerely hope so, but remain pessimistic. Senator Sam Nunn, when he chaired the Senate Armed Services Committee in 1990 (nearly two decades ago), qustioned whether a lighter Army and a heavier Marine Corps were already undesirably redundant and cost-ineffective. My take in the July 2005 issue of Proceedings noted that Title 10, United States Code, tells our Marine Corps to organize, train, and equip forces for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

That prescription, however, isn't worth the paper it's printed on because Marines repeatedly must supplement our shorthanded Army, which cannot satisfy its assignments unassisted. Leathernecks during World War I and since World War II have routinely taken up part of the slack by performing protracted land power missions that have nothing in common with naval campaigns. Included tasks frequently involve nitty gritty urban combat rather than fluid littoral warfare, as demonstrated inside Seoul (1950), Hue (1968), and Fallujah (2004)...

That sorry situation will persist until the Army expands enough to satisfy commitments...

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Maj. Gen. Bergner's Opening Remarks:

Good afternoon, al Salam Aleikem. This has been a difficult and challenging few days. It has also been a period of significant effort by the Iraqi government and their security forces to deal with the violence that criminal activity has been contributing to. This afternoon I'd like to talk in particular about events in Basra and also events here in Baghdad.

Turning to operations underway in Basra, it's important to note that they have been undertaken by Iraqi Security Forces based on the decision and direction of the Prime Minister, with his national security ministers -- completely an Iraqi initiative. Prime Minister Maliki specifically said that he took these actions because -quote- The lawlessness is going on under religious or political cover along with smuggling of oil, weapons, and drugs. These outlaws found support from inside government institutions either willingly or by coercion...turning Basra into a place where citizens cannot feel secure for their lives and property.

Iraqi operations in Basra also reflect the growing ability of the Iraqi security forces, Iraqi decision making, and Iraqi leadership. A year ago it was a significant challenge to move Iraqi Army units to Baghdad to augment forces here at the beginning of Operation Fard al-Qanoon. But, in the past week, Iraqi leaders directed forces that are the equivalent of some two brigades to move to Basra and undertake operations. These forces have included Emergency Response Units, Special Operations Forces, Helicopters and conventional forces. In addition, the Prime Minister and his council of security ministers are personally involved. A year ago, the Iraqi Security Forces could not have moved this force, they would not have been able to support it, and it would have been difficult for the government to take this strong position against the criminals.

Enforcement of the Rule of Law in Basra is not a battle against Jaysh Al-Mahdi, as some have suggested. Nor is it a proxy war between the U.S. and Iran as others have purported. It is the Government of Iraq taking responsible action necessary to deal with criminals on the streets with weapons.

The involvement of Coalition forces is limited to the normal transition teams that are embedded with Iraqi security forces; liaison elements from MNF-I and MND-SE located with the Basra Operational Command; and there are some air assets being made available as needed.

Baghdad:

In Baghdad, Coalition and Iraqi security forces have been, and will continue to be focused on those breaking the law. And, they are exercising significant restraint in those operations. We have not, for example, indiscriminately returned fire on the locations from which the rockets have been launched. We have not undertaken large-scale operations against neighborhoods, just because that is where the indirect fire originated from. We have and will continue to show restraint in dealing with those who honor al-Sayyid Muqtada al-Sadr's pledge of honor to halt attacks. We have and will continue to help Iraqi security forces enforce the rule of law and target those Quds Force-backed Special Groups, and other criminals, who unleash indiscriminate violence in Iraq. And what remains most important is the support of law-abiding Iraqi citizens to identify those responsible for the criminal behavior.

Those who are firing rockets into the International Zone and other Baghdad neighborhoods are criminals who are dishonoring Sadr's pledge of honor and they are placing the lives of innocent Iraqi citizens at risk.

Our operations are not directed at Jaysh al Mahdi, not directed at Sadrists. They are directed at individuals who are breaking the law. Indeed we have welcomed the opportunity to dialogue with Muqtada al-Sadr leaders and have done so at the local level to encourage reconciliation and other initiatives like the cease fire. The suggestion that Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces are targeting individuals because of their political affiliation is simply incorrect. We are targeting criminals regardless of their political or other affiliation. People who break the law are arrested and subject to the rule of law. This is focused on criminals.

Way Ahead:

Whether in Baghdad or Basra or other communities in Iraq, no one wants to see a return to the violence of a year ago. The Iraqis I speak with want to move forward and build on the security gains that have been achieved through enormous sacrifice. They do not want to go backwards. They want to see roads that were once closed re-opened, like we saw this week in.... 9 Nissan district.

They want to see schools open and businesses bringing in the commodities they need. They want to have the freedom to come and go to work without threats and intimidation. They want their neighbors to respect the sovereignty of Iraq. And they expect their Government to take the actions necessary to remove the criminals from the streets so that all of that can happen.

By Colonel Robert Killebrew, USA (Ret.)

The Chief of Staff of the Army's recent decision not to field the proposed Theater Military Advisory and Assistance Groups (TMAAG) was the right one. Regardless of which party wins the general election this fall, future U.S. national security strategy will include increased assistance to allies fighting against radical Islamic aggression. Whether called "building partnership capacity" or some other acronym, the essential idea will be to help other states fight their own wars, rather than providing U.S. combat forces as a first resort. The Army's TMAAG was an effort to get out front of this emerging strategy, but it was taking the wrong route.

Providing enhanced military assistance to a particular allied country, as part of overall U.S. policy toward that country, is first and foremost a political act overseen by the U.S. Chief of Mission -- the Ambassador -- working with the host country and the U.S. regional commander. The COM and the regional commander negotiate very specific support for the host country based on its needs. Military support to the COM is either assigned permanently in-country or "visits" as military training teams (MTT).

To advise the COM and to maintain military-to-military relations with the host country's security forces, most U.S. missions include a military detachment variously called a MAAG, Milgroup or some other acronym acceptable to the host country. The Milgroup's makeup is nonstandard, and tailored to reflect the needs of the host country. Members are stationed in the country for as long as circumstances permit. If the host country and the U.S. jointly agree to provide U.S. military advisors to local security forces, they are assigned to the in-country Milgroup supporting the U.S. mission. Advisors are the backbone of any policy that envisions helping other countries fight their own war. Advisors' duties cover whatever the mission covers -- they train, equip, supervise and accompany host nation forces on missions, subject to constraints of U.S. policy.

MTT, on the other hand, appear in response to a call from the COM for some military specialty beyond the reach of the Milgroup. An example might be an engineer unit to work with host nation engineers to build a critical bridge or to teach engineering skills. MTT generally come from the General Purpose Forces, but can also come from Service schools or installations, depending on the need of the host country. Wherever they come from, they work for the COM while in-country.

Since any U.S. strategy that emphasizes military assistance will be built up gradually, the Army has time to begin to shift its manpower policies and force structure. Rather than fencing off specialists in "advising," as the TMAAG and LTC John Nagl's "advisory corps" would do, the Army should prepare to support advisory missions and MTT with the entire force structure. Three steps can be taken in fairly short order without distracting the Service from ongoing missions in Iraq and Afghanistan and endangering the CSA's "reset" focus that is essential to rebuilding the base combat force.

First, to provide manpower for future advisory efforts, the Army should begin enlarging its inventory of mid-grade officers and NCOs. The Service can get a twofer by re-filling vacant TDA school slots for platform instructors and doctrine shops, as well as elsewhere in the force, positions now occupied by contractors or civil servants. An enlarged officer and NCO corps is not unnecessary overhead, as some have thought, but a national asset, particularly in these times. Assignment to Milgroup duty should once again become a routine assignment for successful officers, who would carry experience in first-line U.S. units out to host countries, then return to their mainstream careers (incidentally with area expertise in critical regions).

Second, the Army should become executive agent for a joint, central schoolhouse for officers and NCOs assigned to Milgroup or advisory assignments, with capacity to expand as required. The school should teach prospective advisors -- who already would be first-rate specialists in military skills -- the tricks of the advising trade and sufficient language skills to be initially effective in-country. In fact, the Army once maintained such a schoolhouse, including an enhanced, war-college-level course for career specialists and Milgroup commanders. Those files still exist at Fort Bragg.

Thirdly, the Army should seek a much higher attendance of allied officers at Army service schools in the U.S. There is probably no more cost-effective way of supporting military-to-military contacts than graduating allies from Carlisle or Leavenworth; at this writing, the head of state of one critical African nation and one critical chief of service in Asia are Leavenworth grads. This writer's counterpart in Vietnam combat was a classmate at Fort Benning. And the list goes on.

MTT require little preparation on a service-wide basis. Organizations are tasked through existing channels and they respond. Some adjustments in training and readiness systems will be necessary to synch ARFORGEN -- the Army's readiness management system -- with overseas requirements, but that is mostly a management challenge. On the other hand, MTT are often challenging and rewarding unit training opportunities.

Seen in this perspective, TMAAG, like the "advisory corps" idea, is just not a sufficient answer to emerging challenges. Changing strategic priorities will require a much more fundamental approach.

Colonel Robert Killebrew served more than 30 years in the Army and is a former Army War College instructor.

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Voice of America

By Greg Flakus

Fort Riley

25 March 2008

US troops at Fort Riley, in the Midwestern state of Kansas, are training for deployment in Afghanistan along with 31 soldiers from Afghanistan's National Army. Some 300 US soldiers are in the current exercise and, as VOA's Greg Flakus reports from Fort Riley, they are getting a good preview of the kind of conditions and problems they will face after they deploy to Afghanistan.

In this exercise, the soldiers are raiding the suspected base of an insurgent group in order to apprehend what they call "a bad guy." The training takes place in a mock Afghan village complete with so-called enactors, usually Afghan Americans, who play the role of villagers and combatants. Soldiers must safely enter the village, locate the house of the insurgents and enter without harming any of the civilians who wander the streets nearby.

Carrying out such an operation requires cultural sensitivity and knowledge of local traditions. US soldiers are taught to respect local village leaders and to work closely with Afghan security forces and that is one reason the Afghan soldiers are here taking part in these exercises. US Army advisors do most training of Afghan soldiers in Afghanistan, but these 31 men are here so that they can help US soldiers learn how to work with Afghan counterparts before they leave Fort Riley.

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl , one of the authors of the US military handbook on counterinsurgency, says gaining a better understanding of the Afghan people is a key factor in defeating al-Qaida and the Taliban.

"It is extraordinarily important to understand the culture and not just have cultural awareness, but actually have cultural competence: to be able to work inside the culture, to understand how different people think and what they value," he said.

The Afghans train here with the vehicles, weapons and gear they will use back home. They interact with their US counterparts through interpreters, although most of them have learned a little English and some of the US soldiers have also picked up some Pashto and Dari, the languages spoken in Afghanistan.

Afghan Army Sergeant Rahmat-ullah Ahmed Zai says troops from both countries can learn something from each other.

"The American soldiers learn from us about the terrain in Afghanistan and we learn from them about advanced military technology," he noted. "They have more theoretical knowledge, while ours is more practical."

He says the soldiers from both armies are focused on the same mission.

"Their goal and our goal is the same: the elimination of the enemy, al-Qaida, the terrorists and the drug traffickers," he added.

The commander of the Afghan detachment here is Captain Najibula Askardzada. He says this training is part of an effort to strengthen his nation's security forces so that the country can recover from 30 years of war.

"In order to rebuild the foundations of the country-schools, clinics, mosques-the Afghan people need security and that can only be provided by soldiers with better training, weapons and equipment," he explained.

Major General Robert Durbin, who was in Afghanistan before assuming command of Fort Riley last year, says US troops are still needed there, but he says Afghan troops will one day be able to operate effectively alone.

"I still think we are a year or two, maybe three, from achieving that, but we already have independent operations from some of their highest quality forces, their commando forces, that have demonstrated their capabilities," he said.

In the meantime, Colonel Nagl says the training exercises with Afghan troops here contribute to making US efforts in Afghanistan much more effective.

"It is really the difference between theory and practice and every step we can take our trainers along the road to being a great adviser here at Fort Riley is a step they do not have to learn on the ground in Afghanistan," he noted.

Nagl and other US officers praise the Afghans for their resilience and hard work and they say friendships forged through these exercises help strengthen the bond between the two nations.

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Transition Team - Fort Riley

International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) - NATO

U.S. Captains Bear Weight of Iraq Strategy

... At the word "viceroy", my ears pricked up. This is very much the sort of thing that I have been watching and waiting to see develop in the U.S. Army and USMC. If the US Army and Marines were to take only one thing away from Iraq (and to a certain extent, Afghanistan), it would be this: that even (especially) the subaltern, or junior officer, would become fully self-aware and self-confident of his role and status as a de facto proconsul, the agent and executor of his nation's policy and strategic interests. This growing self-awareness and self-confidence of the junior and field-grade officer classes is very "Imperial", and in a good way....

FM 3-27.75 The Warrior Ethos and Soldier Combat Skills

... There was an oped in the Washington Post (I think) last year by a serving soldier who pointed out that the term "warrior" contributed to the divide in America between the civilian and the military in that it had an elitist almost intentionally separatist connotation.

Like you I am probably old fashioned and simple minded about such things. If i was at a dinner party at my sister's house in El Cerrito California (right next to Berkeley) I would be proud and comfortable to tell people I am a Soldier; saying I am a "warrior" however would make me squeamish and uncomfortable.

So why then does our army continue to use such a misguided word? I don't think the Marines call themselves warriors, "just" Marines. So why can't we be just "Soldiers?"

An Outsider's Perspective

Having read Rob's excellent post, I went back to Dr. Ucko's article and gave it another look. As I was reading, it struck me that much of his argument is based on an historical survey whose population is one.

Dr. Ucko, along with many, many others, have claimed that the US military has 'historically' turned away from counterinsurgency as soon as possible and returned to the study of conventional war. This, they argue, is a subject our generals are much more comfortable with - with the added benefit that conventional warfighting produces much bigger budgets, quicker promotions, more toys for the boys, etc. I believe this is a false premise based on bad history.

Firstly, with a few exceptions of relatively short duration, the regular military forces of the United States were organized, trained, and funded for employment in Small Wars until just before the Second World War. They were never - never - prepared to fight conventional wars until the balloon actually went up. In the 1920's and 1930's, it was the rebels and deep thinkers who argued we needed to buy bombers and tanks, to think about the impact of mechanization or to train for amphibious warfare. From 1783 to 1935 or so, peacetime armies were small, and employed largely in counterinsurgency, civil support, or stability operations. Training for 'conventional' war was the exception, not the rule, and rarely done above the regimental level...

Infantry Unit Tactics, Tasks, Weapons, and Organization

I have thouroughly enjoyed these threads and associated links. This stuff has interested me for many years.

Here is my proposal for light inf. platoon org.

Platoon HQ Capt.

Pl.sgt.

2x sig.

Weapons squad (6 men) 2x 8.6mm Lapua Magnum rifles (2 pers.)

1x 60mm commando mortar (3 pers.)

1x squad leader

2x section (each 20 men) 1x Lt. with IW

1x section sgt. with IW

3x 6man squad: 1x leader with IW

1x 2ic NCO also no.2 on gun

1x 7.62 Minimi (FNH or Mk48)

1x IW with UGL

2x riflemen with IW

(squad leader leads 4 man rifle group and 2ic

leads gun group)

This gives the platoon 6 rifle squads of 6 pers each, with a total of 6 7.62 LMGs. No 5.56 LMGs or 7.62 GPMGs at platoon level. (kiss)

This section is small enough to chop and change without affecting the 'band of brothers' bonds too much. Everyone knows each other...

What Does the Military do in COIN?

OK, so the clue is in the title.

a.) I am extremely sceptical of the "80% political" aphorism applied to so-called COIN.

b.) I do not believe -- and my short time on this board is reinforcing this view, - that COIN is a valid area of worthy of discrete study, and separated from conflict in general. It's like talking about policing from a purely counter-narcotics or traffic viewpoint.

So, I submit that the military contribution to what we choose to call COIN is primarily providing security for the activities (government, police, normal commercial and social activity/reform/change) and facilities that the insurgency chooses to target, as part of their campaign aims.

I would welcome views that contrast or conflict with my own.

Organizing for COIN at the Company and Platoon Level

Yes, but I have no issue with the paper's conclusion, that there is a direct link to unit discipline and abuse of civilians. In fact, there's a direct correlation between unit discipline (I'm not talking about spit shined buckles, but strong leadership enforcing important standards) and almost any unit's success or failure tactically. I'm sure the NCO's on this board would confirm that.

ISR and Business as Usual

... You can't convince me that the USAF having control of the UAV's from Nellis is a good thing. The USAF may have developed some cool doctrine, but its UAV ops are anything BUT integrated with the ground force. I imagine this is the reason the army decided to get its own (rotary) air force, like the Marines - soldiers get left hanging to dry otherwise in the USAF priority scheme.

UK Army Problems

This has been a decade and a half in the making, and the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars have provided the tipping point. The British Armed Forces in general, and the Army in particular, have almost completely burned out: too many commitments, too few resources, and weak military leadership. Not to mention Government policies. There is a real danger of an institutional breakdown in the not-so distant future.

14 weeks of initial training? That's only enough to cover Recruit training; there's no time for real Infantry training, and that takes at least 3 more months on top of that 14 weeks to get right. This is very disturbing, sending partially-trained troops to war.