Small Wars Journal

The Limits of the Surge

Fri, 04/11/2008 - 11:27pm
The Limits of the Surge: An Interview with Gian Gentile - Judah Grunstein, World Politics Review.

Gian P. Gentile is an active duty Army lieutenant colonel who has served two tours in Iraq, most recently as a combat battalion commander in west Baghdad in 2006. Last month, his World Politics Review article, "Misreading the Surge," brought a fierce internal debate over the Army's new emphasis on counterinsurgency operations and its potential impact on conventional capabilities to the attention of the general public. In the context of this week's congressional hearings on the Surge, WPR asked Gentile for a follow up email interview, to which he graciously agreed...

Much of this debate has played out on our pages and at Abu Muqawama...

Gian Gentile and Abu Muqawama have had a few conversations over e-mail about his skepticism toward counter-insurgency theory and whether or not it can be applied successfully on the battlefield. As you might have guessed, there's an obvious difference of opinion. But Abu Muqawama thinks Gentile, at the least, keeps the counter-insurgency community from falling into group think by challenging shared assumptions and asking critical questions. "Everyone has a role to play," reads the famous Belfast mural of failed insurgent Bobby Sands. Indeed...

Key Principles for Interagency Campaign Design

Fri, 04/11/2008 - 10:44pm
From the US Marine Corps Concept for Interagency Campaign Design, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, 7 May 2007.

Only a campaign based on a comprehensive approach in which all Interagency players are involved in planning and execution is likely to realize any chance of successfully resolving complex intervention problems.

Key Principles

1. The Comprehensive Approach requires an Interagency partnership. What is the"comprehensive approach?" The answer must begin with an explanation of what constitutes a "campaign." A campaign in this sense is a number of disparate actions and activities that are coordinated to realize a singular intervention endstate - and it can transcend the various "levels of war." The comprehensive approach is an acknowledgement that these disparate actions will normally reach far beyond the traditional military responses. Leaders of an intervention should select logical lines of operation for their campaign in an effort to address all aspects of a problem as they understand it. An example of this might be the selection of both a security line of operation and an essential services line of operation. The reality is that the military may be very good at a combat or security line of operation, assuming that the campaign has a requirement for elements well beyond this (such as government, economic development, and essential services), there are other agencies with the U.S. government with greater knowledge for planning theseactivities. From a policy standpoint, these other agencies have the "right" kind of monies forthese "other lines."Therefore, a multi-faceted or comprehensive campaign needs thecooperative efforts of numerous agencies of government. This cooperation should take the form of a partnership for planning and execution—not an essentially military staff with a few token Interagency (IA) representatives for perfunctory planning.

2. Use all relevant tools of government. Every government agency will not be represented on an IA planning staff. The important issue is the mental drill of determining which agencies should be players. However, the time to really get into making this determination is during the discussion of the lines of operation that the planners select - and who will lead each sub-task in each line of operation. The point here is to ask yourselves the questions: "Who should be here and what tools have we neglected that should rightly be a part of this campaign?" In the early stages of campaign design, the process should be particularly inclusive, open to as many government agencies as possible, in order to develop situational awareness in a broad base of planners. As the campaign develops, some of the agencies who are not initially activelyinvolved may play a role in a branch element of the plan, and it will help if they are "read in" early so that they are ready to play their part. Campaign design is a participatory process and this will require open sharing of information amongst stakeholders.

3. Multiple Lines of Operation for a comprehensive campaign. After acknowledging the complexity of the problem that the intervention effort has been assigned to address, there is a natural tendency to "deconstruct" the problem. Unfortunately, complex problems do not lend themselves well to being broken down like an engineering problem as so many functions and activities inter-relate in some manner. Most campaigns will have numerous lines of operation and they must function together as one harmonious whole.

4. Involve "others" in campaign design. To achieve an Interagency campaign design, there should be a broad cross section of represented agencies on the planning team. The next question is to ask yourselves who else should we involve in this design? Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others like them will not want to be aligned with your design process. However, they may have goals that run parallel with yours. Once you determine your vision, endstate and campaign architecture, you are in a position to converse with NGOs and see if they are heading in the same direction. "HANDCON" is just fine. Many of these NGOs must remain neutral - or at least appear that way. If your essential services line of operation calls for providing food, water and basic medical supplies/care to the people in a certain province, and some NGOs are already planning to work on that task—see how you can support them (without compromising their neutrality).

5. The military may play a supporting role. In typical fashion, the U.S. military is accustomed to taking the lead in intervention activities, regardless of the nature of the intervention problem. Sometimes this is simply a factor of the military's ability to deploy a largenumber of people and equipment on short notice—and sustain them in an austere conflict environment. However, assigning the military to lead the effort is not necessarily the best way to proceed in all cases. Perhaps a civilian led intervention effort will best accomplish national objectives. Regardless of who is in charge, when hammering out the campaign architecture, the lines of operation in while the military traditionally takes the lead may be supporting efforts to one or more lines of operation which are more closely aligned with ultimate campaign success. The line of operation for governance is a good example. Often the development of a stable and functional government that can meet the needs of the people and ensure a sustainable peace isreally the "game winner."

6. The emphasis will likely shift over time. The military likes to phase operations in acampaign—and then acknowledge that as the operation "matures," the operation moves into a different phase. Different phases call for a shift in emphasis on what is most important. This phenomenon is true regardless of whether or not the campaign is formally phased. This tendency for the environment to mature or evolve over time based on the interaction of the principleplayers should be an expectation that all planners share. Campaign planners would do well to tryto anticipate and shape this evolution - and maintain the initiative by deliberately shifting theemphasis of their campaign architecture.

7. Use an Interagency lexicon. One of the biggest things that separates the military from theircivilian agency planning partners is the lexicon that the military uses. However, the military is not alone in its use of a distinct or unique lexicon. Most agencies have their own lexicon. While much of this lexicon is not formalized in the fashion that the military does with doctrine, the language differences among agencies can make real communication difficult. Once the various agencies of government become more accustomed to working together, a sort of informaldoctrine and related lexicon will likely come into existence. In the meantime, the best thing that planners can do is avoid jargon and use "the King's English."

8. Use visible and invisible tools. There is a paradox in counterinsurgency theory that says "some of the best weapons do not shoot." People will naturally gravitate to obvious and highly visible options and responses within the context of a campaign. However, in the same way as in counterinsurgency theory, some of the best tools at the disposal of campaign planners are not physical—or even directly observable in their effect. In complex intervention activities which have such an admittedly political aspect, the virtual domain is often the most important one.Perceptions are often as important as reality—and the perceptions most important are those ofthe Host Nation's people. We are usually trying to win the goodwill of the people—their "heartsand minds"—and we accomplish that in this virtual domain of perception management. Even the very visible military tools may be played with a certain political savvy that they support the overall campaign.

9. Make the endstate description focused and achievable. Campaign planners will feel naturally compelled to set lofty goals for their campaign, and this tendency will often reflect in a description of a desired endstate that sounds like the campaign is bent on solving all the Host Nation's problems. Of course planners know better, but there are many competing demands thatcampaign planners will face even from the beginning that will often lead the campaign towards apropensity for "over-reaching." Sometimes this inclination comes from a failure to genuinely understand the nature of the problem and to align that with the U.S. national agenda for theintervention. Candid discussions among concerned stakeholders may help resolve this disparity. This discussion may seem to take the form of negotiation and likely involves both U.S. agencies and a HN government if one exists. In general, a few good questions to ask yourselves as you progress with planning are:

a. Does this endstate description align with the campaign's reason for existence—its basic purpose?

b. How will we know when we've arrived at this endstate?(Also, how will we measure our success?) and

c. Is this endstate reasonably achievable given thepractical realities of which we are aware?

10. Place emphasis on partnership beyond government agencies. As previously noted, we have to look beyond other government agencies for potential planning "partners." However, one of the entities we often overlook are members of the Host Nation government and even indigenous people who we can involve if we are wise in how we go about tapping into their talents. In a similar manner, campaign planners will need both a reach forward capability to access information from people "in country" even before the planners deploy. Upon deployment, the campaign planners will need a reach-back capability that is unlike anything recently employed. Expertise must be sought out wherever it exists. That may mean looking to American private industry for knowledge of a topic or area.

11. The Design and Planning Process is largely about self and collective education. It is easy for planners (regardless of what agency they belong to) to become focused on the production of a product. However, much of the benefit from the process is the collective learning that leads to better understanding and allows planners to bring greater harmony to thevarious activities indicated in the campaign plan

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare

Thu, 04/10/2008 - 12:08pm
Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare - Book Review by Robert Kaplan, Wall Street Journal.

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare

Edited by Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian

(Osprey, 304 pages, $27.95)

... Western military men hate abstractions and worship the concrete. Indeed, the dream of powerful, industrial-age militaries -- as epitomized by the U.S. Army -- is to fight on a circumscribed battlefield empty of civilians, to close with the enemy, and then kill it through a rapid maneuver of tanks, infantry and artillery. The trouble is that the enemy doesn't always oblige. And when it doesn't, industrial-age militaries like America's, rather than quickly adjust tactics, tend to go into a state of denial.

Denial is a subtext of "Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare." The book's editors, Daniel Marston and Carter Malkasian, present a series of lucid, expert essays on the experiences of conventional military forces adapting to an insurgency. The contributors discuss the British in Ireland, Palestine and Malaya; the French in Vietnam and Algeria; the Israelis in the West Bank; and the Americans in all sorts of places. Over and over again, the story is one of a disastrously slow, grudging effort to grasp the kind of war that needs to be fought...

The Public Affairs / Information Operations Great Divide

Wed, 04/09/2008 - 8:49am

Matt Armstrong, MountainRunner, has posted a great piece on the relationship between the US military Public Affairs and Information Operations communities..

 

 

In "Planning to Influence: A Commander's Guide to the PA/IO Relationship", United States Marine Corps Major Matt Morgan analyzes restraints on effective information activities within the Marines, but it speaks to the whole of Defense communications. Adapted from the executive summary of his masters thesis at Marine Corps U., it is a must-read for anyone interested in the subject. Matt couldn't get it published when he wrote it two years ago so today it is posted here with his permission...

On Irregular Warfare

Wed, 04/09/2008 - 6:33am
Irregular Warfare, Both Future and Present by Walter Pincus, Washington Post.

It is the newest Pentagon doctrine, one that has been under discussion for several years and has been the focus of little-publicized, multinational, computerized war games. Now it will be put to the test in Afghanistan and Iraq by United States Central Command.

Last week, Air Force Brig. Gen. Robert H. Holmes, Central Command's deputy director of operations, told reporters that an interagency task force on irregular warfare is about to be announced. He called it "our way at the combatant command to be able to focus all of the instruments of power in order to prosecute the irregular warfight in our region."

But what does "irregular warfare" mean?

Essentially, it is an approach to future conflict that the United States has been carrying out ad hoc in Iraq and Afghanistan. Two years ago, Deputy Defense Secretary Gordon England signed off on a Pentagon "working definition" that described it as "a form of warfare that has as its objective the credibility and/or legitimacy of the relevant political authority with the goal of undermining or supporting that authority." ...

And from Westhawk - 'Irregular warfare' is now legitimate, a decade too late.

... Central Command's interest in the scaled-down indirect approach, with small teams of U.S. soldiers working from the start through existing indigenous groups, shows that the Big Army's previous preference for large-footprint major combat operations or COIN strategies is now heading for the sunset. The merits of irregular warfare will intrigue war planners who have lived through the frustrating experiences of Iraq and Afghanistan.

Indirect methods look attractive now. Ironically, it was Central Command that a decade ago rejected an unconventional warfare option against Saddam's regime...

Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy

Mon, 04/07/2008 - 7:02am
In this morning's Wall Street Journal - Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy by Yochi Dreazen.

... Lt. Col. Gian Gentile, a history professor here who served two tours in Iraq, begs to differ. He argues that Gen. Petraeus's counterinsurgency tactics are getting too much credit for the improved situation in Iraq. Moreover, he argues, concentrating on such an approach is eroding the military's ability to wage large-scale conventional wars...

Col. Gentile is giving voice to an idea that previously few in the military dared mention: Perhaps the Petraeus doctrine isn't all it's cracked up to be. That's a big controversy within a military that has embraced counterinsurgency tactics as a path to victory in Iraq. The debate, sparked by a short essay written by Col. Gentile titled "Misreading the Surge," has been raging in military circles for months. One close aide to Gen. Petraeus recently took up a spirited defense of his boss...

Col. Steve Boylan, a spokesman for Gen. Petraeus, said the surge deserved credit for enabling the other dynamics contributing to Iraq's security gains. "The surge was definitely a factor," he said. "It wasn't the only factor, but it was a key component."

Col. Boylan said that he was familiar with Col. Gentile's arguments but disagreed with them. "I certainly respect the good lieutenant colonel," he said. "But he hasn't been in Iraq for a while, and when you're not on the ground your views can quickly get dated."...

Col. Gentile's arguments have drawn fierce criticism from counterinsurgency advocates, in particular from Gen. Petraeus's chief of staff, Col. Pete Mansoor, who is retiring from the military to teach at Ohio State.

In a posting to Small Wars Journal, a blog devoted to counterinsurgency issues, Col. Mansoor wrote that Col. Gentile "misreads not just what is happening today in Iraq, but the entire history of the war."...

Much more at WSJ.

Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities - LTC Gian Gentile, World Politics Review

Misreading the History of the Iraq War - COL Peter Mansoor, Small Wars Journal

Misreading the History of the Iraq War - Small Wars Council discussion

Our Troops Did Not Fail in 2006 - Small Wars Council discussion

Mansoor and Gentile on SWJ - Abu Muqawama

Two Sides of COIN - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump

Why are We Succeeding in Iraq - or are We? - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Iraq After the Surge

Sun, 04/06/2008 - 10:07pm
The US Institute of Peace has just released its report - Iraq After the Surge: Options and Questions by Daniel Serwer and Sam Parker. This is the report cited in today's Washington Post - Iraq Report Details Political Hurdles and Future Options by Robin Wright.

About the report:

... This paper describes the current policy (as well as possible variants) and presents two alternatives that would reduce the U.S. commitment to Iraq. In deciding among the options, there are important questions that remain to be answered. As General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker are expected to appear before Congress in April, we have appended to this analysis a series of questions that they might be asked so as to clarify U.S. policy and policy options...

From the Washington Post:

A new assessment of U.S. policy in Iraq by the same experts who advised the original Iraq Study Group concludes that political progress is "so slow, halting and superficial" and political fragmentation "so pronounced" that the United States is no closer to being able to leave Iraq than it was a year ago...

Some recent favorable developments in Iraq come from factors "that are outside U.S. control" and susceptible to rapid change, the report said, including the cease-fire by Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the new Sunni Awakening councils made up of former insurgents and tribal leaders opposed to the government of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki...

Hat Tip to Abu Muqawama.