Key Principles for Interagency Campaign Design

Only a campaign based on a comprehensive approach in which all Interagency players are involved in planning and execution is likely to realize any chance of successfully resolving complex intervention problems.

Key Principles

1. The Comprehensive Approach requires an Interagency partnership. What is the"comprehensive approach?" The answer must begin with an explanation of what constitutes a "campaign." A campaign in this sense is a number of disparate actions and activities that are coordinated to realize a singular intervention endstate - and it can transcend the various "levels of war." The comprehensive approach is an acknowledgement that these disparate actions will normally reach far beyond the traditional military responses. Leaders of an intervention should select logical lines of operation for their campaign in an effort to address all aspects of a problem as they understand it. An example of this might be the selection of both a security line of operation and an essential services line of operation. The reality is that the military may be very good at a combat or security line of operation, assuming that the campaign has a requirement for elements well beyond this (such as government, economic development, and essential services), there are other agencies with the U.S. government with greater knowledge for planning theseactivities. From a policy standpoint, these other agencies have the "right" kind of monies forthese "other lines."Therefore, a multi-faceted or comprehensive campaign needs thecooperative efforts of numerous agencies of government. This cooperation should take the form of a partnership for planning and execution—not an essentially military staff with a few token Interagency (IA) representatives for perfunctory planning.

2. Use all relevant tools of government. Every government agency will not be represented on an IA planning staff. The important issue is the mental drill of determining which agencies should be players. However, the time to really get into making this determination is during the discussion of the lines of operation that the planners select - and who will lead each sub-task in each line of operation. The point here is to ask yourselves the questions: "Who should be here and what tools have we neglected that should rightly be a part of this campaign?" In the early stages of campaign design, the process should be particularly inclusive, open to as many government agencies as possible, in order to develop situational awareness in a broad base of planners. As the campaign develops, some of the agencies who are not initially activelyinvolved may play a role in a branch element of the plan, and it will help if they are "read in" early so that they are ready to play their part. Campaign design is a participatory process and this will require open sharing of information amongst stakeholders.

3. Multiple Lines of Operation for a comprehensive campaign. After acknowledging the complexity of the problem that the intervention effort has been assigned to address, there is a natural tendency to "deconstruct" the problem. Unfortunately, complex problems do not lend themselves well to being broken down like an engineering problem as so many functions and activities inter-relate in some manner. Most campaigns will have numerous lines of operation and they must function together as one harmonious whole.

4. Involve "others" in campaign design. To achieve an Interagency campaign design, there should be a broad cross section of represented agencies on the planning team. The next question is to ask yourselves who else should we involve in this design? Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and others like them will not want to be aligned with your design process. However, they may have goals that run parallel with yours. Once you determine your vision, endstate and campaign architecture, you are in a position to converse with NGOs and see if they are heading in the same direction. "HANDCON" is just fine. Many of these NGOs must remain neutral - or at least appear that way. If your essential services line of operation calls for providing food, water and basic medical supplies/care to the people in a certain province, and some NGOs are already planning to work on that task—see how you can support them (without compromising their neutrality).

5. The military may play a supporting role. In typical fashion, the U.S. military is accustomed to taking the lead in intervention activities, regardless of the nature of the intervention problem. Sometimes this is simply a factor of the military's ability to deploy a largenumber of people and equipment on short notice—and sustain them in an austere conflict environment. However, assigning the military to lead the effort is not necessarily the best way to proceed in all cases. Perhaps a civilian led intervention effort will best accomplish national objectives. Regardless of who is in charge, when hammering out the campaign architecture, the lines of operation in while the military traditionally takes the lead may be supporting efforts to one or more lines of operation which are more closely aligned with ultimate campaign success. The line of operation for governance is a good example. Often the development of a stable and functional government that can meet the needs of the people and ensure a sustainable peace isreally the "game winner."

6. The emphasis will likely shift over time. The military likes to phase operations in acampaign—and then acknowledge that as the operation "matures," the operation moves into a different phase. Different phases call for a shift in emphasis on what is most important. This phenomenon is true regardless of whether or not the campaign is formally phased. This tendency for the environment to mature or evolve over time based on the interaction of the principleplayers should be an expectation that all planners share. Campaign planners would do well to tryto anticipate and shape this evolution - and maintain the initiative by deliberately shifting theemphasis of their campaign architecture.

7. Use an Interagency lexicon. One of the biggest things that separates the military from theircivilian agency planning partners is the lexicon that the military uses. However, the military is not alone in its use of a distinct or unique lexicon. Most agencies have their own lexicon. While much of this lexicon is not formalized in the fashion that the military does with doctrine, the language differences among agencies can make real communication difficult. Once the various agencies of government become more accustomed to working together, a sort of informaldoctrine and related lexicon will likely come into existence. In the meantime, the best thing that planners can do is avoid jargon and use "the King's English."

8. Use visible and invisible tools. There is a paradox in counterinsurgency theory that says "some of the best weapons do not shoot." People will naturally gravitate to obvious and highly visible options and responses within the context of a campaign. However, in the same way as in counterinsurgency theory, some of the best tools at the disposal of campaign planners are not physical—or even directly observable in their effect. In complex intervention activities which have such an admittedly political aspect, the virtual domain is often the most important one.Perceptions are often as important as reality—and the perceptions most important are those ofthe Host Nation's people. We are usually trying to win the goodwill of the people—their "heartsand minds"—and we accomplish that in this virtual domain of perception management. Even the very visible military tools may be played with a certain political savvy that they support the overall campaign.

9. Make the endstate description focused and achievable. Campaign planners will feel naturally compelled to set lofty goals for their campaign, and this tendency will often reflect in a description of a desired endstate that sounds like the campaign is bent on solving all the Host Nation's problems. Of course planners know better, but there are many competing demands thatcampaign planners will face even from the beginning that will often lead the campaign towards apropensity for "over-reaching." Sometimes this inclination comes from a failure to genuinely understand the nature of the problem and to align that with the U.S. national agenda for theintervention. Candid discussions among concerned stakeholders may help resolve this disparity. This discussion may seem to take the form of negotiation and likely involves both U.S. agencies and a HN government if one exists. In general, a few good questions to ask yourselves as you progress with planning are:

a. Does this endstate description align with the campaign's reason for existence—its basic purpose?

b. How will we know when we've arrived at this endstate?(Also, how will we measure our success?) and

c. Is this endstate reasonably achievable given thepractical realities of which we are aware?

10. Place emphasis on partnership beyond government agencies. As previously noted, we have to look beyond other government agencies for potential planning "partners." However, one of the entities we often overlook are members of the Host Nation government and even indigenous people who we can involve if we are wise in how we go about tapping into their talents. In a similar manner, campaign planners will need both a reach forward capability to access information from people "in country" even before the planners deploy. Upon deployment, the campaign planners will need a reach-back capability that is unlike anything recently employed. Expertise must be sought out wherever it exists. That may mean looking to American private industry for knowledge of a topic or area.

11. The Design and Planning Process is largely about self and collective education. It is easy for planners (regardless of what agency they belong to) to become focused on the production of a product. However, much of the benefit from the process is the collective learning that leads to better understanding and allows planners to bring greater harmony to thevarious activities indicated in the campaign plan