Officer Questions Petraeus's Strategy

Schmedlap,

I don't know . I mean I hear you on allot of points e.g. pushing CL IX forward during OIF I was a real challenge - read MAJ Jay Misselli's account of being the HHC CDR for TF 1-34 AR in one of the back issues of Armor. I know Jay, and I know that through some heroic efforts they did some incredible stuff. Could you say that the system sucked - yep, but could it have sucked allot more? Its one of those questions that are really hard to answer I think. I do beleive that allot of training got us to a point where a system was good enough that its deficiencies could be overcome.

One thing current operations have done is made us aware of the effects and dangers of the non-contiguous battlefield. Everybody - wrenches, clerks, etc. do CQM, and conduct the theater entry level tasks - not every body does them in theater, but they've all been trained better then before. While I'd agree that many will share the experiences of your mechanics, and other personnel - there are quite a few who won't - depends on the time and place they are at. I saw lots of folks when we'd go into MAREZ that had never left the FOB - that is not a lick on them, they were employed - there are lots of things that happen in support of FOB operations and that enable sustained operations of all flavors.

I saw allot of Artillery folks employed in different capacities, for the most part even the use of mortars was pretty restrictive - mostly to illum missions. Leaders still got the crews down to a range where they could fire HE once or twice - good on the leadership for making it happen - but every mission in that environment is a combat mission - so even a training mission must be treated as such.

CASEVAC - medics and CSHs are probably better trained to handle the worst of casualties then I've ever seen. Lots of advances have been made and allot of guys and gals are here today because of or nurses and docs.

Mechanics have done an awful lot of good work putting things back together in record times, and we've learned allot in many related CSS areas.

Leaders have had the opportunity to lead, and have had to make probably the toughest conditions you can make under some of the worst circumstances - sometimes its the best of a slew of bad choices.

Those are all good things for our profession.

What we have to guard against is a crystallization of mindset. We tend to get wedded to our positions, and become inflexible. Too often we see things only through the bias of our experiences - sometimes only through the most recent of those. We assume that pieces, parts or even the whole of things can be expunged as no longer relevant - based solely upon a few years, without due consideration for how they came to be, or what other things are altered as a result of getting rid of them.

Bias and parochialism kind of remind me of Kentuckiana cousins - they often originate from different sides of the river - but there effects can look allot alike. Parochialism generally originates from fear, from greed, or from ignorance - its more easily spotted and called out. Bias - is often sincere, harder to spot and born from real experience. We all have bias, and spotting our own is key to spotting inconsistencies, making good decisions, and identifying opportunities.

If preparing for high stakes conventional warfare all the time left us unprepared to conduct counter insurgency operations, is it fair to question that if all we did was prepare for counter-insurgency operations that it would leave us unprepared for the former?

I'm not saying that we do, but I am asking the question? Our CTCs have been rightfully restructured to better train and enable units to succeed in Iraq and Afghanistan - it is absolutely the right thing to do right now. Unit leaders must be allowed to accept risk, and train on those things which will allow us to achieve our objectives in the fastest and most economical manner (lives, time, etc.)-not every platoon needs to do a Table VIII right now if they are headed to Iraq in less then a year. The policy objective(s)we've been tasked to achieve involves successful COIN.

However, the next one may not. The warfare that characterizes our next war may look very different - and to model future requirements solely on our current experiences I believe does not serve our best interests. Likewise to discount our current experiences would be foolish. Reconstituting the materiel side so that we can return to balanced training is going to be a real challenge - I've seen the numbers and I've talked to the planners and point men involved with some of it up at the Army staff - it ain't pretty. I just came back from from talking to a BCT going through Unit Reset and ARFORGEN - their numbers are not so great either. I just talked to one of my old bosses involved in Army modernization - and who will soon move on to stand up a spanking new BCT - also not a pretty story.

Those are just the conditions as they are - again - in my opinion - the outcome in Iraq is worth the effort, and I think we can get through this without breaking - strained maybe, but not broken. However, what we cannot afford is an "either or position" that roots us to a constrained way of thinking. The United States is not Israel, it is not Iran, it is not France, etc. - our interests and responsibilities are broader - we may choose to make them so, but they are.

As a result of those interests and FP objectives, our military forces must be capable of full spectrum operations in the broadest sense - from the tactical to the strategic. Wherever there is a GCC we have identified some interests there where military force may be required. We may not get to pick the time or the other conditions.

More then any other challenge, preserving the open mindset needed to retain the flexibility to envision the various possibilities preserve and generate needed capabilities and to adapt to the conditions as they manifest themselves in the future may be the hardest thing to do. It has been in the past.

Best, Rob

No intent to be dismissive, merely asserting that I don't see things as you do and that problems you detect are not necessarily such in my opinion.

All things can be said to be true only under certain circumstances. With respect to maintaining or growing strength of the force, I submit that as it's a volunteer force -- and will almost certainly stay that way, as it should IMO -- people will enter, stay or leave as they see fit. I believe, based on history, that those who do decide to do those things will be adequate to maintain the force at required levels. Only time will tell, so to argue that is specious.

Given the size of our defense budget, I submit that to assert that we have enough money but don't allocate it well is virtually proven by (a) the amount in; and (b) the fact that some areas have broadly perceived shortfalls while others are claimed to be vastly overfunded. In any event, to formally argue that is to go the angels on the head of a pin route and I did not and do not propose to do that. You may disagree with my statement, I'm comfortable with that.

You may predicate your position on that espoused by the JCS and the SecDef. Having watched the current and many former editions it has been my observation that all have always wanted more money. There have been times when I agreed with them (late 50s, late 70s, late 90s -- is their a pattern there...) but I do not agree at this time. Again, we can differ on that.

I do not believe I said that we should not care about the reenlistment rate; I did say it was not a problem at this time. Not the same thing.

Michael Totten does good stuff. I read that article before you recommended it in this thread. Two things struck me:

"The mukhtars used to talk and direct their comments toward us," Captain Glenn had told me earlier. "Now they direct it toward each other and toward the sheikhs. They used to focus on asking the Marines to do this and do that. Now it's the police talking to the mukhtars and the mukhtars talking to themselves. At this point we pretty much jot down the notes."

Sounds like good progress to me and I have not forgotten the sometimes bitter fighting a short time ago that provided that window in that area. The other thing that struck me was that I concentrated on what was being reported as done and you appear to have concentrated on what the troops said. Those frequently differ. Most always, in fact...

Thus my comment on the article.

Having spent a couple of years in the ME and having been to Iraq twice -- admittedly some time ago -- and having been a mediocre Marine in my misspent youth (and engaging in both conventional war and COIN efforts with some switching between the two), you'll forgive me if our perceptions differ on the combat skill involved in fighting an insurgency (versus the civic action stuff that takes place sometimes concurrently and sometimes post facto) being translated into conventional war skill easily at the Company and below level, fairly readily at Battalion level -- and I'll acknowledge that at echelons above that, it is more difficult -- but even poor experience is better than no experience, they tell me...

I'll grant you that the community trashcan doesn't translate well to a warfighting skill. However, to get to the point where that trashcan is a concern does indicate considerable warfighting skill in this case. Anbar was not so benign a short while ago -- and could not be again in the veritable blink of an eye.

Ken,

You are quickly dismissive of a great many things that I dont take for granted at all. The reason, I believe, has to do with axioms, or presuppositions. For instance, your statement "those who want to stay will, those who do not will leave. Always been that way and it's not a problem," is only true under certain circumstances such as maintaining an equilibrium in staying / going, or in the event that we grow the armed forces, having more entry and re-enlistment than leaving (a positive slope).

This also pertains to the third statement of yours, "a bit of both but my point was we waste a tremendous amount of money, always have. Congress helps. We have enough money, we just don't allocate it well." Simply to assert that "we have enough money is not constructing a formal argument. To assert it doesnt make it so.

Another way of saying it would be this. I didnt construct a formal argument either that we need to grow the size of the military or increase the budget. I didnt think I had to, since I am riding the coattails of the JCS and SECDEF. Gates has already made the case for these two things, and the plan, while ensuring cost cutting (e.g., cutting back on the number of F-22s), doesnt entirely cut out the materiel for conventional warfare.

In the absence of data to the contrary (the SECDEF would have more than I do), and in the absence of a formal argument by you that we shouldnt care about re-enlistment rate ('its not a problem) and that we have enough funds ('we have enough money), Ill side with Gates until a good defeater argument is shown to me. Perhaps a final way of saying it would be this. Gates and the JCS have very different presuppositions than you do, apparently, and have reached very different conclusions because of that (they want to grow the size of the military as well as increase its budget, and the re-enlistment bonuses we see today comport with that desire). This has nothing to do with rightness or wrongness, but it does have to do with axioms (e.g., their plans for more than one war, one conventional and the other COIN, engagements and peacekeeping in other parts of the world, battalions in ready reserve, MEUs floating in certain places at certain times and ready to deploy, increased stress on CENTCOM, or whatever they are).

Concerning the second point, "Anyone that can do what the kids are doing now will have no problem in a conventional war," I do highly recommend that you read Michael Tottens latest piece (it would appear that you didnt when I first recommended it). Again, simply to assert this doesnt make it so. Ill leave it to you to construct that argument, and I am open to hearing it. I think youll probably run into some difficulty in formally demonstrating that a study in Middle East tribal culture in order to help engender a sense of responsibility for the block or community trashcan will be helpful viz. the conduct of conventional warfare. It might help with the general education of our Captains and Majors in the areas of anthropology and sociology, but the connection of this to war fighting skills, per se, eludes me at the moment. Again, Im all ears.

As you know, I agree with you that major conventional effort must be our focus and that COIN is a necessary evil that should not get excessive emphasis. We have in the past disagreed on our capability to be a full spectrum force. I still believe we are fully capable of doing that. It also seems to me that my confidence in skill transferral by the troops -- not the higher command levels -- is somewhat higher than most.

As you said re: the UK 7 Armored Div <i>"...It had limits and it was not directly transferable to other types of combat operations facing a somewhat different enemy and in very different terrain." </i> I believe that is a universal truth that will always apply, thus, as it is a given, I see no sense in spending a great deal of effort trying to prepare when one doesn't know what to prepare for enemy and terrain wise. that applies to Battalion and below; most of their tasks are pretty well transferable; it's echelons above that will have the problems.

I agree with you on this; <i>"The one that comes most to mind is higher level (brigade, division, and corps) command and control in a fluid, maneuver environment..."</i>and we should be working on that. Since above Brigade, those echelons are not overly involved at this time; I would presume they're working on that issue at least to an extent...

On this one; <i>"How good are we now, honestly, at our own infantry and tank coordination in a high intensity fire fight?"</i>Probably not very good but it's been my observation that is a cognitive skill, quite perishable and has to be renewed, literally, with each OpCon or cross attachment. On both sides.

This is quite true; <i>"War's most basic element is fighting; if fighting is not at its base than it is not war.</i>The basic elements ARE fighting, it's the upper echelons where the potential for skill decay and trauma arise, I think. Hopefully, BCTP and other venues are addressing this.

Out of order but lastly;<i>"What would happen to the civilian contractors who make up a big part of that system if they were told to pack their bags and move out into the open country away from the fobs to do this movement to contact."</i>That is a good and scary question and, I believe, goes well beyond the 'To COIN or not to COIN' argument. It existed as a problem prior to 2001. That one bothers me...

I am not at all sanguine that just because we have an army today with much combat experience in Coin from Iraq and Afghanistan then that experience is easily transferred if the American Army is called on to conduct more conventional types of operations. Colonel Pete Mansoor has made this point as well as others on this thread. I think of the British 7th Armored Division who fought after a while fairly well in North Africa, had gained much experience in fighting the Germans in open, desert terrain. But when that Division was pulled out and chunked into the Normandy invasion and was part of the advance on Caen that seemed to take forever they had many troubles. The point here is that they did have much experience in the desert but when they fought the German panzer divisions in the terrain around Caen, Normandy they ran into major problems. Their experience from the desert only went so far. It had limits and it was not directly transferable to other types of combat operations facing a somewhat different enemy and in very different terrain.

The Israeli experience in southern Lebanon in summer 2006 can be instructive here. I accept my friend AM's warnings about not taking it too far but there are some salient points that can inform the debate. Simply put the Israelis did not fight well at the small unit level of squads, platoons, and companies. They had problems with simple coordination of tanks and infantry. They also had problems coordinating at higher levels for air and artillery support. Part of the reason for their poor performance was that the majority of their effort in the years prior was toward stability operations in the territories.

Now is the American Army today after 6 years in Iraq and Afghanistan exactly like the Israeli Army? Of course not. The American Army has honed quite well certain combat skills in Iraq; but I submit we are lacking in some critical areas. The one that comes most to mind is higher level (brigade, division, and corps) command and control in a fluid, maneuver environment. Also, how well do we think we would perform at the Corps level if we had to do a movement to contact to the east with operational level logistics. At Corps level in Iraq now our logistics are executed out of static nodes with relatively secure lines leading in and out of them. What would happen to the civilian contractors who make up a big part of that system if they were told to pack their bags and move out into the open country away from the fobs to do this movement to contact?

How good are we now, honestly, at our own infantry and tank coordination in a high intensity fire fight?

What I have been saying is that of course we need the capability to conduct stability and support ops; but that capability must flow out of a core competency of knowing how to fight. War's most basic element is fighting; if fighting is not at its base than it is not war. We should begin the process of rebuilding our army with that fundamental fact in mind. Perhaps then we can regain the balance that we need.

Hi Schmedlap,
I agree with much of what you said, getting the basics and the building blocks right are critical. I also agree that the skills Infantrymen use conducting COIN are largely transferable to conventional offensive and defensive missions - in fact, I'd argue that much of what we do in Iraq and Afghanistan has built up skills in leaders and and in tactical units at the BN/Sqdn/TF levels that could not be built anywhere else.

Much of the Art is the same, but the Science is a bit different.

However, I'd also say that if an Artillery Battery or Tank company and below are largely acting as Infantrymen, then they are not acting as artillerymen, tankers, etc. If a BN TF or above is conducting C2 of their element while conducting COIN operations, the roles and the drills those staffs do are somewhat different then those during a line of operation (LOO) that takes them hundreds of KMs into enemy territory. Just operating from a fixed site offers different challenges and advantages then jumping the TOC or trying to conduct battle command on the move. While some of the tasks may be similar, there are also those that are different.

Sustaining the operation is different as well. Operating from FOBs along known and established MSRs with established land, sea and air LOCs (Lines of Communications) offers a different set of challenges then having to open and secure supporting LOCs or having to make choices about whether and when to order classes of supply - or to whom do you give priority of support (POS) is different.

Even in Iraq with regard to the IA, we saw what happened when we stood up the tactical forces without the operational logistics to support them - it was both a tactical and political necessity, and as long as they were relatively static and either supportable by CF BCTs, or by Iraqi RSUs (Regional Support Units) it was manageable, but once they go to put a division on the road to Basra, and try and sustain an attack - or when they eventually take over their own security against external threat, they will require operational LOG to make that happen.

My point is that while you can have really sharp teeth at the tactical end, if you can't push I, III, V, VII and IX to the teeth who are now hundreds of km in from the SPOD. if you can't back haul the casualties, if you can't get the science right because the tools are not there, then it makes little difference if the Operational Art is on the money.

Even at the tactical level - actions on the OBJ never bothered me in the company attack - I'd given my PLs, PSGs and SLs lots of leash, and we'd done dirll after drill - the hardest part was getting out of the damned TAA, forming up in, movement in a manner that was reasonably coordinated and then synchronizing fire and maneuver. The boys did their part on the OBJ - they had that pretty much cold. If you've never done that as a CO CDR, or never done it as a BN CDR, or never moved you BCT, etc - then imagine the lack of understanding someone at the DIV, Corps or GFLCC might have about all the friction that occurs just trying to do what on its face would look like the easy parts.

There is also the issues of force generation, unit reset, equipment shortfalls, etc. There is also the issue of how our current wars influence our decision with regards to the broader DOTMLPF - from the acquisitions we pursue, to the focus of PME, the ranges we build, the UBLs (Unit Basic Loads)we design and authorize, the STRAC allocations, the number and types of UMRs & MTO&Es we ascribe to a unit based on how much stuff can we plan on being able to put on a RO/RO or C-17, etc. - the MOG (maximum on ground) capacity of some FLS (Forward Landing Strip) somewhere, etc.

I'm not trying to beat a dead horse here, but there is a great deal that is different based on the conditions of the mission you've been given. Too often we forget why we did something, or why we had a piece of equipment until we're faced with a need. Just like there was an absence of COIN doctrine and training post invasion, we don't want to get told go seize a beach head drive North, penetrate the Zagros and turn ENE.

However unlikely we think the order to seize a city like Tehran may be, we always want our enemy to believe that if we decided it had to be done - then it could - to get them to believe that the means have to be visible - it keeps everybody honest, and their hands on the table to greater extent. If you do the math on a drive like that (many have) then you realize that to multiple LOOs that keep a potential enemy from being able to concentrate his forces on his terrain and on his terms require a good deal more - add in the inevitable LOG overhead that accompanies the friction we'll self generate and now you really have a pile back at the docks.

We have to do both. They are different enough to admit that there is risk whenever we choose or simply must focus on one over another. The challenge is to do enough right fast enough where you can reduce your risk and shift your weight.

Again, I believe that interests at stake in Iraq are of an order that achieving them better secures our future options and advantages - to do that means remaining out of balance for awhile longer, but as quickly as possible we must get back into a balance that preserves full spectrum capabilities. That may mean adding more resources (formations) to the force, greater resources within the broader inter-agency, more money, reduced number of formations in Iraq in 2009, BPC in places that can exert some regional influence, greater commitment by our allies who have come to understand what is their interests,.etc. but at some point we need to get back into contextual balance with regard to our strategic ends/ways/means be they regular/irregular, conventional/unconventional, direct/indirect, etc. Understanding when to shift our effort based on the strategic, operational and tactical conditions requires not getting wedded to a any one set of predictions about how the future will develop.

Best, Rob

Oh, I care -- and I know that 20 year olds like doing stuff. <i>"...if you don't care about keeping qualified people..."</i> Those who want to stay will, those who do not will leave. Always been that way and it's not a problem.

<i>"...Nor does it mean that doing it is beneficial to conventional warfare skills, which was the subject anyway.</i> Anyone that can do what the kids are doing now will have no problem in a conventional war. See Schmedlap above.

<i>"...it is a matter of political will, not the purse."</i> A bit of both but my point was we waste a tremendous amount of money, always have. Congress helps. We have enough money, we just don't allocate it well.

Well, yes, I understand, and you're right that it is immaterial, that is if you don't care about keeping qualified people. In other words, they will always obey orders. That doesn't mean they will like it and ask for more four years from now when it comes time to re-enlist. Nor does it mean that doing it is beneficial to conventional warfare skills, which was the subject anyway.

As for adequately funding and sourcing the military, we can do an awful lot more than we have. It is a matter of political will, not the purse. Max Boot has a good commentary on the Iraq recession myth. The Iraq campaign is costing us 0.91% of our GDP, compared to orders of magnitude higher than that for wars of the past. Again, it is a matter of political will.

With respect to <i>"But actually wants to do it? I don't know any."</i> That's probably quite true -- it is also really immaterial; the troops will do what needs to be done. Grudgingly perhaps but well enough.

Nor can the nation afford much more in the way of <i>"adequately fund and source the military."</i> DoD needs to get its act together and spend what is allotted a little more wisely.

Re: the Sysadmin force. Where are we going to get in adequate number the people who want to do that?

Regarding arifJAA's comments, I agree that if COIN involves kinetic operations, deployment skills (such as an MEU for the Marines) conventional warfare skills can only be helped by engaging in COIN. But read Michael Totten's most recent entry from Fallujah. What the Marines are doing now in Fallujah can only be seen as the very tail end of COIN, and in fact, peacekeeping. I will tell you honestly that I don't know of a single Marine who acutally wants to do that. Capable of it? Sure. Adapt to it? Of course. But actually wants to do it? I don't know any.

I think Rob's comments are correct. We cannot have a healthy military and adopt an either / or approach. The only reason we cannot have the both / and approach is the lack of political will to adequately fund and source the military. This goes back to Gian's point about Nagl's proposal for advisory unit. The Army cannot afford it. I agree with Gian here.

I am still contemplating Barnett's proposals for a bifurcation between Leviathan and Sysadmin, and haven't come up with anything smart to say on that yet.

Good post, Rob. Good if hard questions and the only answer is, I suspect, as my ancient Pappy told me with respect to the female of the species; "Be alert."

I am surprised that I have not been taken to task about the concluding quote from me in the WSJ article by Yochi Dreazen.

The quote by me presented a defiant tone to the reader by stating:

"Really, what's the worst they could do to me?"

Although I do not question that I made this statement in the interview to the WSJ reporter and I take full responsibility for my words it was taken out of context for the point I was trying to make. I do apologize for the quote which was unprofessional and the impression that it has probably left on many readers. The context of the question where I made this statement went something like this. Yochi Dreazen at the end of the interview told me that he thought I was courageous for speaking my mind about Iraq, the Surge, and going against conventional wisdom in the Army. I quickly cut him off and did not want the word courageous applied to me. That word is more deserving of the brave men and women in the American military facing down the fire of a hostile enemy in Iraq and Afghanistan. So the point I was trying to make was that I didnt see myself as "courageous" but instead in a good place to be for the space and distance from Iraq that I think gives me a good perspective on things. At the end of the discussion I quipped the statement that he quoted. Now I certainly wished I had not and apologize for it.

I would like to comment on a point brought up about maintaining full spectrum capabilities. While the threat to our short term national security may not include vast armored formations in the wake of BAGs and DAGs firing preplanned targets to support deep penetrations into western Europe, there is merit in preserving U.S. military capability to be able to conduct conventional offensive operations on the scale it did in 2003, if not larger.

Our tool bag must also contain the elements of deterrence, and constraining that deterrence to air and maritime coercion only vs. the ability to compel on land would be a self-imposed constraint. Such a constraint may find us with inadequate means to deter aggression, or without a credible threat to impose our will on the ground if called to do so. The moment we convince ourselves that a capability is no longer needed is probably the moment someone else will identify it as a deficiency, followed shortly by their filling that niche. Clearly part of a state like Iran's rationale for obtaining nuclear weapons is to protect its regime - making the stakes of regime change much higher with regard to forced entry.

We cannot hedge too much in any one area - because no matter how unlikely we view a particular future in the short term, it is likely based on the interactive nature of the future that it will be different then we expect it.

Keep in mind that although we've identified that we came up short post invasion, there was an invasion that occurred first. Whatever possible futures we've produced out of Iraq, they are different then the ones that would have occurred without a force capable of conducting the invasion. I'd add that the act itself also created an impression with Iraq's neighbors, part of which remains valid - that no matter what the penalties on the back end are, if the U.S. political end is to destroy a regime, it is willing and able to do so. That is a powerful deterrent to many, and a tool to achieve some goals without ever having to employ military force - e.g. some of Libya's ambitions.

The challenge for planners resides in balancing risk, or as described in the QDR - shifting our weight IAW the conditions. I agree that an outcome in Iraq that is more inline with our interests is of strategic importance, not only in the short term, but in the long term as well. Our ability to conduct COIN is in my opinion helping us realize those goals, but without a doubt there is risk in other areas. There is risk with regard to Afghanistan, and there is risk abroad, there is military risk, and there is political risk. The questions are: is the risk justified? - i.e. is the "object in view" of such importance that compromising with regard to other ends, worth it. I think for many reasons that can be tied to our enduring interests in the ME , they are; the second question is how do you mitigate the identified risks? - can you contain the enemy, or limit his freedom of movement in other areas where he is known to exist; while you focus resources on what you have decided is the main effort? A related question to the latter is not only knowing what your enemies are up to, but the capabilities and goals of your friends, and what your relation to them is - e.g. when will some threat emerge that you cannot ignore, or adequately address without abandoning some portion of your main effort. Can you build partner capacity (in all areas, or portions of areas) to improve your position strategically, while degrading your enemys?
We have to resist adopting an "either / or" approach - both out of strategic necessity based on our short and long term FP objectives, and in order to retain the widest margin of options we can sustain with regard to means. It is difficult - there is certainly immediacy with regard to how the current conditions drive OPTEMPO in support of OIF - just getting to a 1:1 with respect to deploy : dwell is a challenge, but is the object in view worth it? Does the achievement of our goals in Iraq better position us for long term possibilities both in the ME and Internationally?

Is their risk? - Yes. There is always going to be risk. Identifying the risks, placing them in the appropriate context based on tactical, operational and strategic conditions as they apply to U.S. foreign policy objectives is what must be done in order to make sound decisions. Consideration of our FP objectives in relation to those of our enemies and allies is what keeps us agile. Again, we need to resist the comforts of "either/or" approaches that equate to self imposed constraints - our interests are just that broad.

Best, Rob

As we discuss COIN and our role in it, I cannot state strongly enough that there is only one COIN fight the US can win and that is an insurgency against the US. We cannot win in Afghanistan, Iraq, Colombia, Trans-Sahel, the Philippines, etc. We can only be the external support to governments that are threatened with insurgency. We can only help them to be successful as the essence of an insurgency is the fight for who will be the legitimate governing power of the indigenous population. As long as we try to employ our forces to "win" the insurgency vice help our friends, partners, and allies win their insurgency we will focus on the wrong tasks. I believe we need a force that can operate across the spectrum - not every force can do everything and of course the challenge is balancing our force so that we can do what is required to defend our nation from Foreign Internal Defense (which includes indirect, direct, and combat operations in support of a host nation) to major combat operations.

We must remember that we will always be fighting a thinking, adapting enemy (whether a force from a nation state or an ireegular force)and we must out think as well as be able to out fight him ourselves (when the threat is directed against us) or help our friends, partners, and allies out think and out fight the enemy themselves.

In the past, people not involved in the fighting of wars, have possibly over-apportioned fault or credit to machines, be it a tank, a plane, a rifle, etc. While those machines did have an impact, they either constrained or enabled superior quality (or deficiencies) in terms of training, experience and leadership, the attribution of success or failure to a machine or thing shows a lack of understanding about the role of the person.

The politicization of a war (no surprise since war is a political endevour) is likely to look for those areas which it can best understand and articulate. Few discussion outside of professional military circles will focus on how the role of continued experience in war advances leaders' abilities and professional judgment. Its a subjective topic, one that is hard to quantify generally, and hard to qualify outside professional circles.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the most visible discussion is not currently around hardware (although we have seen spats of it focused on MRAP, body armor, etc.), the nature of the war does not lend itself to a sustainable discussion on those matters. A great deal of discussion however, has been around General Petreaus as the MNF-I CDR, the release of FM 3-24 - Army's COIN doctrine, and the increase in means to conduct operations - a.k.a. - the "Surge". As a result all three of those are entwined in politics - its unavoidable.

What is given little attention outside professional circles is the role leadership at all levels plays in the operationalization of the latter. While many soldiers (since its currently Army doctrine and not Joint we're talking about) may not have read 3-24, they have built upon their experiences, built upon the experiences of their buddies, leaders and units, had access to many other venues discussing COIN or related activities, gone through a train up where others have participated in the above (be it a CTC MRE, or PME), etc. and as such have been exposed to tools that have better prepared them for their future experiences.

I don't think anyone in uniform (at least in the ground services) is making a mono-causal attribution solely to new doctrine, or to an increase in means - we understand that its a combination of many things. However, the level of professional thinking and discussion facilitated by events like the publication of FM 3-24 (COIN), FM 3-0 (Operations), the est. of an Army/Marine COIN Center, the innovative ways leaders have approached training, the many professional writings, etc. should not taken for granted either. Nor should the increase on the ground in our most important asset - the soldier be taken for granted - it matters, it has increased our ability to affect more people, more ground, more enemy.

The fact that doctrine now reflects some of our experiences and thinking, is to me a good thing. It does not rule out existing doctrine, it does not constrain us (in my opinion and experience) to reaching outside of doctrine when the conditions require it. The fact that the decision was made to increase the means available to operationalize parts of the doctrine and the experiences/judgment of tactical and operational commanders is to me also a good thing - this is a case where although quality is critical, the need for quantity of quality also increased/increases the options and opportunities available to leaders.

For many of us inside the profession, the public and political events such as the doctrinal releases, the increase in troops, the testimony of senior leaders are not separate from the increase in experience, improvement in professional judgment, and level of proficiency of those conducting and leading the operations. If you are outside of the profession, its hard to understand that relationship, as such the media, the public and politicians will focus on what they do.

Best, Rob