Following Operation Iraqi Freedom, the northwestern border and farming city of Tal Afar was a relatively peaceful and stable haven in Iraq. During 2004 and 2005, the city emerged as both a hub of insurgent infiltration from Syria to Mosul and as a refuge for insurgents fleeing the campaigns in Anbar province. The city was cleared during a major operation in November 2004 by 2d Squadron, 14th Cavalry Regiment, and again in September 2005 by the 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment (ACR) accompanied by the 3d Iraqi Army (IA) Division. The 3d ACR followed up on its success by establishing company- and platoon-sized U.S./IA outposts throughout the city to restore order and allow the reformation of civil government and security forces to rebuild. The conflict also included a bitter campaign by Sunni supremacists to exterminate the Shia presence in town, which had the effect of polarizing the populace along sectarian lines.

Our unit, Team Battle, 2-37 Armor, assumed responsibility for west and southwest Tal Afar on 14 February 2006. It consisted of a motorized tank platoon, a dual-purpose tank/motorized platoon, a mechanized infantry platoon, and a combat engineer platoon. The team's specific tasks included ensuring mobility on the alternate supply route (ASR) in its sector, developing IA and Iraqi Police (IP) capabilities, and defeating the insurgents' ability to operate in its area of operations (AO). Approximately half of the sector was occupied by friendly tribes, mostly Shia, who formed a partnership with coalition forces to protect their interests and restore a fair government to Tal Afar.

Cavguy is the Small Wars Council screen name of Major Niel Smith, of the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He currently is assigned to the U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center as an operations officer. He has served almost 29 months in Iraq during two tours with 1/1 AD and 2-37 Armor, serving as a company commander, battalion staff officer, and brigade staff officer in Baghdad, Najaf, Tal Afar, and Ramadi. The opinions stated in this post and this are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the Combined Arms Center or the Department of Defense.

Much more.

Americans at War is a signature program of the U.S. Naval Institute that has engaged national audiences through poignant and personal portrayals of the war experiences of America's men and women in uniform. Individual veterans are presented in a series of 90-second short stories — powerful tales that inspire pride and patriotism. The Naval Institute, the benchmark publisher of naval and maritime books and magazines for more than 130 years, is documenting the American war experience for a diverse audience and honoring the strength, character, leadership, perseverance, and sacrifice of America's heroes.

The U.S. Naval Institute, a non-profit organization, honors the heritage of military service and the personal sacrifices of individual heroes through the Institute's unparalleled photo collection and library, professional books, Proceedings magazine and Naval History magazine, oral histories and videos.

Through the eyes of those who were there, Americans at War looks back at the moments when ordinary people were called to extraordinary heroism.

High-definition interviews offer intimate, one-on-one experiences. It's a priceless understanding of the effects of war through harrowing personal accounts. Featured on PBS, this award-winning series offers 50 compelling vignettes.

This series is educating a new generation of young men and women, and honors our nation's heroes who have sacrificed so much.

Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling is deploying to Iraq again this afternoon. We wish him, his family and his soldiers God speed, fair winds and following seas.

In light of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates' address yesterday at the US Military Academy we thought it timely to point out another important speech on issues of leadership and "generalship".

That speech would be Secretary of the Army Pete Geren's address at the George C. Marshall Awards, Washington and Lee University, on 17 April 2008. The full transcript can be found at this link.

Here is an excerpt:

... You the Marshall class of 2008, are part of the legacy of one of our truly great Americans. You are being recognized both for your outstanding performance in ROTC and for your potential as future Army officers.

Each of you was selected as the top cadets of your ROTC Units -- you have demonstrated outstanding leadership and academic achievement.

Together, you represent our Army's next generation of leaders. You are among our very best and our expectations of you are high. Today, our Army is the best led, best trained and best equipped Army the world has ever seen. Your job is to make sure we can still say that 20 years from now.

You are leaders who will lead our Soldiers during this time of war and in this era of persistent conflict and persistent engagement.

You will lead in complex and complicated times - under the Chinese curse of all those who are fated to live in "interesting times" - and much will be asked of you. You will be entrusted with our Nation's most precious resource - our sons and daughters - and our nation's most important mission - our nation's defense.

Napoleon told us, "There are no bad soldiers, only bad generals."...

Each of you has been given Forrest C. Pogue's four-volume biography of George C. Marshall. You would do well to study it. The many and varied challenges George C. Marshall confronted over his nearly 60 years of service to our Nation - you will find them all compressed into your military career, whether it be 5 years or 40 - perhaps even into a single tour in Iraq or Afghanistan. Clear-hold-build, Counter-insurgency, stability operations, combat, nation-building - winning a war, winning the peace - and laying the foundation for a sustainable peace - our Soldiers are doing all of that and more -- everyday.

That is a lot to ask of you - but that is what we are asking of Army leaders today...

Our Army understands that the way we fight has changed - and is changing, and you will become the leaders who will carry this dynamic vision into this century.

And, if we are going to retain the combat edge honed in Iraq and Afghanistan, and adapt as the future requires, we must be an institution that encourages Soldiers to ask hard questions, questions that make us uncomfortable - reward not only the Soldier who risks his life, but also the Soldier who is —to risk a promotion - encourage those who afflict the comfortable.

Recently, LTC Paul Yingling wrote a piece that appeared in the Armed Forces Journal - and sparked heated debate throughout the Army - ruffled some feathers - ruffled a lot of feathers. That is a good thing. We need more, not fewer, Paul Yinglings.

And on this point, George C. Marshall also can serve as our model. Many thought MAJ Marshall's career was at an end in 1917 when he publicly disagreed with and angrily lectured GEN "Black Jack" Pershing at 1st Division headquarters in France during World War I. He even grabbed the general's arm when he tried to disengage.

His anger and assertiveness did not draw a rebuke from Pershing - rather it earned his respect...

You can find articles by LTC Yingling at his SWJ Bio Page.

Readers joined U.S. Army Lt. Col. John Nagl, author of " Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam," on Tuesday, April 22 at 1 p.m. ET to discuss the latest developments and the debate in Washington among government, military and intelligence officials about what course to follow in Iraq...

Here's the first question and answer.

Detroit: Lt. Col. Nagl, as an American trying to make sense of Iraq I find it troubling that the administration and the media to a great extent try to simplify the relationships and polarization that exists in Iraq. Good vs. evil hardly can be the subtext to this story. It is my understanding that all political groups of any size have their own militias, not just Sadr. Is this true? If so, what of the joyous recent pronouncements from Rice that the Iraq government is banning militias? Why are they moving on him now, and what is the implication given the upcoming elections?

Lt. Col. John Nagl: Detroit, Iraq is indeed a complicated place; I think General Petraeus and Ambassador Crocker did a good job last week of laying out just how fragile the progress we've seen over the past year still is, and how many parties have an interest in the future direction of Iraq. There are in fact several political groups with affiliated militia movements, although Sadr's is among the most worrisome, and has the potential to significantly affect the course of the elections this fall. In this light, I think the decision by the Government of Iraq (GoI) to move against not just Sadr's militia, but all of them, is a step in the right direction. How well it is executed remains to be seen.

Also check out SWJ friend Andrew Exum's Strategic Miscommunication over at The Guardian. Key quote from the subtitle - The Pentagon's spinning of military analysts isn't an illegal propaganda campaign against the American people - it's just savvy PR.

In a third-party counterinsurgency campaign pitting a strong, industrial democracy against a poorly-armed guerrilla group, the weak underbelly of the democracy carrying out the campaign is the popular support it must have to continue its war efforts. An authoritarian government can start and stop wars when it decides - democracies ostensibly require the will of the people to initiate and then carry out any type of sustained military action. As such, maintaining the enthusiasm of the populace for the war effort is both desired and necessary in a counterinsurgency campaign. That said, the potential for excess on the part of the government is readily apparent, and checks on abuse of power must be firmly established...

If you just glanced at the front page of Sunday's New York Times, you could be forgiven for thinking reporter David Barstow and his editors had uncovered a real scandal at the Pentagon: had the department of defence been waging a propaganda campaign against the American people in the early years of the Iraq war?

In the end, though, all the 8,500-word article revealed was that the department of defence had (very cleverly) manipulated popular opinion by targeting opinion makers - in this case, the retired generals who often turn up on television news as "military experts" - with the same kind of positive "spin" everyday Americans are subjected to every waking hour during a presidential campaign...

Full Transcript - US Department of Defense. Highlights include comments on leadership and credibility, Iran; Iraq, Afghanistan and the Long War; applying Fox Conner's three axioms to the security challenges of the 21st century -- 1. Never fight unless you have to, 2. Never fight alone and 3. Never fight for long.

An AFPS News Excerpt:

Success on today's and tomorrow's battlefields requires military leaders guided by conscience who refuse to be "yes men," Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said in a speech last night to future Army officers at the U.S. Military Academy.

Gates told the cadets at West Point, N.Y., that he considers principled dissent a sign of a healthy organization, but he also encouraged loyalty among the dissenters.

The Army will need leaders of "uncommon agility, resourcefulness and imagination, leaders —and able to think and act creatively and decisively in a different kind of world and a different kind of conflict than we have prepared for over the last six decades," Gates said.

But one factor remains constant, Gates continued. "We will still need men and women in uniform to call things as they see them and tell their subordinates and superiors alike what they need to hear, not what they want to hear." ...

Related news items:

Leaders Must Follow Conscience - Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

Gates Revives Old Military Axiom - Agence France Presse

Gates Calls Iran 'Hell Bent' on Getting Nukes - Robert Burns, Associated Press

US Troop Levels in Iraq Will Fall - Andrew Gray, Reuters

Full Transcript - US Department of Defense. Highlights include comments on air power, unmanned aerial vehicles and counterinsurgency.

Related news and blog items:

Gates Assails Pentagon on Resources - White and Branigin, Washington Post

Gates Advises on Disagreeing With Leaders - Thom Shanker, New York Times

Air Force Under Fire From Gates - Peter Spiegel, Los Angeles Times

Air Force Must do More for War, Gates Says - Associated Press

Gates Forms ISR Task Force - Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

Gates Urges Unconventional Thinking - Donna Miles, American Forces Press Service

Why the Air Force Bugs Gates - Mark Thompson, Time

The Problem with Culture (Ours) - Abu Muqawama, Abu Muqawama

The Ghost of Boyd Invoked - John Robb, Global Guerrillas

Gates: Air Force Must Do More - Sharon Weinberger, Danger Room

The May -- June 2008 issue of Military Review has been posted to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center web site.

Since 1922, Military Review has provided a forum for the open exchange of ideas on military affairs. Subsequently, publications have proliferated throughout the Army education system that specialize either in tactical issues associated with particular Branches or on strategic issues at the Senior Service School level. Bridging these two levels of intellectual inquiry, Military Review focuses on research and analysis of the concepts, doctrine and principles of warfighting between the tactical and operational levels of war.

Military Review is a refereed journal that provides a forum for original thought and debate on the art and science of land warfare and other issues of current interest to the US Army and the Department of Defense. Military Review also supports the education, training, doctrine development and integration missions of the Combined Arms Center (CAC), Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Addendum: Anbar Awakens by Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army.

In the March-April issue of Military Review of Military Review, Major Niel Smith and I wrote about the accomplishments of the Soldiers, Marines, Sailors, and Airmen who fought in Ramadi from June 2006 through February 2007. I would like to elaborate on an important point raised in the article: the Al Anbar campaign was a model of joint operational effectiveness.

Money as a Force Multiplier in COIN by Lieutenant Colonel Leonard J. DeFrancisci, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve.

Before Operation Al Fajr, the second battle of Fallujah (in November-December 2004), an estimated 4,000 insurgents roamed the streets of Fallujah, Iraq, killing government soldiers and policemen and essentially turning the city into a rebel stronghold. They could do so not just because of their numbers and ruthlessness, but because they derived significant strength from the local population. In essence, the people provided the insurgents with the recruits and support necessary to thrive and move freely within the battlespace.

To attack this strength, the Marine Corps' Regimental Combat Team 1 (RCT-1) would use a powerful weapon—money—to drive a wedge between the insurgents and the people and help win the second battle of Fallujah. In particular, the combat team's civil affairs units influenced the people by providing money to alleviate their immediate needs, settle grievances, and reduce frustration arising during the course of the battle. At the same time, the units developed long-term reconstruction efforts to help local Iraqi leaders gain control of the area. In this way, RCT-1 built legitimacy for coalition forces and further increased rifts between insurgents and their much-needed popular support. These actions reduced the enemy's base of operations and ability to maneuver. As this article will show, RCT-1 civil affairs units wielded financial power as a combat multiplier and reduced the enemy's overall combat potential.

Reforming the Madrasah: A Disregarded Dimension in the War on Terrorism by Major Todd Schmidt, U.S. Army.

The Global War on Terror is a war of ideas." We have heard this and similar statements repeatedly over the past five years. We read it in the papers and blogs. We listen to it from our leaders and politicians. It is an accurate statement, but it remains widely underappreciated.

The U.S. government has committed itself to a strong, concerted, and necessary effort to fight in the "war of ideas" using strategic communications, information operations, psychological operations, and civil affairs. In an effort to augment this effort, U.S. troops collect beanie babies, soccer balls, and second-hand clothes to distribute to Afghan and Iraqi children. But Soldiers' well-intentioned actions, like those of their higher-ups in the military and government, have been largely ineffective. Promoting good will via humanitarian assistance and gestures has made little lasting impact, because such actions do not successfully challenge the ideological forces underpinning Middle Eastern cultural perceptions—and these perceptions are at the root of the conflict between Islamic terrorists and the West. To win the war of ideas, the U.S. and its allies must counter the formation of extremist attitudes where they are born and inculcated: in the Islamic madrasah school system.

From Enduring Strife to Enduring Peace in the Philippines by Major Gary J. Morea, U.S. Army.

With the exception of a brief period of American control in the first half of the twentieth century, conflict has persisted in the Mindanao, the southern island group of the Philippines, for 500 years, since the first acts of resistance towards Spanish colonization in the sixteenth century.

In fact, this conflict is the second longest internal conflict in history.

The population of the Philippines is a mosaic of diverse ideologies, religions, and cultures that have coalesced into three distinct regions of the archipelago. At times, these regions have been at odds with each other. While several attempts at conflict resolution have been made over the years through many different forms of government, the conflict has not yet been resolved and groups continue to struggle against the central government for political consideration, concessions, and/or autonomy. Those living in the Mindanao, for whom resistance is central to identity, still writhe against the forces that wish to control them.

Title 10 Domestic Humanitarian Assistance: New Orleans by Major Michael C. Donahue, U.S. Army.

On Thursday, 1 September 2005, the 2d Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division, was alerted to deploy to New Orleans to assist in humanitarian relief operations following Hurricane Katrina. Coming out of a year-long deployment in Iraq, the Black Jack Brigade had lost a significant percentage of its officers and enlisted Soldiers to post-deployment reassignments. Consequently, many staff members were new and unfamiliar with the brigade's standardized operating procedures. Moreover, the brigade was undergoing transition to modularity, which involved complete structural reorganization and the realignment of personnel and equipment. Nevertheless, the vanguard element of the brigade—1st Battalion, 5th Cavalry—deployed on 3 September. The remaining brigade elements deployed and closed on the Naval Support Activity, New Orleans, by 6 September 2005.

The brigade operated under the control of the 82d Airborne Division and was assigned the Algiers district of Orleans Parish as its area of responsibility (AOR). Although Algiers had suffered severe wind damage and the loss of essential services, the parish did not experience the flooding that devastated the northern areas of New Orleans.

The Taliban: An Organizational Analysis by Major Shahid Afsar, Pakistan Army; Major Chris Samples, U.S. Army; and Major Thomas Wood, U.S. Army.

The Taliban did not grow out of the dark overnight, nor was it unknown in the Middle East, the region of the world most severely affected after 9/11. Following its emergence in 1994 from madrassas, the Taliban achieved surprising victories over its enemies and assumed rule over much of Afghanistan.2 Simultaneously hailed as saviors and feared as oppressors, the Taliban were an almost mythical phenomenon that seemed to embody the very essence of Afghan cultural beliefs, especially revenge for transgression, hospitality for enemies, and readiness to die for honor. The Taliban knew the Afghan people and their ways and embedded themselves in the complex Afghan web of tribalism, religion, and ethnicity.

Despite their quick overthrow in 2002 by a small coalition of U.S. forces and anti-Taliban groups, the Taliban has not gone away. In fact, today, in the face of thousands of NATO and U.S. troops, a growing Afghan National Army (ANA), and a popularly elected government, the movement's influence in Afghanistan is increasing. It continues to wage an insurgency that has prevented the new government from establishing legitimacy, and it has created massive unrest in Pakistan. Clearly, it behooves us to know something more about this archaic but formidable enemy.

The Al-Qaeda Media Machine by Philip Seib, J.D.

Like an aging rock star who has dropped out of the public eye, Osama bin-Laden occasionally decides to remind people that he's still around. He makes video appearances that first appear on Arabic television channels but which the world quickly sees on television or on multiple Web sites. Bin-Laden's message is "Hey, they haven't caught me yet," which cheers up his fans, but his threats and pronouncements are mostly terrorist boilerplate. For all the parsing of his sentences and scrutinizing of the color of his beard, hardly anything in his videos helps us better understand and combat terrorism.

Meanwhile, significant Al-Qaeda media efforts go largely unnoticed by news organizations and the public. This myopia is characteristic of an approach to antiterrorism that focuses on Bin-Laden as terror-celebrity while ignoring the deep-rooted dynamism of a global enemy. Most jihadist media products make no mention of Bin-Laden, but they deserve attention because they are vital to Al-Qaeda's mission and to its efforts to extend its influence. Al-Qaeda has become a significant player in global politics largely because it has developed a sophisticated media strategy.

Through an Arab Cultural Lens by Helen Altman Klein, Ph.D., and Gilbert Kuperman.

Retired Major General Robert H. Scales has described how in today's world, military victory "will be defined more in terms of capturing the psych-cultural rather than the geographical high ground."1 It is in this spirit that we look at the Arab Middle East.

U.S. military and civilian personnel are increasingly sensitive to customs, social organization, leadership, and religion as aspects of Arab culture. It is clear that, with international events as they are, America and its allies need to appreciate how Arabs think. When we misunderstand the Arab perspective and fail to see events through Arab eyes, we can make costly mistakes. To this end, the U.S. Air Force commissioned a study of the Arab mind to identify key differences between Arab and Western thinking.2 Study members reviewed research literature, religious texts, and even business and travel guides. The United Nation's report on Arab culture proved particularly valuable.3 The group conducted in-depth interviews with 16 Arabs from Egypt, Israel's West Bank, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, and with 6 Westerners with extensive experience in dealing with Arabs from Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.

Islam and Symbolism by First Sergeant António Rodrigues, Portuguese Army.

Islamic culture is resplendent with symbols containing historical, religious, and mystical elements. Persons working in the Middle East are advised to become familiar with them.

Symbols resonate throughout Islamic cultures, from high art and literature to popular culture. They can be found everywhere in everyday social life. It is fair to say that an understanding of Islamic culture is incomplete without an appreciation for the rich panoply of symbols that tie ancient history and tradition to modern cultures and societies that have embraced or largely embraced Islam.

Islamic symbols come from diverse sources. Most share a common nexus with the life and mission of the Prophet Mohammed and the genesis of Islam, but others are legacies of ancient sources that date from before the emergence of Islam.

Transition Teams: Adapt and Win by Captain William C. Taylor, U.S. Army.

Having served as executive officer and operations officer of a battalion military transition team (MiTT) in Iraq from May 2007 to April 2008, I found that operations varied greatly from team to team. At first this surprised me, since the mission we'd been given before deploying seemed fairly clear-cut: "provide advisory support and direct access to coalition effects to enhance the ability of Iraqi forces to operate independently, advise the Iraqi Army (IA) on tactics, military decision-making process, counterinsurgency (COIN ) warfare, leadership, teamwork, communications, urban combat, and provide knowledge on combat arms management and organizational experience." Some teams had taken this mission statement at its word and adhered strictly to their advisory tasks, disdaining any interaction with the local coalition unit. Other teams focused heavily on liaising between their IA and parent coalition unit, and did minimal advising. Even among the MiTTs that focused on training, there were differences. Few teams, for example, dared to wade into leadership, teamwork, and ethics with their IA unit's leaders. Internal MiTT leadership varied too: some team leaders were democratic, others more traditionally hierarchical. How, I began to wonder, given all these different examples and some obvious differences among Iraqi units, should we operate on our own team?

Constructive Engagement: A Proven Method for Conducting Stability and Support Operations by Sergeant Major Martin Rodriguez, U.S. Army, Retired; Major Andrew Farnsler, U.S. Army; and John Bott.

In the Iraqi Theater of Operations (ITO), successful conduct of stability and support operations (SASO) requires an imaginative combination of lethal and nonlethal methods. For the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division, the combination is known as constructive engagement (CE) and is conducted in battalion sectors throughout Baghdad. Constructive engagement combines the full spectrum of military operations with diplomacy at the tactical level, a strategy described by top commanders in Iraq in a 2004 New York Times article as "a mix of military tactics, political maneuvering, media management and a generous dollop of cash for quickly rebuilding war-ravaged cities—a formula that, if it survives the test of time, could become a model for future fighting against the persistent insurrections plaguing Iraq."

During full-spectrum operations in a SASO environment, a commander must balance the application of military (lethal and civil-military) operations with diplomatic engagement to achieve the desired end state. CE describes the methods commanders use to reach this balance, and in Baghdad the goal is the creation of a safe and secure environment in which the seeds of a republic will flourish. The mix of military and diplomatic tactics required very much depends on the environment within each unit sector and the personality of the battalion commander; a commander's skill as a Soldier and diplomat often determine the unit's level of success. Many small-unit leaders and commanders in Baghdad found diplomatic methods are often the most efficient means of reducing the insurgent base.

The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System by James R. Locher III.

The National Security System that the president uses to manage the instruments of national power, and the manner in which Congress oversees and funds the system, do not permit the agility required to protect the United States and its interests in an increasingly complex and rapidly changing world. From 9/11 and Hurricane Katrina to the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and emerging threats to the homeland, 21st-century national security challenges demand more effective communication across traditional organizational boundaries. Meeting these challenges requires a common vision and organizational culture and better integration of expertise and capabilities.

The Story Behind the National Security Act of 1947 by Charles A. Stevenson, Ph.D.

Harry Truman was at Washington D.C.'s National Airport on Saturday, 26 July 1947, waiting impatiently to fly home to Missouri to see his dying mother. First, however, he wanted to sign a long-delayed bill reorganizing the government to deal with national security matters. Congress had completed action on the measure, but the printing office had closed, so there was a delay in preparing the bill for Truman's signature.

A little after noon, congressional clerks brought the bill on board the Sacred Cow, the four-engine C-54 presidential plane. Truman promptly signed it, as well as an executive order setting forth roles and missions for the Armed Forces and a paper nominating James Forrestal to be the first Secretary of Defense. An hour later, en route to Missouri, Truman learned that his mother had died. Meanwhile, just before adjourning until November, the Senate quickly approved Forrestal's nomination by voice vote.

Will the Army Ever Learn Good Media Relations Techniques? Walter Reed as a Case Study by Colonel James T. Currie, U.S. Army Reserves, Retired, Ph.D.

If you ever wanted a near-perfect case study of how not to deal with the press, the Walter Reed Army Medical Center (WRAMC) controversy would be a great place to start. Of course, the Walter Reed episode also offers lessons in leadership and accountability. Some of those lessons manifest themselves in this article, but the focus here is on the Army's bungled interaction with the news media and on how to avoid a repeat of the nightmarish fiasco.

Here are the links to the English translation versions of the articles:

You'll Have to Learn Not to Cry... by the editors of Air & Space Power Journal

This issue of Air and Space Power Journal addresses the study, understanding, and dissemination of tragic problem of concern not only to military personnel in the battlefield but also to civilian populations around the world: the use of "child soldiers" by armed forces, religious fanatics, and insurgent groups. Specifically, this edition seeks to provide a better understanding of this tragic issue, foster better awareness, and find solutions to the problem.

History confirms that in the past, wars were fought mainly by adults as part of state armies. Today, however, children—some of them younger than 18 years of age—participate in warfare. The warring parties often abduct or force them to fight against their will, disregarding with impunity the international laws applicable to the rights and protection of children.

The New Children of War by Dr. Peter Singer.

The nature of armed conflict, though, has changed greatly in the past few years. Now the presence of children is the new rule of standard behavior in war, rather than the rarity that it used to be. The result is that war in the twenty-first century is not only more tragic but also more dangerous. With children's involvement, generals, warlords, terrorists, and rebel leaders alike are finding that conflicts are easier to start and harder to end.

The practice of using children, defined under international law as under the age of 18, as soldiers is far more widespread and more important than most realize. There are as many as 300,000 children under the age of 18 presently serving as combatants around the globe (making them almost 10 percent of all global combatants). They serve in 40 percent of the world's armed forces, rebel groups, and terrorist organizations and fight in almost 75 percent of the world's conflicts; indeed, in the last five years, children have served as soldiers on every continent but Antarctica. Moreover, an additional half-million children serve in armed forces not presently at war.

Child Soldier as Tactical Innovation by Robert Tynes.

Suppose that you are on patrol in Medellí­n, Colombia. As you pass a house, you hear shouting inside. Two men are pleading not to be killed, and to their cries a stern "Shut up, and tell us!" snaps back. The voice is tough but not booming. The shouting sounds young, not deep enough to be that of an adult. Your patrol decides to enter the house through the front, the side window, and the back. When you break in, you find two men tied up in chairs. You also find two boys, holding guns up to the heads of the hostages. You yell at them to drop their weapons. But they don't. What do you do? If you don't shoot at the boys, the hostages will die. Or you will be shot at. If you fire on the boys, you will probably kill them. They are 13 years old.

This is the dilemma that American soldiers are having to face more and more on the battlefield. Whether it is in Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, or Colombia, child soldiers have become an integral part of both insurgencies and government forces. Saddam Hussein's regime recruited child soldiers, an issue that American soldiers had to face when they invaded Iraq in 2003. Many of these young recruits had been trained in military-like boot camps.

Child Soldiers: Despair, Barbarization, and Conflict by John Sullivan.

Contemporary warfare is no longer the sole domain of adults and state forces. Children are increasingly involved in conflicts waged by nonstate actors: guerillas, terrorists, jihadi bands, gangs, criminals, and warlords. These groups utilizing child soldiers operate outside the norms of war and the rule of law, and have abandoned long-held prohibitions against terrorism, attacks on noncombatants, torture, reprisal, and slavery. These actors fight among themselves and against states for turf, profit, and plunder while accelerating the barbarization of warfare. This article examines the use of children in war and armed conflict. Specifically, it reviews the contemporary child-soldier issue and discusses child combatants in three settings: internal conflicts (civil wars and insurgencies), terrorism, and criminal gangs. Finally, it describes how children become child soldiers and looks at ways of responding to the problem.

Child Soldiers: Are US Military Members Prepared to Deal with the Threat? By Lieutenant Colonel Judith Hughes, USAF.

The growing volume of literature on the subject of child soldiers may be the first hint that the problem is getting worse instead of better. The problem is not unique to one particular country or region of the globe. Children may be active soldiers in combat in over 75 percent of the world's conflicts. The actual number of child soldiers is hard to quantify. Amnesty International cites research that estimates 300,000 child soldiers are exploited in over 30 countries but points out that efforts are under way to collect more reliable data on the actual number of children who are soldiering.3 Current Human Rights Watch Web sites also give the figure of 300,000 child soldiers, but it is interesting to note that literature published in the late 1990s also estimated the same number of children. The lack of change in these numbers may represent not a stagnant growth pattern but more likely the difficulty of getting accurate data.

The Law of Lost Innocence: International Law and the Modern Reality of Child Soldiers by Major Bryan Watson, USAF.

History does not note many instances in which children have served during wartime; in fact, the last four millennia of warfare have embraced a general norm against using children in war. Modern conflicts have distorted this standard, with some commentators pointing to a "drastic spike" in the practice over the last two decades and arguing that the last fifteen years have come to be known as the "era of the child soldier."

By most accounts, this increase is grounded in the complexity of the modern global order. One scholar points to (1) "social disruptions and failures of development caused by globalization, war, and disease" leading to "greater global conflict and instability" and "generational disconnections that create a new pool of potential recruits," (2) "technological improvements in small arms [that] now permit child recruits to be effective participants in warfare," and (3) "a rise in a new type of conflict that is far more brutal and criminalized." Together, these phenomena have caused tremendous numbers of children to become vulnerable to exploitation as a convenient labor pool for the world's battlefields.

Girl Child Soldiers: The Other Face of Sexual Exploitation and Gender Violence by Dr. Waltraud Morales.

A simple perusal of the hundreds of online resources on "child soldiers" will reveal that in the first decade of the twenty-first century, some of the worst abuse and exploitation is under way. Mankind has made extraordinary progress over the last 300 years in sensitivity and awareness as well as policy making and legislation against many of the most egregious violations of human rights, ranging from battery and torture to outright slavery. Both international humanitarian and international human-rights law have formally and explicitly recognized children's rights and extended special protections. Recently, more governments have acceded to the United Nations' Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict.

Nevertheless, at this very moment, according to recent appeals by nongovernmental organizations (NGO) such World Vision, the International Rescue Commission, and the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, and major intergovernmental organizations (IGO), including the United Nations and specialized agencies such as United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), millions of children around the world not only are the victims of violent conflict and war but also have been forced to become child soldiers. The International Rescue Committee has described the systematic atrocities committed against the world's children as no less than a slow "genocide" or "holocaust" that has yet to grab the world's full attention and organized response.

Here is the short version of the thesis: The political appointees in the Pentagon try to counteract adverse news stories and also try to increase what they believe are positive news stories.

Whoa Nellie! Knocked ya right outta your saddle with that one, didn't they?

Of course, as with all such situations, there are some nuggets to be found within the body of the story. I will get to those in a minute. But as in other cases, be it the flights of fantasy engaged in by the Associated Press when they published their No Gun Ri story back in 1999, or the befuddled and confused musings of the quacks who would deny the Holocaust, or even the delusional belief of many military officers that it was the media, not the military, who lost Vietnam (Note: It was our fault. Us. In uniform. We failed in Vietnam. End Note.), the reporter for the New York Times takes factoids and spins them into a narrative just ripe for the Conspiracy Theorists of America, Inc.

Just look at the opening graphic. Somehow the NYT contends that Major General (Ret) Robert Scales is an administration cheerleader incapable of independent thought?! In what alternate reality is that true? Generals Montgomery Meigs and Barry McCaffrey? For Christ's sake, those are three of the most vocal and respected critics of the military conduct of operations that America has seen these past five years (though it should be noted that at least McCaffrey was initially in favor of the invasion). And yet the NYT wants to paint them as tools of the administration? Seriously? Folks, at least two of those generals have been invited panelists to speak before the House and Senate Armed Services Committees about the problems with the war. Invited by the Democrats mind you, not the Republicans. Seriously, somebody at the NYT headquarters needs to consider instituting a random drug testing program over there because the intellectual loops one has to tie oneself into to come to their thesis are worthy of Jayson Blair's style of "reporting."

Any hope that there might critical thinking vanishes in a cotton-candy poof of intellectual smoke when one realizes that the Times is seriously contending that we readers should believe that these retired generals and other officers were swayed by, well, see it yourself: "In interviews, participants described a powerfully seductive environment — the uniformed escorts to Mr. Rumsfeld's private conference room, the best government china laid out, the embossed name cards, the blizzard of PowerPoints, the solicitations of advice and counsel..."

Wait a second...you mean that the "participants" called it "powerfully seductive"? No, look closer, that word "described" means something. It means that they said no such thing and that the reporter is interpreting the scene for us plebians because, you know, we're not qualified on that count.

We should instead just take the reporter's word for it that men who just spent several decades dealing with all that same stuff as a course of their normal daily lives (the General Officer's mess in the Pentagon anyone?) are now suddenly "seduced" by "uniformed escorts" (ooooh, ahhhhh...such pretty uniforms, I am sooooo flattered), flatware and embossed cards. Oh, and I bet they were just bowled over by that new invention, the PowerPoint briefing. Bet none of them ever saw nuthin' like that.

What makes this even more disappointing is that the broader outlines of the thesis are not even really news. You see, when somebody writes a book about a topic, you cannot then pretend that book does not exist which covers the same material, or that you have found something all new...as the New York Times has now done. Retired Colonel and former-analyst Ken Allard wrote just such a damned book, several years ago. That is years. Not weeks. Not months. Years. It's called Warheads, and it is about the underside of being a military analyst. Now while Allard noted most of the points (but without the conspiracy theory spin) about interactions and connections, in his book, and is a source cited in the article in his own right...there is not so much as a hint about the fact that this is all, effectively, old information.

Hell, you can ask any historian and he'll take you back further. As one friend asked me, "When exactly did DoD PAO get into the 1984 business?" That would be 1947. Prior to that it was Department of War and Navy which did the same thing. And if you don't think FDR gave or withheld access? Or Wilson? Or Lincoln? You need to go back to school. All three most definitely tracked what was written and by whom, and granted or denied access on that basis...as did that feller Sherman (when he wasn't threatening to actually hang journalists), and Grant, and Pershing, and you can bet MacArthur did, and even Eisenhower tracked what journalists wrote, by name, and granted or denied access on that basis at times. (Most especially during the flare-up with His-Royal-Hineyness Montgomery of Alamein when the whole flap over "saving the Americans" appeared in the UK press in late Dec '44.) And let's not even get into Korea and Vietnam. So unless one is also "concerned" that this was wrong for Grant, Pershing, Eisenhower, etc., and that they were doing it wrong...

Now I am certainly not disputing that the Administration tries to spin America, and occasionally the world for that matter, like a Siamese kitten dropped into a Maytag. And I in no way dispute that they have tried to use friendly analysts to do so. I do not think that there is a reader out there who would be the least bit surprised that as the NYT put it, "many of them ideologically in sync with the administration's neoconservative brain trust." Hello? Homer Simpson has had more enlightening insights that that.

What I am disputing that it was propaganda for them to make the attempt. Look at the Creel Committee (aka the Committee for Public Information) circa 1917-1918. That, ladies and gentlemen, is propaganda. Look at some of the other things done during the Wilson Administration as well. This? No, this is about as surprising as POTUS giving repeated "exclusive" sit-down interviews to FOX News, and boxing out the other stations. It is also about as effective.

Indeed that is the unstated subtext of this story, and it is a pity nobody in the editorial offices of the New York Times picked up on the fact and gave that reporter a clue. You see the story is not that the current Administration tries to spin. All of them do that and none of us are surprised. The story is that this administration's public relations people are so completely incompetent at the effort. How do we know? Well, for starters look at public support for the war. But more importantly, go to the NYT site and look at some of the specifics of who the civilian appointees in the Office of the SecDef decided to invite, over and over...notice anything? FOX News, FOX News, FOX News...and that gang, is why the public affairs people in DoD and this Administration are about as successful at this whole "propaganda" thing as Charlie Brown on the first day of football season.

If your intent is to swing the public opinion which has turned against the war (or at various points, "was turning"), then hello, you have to talk to those people, the people who hold different opinions. You do not go forth with public appeals and "talking points" to the people who rabidly support your every bowel movement and seek justification for holding the TP whilst you wipe!

The bottom line is that somebody who watches FOX News gets the absolute LEAST war news (about 30% less as I recall), and is likely already completely ideologically committed to the Administration anyway, so it serves no purpose. (Something that the civilian political appointees in the OSD/DoD Public Affairs offices apparently have difficulty understanding.)

Now I stated at the outset that there is a nugget here, and that is the business ties aspect of the story, that's legit. To a degree. But at the same time you don't see when a legal consultant is on the air, or a medical one, the depth of their ties to their own industries. The interlocking of the board memberships is also a bit problematic, and I think full disclosure on those points should have been made by the analysts. But then again, if the news organizations did not ask (or even inform/educate about the standards of journalism) their analysts the questions about their business connections, how were the retirees supposed to know about the journalism ethics? Osmosis?

A wise fellow once noted that "A Nation that would separate it's scholars from its warriors will have its thinking done by cowards and its fighting done by fools." Well, on a similar note lets add the Bateman Corollary: "A nation that would separate its soldiers from its communicators will have its COIN (counterinsurgency) conducted by mutes and its communications done by the militarily illiterate."

You can vent to the author at R_Bateman_LTC@hotmail.com

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