From the Human Terrain System,

It is with deep sorrow that we must inform you of the tragic death of Michael Bhatia, our social scientist team member assigned to the Afghanistan Human Terrain Team #1, in support of Task Force Currahee based at FOB SALERNO, Khowst Province.

Michael was killed on May 7 when the Humvee he was riding in was struck by an IED. Michael was traveling in a convoy of four vehicles, which were en route to a remote sector of Khowst province. For many years, this part of Khowst had been plagued by a violent inter-tribal conflict concerning land rights. Michael had identified this tribal dispute as a research priority, and was excited to finally be able to visit this area. This trip was the brigade's initial mission into the area, and it was their intention to initiate a negotiation process between the tribes.

Michael was in the lead vehicle with four other soldiers. Initial forensics indicate that the IED was triggered by a command detonated wire. Michael died immediately in the explosion. Two Army soldiers from Task Force Currahee were also killed in the attack, and two were critically injured.

During the course of his seven-month tour, Michael's work saved the lives of both US soldiers and Afghan civilians. His former brigade commander, COL Marty Schweitzer testified before Congress on 24 April that the Human Terrain Team of which Michael was a member helped the brigade reduce its lethal operations by 60 to 70%, increase the number of districts supporting the Afghan government from 15 to 83, and reduce Afghan civilian deaths from over 70 during the previous brigade's tour to 11 during the 4-82's tour.

A copy of Colonel Schweitzer's comments can be found at the Human Terrain System web page.

We will remember Michael for his personal courage, his willingness to endure danger and hardship, his incisive intelligence, his playful sense of humor, his confidence, his devoted character, and his powerful inner light. While his life has ended, he has not disappeared without a trace. He left a powerful effect behind, which will be felt by his friends and colleagues and by the people of Afghanistan for many years to come.

Steve Fondacaro

Program Manager

Montgomery McFate

Senior Social Science Advisor

Human Terrain System

US Army TRADOC

"The program has a real chance of reducing both the Afghan and American lives lost, as well as ensuring that the US/NATO/ISAF strategy becomes better attuned to the population's concerns, views, criticisms, and interests and better supports the Government of Afghanistan."

--Michael Vinay Bhatia, November 2007

FORT MONROE, Va. (TRADOC News Service, May 9, 2008) -- Michael Vinay Bhatia was killed Tuesday by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) strike in the vicinity of Sabari District in the Khowst Province of Afghanistan. He was a civilian contractor employed by BAE Systems, assigned to 4th Brigade Combat Team, 101st Airborne (Air Assault) Division in Afghanistan and working as a social scientist supporting the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System (HTS) program.

While assigned to the 4th BCT, Bhatia brought a critical skill and wealth of knowledge to his support of the mission in Afghanistan. He developed this knowledge, not only as an academic, but also as a humanitarian and researcher in areas such as East Timor, Kosovo and the Sahrawi refugee camps of western Algeria.

HTS is a program run by the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Its purpose is to improve brigade and division commanders' level of understanding of the highly complex local socio-cultural environment in areas where U.S. Army troops are deployed.

"Our deepest sympathy and heartfelt prayers go out to Michael Bhatia's family and friends," said Gen. William S. Wallace, TRADOC's commanding general. "Michael is a hero. The Army didn't go looking for him to ask him for his service -- he came looking for us because he was committed to make things better. Our nation is better, as are the people of Afghanistan, because of his devotion and brilliance. He will not be forgotten."

Bhatia was a leading academic and lecturer in conflict and international relations who realized that his vast experience and cultural knowledge could be a critical asset to the Army in operations surrounding Afghan villages and provinces. A 1999 doctoral candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford and a George C. Marshall Scholarship recipient in 2001, his hope was providing assistance in creating a better quality of life for the local population while decreasing the level of lethal operations within the 4th BCT area of responsibility.

"Michael Bhatia's efforts empowered the achievement of peace and stability among local populations without a reliance on force alone as the principle means," said Steve Fondacaro, HTS project manager. "He didn't merely write about it or talk about it, he just did it. And there are very many Soldiers and civilians who are alive today and together with their families because of it."

As a civilian and as an academic, Bhatia lived the Army values of personal courage, loyalty, duty and respect. His accomplishments and contributions will be felt for many years to come.

More:

Medway Scholar Killed in Afghanistan Combat - Boston Herald

Afghan Bomb Kills Scholar from Mass. - Boston Globe

Brown Grad Killed in Afghanistan - Providence Journal

Medway Native Killed in Afghanistan - Daily News Tribune

Michael Bhatia - The QWU Blog

Meet Michael Bhatia - Foward Movement

In Memory of Michael Vinay Bhatia '99 - Brown University

The Cost of Being There - Complex Terrain Laboratory

Michael Bhatia Killed in Khost - Ghosts of Alexander

Social Scientist Killed in Afghanistan - Kings of War

'Human Terrain' Social Scientist Killed in Afghanistan - Danger Room

Fallen American - Forward Movement

In Memory of Michael Bhatia - Coming Back to Kabul

Human Terrain Team Member Killed - Historicus

By Sam Brannen

In the middle of Baghdad sits one of the United States' greatest strategic liabilities in the Iraq war: a four square-mile swath of territory called the Green Zone (the "International Zone" when in polite company). Still crowded with the gaudy war memorials and palaces of Saddam's regime that are too big to tear down, it is for many Iraqis the icon of U.S. occupation and a telling window into a post-surge security environment that looks more likely to loop back than move forward. The onetime seat of Paul Bremer and the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Green Zone is now shared by the sprawling Embassy Baghdad, the core of Iraq's central government, and thousands of international contractors, including the infamous Blackwater security details. Green Zone denizens live in trailers, sometimes stacked one on top of the other, accustomed to the blare of the incoming round siren and ducking for cover in evenly spaced cement bunkers that are a bizarre juxtaposition to swimming pools, palm trees, and marble buildings.

Outside the Green Zone, American troops are fighting pitched battles in the high-density urban slums of Sadr City. Their objective is to reduce the mortar and rocket fire that has lately rained down on the Green Zone. By installing a massive cement wall to cut Sadr City in half, U.S. forces are attempting to corral militiamen and mortar teams out of range. As soldiers build the Sadr City wall, they fight for every inch in a slow grind that recalls trench warfare, taking casualties and under constant fire.

It is worth asking whether the Green Zone would be attacked absent such a pronounced U.S. presence tucked behind elaborate security checkpoints and layered defenses. Rather than destroy entire Baghdad neighborhoods in the search for small groups of insurgent indirect fire teams, it seems the simpler, more humane, and ultimately more strategic answer is to simply leave the Green Zone for either the more remote airport complex or elsewhere outside the city. In the U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Field Manual (FM 3-24) it is written, "Ultimate success in COIN [counterinsurgency] is gained by protecting the populace, not the COIN force. If military forces remain in their compounds, they lose touch with the people, appear to be running scared, and cede the initiative to the insurgents." The same could be said for the diplomatic forces walled up in the Green Zone and faced with the constant threat of death or injury at the hands of an unseen foe. The psychological toll of life as a sitting duck is clear: at least 40 percent of State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) who have served in danger zones return to the United States with post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). One would imagine numbers are even higher for FSOs returning form Iraq. Why not reduce some of that stress by moving to a safer spot?

Leaving the Green Zone, however, does not appear to be on the minds of decision makers. Word was out this week of long-term plans including $1 billion in neighboring development—in military speak, a "zone of influence"— to surround the brand new 27-building, 104-acre U.S. embassy in the Green Zone (the largest U.S. embassy in the world). Developers are honestly mulling over the risk of building a Marriott Hotel, a shopping district, and other niceties. (For the record, Marriott has already built a five-star hotel next to the U.S. Embassy Kabul's version of a green zone—but it is a far safer area.)

Last summer, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, chaired by General James L. Jones (USMC, ret.), wrote in its report to Congress that by early 2008, Coalition forces could shift to a "strategic overwatch" position in Iraq. The Commission wrote, "Such a strategy would include placing increasing responsibilities for the internal security of the nation on the ISF [Iraqi Security Forces], especially in the urban areas." The Commission further noted that the massive Coalition military footprint in and around the Baghdad region gave Iraqis the impression of "permanence, an occupying force...." The Commission recommended quickly moving out of population centers and immediately turning over to the Iraqi government the palaces of the Ba'athist regime that it has occupied since 2003.

America should send the right message to the Iraqi people. This can begin by abandoning the Green Zone and donating the monstrous embassy just completed. U.S. taxpayers may not like turning over a $1 billion structure or other costs of relocating, but considering the immeasurable loss of an American soldier, and the cost of a single day of occupation of Iraq at $720 million, why not try something different? Leave the Green Zone.

Sam Brannen is a fellow with the Center for Strategic and International Studies International Security Program, where he works on projects related to defense strategy and policy, Middle East security (especially U.S.-Turkey and U.S.-Turkey-Iraq issues), and U.S. national security reform. He is a frequent media commentator and has appeared on CNN, Fox News, Al Jazeera, and NPR. During the summer of 2007, he served as a staff member for the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, chaired by General (Ret.) James L. Jones.

Members of the House Armed Services terrorism, unconventional threats and capabilities subcommittee unanimously adopted the establishment of an executive agent of irregular warfare into their version of the FY-09 defense authorization bill.

While the legislative language is vague, subpanel Chairman Adam Smith (D-WA) noted that whatever action the department decides to take on the executive agent authority, the Pentagon needs to ensure that approach will have an interagency aspect. "There are a lot of different people that have concerns" with irregular warfare operations, Smith said, adding an interagency approach would ensure those concerns would be heard.

As far as which organization should be granted the executive-agent authority, subcommittee member Jim Marshall (D-GA) noted that of the two likely candidates for the job - the Army or U.S. Special Operations Command - the Army would benefit the most.

Arguing that the majority of future, full-scale conflicts the United States may be involved in will likely be conducted as irregular-warfare campaigns, Marshall said the Army had better become adept in waging that kind of war. "Big Army is going to have to be able to do [irregular warfare] and do it well," he said, adding that executive-agent authority for irregular-warfare would be a step toward that goal.

More at Inside Defense to include funding of USSOCOM's unfunded mandates.

UPDATE: Via Voice of America and Associated Press - US military officials in Iraq say the leader of al-Qaida in Iraq has not been captured. They denied reports from an Iraqi Interior Ministry spokesman Major General Abdul Karim Khalaf, who told Iraqi state television on Thursday that Abu Ayyub al-Masri had been detained in a raid in the city of Mosul.

"Neither coalition forces nor Iraqi security forces detained or killed Abu Ayyub al-Masri. This guy had a similar name," said Maj. Peggy Kageleiry, a US military spokeswoman in northern Iraq. She said no additional details were being immediately provided.

Iraqi Defense Ministry spokesman Mohammed al-Askari said the confusion arose because the commander of Iraqi forces in northern Ninevah province was convinced that he had arrested al-Masri — also known as Abu Hamza al-Muhajir.

-----

The London Times, Associated Press and Reuters are reporting that al-Qaeda in Iraq leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri has been captured by Iraqi troops in Mosul. The capture was also reported on Iraqi television though there has been no official denial or confirmation from Multi-National Forces-Iraq or the Pentagon. Al-Masri took over al-Qaida in Iraq after Abu Musab al-Zarqawi was killed 7 June 2006 in a US airstrike northeast of Baghdad. From the reports:

"The leader of al Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Hamza al-Muhajir, has been arrested, the Arabic television station al-Arabiya reported on Friday, quoting the Iraqi Defense Ministry."

"Arabiya said Muhajir had been detained in a joint Iraqi-U.S. operation in the northern Iraqi city of Mosul. The US military said it had no information on the reports at this stage..."

"US officials said al-Masri joined an extremist group led by al-Qaida's No.2 official. He later joined al-Qaida training camps in Afghanistan in 1999 and trained as a car bombing expert before traveling to Iraq after the US-led invasion in 2003."

James Joyner at Outside the Beltway probably has it right as to the significance of al-Masri's capture:

I doubt this will make any terrific difference. We've captured or "otherwise dealt with" more number twos and number threes than you can shake a stick at over the years and buried this guy's predecessor under a ton of rubble. Still, if true, it at least means the Iraqi security forces are getting better.

News Links

Man Held is Not Leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq - Freeman and Sabah, Washington Post

US Military Denies Iraq Report of al-Qaida Arrest - Associated Press

Leader of al-Qaida in Iraq Has Not Been Captured - Voice of America

Iraq al-Qaeda Chief Not Captured - BBC News

Al-Qaeda in Iraq Leader Arrested In Mosul - Freeman and Sabah, Washington Post

Al-Qaeda in Iraq Leader Abu Ayyub al-Masri Captured - James Hider, London Times

Iraqis Report Capture of al Qaeda in Iraq Leader - CNN News

Iraqi Army Says Iraqi al-Qaida Leader Arrested - Associated Press

Al Qaeda's Leader in Iraq Arrested - Reuters

Al-Qaeda Iraq Leader 'Arrested' - BBC News

Blog Links

US Military Denies al Masri in Custody - Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal

Abu Ayyub al-Masri Arrested - James Joyner, Outside the Beltway

Al-Masri the Egyptian Falls - Richard Fernandez, The Belmont Club

Favorable Indicators - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

Abu Ayyub al Masri Reported Captured - Bill Roggio, The Long War Journal

AQI # 1 Busted - Dr. iRack, Abu Muqawama

UK Troops and US Marines Join Forces to Tackle the Taliban in Garmsir

By MoD Defence News via British Defence Staff - United States (BDS-US)

UK troops working as part of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in southern Afghanistan have been taking part in a joint operation with US Marines aimed at disrupting Taliban activity in the volatile Garmsir area of Helmand province.

UK troops are working as part of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in southern Afghanistan.

Troops from 16 Air Assault Brigade joined the Marines, from the US 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU), as they pushed south of Garmsir where currently, but for a few border security police, neither ISAF nor the Afghan Security Forces have a presence. The purpose of the operation was to extend security authority further south towards the Pakistan border.

Although British framework operations are currently focused further north, in the areas of Lashkar Gar, Sangin, Gereshk and Musa Qaleh, the British Task Force has had an important role to play facilitating the move of the MEU down through the province.

This type of operation, known as a Forward Passage of Lines, is generally believed to be one of the most complex, involving as it does the initial movement of large amounts of men and equipment long distances across potentially hostile ground and then passage through the positions of the force already deployed on the ground, in this case C Company.

Large convoys are extremely vulnerable and the slightest delay or mishap can have serious repercussions. Thorough planning is essential, particularly in a multi-national context. The Royal Regiment of Scotland, largely responsible for executing the passage on the ground, had neither trained nor operated with the Marines before.

Led by the Task Force Headquarters under 16 Air Assault Brigade, every piece of detail was picked over by British and American commanders and staff officers, shuttling between Helmand and Kandahar to ensure the operation went smoothly. When the time came the Marines, in an initial move, drove south and assembled at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Dwyer, ready to conduct their passage through British lines and across the Helmand River.

So, in the early hours of Wednesday morning, 30 April 2008, the operation began, with a narrow and precarious bridge crossing over the Helmand River, the first obstacle. With their knowledge of the ground and expertise in marking a safe route, the UK troops played a vital part in proceedings.

Other elements of the Task Force also played a significant part: soldiers of 7 Royal Horse Artillery, as well as being prepared to provide artillery support, have taken the lead de-conflicting different parts of the battle space to avoid any possibility of friendly fire; and British engineers from 23 Regiment also stood by to assist with clearing the route of roadside bombs or to lay bridges over the Helmand River if required. Back at Camp Bastion, the British Field Hospital and, in particular the Medical Emergency Response Team (MERT), supporting the Marines' own medical capability, stood by to evacuate any casualties.

UK military spokesman, Lieutenant Colonel Robin Matthews, explained the UK involvement in this latest operation:

"We had people up at Kandahar air base integrated into their (24 MEU) planning, helping to shape the operation. We've got two years of experience of Helmand, knowledge of the people and the terrain, which was a vital part of the planning process. All of this was fed into the planning to help them identify how to conduct the operation to best effect.

"The Brigade also contributed a lot in terms of intelligence and knowledge in advance. We were using our Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) to give surveillance intelligence, and then cover for the route. We also used the intelligence we gathered from patrols around FOB Dwyer near Garmsir to get an understanding of the local atmosphere.

"For the actual operation, the US Marines travelled from Bastion down to FOB Dwyer and then to FOB Delhi under their own steam. From there 5 Scots under the Command of 2 Scots Commanding Officer Lieutenant Colonel Nick Borton provided route planning and marking.

"23 Regiment Royal Engineers provided Explosive Ordnance Disposal teams. They were also on standby for engineering support where needed, including being ready to put in a new bridge if required. We also provided vehicle recovery teams and a medical team in case things got difficult.

"The convoy travelled from Bastion to Dwyer to Delhi, and a great deal of planning went into sorting out how to accommodate and support them as they went. Convoy logistics patrols went ahead to Delhi to make sure there were supplies in place, although mostly the Marines had to be reasonably self-sufficient.

"The Marines left FOB Delhi under darkness to traverse the last part of the route where the UK gave support, down into Garmsir. They had to traverse a narrow and vulnerable bridge, and the fact that they got all their vehicles across without mishap is a testament to the good planning of Task Force Helmand and the MEU."

Colonel Pete Petrozio, Commanding Officer of 24 MEU, added:

"This is what alliances are all about, professionals coming together to achieve the right effect.

13 May 2008 - After the Iraqi Offensive: An Address by Colonel H. R. McMaster (Public Event). Washington, D.C. Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. The government of Iraq has made great strides both militarily and politically over the past year and a half. After dramatically reducing al Qaeda in Iraq's operational capability, the Iraqi Security Forces have successfully undertaken operations to reclaim segments of Basra and Sadr City from Shiite extremist elements. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al Maliki has won increasing support from the major Sunni, Kurdish, and Shiite blocs due to his leadership in this offensive. Moreover, in a sign of bottom-up reconciliation, nearly 90 percent of Sunnis polled declared their intention to participate in the October provincial elections. How will Iraqi political dynamics evolve as operations against Shiite extremists continue? How will the security situation in Iraq evolve as the July drawdown in U.S. forces approaches? How have recent events in Iraq influenced our understanding of nation-building strategy? Having recently returned from working with Ambassador Ryan Crocker and General David Petraeus in Iraq, Colonel H. R. McMaster will address these and other questions at AEI on May 13. Following his address, Michí¨le Flournoy of the Center for a New American Security and AEI's Thomas Donnelly will join Colonel McMaster for a discussion of these issues.

15 May 2008 - Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power (Public Event). Washington, D.C. Sponsored by the American Enterprise Institute. In Ground Truth: The Future of U.S. Land Power (AEI Press, May 2008), AEI scholars Thomas Donnelly and Frederick W. Kagan pose a series of urgent questions for policymakers: What is the strategic role of American ground forces? What missions will these forces undertake in the future? What is the nature of land warfare in the twenty-first century? What qualities are necessary to succeed on the battlefields of the Long War? What is the ideal size and configuration of the force--and how much will it cost? On Thursday, May 15, Donnelly, Kagan, and Kathleen Hicks of the Center for Strategic and International Studies will discuss these and other questions about the size, shape, and costs of the land forces the United States will require in the years ahead.

17-19 June 2008-

3rd Annual North American Security Colloquium: Wars Without Borders (Public Event). Kingston, Ontario. Sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College, Queen's Centre for International Relations, Defence Management Studies at Queen's University, and the Canadian Forces Land Doctrine and Training System. The conflicts today in Iraq and in Afghanistan are examples of what some leading scholars and many commanders have termed "continuous wars among the people." This type of conflict is developing or occurring in other regions of the world, in Africa and in Latin America for example. In many of these situations traditional and legal borders no longer define or contain the conflict, nor do obvious sovereign entities control belligerents. International commitments to control these conflicts necessarily demand complex, multi-dimensional diplomatic, military, police, and humanitarian responses. What has been learned about such conflicts from operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may to some degree be transferable to conflicts in other regions. Assuming that the international community may well face future operations characterized by regional, borderless "wars among the people", the centres at Queen's University and their partners propose convening a distinguished group of approximately 200 experts from academic, military, governmental, and international institutions to examine how best to prepare commanders, military units and governments to plan for and conduct complex, multi-dimensional stability campaigns in this new environment.

16-18 September 2008 - The U.S. Army and the Interagency Process: A Historical Perspective (Public Event - Conference / Call for Papers). Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Sponsored by the U.S. Army Combat Studies Institute. The symposium will include a variety of guest speakers, panel sessions, and general discussions. This symposium will explore the partnership between the U.S. Army and government agencies in attaining national goals and objectives in peace and war within a historical context. Separate international topics may be presented. The symposium will also examine current issues, dilemmas, problems, trends, and practices associated with U.S. Army operations requiring close interagency cooperation.

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your Small Wars related event listed on Small Wars Journal.

From Army Focus on Counterinsurgency Debated Within:

An internal Pentagon report is raising concerns about whether the Army's focus on counterinsurgency has weakened its ability to fight conventional battles. The report's authors — all colonels with significant combat experience — say the Army is "mortgaging its ability to (successfully) fight" in the future.

The report, recently obtained by NPR, is the latest twist in an ongoing debate within the Army over whether it is now too focused on counterinsurgency training. The counterinsurgency doctrine emphasizes the use of minimal force, with the intent of winning the hearts and minds of a civilian population...

U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates sent a subtle but firm message to the Army a couple of weeks ago when he announced that Gen. David Petraeus — a staunch counterinsurgency advocate — has been nominated to take the helm of Central Command, where he will oversee the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The post is arguably the highest-profile assignment in the U.S. military today.

"I would say that Gen. Petraeus' promotion is an affirmation of the fact that the counterinsurgency doctrine he wrote and the counterinsurgency strategy that he implemented in Iraq was successful," says Lt. Col. John Nagl, one of the Army's top experts on counterinsurgency doctrine...

Col. Sean MacFarland was among the first to successfully apply counterinsurgency doctrine in Iraq in 2006. And yet he was a co-author of the recent internal Army report suggesting that the Army is far too focused on counterinsurgency training. This singular focus, he writes, is weakening the Army.

The report cites field artillery as an example of an area that has suffered from inattention. Since 1775, artillery units have served as the backbone of the U.S. Army. But today, a stunning 90 percent of these units are unqualified to fire artillery accurately — the lowest level in history.

MacFarland declined to be interviewed for this story. But views like his have been amplified publicly by an iconoclastic, Berkeley-educated officer, Lt. Col. Gian Gentile.

"Due to five years in Iraq and six years in Afghanistan, I believe that the U.S. Army has become a counterinsurgency-only force," Gentile said recently during a public lecture in Washington. He also declined to comment for this story.

Gentile, who served two tours in Iraq, is perhaps the most outspoken internal critic of what he calls the Army's dangerous obsession with counterinsurgency...

In a recent posting on a counterinsurgency blog, Col. Peter Mansoor, a top aide to Petraeus who also helped write Field Manual 3-24, accused Gentile of "misreading the history of what's happening in Iraq...

Much of this debate has played out here on SWJ and the Council. Expect more in the coming months...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

The priority issues include ISR / Unmanned Aerial Systems, Intratheater Airlift / Joint Cargo Aircraft, Cyberspace Operations / Information Operations, Irregular Warfare, Excessively Overlapping Service Capabilities, DOD Governance Roles and Responsibilities, and Supporting Interagency Roles and Missions.

On Irregular Warfare Inside Defense had this to say:

The fourth issue group will focus on irregular warfare. It will be led by Michael Vickers, assistant secretary of defense for special operations / low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities; Marine Corps General James Mattis, commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command; and Lieutenant General John Sattler of the Joint Staff, also a Marine.

This group will examine irregular warfare capabilities that are common to

special operations forces and general purpose forces in order to explore opportunities to forge greater integration and interoperability between the two, according to the draft document.

"What DOD organizational structure would provide the best oversight for irregular warfare, maximize efficiencies across DOD components, better balance risk and investment priorities, enhance future capabilities development and ensure effective operations?" asks the draft document.

With the Army and Marine Corps shouldering the bulk of operations in Iraq

and Afghanistan, this issue group will examine how "to develop air and maritime capabilities for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense," according to the document.

For those who subscribe to Inside Defense there is much more on roles and missions issues and the upcoming review. Good read...