In recent days, many "war of words" op-ed essays and newspaper editorials have been linked to by Small Wars Journal -- and appropriately so, for the issues they raise must surely be resolved in a far more adequate way than is now the case.

Most of these postings have been written by well-intentioned but, I think, mistaken authors who are angrily objecting to recent advisories -- not mandates but preliminary advisories -- by the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) that we begin avoiding the very familiar "Jihad" (Holy War) and "mujahideen" (holy warriors) labels in the ongoing War on al Qaeda-style Terrorism.

For my own part, when I first saw these two documents long before they became public, I gave one of them a C- and the other a C+ at best -- but for reasons entirely different from those of the critics who are now attacking them in their entirety. At this point, I agree with only about half of their dozen or more specific recommendations of words to use and not to use.

Unfortunately, both of these advisories are insufficient to the situation and are, therefore, vulnerable to charges that they let both the terrorists and the despotic perversions of Islam which sponsor them "off the hook" -- and leave us with an unclear idea of exactly who and how very dangerous the "Jihadi" (but no longer to be called that) enemy really is.

This essay will attempt to describe the truth-in-language path which the NCTC, DHS, Department of State, Department of Defense and National Security Council experts should now follow in correctly and adequately defining what I have long called "The al Qaeda Apostasy" -- and doing so in several of the Islamic religious words they say should be avoided. In other words, I am a critic, too -- but in a largely constructive and supportive way rather than an angry and confrontational one.

Rather than trying to deal with each of these commentaries individually, I have selected a representative one -- a May 1, 2008 New York Post editorial, entitled "Jihad Newspeak" -- and will attempt to respond not only to its rationale and particulars but also to many of the individual columnists' worries, objections and understandable confusion.

Part # 1: Who Is at War With Whom?

As the acting NCTC Director Michael Leiter said recently to a distinguished audience at the DC-based Washington Institute on Near East Policy, we must somehow "show that it is al Qaeda, not the West, that is at war with Islam."

This strategy and practice of attacking terrorism but not Islam itself has been US doctrine from the beginning, but it is good to see this clearly and publicly reaffirmed by a senior anti-terrorism official at a time when others seem to consider Islam of the Qur'an to be the real enemy -- and view the AQ-style Terrorists as an accurate and faithful reflection of that religion, rather than a radical deviancy from it.

To make a medical analogy, we seek to kill the AQ and similar cancers without attacking the host per se -- so as not to unite the two and so as to inspire so-called "moderate" and civilized Muslims to become our allies in killing the cancer. But others are angrily blaming the host (Islam, in context of their insistence that there is only "One Islam") as being a —and inherently complicit and guilty sponsor of the terrorists rather than as a besieged and conflicted victim itself.

For his part, Osama bin Laden tries daily to paint the same "war of religions" picture as some of the hard-line critics do, albeit for very different reasons. He pontificates that this is "America's War Against Islam" and that it is, therefore, the "holy-war" and the "Will-of-Allah" obligation of every Muslim to fight back in every way imaginable.

In this vein, bin Laden's and his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri's every appeal to their new recruits and their existing followers alike stresses the urgent need for a most holy and Godly "Jihad by faithful mujahideen and self-sacrificing young shahideen destined for Paradise -- as a proper reward for killing us infidels and destroying The Great Satan."

That's their story and they're sticking with it. The question now is whether we should accept and continue to parrot that self-serving Salafi-Wahhabi-Muslim Brotherhood-AQ mantra or "narrative" -- or should we challenge and defeat it

(1) by the sufficient condemnatory words which make it eternally evil and bound for Hellfire, rather than a matter of "holy war martyrs " bound for Paradise,

(2) by the proper religious, as opposed to politico-Islamist, frames of reference (see Part 4 below) which paint the same satanic picture of these suicide mass murderers, and

(3) by the tough counterinsurgency (COIN) strategies, operations and tactics which are founded (more on this in Part 4) upon an optimum counter-narrative?

Author's Note: For a more detailed (10,000 words) discussion of what follows -- and more --- please check my August 2007 entry in the USMA/CTC Essay Contest on National Security Strategy.

American Doctrine versus the Osaman Doctrine

One of the ways to differentiate the American doctrine from the Osaman doctrine is by carefully changing some of the incorrect words and labels we have been using in defining and discussing who is who and what is going on in in this most "irregular" of wars.

This is a language by which we have been classifying our deadly enemies as "holy warriors" and "martyrs" (because that is who they SAY they are, n'est-ce pas?) -- and which also seems to concede the Terrorists' patently false charges that we are all "infidels" and that America is "the Great Satan."

In the so-called War of Ideas, such branding of the genocidal and hyena-like terrorists by exactly the glorifying names they want to be called does not seem like a very bright idea. Truth be known, as long as two years ago but to deaf ears at the time, a distinguished former NCTC Director, John Brennan, appealed for much-needed change in an excellent Washington Post essay as follows:

"Bin Laden has also insidiously convinced us to use terminology that lends legitimacy to his activities. He has hijacked the term "jihad" to such an extent that US and other Western officials regularly use the terms "jihadist" and "terrorist" interchangeably. In doing so, they unwittingly transfer the religious legitimacy inherent in the concept of jihad to murderous acts that are anything but holy."

Despite this concern, there have been no significant changes in the last two years. And even the current recommendations which are so hotly disputed barely scratch the surface -- by recommending three or four words not be used but failing to recommend in adequate detail what other more appropriate terms (including several listed and defined below) should be used in their place. Conclusion: This is advice well intended but still quite insufficient.

An indication that it might be further refined and strengthened can be found in the fact that National Security Advisor Juan Zarate has recently observed that the AQ leadership is quite "sensitive to the perceived legitimacy of both their actions and their ideology. They care about their image because it has real-world effects on recruitment, donations, and support in Muslim and religious communities."

In addition, a well-regarded analysis of these several USG advisories by scholars Matthew Levitt and Michael Jacobson at the Counterterrorism Blog concludes that:

"Although the 'struggle of ideas in the Islamic world' section of the State Department report still focuses on the US Government's attempts to explain its policies and values, its message has undergone a serious overhaul. The initial U.S. approach in the wake of the September 11 attacks was to try and sell the United States to overseas audiences, an approach widely regarded as ineffective in stemming the tide of radicalization. Efforts will now concentrate on discrediting the terrorists."

HOORAY for that!! Better six years late than never! Such assertive discrediting -- and even such demonization -- of the AQ Terrorists and their like-minded radicals is an urgently needed tactic which is fully explained in two late-2006 TrueSpeak.org essays of mine - Urgent Need For Truth-In-Language In US Public Diplomacy and Is it Holy "Jihad" or Unholy "Irhabi Murderdom"???

HEADQUARTERS GRAND ARMY OF THE REPUBLIC

General Orders No.11, WASHINGTON, D.C., May 5, 1868

I. The 30th day of May, 1868, is designated for the purpose of strewing with flowers or otherwise decorating the graves of comrades who died in defense of their country during the late rebellion, and whose bodies now lie in almost every city, village, and hamlet church-yard in the land. In this observance no form of ceremony is prescribed, but posts and comrades will in their own way arrange such fitting services and testimonials of respect as circumstances may permit.

We are organized, comrades, as our regulations tell us, for the purpose among other things, "of preserving and strengthening those kind and fraternal feelings which have bound together the soldiers, sailors, and marines who united to suppress the late rebellion." What can aid more to assure this result than cherishing tenderly the memory of our heroic dead, who made their breasts a barricade between our country and its foes? Their soldier lives were the reveille of freedom to a race in chains, and their deaths the tattoo of rebellious tyranny in arms. We should guard their graves with sacred vigilance. All that the consecrated wealth and taste of the nation can add to their adornment and security is but a fitting tribute to the memory of her slain defenders. Let no wanton foot tread rudely on such hallowed grounds. Let pleasant paths invite the coming and going of reverent visitors and fond mourners. Let no vandalism of avarice or neglect, no ravages of time testify to the present or to the coming generations that we have forgotten as a people the cost of a free and undivided republic.

If our eyes grow dull, other hands slack, and other hearts cold in the solemn trust, ours shall keep it well as long as the light and warmth of life remain to us.

Let us, then, at the time appointed gather around their sacred remains and garland the passionless mounds above them with the choicest flowers of spring-time; let us raise above them the dear old flag they saved from dishonor; let us in this solemn presence renew our pledges to aid and assist those whom they have left among us a sacred charge upon a nation's gratitude, the soldier's and sailor's widow and orphan.

II. It is the purpose of the Commander-in-Chief to inaugurate this observance with the hope that it will be kept up from year to year, while a survivor of the war remains to honor the memory of his departed comrades. He earnestly desires the public press to lend its friendly aid in bringing to the notice of comrades in all parts of the country in time for simultaneous compliance therewith.

III. Department commanders will use efforts to make this order effective.

By order of

JOHN A. LOGAN,

Commander-in-Chief

N.P. CHIPMAN,

Adjutant General

Official:

WM. T. COLLINS, A.A.G.

Bush Pays Tribute to Troops on Memorial Day - Associated Press

Bush Urges Americans to Honor Holiday's Meaning - John Kruzel, AFPS

This Memorial Day - Washington Times

Honoring life on Memorial Day - Mike Mullen, Washington Times

Fallen But Never Forgotten - Blackfive, Blackfive

Reflections by Frontier 6 - Frontier 6, CAC Blog

Promises to Keep - COB6, Blackfive

Reflections by Frontier 6 - Jack, DoD Live

Memorial Day 2008 - CJ, A Solider's Perspective

Missing - Jules Crittenden, Forward Movement

The 173rd Airborne in Vietnam - Blackfive, Blackfive

Thank You From Those Left Behind - Blackfive, Blackfive

Roundtables: Memorial Day Edition - Grim, Blackfive

Memorial Day: Remembering the Fallen - Laughing Wolf, Blackfive

Memorial Day and Dog Tags - Phillip Carter, Intel Dump

Mullen Cites Importance of Remembrance in Memorial Day Message - AFPS

To Live with Honor - Joseph Morrison, National Review

Saluting Those Who Serve - Ed Feulne, Washington Times

Memorial Day - Baltimore Sun

The Dead We Honor - New York Post

The Fallen Live On - Boston Globe

Memorial Day 2008 - Austin Bay, Washington Times

How We Can Really Honor Our Veterans - Joe Galloway, McClachy News Service

Forgotten Heroes - Ed Sherwood, Washington Times

Mystic Chords of Memory - Mackubin Thomas Owens, National Review

The Gates of Heaven - Blackfive, Blackfive

A Weekend to Remember Them - Joseph Rehyansky, Human Events

Returning Meaning to Memorial Day - Bret Schulte, US News & World Report

Burial at Arlington - Douglas Stone, Human Events

Let Us Remember Them - Colbert King, Washington Post

Protesting the Antiwar Protestors - Kevin Ferris, Wall Street Journal

The Last Doughboy - George Will, New York Post

On Memorial Day - Los Angeles Times

His Family Chose to Serve - Mac Thornberry, Washington Times

Ross McGinnis: Medal of Honor - Chuck Simmins, America's North Shore Journal

Where They've Been, What They've Done - Cannoneer No. 4, CIIDG

Memorial Day - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Memorial Day - Eagle1, EagleSpeak

Memorial Day - Maj Pain, One Marine's View

Why Didn't We Listen to Their War Stories? - Edward Lengel, Washington Post

Washington Set to be 'Thunder'-Struck - Jennifer Harper, Washington Times

Memorial Day Book Suggestion - COB6, Blackfive

Funeral Duty - William Troy, Washington Post

Remember to Remember - William Kristol, New York Times

Arlington Burial: Fanfare, Precision - Karen Goldberg Goff, Washington Times

Five Best Works of War Poetry - Wall Street Journal

Vietnam Wall: Personal, Searchable - Washington Times

First up -- setting it straight -- defining vs. ignoring the problem.

The fix-the-military argument was recently made at greater length by the New York Times. On May 18, the paper's editorialists noted that the efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan have taken a serious toll on the Army and Marine Corps, wearing down not only people but equipment "at an unprecedented rate." Well, the loss rates would not have been surprising to the defenders of Bastogne, the armies at Antietam, or the servicemen and women in any other major war, but it is true that US land forces have been asked to do too much with too little for too long.

The question is how we should respond to this fact. The Times and its anti-war allies argue that the remedy is not to expand the force to meet the wartime mission, but to reduce the mission to what a small force can handle, consistent with a decent family life, defense budgets constrained to historic lows and peacetime recruitment and promotion "standards."

In other words, let's not fix the problem. Let's give up.

And second up, the solution.

The Army and the Marines are indeed under great stress, but, as service leaders, officers, and sergeants-major take great pains to explain, they are far from broken. If anything, the tactical performance and discipline of US forces in the field has improved significantly in recent years. The Iraq surge is a case study of counterinsurgency warfare planned and executed brilliantly. Broken forces do not conduct such operations. From the level of team and squad to supreme command, US forces have adapted themselves remarkably to a war they were not at first ready to fight. In retrospect what is remarkable is how resilient and flexible the all-volunteer, professional force has proven to be.

The compelling reason to reinvest in America's Army and Marine Corps is not to withdraw and prepare for the "next war," but to build land forces capable of sustaining and prevailing in the so-called "Long War," the effort to secure more legitimate governments, and thus a more durable stability, in vital regions like the Persian Gulf.

So what does a Long War land force look like?

To begin with, it's bigger. Much bigger...

Read the rest here.

Where would one find the U.S.'s greatest weapon? Try traveling to Carlisle, Pennsylvania, the home of the Army's War College.

You will enjoy the trip. The College's stunningly beautiful campus hosts historic buildings that reflect the service's proud warfighting history in a dignified yet refreshingly unapologetic manner. Just being there makes you stand straighter and -- importantly -- think clearer about serious subjects.

Clear thinking about serious subjects is what marked the Army's XIX Strategy Conference convened there in early April. The premier convocation of its type, the meeting displayed an often misunderstood aspect of how the U.S. military improves itself: by welcoming critiques from the widest variety of sources, and encouraging opposing ideas to collide with great force.

The ability to think, learn, and adapt is what makes America's military the finest in the world. Though it does not use these words, the Army exploits conferences like that at Carlisle to, in effect, tap into a concept from the Nation's powerful engine of change, its free enterprise system.

Free enterprise triumphs as an economic system because it respects and empowers competition. Competition breeds efficiency and innovation. Unfortunately, the competitiveness outsiders may see in military debates can be misread as mere parochial squabbling. Sometimes that's true, but more often the rivalry reflects honestly-held but differing beliefs as to how to use the military instrument most effectively in today's very complex environments.

The good news is that those differences can make the U.S. military a devilishly difficult problem for our adversaries. Increasingly Iraqi insurgents are finding themselves watched and targeted by the Air Force's unmanned drones linked to high-flying bombers. The satellite-guided weapon that lands precisely in their lair could come from aircraft they never saw or heard.

There is really no escape. Just when the insurgents think they've somehow outsmarted the Air Force's high-tech surveillance capabilities, a young Army captain could show up on their doorstep with a platoon of no-nonsense U.S. and Iraqi troops. How? Today's captains carefully cultivate information sources among the locals as the Army's new counterinsurgency manual teaches them to do. Schooled in the manual, such captains deliver offers the insurgents can't refuse: be captured or be killed.

These are exactly the kinds of dilemmas the U.S. military loves to impose upon our enemies.

To get to the point where differing approaches are meshed to produce battlefield success requires passing through a crucible where white hot exchanges of ideas are forged into joint and interdependent "steel". The process is not always "pretty", and certainly not for the timid, but is one that -- regardless -- works.

The Army's conference is central to this eminently "American" way of strategizing for war. Panels convened to wrestle with such questions as how can the interagency process work more effectively? What is the right balance of military forces? What is the role of civilian specialists? How can the armed forces optimize themselves for the future?

Moreover, the attendees, who represented a myriad of organizations in and out of government, showed no hesitation in challenging panelists with the toughest questions.

If you were hoping that at the end everyone stood and sang "Kumbaya" you will be disappointed. Disagreements still exist -- and may (should?) always exist -- but views do evolve. Military professionals know that being challenged intellectually forces them to re-examine their thinking. In some instances it will simply make views even firmer; in other instances, fresh information produces new insights. Both results are valued.

The finest military leaders want, indeed, demand, that differing ideas be ruthlessly explored. They expect and encourage vigorous debates. Can that process go awry? Sure. When it devolves into personal attacks and gets mired in finger-pointing, progress ceases. Accountability for the past may have its place, but it is vastly more important to look to the future. The stakes are too just too high.

Looking to the future is what took place at Carlisle. The American way of war is renewing itself. Our most powerful weapon - the competitive analysis of security issues by America's military - is taking the field. Our enemies ought to beware. And update their wills.

Lt Col Nagl was one of the principal authors of FM 3-24, the Army/Marine Corps' new counterinsurgency manual; Maj Gen Dunlap is the author of "Shortchanging the Joint Fight?" a critique of that same manual. These are their personal views.

In a May 15 memo to the armed services, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs

of Staff Adm. Michael Mullen, the combatant commanders and other defense officials, England says an irregular warfare study uncovered steady-state shortfalls in the general-purpose forces' capability and capacity to handle counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense missions.

Inside the Pentagon, which obtained a copy of the memo, quotes England as identifying deficiencies in doctrine, training and institutions before general-purpose forces can train, equip and advise large numbers of foreign security forces in key irregular warfare missions.

DOD's roles and missions review will seek to find the right division of responsibilities for special operations troops and general-purpose forces across the spectrum of irregular warfare, including for counterinsurgency and foreign internal defense, according to a draft terms of reference that ITP reviewed.

Based on the study's results and recommendations, England directs specific follow-up actions. Transforming the Pentagon's institutions for irregular warfare requires "concerted effort and continued attention by all DOD components," he writes.

SWJ has more at a 6 May post - IW on Roles and Missions Task List

On a related issue, Inside the Pentagon also reports that Outgoing Army Vice Chief of Staff General Richard Cody has rejected plans for a new breed of units that would spearhead the training of foreign armies, asking instead that the service's Training and Doctrine Command reassess the idea, according to service sources.

Harvey Perritt, a TRADOC spokesman, said Cody gave officials at the Ft. Belvoir, VA-based command until Aug. 31 to present a revised concept to Army leaders. Service officials will know by the end of July whether they will field a previously planned pilot TMAAG unit, he added. "By that point, the review will be far enough along," he told InsideDefense.com.

One Army official, who requested anonymity, said service leaders still believe the goals behind the TMAAG -- an expeditionary cadre of trainers fostering military relations around the globe -- have merit.

SWJ has more at The Army's TMAAG.

Introduction and Background

America's Frontier Wars: Lessons for Asymmetric Conflicts by Congressman Ike Skelton.

Congressman Ike Skelton suggests how to overcome the threat of asymmetrical warfare by examining yesteryear's battles to develop strategies and tactics for tomorrow's conflicts.

Revisiting CORDS: The Need for Unity of Effort to Secure Victory in Iraq by Major Ross Coffey, U.S. Army.

An innovative solution to unity of effort in Vietnam, CORDS offers a blueprint for realizing the national strategy for victory in Iraq.

The Most Important Thing: Legislative Reform of the National Security System by James R. Locher III.

Whatever its adequacy in a former era, today's national security system is an inefficient anachronism. We need sweeping reforms that create a much more agile system.

Beyond Guns and Steel: Reviving the Nonmilitary Instruments of American Power by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates.

The secretary of defense says the U.S. must develop a cadre of deployable civilians to strengthen the Nation's "soft" power in today's national security environment.

Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future by Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, with Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army.

Looking beyond the current wars, a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Corps-Iraq calls for significant changes to the way we train and fight.

FM 3-0 Operations: The Army's Blueprint by General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army.

TRADOC's commander introduces the newest version of FM 3-0, the Army's guide to operating in the 21st century.

FM 3-07, Stability Operations: Upshifting the Engine of Change by Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell IV, U.S. Army, and LTC Steve Leonard, U.S. Army.

FM 3-07 is the first doctrine of any type to undergo a comprehensive joint, service, interagency, intergovernmental, and nongovernmental review. This FM will institutionalize a whole-of-government approach to combating insurgency and sustaining success in an era of persistent conflict.

Cause for Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq by Paul Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation.

An interagency initiative, the Task Force for Business and Stabilization Operations is helping to quell insurgent violence by resuscitating Iraq's old state-owned industries.

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan by Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army.

Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of military, economic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan during OIF VI.

Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wallen, U.S. Air Force.

During stability operations, economic actions become as important as military actions.

The Role of USAID and Development Assistance in Combating Terrorism by Colonel Thomas Baltazar, U.S. Army, Retired, and Elisabeth Kvitashvili.

The USAID, now recognized as a critical component for fighting the War on Terrorism, is transforming to take on greater responsibilities to shore up unstable countries.

Counterinsurgency Diplomacy: Political Advisors at the Operational and Tactical Levels by Dan Green.

In the age of the strategic corporal, it is high time for the tactical POLAD.

Control Roaming Dogs: Governance Operations in Future Conflict by Major Troy Thomas, U.S. Air Force.

Governance operations have been treated as tangential postconflict missions, leaving field commanders ill-prepared for governance tasks and delaying consolidation of political aims.

Monitoring and Evaluation of Department of Defense Humanitarian Assistance Programs by Colonel Eugene V. Bonventre, U.S. Air Force.

Measures of effectiveness, normally ubiquitous throughout DOD, do not exist for monitoring and evaluating military humanitarian assistance activities. Making efforts to gauge these programs can pay dividends in stability operations.

Why We Need to Reestablish the USIA by Michael J. Zwiebel.

Since 1999, when the USIA was abolished, U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been spotty. Reestablishing the old agency would be one way to fix a glaring problem.

The Sole Superpower in Decline: The Rise of a Multipolar World by Shri Dilip Hiro.

A widely-published author asserts that we are witnessing the rise of a multipolar world in which emergent powers are challenging American hegemony.

The editors would like to share the following article with the SWJ community. Published in World Politics Review on 20 May 2008, this piece examines the challenges and opportunities to arise from the Sons of Iraq phenomenon. It also seeks to debunk some of the myths to have been spun from this remarkable development. The article is also the forerunner of a longer piece on the political integration of irregular armed groups in Iraq since 2003 to the present day. Republished here with permission from the author; comments, criticism and feedback would be most appreciated.

Upcoming Iraqi Elections Must Consolidate Security Gains of 'Sons of Iraq'

By David Ucko

In the typically polarized debate on Iraq, the significance of the "Sons of Iraq" -- the predominantly Sunni militias now allied with the U.S. military against insurgents and terrorists -- can easily be lost. Depending on one's point of view, the U.S. military's new Sunni friends are either "concerned local citizens" or "opportunist insurgents" -- with pro- and anti-war camps each using the phenomenon to support pre-existing political positions. As Iraq approaches provincial elections in October, however, and the United States nears its own presidential vote, it is high time to abandon easy slogans and to examine the fresh challenges and many opportunities presented by recent events in Iraq. Among such events, the emergence of the Sons of Iraq stands out as particularly important.

Sons of Iraq (SOI) is the collective name used for the tribal elements, insurgents and civilians that turned against extremist groups active in Iraq and began working instead with the U.S. military. With the help of U.S. soldiers and Marines, the SOI have been largely responsible for the decrease in violence seen since the onset of the so-called "surge" in early 2007. The phenomenon, however, predates the surge, finding its origins in al-Anbar province in late 2006. There, the U.S. military and local Sunni tribes were able to seal security pacts with locals to work together against al-Qaida in Iraq (AQI) and other Islamist armed groups. This pattern soon repeated itself in other parts of Iraq, bringing stability to former insurgent and AQI strongholds. At present, an estimated 103,000 Sons of Iraq (70 percent Sunni; 30 percent Shiite) are working with the U.S.-led coalition.

The Sunni community was for a long time excluded from the state-building project in Iraq: Their ethnic affiliation suggested close proximity to the former regime and their tribal structure clashed with the democratic foundations on which the future Iraqi state was to be built. The decision to disband Baathist security forces also alienated the many Sunnis serving in the Iraqi Army. The added alienation of Sunnis from government -- through U.S. military operations, which overwhelmingly targeted the Sunni community, and the ensuing Sunni sense of victimization, leading to their boycott of the January 2005 elections -- made this community a natural ally of the insurgents and extremists establishing themselves in Iraq's power vacuums. Such alliances were based on shared Sunni identity, opposition to the sectarian, Shiite-dominated central government, and to its protector, the American-led coalition. U.S. strategy, meanwhile, seldom differentiated between elements of the Sunni community. The few attempts by various U.S. military units to create and exploit extant rifts were on the whole unsuccessful.

In late 2006, two related factors changed this state of affairs. First, AQI rendered itself deeply unpopular among the Anbar tribes by disrupting or taking over informal business networks, seeking to marry into the higher tribal echelons and through its intimidation and violence. These efforts resulted in a backlash. It was not, as is commonly reported, primarily a matter of AQI brutality -- though this aspect certainly accelerated the breakdown in relations. More fundamentally, the backlash grew out of a wider competition over resources, financial networks, social influence and political power. Differences in these areas were what fuelled the violence, itself a crude attempt by AQI to coerce the tribes into submission.

Secondly, the U.S. military changed its strategy, assisting and even enabling the decoupling of Sunni tribes and extremist groups. In short, a number of U.S. brigades moved from a narrow focus on rooting out the insurgency to a broader effort to "end the cycle of violence," primarily by examining and engaging U.S. adversaries' various motivations for picking up arms in the first place. This effort resulted in the identification of individuals within the insurgency with whom cooperation would be possible. By pursuing a strategy of co-opting and cooperating with the middle ground, the U.S. military helped achieve the common goal of greater stability while marginalizing more extremist elements.

The U.S. Role

It bears emphasising that the change in U.S. military strategy in Iraq -- and the later surge of five additional brigades -- directly enabled these collaborative arrangements. Detractors of the new strategy commonly credit the Sunni groups' shift in allegiance rather than any U.S. action for the ensuing security gains. In most cases, however, the former could not have occurred without the latter.

When the U.S. Army 1st Armored Divison's 1st Brigade Combat Team, known as the "Ready First Combat Team" (RFCT), first deployed to al-Anbar, it conducted a review of local population and realized most residents of the predominately Sunni province did not willingly side with the extremist elements, as previously assumed. Instead, AQI was escalating its intimidation and was generally disliked, yet the tribes were unable to counter this threat for fear of retaliation. Meanwhile, American assurances of an imminent troop withdrawal, intended to placate the Sunni tribes, in fact heightened their fears of continued AQI intimidation and of an Iranian power-grab (conducted either directly or through the Iraqi government, then widely seen in al-Anbar as a "Persian" puppet government). The RFCT therefore changed the message and the mission: U.S. troops would not leave, but would stand by the sheiks and actively help their forces defend against Iranian interference and AQI violence.

A similar type of partnership was emerging in northwest Baghdad. With a mission statement "to defeat al-Qaida and affiliated movements," the 1st Infantry Division's "Dagger Brigade" initiated its tour in November 2006 by carefully studying the local population. It emerged that, in this ethnically mixed area, the Sunni population felt compelled to side with AQI as an imperfect security guarantee against the incursions of Shiite death squads conducting ethnic cleansing. This understanding of the Sunni perspective suggestive an opportunity to "turn" the area's more moderate fighters.

These pacts were to be sealed with action rather than words. Even before a shift from operating out of isolated forward operating bases became official U.S. strategy, the RFCT, Dagger Brigade and other units deployed to the most volatile sections of their areas of operations to gain the support of the sheiks and of the local population. The Dagger Brigade established combat outposts on the sectarian fault lines separating the Sunni community from Shiite extremist elements. With the first outpost, the unit immediately saw increased participation by local citizens in maintaining security, which in turn allowed for job creation and a more vibrant economy. In Ramadi, combat outposts were constructed where AQI violence was at its highest. There, U.S. troops teamed up with Sunni sheiks' forces to combat the terrorist threat. Tribal fighters also joined the security forces en masse and worked with the U.S. military to protect and secure the hospital and other civil institutions against AQI control.

The deployment of U.S. troops throughout Iraq's cities -- as opposed to their being hunkered down in isolated bases -- became a central tenet of the U.S. military's Iraq strategy in February 2007, leading to closer interaction with local communities. More and more U.S. units successfully teamed up with Sunni moderates against extremists. As various collaborative opportunities emerged, greater numbers of SOI were put on the payroll. The recruits were screened and registered using biometric technology, but were then largely free to patrol their own neighborhoods, countering the forces causing violence there and producing a notable reduction in bloodshed nationwide.

Progress or Expedience?

While the positive results of the SOI phenomenon are undeniable, questions have now turned to their significance as part of the United States' broader Iraq project. Discussion has focused on the sheiks' loyalties and the tenability of local security agreements with what are, after all, former insurgents. It is feared that, out of desperation, the U.S. military has embraced a short-term solution that will prove detrimental to the Iraqi state.

Many of the concerns underlying this critique are baseless. The U.S. military has not, for example, simply bribed another militia, bent on ethnic cleansing. The SOI are neither cohesive as a force nor independently strong: They are carefully screened, derive their strength from U.S. support and are limited to police missions. Nor has the United States armed these fighters: Most of the weapons used existed long before the shift in U.S. strategy. The tribes, meanwhile, are not sectarian but rather secular nationalists, concerned over all with their local power base and community. Indeed, their grievances against extremists were genuine rather than opportunistic and they therefore did not need to be bought off.

Finally, though the SOI have gained influence at the expense of the central government, their rise does not ultimately have to pose a challenge to the Iraqi state. The Iraqi government -- fragmented and intensely identity-driven -- has itself been responsible for some of instability and denial of services witnessed in Iraq. The emergence of alternative political structures can provide a healthy challenge to the elected government, whose inability or unwillingness to address violence in Iraq has rendered it increasingly unpopular. It is therefore promising to see a number of the tribal councils transforming their movements into political parties, able to partake in the provincial elections later this year.

If the dangers most commonly associated with the SOI are less than what they seem, however, it does not follow that their rise has or will be entirely unproblematic. The empowerment of Sunni tribes and former insurgents is a threat not only to the dominant Shiites in Baghdad, but also to the Sunnis in government who have so far posed as the champions of their ethnic constituency. This explains why the Iraqi government has done so little to consolidate and build on the gains in the security situation. Unless this changes, the pacts made with the U.S. military are likely to unravel -- along with the achievements seen since 2006.

This danger is illustrated by the difficulties faced by Sunni volunteer fighters seeking a permanent place within the government's security services. While volunteer fighters who have civilian skills can return to a more traditional profession, many SOI are untrained and uneducated or simply un—to abandon the power and prestige of protecting their community. Several SOI were also part of the former security forces, which were dismissed by the Americans in 2003, and are therefore eager to reclaim their profession. According to current plans, only 20 percent of the tribal fighters are to be integrated with central government security forces, with the rest provided civilian employment opportunities. However, even the process of approving selected SOI for national service has faced delays and rarely led to actual integration. As a result, volunteers are threatening to desert or actually deserting.

The delays stem from a combination of bureaucratic impediments and government resistance. The Shiite and Kurdish parties in power clearly want to maintain their grip on the security structure, currently based around their own sectarian militia: the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq's Badr Organization and the Kurdish Peshmurga. The government has also expressed concern that a large incorporation of volunteer fighters would bring AQI or insurgent elements into the security forces. These fears should be allayed by U.S. registration and scanning methods, but have nonetheless significantly delayed the reintegration process.

The problem is not merely one of Baghdad intransigence: While seeking the legitimacy of national service, some tribal elements have resisted foreswearing the benefits of their isolation, which range from control over local jobs, resources and business opportunities to the significant payoffs from extra-governmental deals made with the U.S. military. In addition, the Iraqi security services have a limited absorption capacity, though this technical impediment is diminishing over time. Nonetheless, the administrative process of incorporating SOI into existing forces and of forming new units may require more patience than currently exists.

Looking Toward Elections

The viability of disparate bottom-up security pacts as a means toward sustainable stability therefore remains uncertain. Given the reality facing Iraq in 2006 and the alternatives available to the coalition, the turning of Sunni insurgents and tribes is unequivocally good news. At the same time, however, as these cooperative arrangements emerged without much buy-in from the central government, this method of reintegration -- never mind reconciliation -- is far from ideal. The long-term consolidation of security gains will require the government to eschew the self-interested form of decision-making that has marked its performance since the handover of sovereignty in 2004.

On this front, the best source of hope -- and an indicator of where Iraq is heading -- will be the planned October 2008 provincial elections and December 2009 national elections. In a best-case scenario, the elections will offer Sunnis a chance to elect leaders they view as legitimate and representative, which may in turn undercut their motivation for future violence. The United States must therefore use its status as guarantor of Iraqi stability to ensure the government of Iraq holds elections fairly and on time. And, in lieu of sloganeering, these Iraqi elections must become a focal point for serious discussion and policymaking in Washington.

Dr. David Ucko is a research fellow in the Department of War Studies at King's College London. This article is based on research he conducted while serving as a visiting research associate in the Washington office of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

By Sam Liles

I have this fantasy that the warrior scholar elite can happen in my life time. Yes, I believe in the elite who are the best because in the realm of conflict failure to be elite carries the badge of vanquished. I believe that America has not only the most technologically sophisticated military, but the smartest and most creative military in history. Washing aside the driveling nauseous tripe of generational conflict between aging boomers, effete generation x'rs and dullard generation y'rs and you find honorable and efficient soldiers. Soldiers who expand beyond a passive roll into the active roll of scholar.

This is not a case of radical changes in the public education system serving society as some have received waivers and have "other" issues prior to enlisting or accepting a commission. America's soldiers succeed in spite of the mediocrity of a declining society that does not support them. In the midst of conflict the military system has a tendency to wring the vinegar out in a Darwinian evolutionary cycle. The bloated, bleeding, puss of a megalithic military industry complex collapsing before our own eyes is creating a generation of Spartan warriors. In the terror of wounded veterans, amputees, haggard eyes, and tired bodies is a systematic return to the scholarship of war. Failure to learn and implement the lessons of battle has no positive result.

Studying war is nothing less than studying the burdens of society and the relationship of the man to that society. We don't want to burden the discussion with thoughts of civilization, as on the battlefield any pretense of what we mockingly call civilization will be forgotten. There is nothing less humane but more human than the frightening realities of the battlefield. The warrior scholar does not study ways to kill his fellow human being so much as he studies the art of war. War has a beginning and an end. Only in the incestuous perversity of politics and commerce does war continue for no other reason than profit. The study of society is the scholarship of war.

Doctrine is the implemented principles of lessons learned. Where those lessons were learned may have been at Hells Gate, Saigon, or Baghdad. When those lessons were learned is immaterial other than the warrior scholar should be aware of them. This is not the job of higher education or egregious bureaucratic hand holding while paying lip service to some pedantic decree from on high. This is knowledge that only the soldier can infuse into their own soul and use beyond a classroom. Lessons learned and passed on from soldier to soldier and rapidly becoming part of the cultural framework are the best transmission mechanism.

Unfortunately the stripped down no nonsense order of a military at war has not infused the gangrene leprous putrid bureaucratic machinery of the military industrial complex. Solutions for the battlefield are still being fed into the accountant's spreadsheets and weighed on a cost benefit scale. This business like miasma with military contractors, outsourced war, paid for intelligence assets, and profit margin commands is a parasite on the high performance military. This is the current cognitive battlefield for the warrior scholar. It is a terrible drain on the resources and mental acuity to wage war.

There is something to be said about the apprenticeship of the neophyte to the journeyman trade of conflict and war. The heat and violence of battle are experiences that carry a message and lesson no classroom will ever explain. The warrior scholar though can inform the methods of education and this is a message the academic must listen to if they wish to remain relevant to the discussion. The patterns of history inform of future patterns, the engineering and technology disciplines inform of future tools and risk, and the knowledge of mathematics expresses a language that is universal.

To service the warrior scholar and the future warrior society needs to provide an educational framework of humanities and liberal arts that provide the essence of classical philosophy. Less, we create Ludites a good understanding of engineering and technology is of special importance. The officer cadre must have at least a passing understanding and awareness of the classical literature of conflict. The enlisted men should have a vocational understanding of the world prior to today and how it shaped whatever they are looking at.

These are the basic tenets of a warrior scholar and an opening treatise in the scholarship of learning conflict.

Cross-posted on the Selil Blog.