Simply generating forces and getting them into the fight also falls short of a long-term solution; forces must be generated while the long-term capability to replenish those forces is developed using a systems of systems approach. This enduring capability requires an "enterprise mindset" to manage those forces and capabilities throughout the entire life cycle of force management, acquisition (including both personnel and equipment), training, distribution, deployment, sustainment, development, and separation and release from active duty (also including both personnel and equipment). Proper stewardship of these processes requires leader development and national-to-tactical resource management -- which requires a shift in the ministerial mindset in the aftermath of the Saddam regime.

The Multi-National Security Transition Command -- Iraq (MNSTC-I) has the mission "to assist the Iraqi Government in the development, organization, training, equipping, and sustaining of Iraqi Security Forces and Ministries capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment where individual freedom, the rule of law, and free market economy can evolve and, in time, will contribute to Regional Security in the Gulf Region." This mission charges MNSTC-I with the responsibility to assist in the building of forces as well as assisting in the long-term sustainment and management of those forces by the ministries of Interior and Defense -- all taking place while engaged in the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq.

To build this ministerial capacity, MNSTC-I uses an "enterprise approach" to track the systems and processes involved in the development and sustainment of trained and ready forces for the Iraqi Government. The enterprise approach is used to assist in the development of ministerial capability.

The enterprise "star chart" is very similar to the Army Organization Life Cycle Model (AOLCM) that is used in the Army War College in the "How the Army Runs" Senior Leader Reference Handbook, or HTAR. The AOLCM provides a holistic view of the interconnected systems and processes used to manage change on a continuing basis -- a situation that certainly exists today in Iraq.

The ministerial "star chart" shows that building and developing security forces in Iraq requires much more than building units and issuing equipment -- but also includes the hidden complexity that is involved in sustaining that capability. Focusing solely on building units and issuing equipment doesn't set the conditions for a meaningful transition -- it is only a transfer mentality.

Transition also includes developing a vision of the future while establishing clear goals and objectives to be met with specific milestones. To do this effectively there is a requirement to track not only the specific tasks associated with each of the enterprise elements, but to also track the effectiveness of those tasks within the entire enterprise. A 'balanced scorecard" that depicts the disparate tasks within each enterprise element -- and then measures whether or not the end state -- "Iraqi Security Forces and Ministries capable of defeating terrorism and providing a stable environment where individual freedom, the rule of law, and free market economy can evolve and, in time, will contribute to Regional Security in the Gulf Region" is being achieved.

This entire "systems of systems" or enterprise approach represents a change in the methodology to security transition -- creating a transition that will create enduring capability, rather than focusing merely on the short-term mission of generating forces.

Dr. Jack D. Kem is the Chief of the Combined Arms Center (CAC) Commander's Initiatives Group (CIG), Fort Leavenworth, KS. As the CIG Chief, Dr. Kem assists the CAC Commander by developing ideas and initiatives, conducting strategic planning, and conducting independent and unbiased analysis of the CAC Commander' areas of interest. Dr. Kem also hold a concurrent appointment as a Supervisory Professor in the Department of Joint, Interagency, and Multinational Operations in the US Army Command and General Staff College. Dr. Kem is currently on temporary assignment with MNSTC-I.

Detention Centers Give Glimpse Into al-Qaida - Gerry Gilmore, AFPS

Officials who manage detention centers in Iraq are getting a valuable look inside the mind of al-Qaida in Iraq, a senior US military officer said here today.

"We have learned so much about who al-Qaida is; we have learned so much about how they recruit and what their intent is; we have learned so much about how to counter them and how to engage [the detainee population] with a very clear program that breaks away their support base," Marine Corps Maj. Gen. Douglas M. Stone told Pentagon reporters.

About 21,000 detainees are being held in detention centers in Iraq under a United Nations resolution, said Stone, who recently completed a 14-month duty tour as the deputy commander of detention operations for Multinational Force Iraq.

Stone said he implemented a system last fall that separated hard-core extremists from more moderate members of the detention population. Moderate, well-behaved detainees, he told reporters, are rewarded with family visitation times, literacy and vocational training classes and more.

Confirmed extremists, including foreigners who entered Iraq to wage war against US and Iraqi security forces and against Iraqi civilians are separated from non-extremists within the detention population, he said.

Moderate-thinking detainees deemed not to be security threats want to re-enter Iraqi society as peaceful, productive citizens, Stone said. The majority of these detainees, he explained, got into trouble helping insurgents by being lookouts or performing other low-level tasks -- not because they shared the extremists' philosophy, but because they were desperate for money.

Voluntary education and vocational programs offered at detention centers are providing moderate-thinking detainees a conduit to re-enter society as productive citizens, Stone said.

The Fate of The Worst - Max Boot, Contentions

One of the unheralded heroes of the past year in Iraq is Major General Douglas Stone of the US Marine Corps, who has just ended a stint as commander of detainee operations. His most notable innovation has been to institute "COIN behind the wire" — that is a counterinsurgency program aimed at weaning detainees away from terrorism. It is too soon to tell to what extent this program has succeeded, but early indications are positive. The program is now being put to the test because the US command is reducing the number of detainees in American custody. The total has already dropped from 25,000 to 21,000, as noted in this Washington Post article, yet the amount of violence for the past three weeks has been at its lowest level since early 2004.

General Stone's Exit Interview - Matt Armstrong, MountainRunner

Very briefly but worth your time watch the video below, at least the first seven minutes. Major General Doug Stone, formerly of Task Force 134, gave an exit interview after turning over command of detainee operations in Iraq. I recommend watching his opening remarks as he speaks directly to the point who the detainees are, their motivation, and how he managed to attain a recidivism rate of... well it is "miniscule" as he noted (only 40 returned out of about 10,000 released).

More on the debate that has played out (and is ongoing) here at the Small Wars Journal, on the Small Wars Council discussion board and the counterinsurgency blog Abu Muqawama.

For background see Eating Soup with a Spoon by LTC Gian Gentile at Armed Forces Journal:

The Army's new manual on counterinsurgency operations (COIN), in many respects, is a superb piece of doctrinal writing. The manual, FM 3-24 "Counterinsurgency," is comparable in breadth, clarity and importance to the 1986 FM 100-5 version of "Operations" which came to be known as "AirLand Battle."

The new manual's middle chapters that pertain to the conduct of counterinsurgency operations are especially helpful and relevant to senior commanders in Iraq. But a set of nine paradoxes in the first chapter of the manual removes a piece of reality of counterinsurgency warfare that is crucial for those trying to understand how to operate within it...

LTC Gentile at World Politics Review - Misreading the Surge Threatens U.S. Army's Conventional Capabilities:

... A misleading current narrative contends that the recent lowering of violence in Iraq is primarily due to the American "surge" and the application of so-called "new" counterinsurgency methods. Because these new counterinsurgency methods have worked in Iraq, the thinking goes, why not try them in other places, such as Afghanistan? This hyper-emphasis on counterinsurgency puts the American Army in a perilous condition. Its ability to fight wars consisting of head-on battles using tanks and mechanized infantry is in danger of atrophy.

The truth is that American combat forces in Iraq have been conducting counterinsurgency operations successfully and pretty much by the book since about the middle of 2004. By that time, U.S. commanders had identified the mistakes of the first few months of the occupation, had absorbed a significant number of lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies, and had started to train units on correct counterinsurgency methods prior to their deployments...

And this by COL Peter Mansoor at Small Wars Journal - Misreading the History of the Iraq War:

... Gentile's analysis is incorrect in a number of ways, and his narrative is heavily influenced by the fact that he was a battalion commander in Baghdad in 2006. His unit didn't fail, his thinking goes, therefore recent successes cannot be due to anything accomplished by units that came to Iraq during the Surge.

The facts speak otherwise. Gentile's battalion occupied Ameriyah, which in 2006 was an Al Qaeda safe-haven infested by Sunni insurgents and their Al Qaeda-Iraq allies. I'm certain that he and his soldiers did their best to combat these enemies and to protect the people in their area. But since his battalion lived at Forward Operating Base Falcon and commuted to the neighborhood, they could not accomplish their mission. The soldiers did not fail. The strategy did.

The "big base" strategy only changed when General Dave Petraeus and Lieutenant General Ray Odierno came to Iraq and implemented the new counterinsurgency doctrine in the recently published FM 3-24. Few U.S. Army units were implementing that doctrine as early as 2004, as Gentile claims. Some units were moving in that direction, as Colonel H. R. McMaster's accomplishments with the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in 2005 attest. But these units were exceptions to the general rule. Most units were still more intent on finding and killing the enemy than they were on protecting the Iraqi people and making it impossible for the insurgents to survive in their midst...

Now on to The War We Have by Christopher Griffin, American Enterprise Institute (emphasis and links by SWJ):

The appointments of Gens. David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno to the head of Central Command and of Multi-National Force-Iraq, respectively, send one clear message: The surge will go on. Its two key architects and most visible proponents, after all, are now at the helm of American military operations throughout the Middle East and Iraq. But as the generals settle into another stint of command, the military is agog in debate as to the success of the surge and what it means for both the Army's future and its past.

Many of these arguments have been conducted on the Small Wars Journal website. Two leading voices so far have been Lt. Col. Gian Gentile and Col. Peter Mansoor. These two soldier-scholars are professors of military history and have combat experience in Iraq, where Gentile commanded a battalion in 2006 and Mansoor serves as Petraeus' executive officer after having commanded a brigade in 2003-2005...

Gentile and Mansoor lay out strong, contrasting views on the history of the war. Either the U.S. wasted its efforts through 2006 by executing a flawed strategy that removed American forces too quickly from the fight, or the U.S. just got lucky rather than better in 2007. Either the surge and the execution of FM 3-24 represents the culmination of years of military learning, or it is waste of military doctrine that will ultimately eat into the ability of American forces to fight conventional battles. And ultimately, either the U.S. is on the path to victory in Iraq, or else it is as contingent as ever upon the willingness of Sunni and Shiite factions to play nice....

One SWJ contributor, "Schmedlap" captures this problem when he observes that the popular narrative of the surge is unfair, but that it really does not matter that it is so: "I agree with the general theme that Iraq has not been turned around by some enlightened soldier-scholar with a Ph.D. rolling into to town and using intellect instead of firepower. That was an image that appealed to the media and academia and was politically expedient. However, Gen. Petraeus made a big difference by simply reversing the FOB consolidation trend." It may indeed not be fair, and when the military's historians review the Iraq war as it was fought year by year and town by town, they will certainly find more nuance than the current explanation that 2006 was a necessary condition before Iraq would experience its annus mirabilis in the surge. Perhaps the last sacrifice of the soldiers who fought in 2006 will be to patiently await the day that their efforts are given a full and proper accounting.

More at The War We Have.

This study explores the nature of the insurgency in Afghanistan, the key challenges and successes of the US-led counterinsurgency campaign, and the capabilities necessary to wage effective counterinsurgency operations. By examining the key lessons from all insurgencies since World War II, it finds that most policymakers repeatedly underestimate the importance of indigenous actors to counterinsurgency efforts. The US should focus its resources on helping improve the capacity of the indigenous government and indigenous security forces to wage counterinsurgency. It has not always done this well. The US military-along with US civilian agencies and other coalition partners-is more likely to be successful in counterinsurgency warfare the more capable and legitimate the indigenous security forces (especially the police), the better the governance capacity of the local state, and the less external support that insurgents receive.

New RAND COIN in Afghanistan Study - Tim Stevens, Ubiwar

Seems like the folks at RAND have been similarly busy, with another COIN report out today: Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan by Seth G. Jones, the fourth volume in the RAND Counterinsurgency series. The tone of the report partly reflects what I've been hearing the last couple of days about operations in Afghanistan - "comprehensive organisational dysfunction" sticks in my mind - although Jones concentrates more on capacity-building and security security reform.

RAND Study on Counterinsurgency - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Seth G. Jones of RAND National Defense Research Institute has published Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan. It will required several assessments to analyze the entirety of the paper, and in lieu of attempting to assess the paper chronologically, we will address it thematically. Several quotes will be supplied (mainly from Chapter 2 which is entitled Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare).

Pakistan Helped Taliban Insurgents - Jason Straziuso, Associated Press

Pakistani intelligence agents and paramilitary forces have helped train Taliban insurgents and have given them information about American troop movements in Afghanistan, said a report published Monday by a US think tank.

The study by the RAND Corp. also warned that the US will face "crippling, long-term consequences" in Afghanistan if Taliban sanctuaries in Pakistan are not eliminated. It echoes recent statements by American generals, who have increased their warnings that militant safe havens in Pakistan are threatening efforts in Afghanistan. The study was funded by the US Defense Department.

'US Faces Severe Consequences' - Pakistan Daily Times

The United States and its NATO allies will face "crippling, long-term consequences" in their efforts to stabilise Afghanistan if Taliban sanctuaries in neighbouring Pakistan are not eliminated, a report published on Monday said.

Funded by the Defence Department, The study, 'Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan', has claimed that NATO officials have uncovered several instances of Pakistani intelligence agents providing information to Taliban fighters, including information on "the location and movement of Afghan and coalition forces".

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has also pleaded with the global community to address the issue of militant sanctuaries in Pakistan. Afghan intelligence officials say young, uneducated males are recruited in the Tribal Areas to become suicide bombers and fighters.

However, Pakistan denies that it supports the insurgents.

The US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center is hosting a five-day program for prospective counterinsurgency leaders, 11-15 August 2008, at the Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The program is focused on equipping leaders with an understanding of the insurgency and counterinsurgency environments, as well as close consideration of the kinds of persons and organizations that usually emerge from insurgencies in contrast to those of conventional conflicts. This event will be held at the Battle Command Training Center (BCTC) Training Facility on Fort Leavenworth. Seating is limited. However, registration is open to any person who serves in any official capacity with regard to dealing with insurgencies, with priority is given to those applying from invited organizations. Other applicants will be reviewed for eligibility on a space-available, case-by-case basis. The duty is uniform/business casual. The deadline for application is 1 August 2008. For more information, contact the COIN Center at 913-684-5196. Application must be completed on-line at the Counterinsurgency Leaders Workshop web page.

This decade, a million American soldiers have deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan. Many have had a chance to develop relationships with Iraqi and Afghan soldiers, civil servants, and businessmen. Summed together, these relations are now forming bonds that will endure beyond whatever decisions statesmen in these countries decide to take. The personal relationships between Americans and their counterparts in Iraq and Afghanistan will influence the strategic balance in the region. These relationships are also likely too numerous and too deep for any statesmen to control.

Rob Thornton is a US Army officer and combat veteran of the Iraq war. He spent a year as an advisor to an Iraqi battalion and now works at the US Army school house at Fort Leavenworth improving the US military's foreign military advisory efforts. Thornton recently wrote a comment at Small Wars Journal Blog that illustrated the bonds that are strengthening at the personal level between Americans, Iraqis, and, presumably, Afghans...

More, read it all.

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, addressed graduates of the Army War College yesterday at Carlisle Barracks. Major themes included listening to combat-tempered Soldiers and Marines, rebuilding combat capabilities that have atrophied during the protracted counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan, gaps in US military capabilities, gaps in professional expertise, building allies' capacity, improving international and interagency cooperation, and fostering both security and stability through healthy vibrant deterrence.

Here are several press reports on Admiral Mullen's address:

Heed Combat Veterans, Graduates Are Told - Ann Scott Tyson, Washington Post

The nation's top military official yesterday urged graduating US officers at the Army War College to listen to the combat-tempered soldiers below them, saying it is critical to keep young veterans in the force and tap their understanding of today's unconventional wars.

Adm. Michael Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stressed that junior officers and enlisted soldiers "are wise beyond their years," adding that "war has a way of doing that." Such soldiers know "a few new things about how to wage irregular warfare in this new century," and military leaders "would be foolish to toss that knowledge aside," Mullen said in a commencement address to more than 300 colonels and lieutenant colonels graduating from US Army War College at Carlisle, Pa...

CJCS Wants Refocus on Major-combat Skills - Julian Barnes, Los Angeles Times

The US military's top uniformed officer on Saturday urged the armed forces to rebuild combat capabilities that have atrophied during the protracted counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The focus by Adm. Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on major-combat skills contrasts with recent speeches by Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates. Gates has urged the Army not lose its focus on counterinsurgency and has criticized the tendency of some military officers to focus on potential future conflicts at the expense of trying to win the wars it is engaged in now.

A senior aide to Mullen said the chairman was not trying to draw a contrast with Gates. The aide said the two men were in full agreement on likely future threats faced by the US.

Mullen, speaking at graduation ceremonies at the Army War College in Carlisle Barracks, Pa., said the military's "most pressing long-term problem" was maintaining armed services that are correctly shaped, equipped and trained...

Mullen Tells Senior Officers to Listen to Young Troops - Jim Garamone, AFPS

All ranks must work to together to change the military from a peacetime mentality to a war footing, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff told graduates of the Army War College.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen also told the 339 graduates that he is concerned about gaps in US military capabilities.

"In the Air Force, we have seen - as recently as this week - evidence of a serious decline in nuclear mission focus and performance, a decline which erodes our nation's ability to effectively deter and to defeat potential major adversaries," he said.

"I respect and admire the decisions by (Air Force) Secretary Michael Wynne and (Air Force Chief of Staff General T. Michael) Moseley to accept responsibility and accountability for this decline," he continued.

Their decision to shoulder responsibility was right and is "a lesson to us all about leadership, but so too should it serve as a cautionary tale about the dangers of complacency."

The gaps in professional expertise cannot persist, particularly when the military is called upon to engage around the globe, building allies' capacity, improving international and interagency cooperation, and fostering both security and stability through healthy vibrant deterrence, Mullen said.

"We can expect the counterinsurgency mission to continue, perhaps even grow, but we must also stay prepared for a range of military operations," he said. "We cannot sacrifice the future for the sake of the now."

The US military must listen to battle-hardened young servicemembers, Mullen stressed, and the lieutenant colonels and colonels must listen. "(The troops) are out there making a difference, and they know it," Mullen said. "They also know, as you do, a few new things about how to wage irregular warfare in this new century."

In Iraq, American servicemembers are providing the stability the country needs. They are training Iraqi security forces and have made sacrifices to do so. That combat experience is invaluable, Mullen said. "They are wise beyond their years," he said. "War has a way of doing that. We owe them our attention and our time. We owe them the opportunity to think and to speak.

"Two weeks ago, I stood before the graduating class of the Naval Academy, and I told them to question you, their seniors, about the way we do things," he said. "Today, I urge you, in turn, to listen to them, your juniors. Learn what's on their minds; come to know their concerns. ... We need your help in bringing these issues to the forefront of a system that is mired in peacetime and must fundamentally change, one that puts our people at the center of the universe."

The chairman also called on a national discourse on defense. "Quite frankly, I don't believe our armed forces are as balanced as they need to be for that future," he said. "That's why I have so strongly argued for a renewed debate in this country about the level of defense spending."

He said he would like to see a thoughtful reevaluation of the threats America faces and the risks the country is —to run. He suggested the country should invest roughly 4 percent of gross domestic product in national defense. "Whether we stay at that level or rise above it is, of course, for the American people to decide, but we ought to have that discussion," he said. "Maintaining a force that is correctly shaped, sized, trained and equipped so that we may adequately defend our nation is our most pressing long-term problem."

The military needs to be able to fight counterinsurgencies, but some regional threats also require conventional capabilities. The Navy has a power-projection mission that requires more than the 280 ships currently afloat.

In the Army and Marine Corps forces need to fill gaps. "There are young Marines who have never deployed aboard a Navy ship, and Army officers who have not been able to focus on their mission of providing artillery fire support," he said. "We must be able to fight with equal vigor the savage wars of peace and the fractured peace that could be major war in the future."

Mullen told the officers that they must have a more balanced view of the world. The War College class has 43 international fellows including officers from Egypt, Romania, Afghanistan, India, Iraq, Lebanon, Mongolia, Colombia, Indonesia and Mexico. "These individuals have given you a glimpse of the world through their eyes," Mullen said.

He urged the students to stay in contact, saying this will help build relationships and broaden perspectives.

"We must understand intimately how others see the world -- our friends and our enemies -- and where we reside in that worldview," the chairman said.

"We must read their books, speak their languages, understand their cultures, and learn their histories, so we can know who they are and where they are going."

Mullen also recalled his trip to the Pacific and Pakistan earlier this week. He said the trip illustrated the need for balance in the military and the need to address a range of missions. U.S. Pacific Command forces operate daily across the range of military activities from humanitarian assistance and disaster relief -- such as recent humanitarian missions supplying aid to China and Burma -- to counterterrorist operations and foreign internal defense -- such as operations under way in the Philippines. In addition, Pacific Command forces train and exercise with conventional forces in the Republic of Korea.

"U.S. forces worldwide must likewise be able to provide our civilian leaders a wide range of options for deterrence escalation and de-escalation and, wherever we can, a helping hand," Mullen said.

The War College graduation was held at 9 a.m. and the temperature already was climbing into the mid-90s. The audience turned programs into fans and sought shade from the sun that broke through the fog just in time for the ceremony. The graduation was on the parade ground that once saw the stamp of militia raised for the French and Indian War.

The link is to a draft white paper I've been working on as part of my duties at the Joint Center for International Security Force Assistance. Any comments, criticisms, or suggestions are most welcome. Here are two excerpts, one from the introduction and one from the summary.

Introduction

ODP (Operational Design Process) fills a gap between the issuance of a policy objective, and the planning to achieve that policy objective. Contained within is a description of a way of framing a design for the purpose of proposing a problem, and then developing a theory of action. It is an interpretation and adaptation of the Operational Design Process (developed at SAMS and employed at the Army's Unified Quest 2008 War Game and is itself an adaptation of Systemic Operational Design). It must be inclusive of not only the "out puts" or "products" of the process, but more importantly the interaction of the people who participate in the process, and who will go forward in planning and implementation / execution. The critical issue ODP highlights is that the right problem is identified and considered based on a thorough analysis to which a theory of action can be developed that can be scrutinized based on continuous interaction.

This is not planning. It is a process that should be done prior to planning, but can be continued through implementation in order to ensure the theory remains valid. Designing the Operational Frame by establishing a theory of reality and a theory of action helps the commander and staff to avoid the effects of cognitive dissonance. Cognitive dissonance is the effect where because a COA has been committed to in planning, all other relevant information which might contradict or conflict with the COA that has been committed to, or invested in, is ignored, bent to establish a fallacious causal relationship, or biased as to have the wrong weight. Cognitive dissonance can cause a commander and staff to see only what they wish to see, and make bad decisions. While all bias cannot be eliminated, the ODP can help mitigate the natural biases commanders and staffs have with regard to a chosen COA. It does this through its interactive nature which better represents reality, and by identifying many of the various potential outcomes, and establishing more explicitly how those outcomes might occur.

Summary

ODP is not planning, it is a theory of reality that informs a theory of action upon which a campaign design can be built and tested through interaction. ODP fills a gap between the issuance of a policy objective, and the planning to achieve that policy objective. This is founded on assessing the environment as holistic, interactive, biological system which recognizes that there are critical subsystems within. These subsystems of people often interact in non-linear ways with produce non-linear outcomes. As a process, it seeks to test the underpinning logic to which we ascribe rationality, with the recognition that although we might consider an act as irrational, the cultural, sociological and political conditions in which the system exist may make the same act plausible, rational or even likely. This process engenders that it is better to think in terms of tolerances and relevance then in absolutes. This process recognizes that as long as there are people and politics there will remain interaction, and as such tolerances and relevance can change over time. ODP can be applied wherever there are complex interactive problems.

Using ODP to Establish a Campaign Design Framework for SFA Activities -- June 2008 DRAFT white paper

Discuss at Small Wars Council