The author discusses several types of wars of ideas in an effort to achieve a better understanding of what wars of ideas are. That knowledge, in turn, can help inform strategy. It is important to note, for instance, that because ideas are interpreted subjectively, it is not likely that opposing parties will "win" each other over by means of an ideational campaign alone. Hence, physical events, whether intended or incidental, typically play determining roles in the ways wars of ideas unfold, and how (or whether) they are end. Thus, while the act of communicating strategically remains a vital part of any war of ideas, we need to manage our expectations as far as what it can accomplish.

Wars of Ideas and the War of Ideas

Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Public Event). Washington, DC. The Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) is sponsoring a discussion on counterinsurgency on 22 July 2008, at the National Press Club (the Holeman Lounge), Washington, DC. Dr. John Nagl (Center for a New American Security), Dr. Daniel Marston (Australian National University), and Dr. Carter Malkasian (CNA) recently collaborated on Counterinsurgency in Modern Warfare (Osprey, 2008), an edited book that examines 13 of the most important counterinsurgency campaigns of the past 100 years, including the current Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Dr. David Kilcullen (U.S. State Department), the renowned counterinsurgency expert, will moderate the discussion and provide critical commentary. Lunch will be provided. Books will be available to purchase at a discounted rate. For more information, visit the first link above. RSVP at kattm@cna.org or 703.824.2436.

Several items concerning the directive from the ITP article:

1) To replace DOD Directive 3000.5 that placed Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) operations on par with "traditional" combat operations.

2) Directs "host of efforts" to improve coordination between Defense and other government agencies.

3) Defines IW as comprising Counterinsurgency (COIN), SSTR, Counterterrorism (CT), Foreign Internal Defense (FID), and Unconventional Warfare (UW).

4) Instructs the Services to balance their capabilities to conduct both regular and irregular warfare.

ITP reports that critics contend that including SSTR under IW would cast stabilization operations, in which help from civilian government agencies and non-governmental organizations is crucial in too militaristic a light.

There is much more at Inside the Pentagon.

I have a few questions for the learned readership of Small Wars Journal. The first is, how many of you have ever looked up the official Department of Defense definition for 'Information Operations?'

According to JP 3-13, Information Operations, the term is defined as "the integrated employment of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making while protecting our own."

I am confident there exist more confusing definitions in the U.S. military lexicon, but surely there cannot be too many. In effect, the Department of Defense has taken the term 'information operations' as understood by cyberwarfare types and mashed it together with the term 'information operations' as understood by those of us waging wars of narratives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The resulting confusion has left us with a definition that tries to be everything to everyone while at the same time leaving us with a shoddy definition to communicate what we're talking about as counter-insurgency theorist-practitioners when we use the term.

As Frank Hoffman has noted, one of the deficiencies in FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency is the lack of any real, in-depth discussion of IO. On the once hand, our operational designs imply that all lines of operations -- combat operations, the training of host nation security forces, governance, etc. -- rest upon effective IO. It follows, as Hoffman writes, that "something that is 'critical' should merit more than three pages of succinct comments."

I found it really interesting to note, though, the different ways in which IO are discussed in the old FM 3-0, Operations (from 2001) and the latest edition of FM 3-0 (published earlier this year). In the old manual, IO are discussed within the context of cyberwarfare and net-centric warfare, noting the way in which IO enhance our situational awareness and knowledge of what's taking place on the battlefield. In the new edition of FM 3-0, by contrast, an entire chapter is devoted to something called "information superiority." And though the chapter more or less follows the JP 3-13 definition and discusses everything from psychological operations to surveillance and reconnaissance (honestly, what does one have to do with the other?), the passage offered at the beginning of the chapter alludes to something much different than IO as they're discussed in the old FM 3-0:

Be first with the truth. Since Soldier actions speak louder than what [public affairs officers] say, we must be mindful of the impact our daily interactions with Iraqis have on global audiences via the news media. Commanders should communicate key messages down to the individual level, but, in general, leaders and Soldiers should be able to tell their stories unconstrained by overly prescriptive themes. When communicating, speed is critical—minutes and hours matter—and we should remember to communicate to local (Arabic/Iraqi) audiences first—U.S./global audience can follow. Tell the truth, stay in

your lane, and get the message out fast. Be forthright and never allow enemy lies to stand unchallenged. Demand accuracy, adequate context, and proper characterization from the media. (From Multinational Corps--Iraq Counterinsurgency Guidance, 2007)

This passage, of course, is drawn from the counter-insurgency campaign in Iraq, and what it alludes to is our ability to control the narrative of the campaign and to counter the efforts of others -- the enemy; misinformed or biased media -- to do the same. But surely IO go beyond just that.

My challenge for this website's readers, then, is the following: what do we, as counter-insurgency theorists and practitioners, mean when we use the term "information operations?" Do we use IO as shorthand for psychological operations and message management? Obviously, our definition of IO is different from the definition officially in use. And I suspect our definition has more in common with the way Hizballah or the Taliban thinks about IO than the way in which the lexicographers of the Pentagon think about IO. (That, by the way, is a good thing.) So who out there can propose an alternate definition, and one which we can offer to those in the field in Iraq and Afghanistan? And is "information operations" even an appropriate term for that to which we're referring?

Andrew Exum is pursuing his doctorate in the Department of War Studies, King's College London. He served in the U.S. Army from 2000 to 2004, leaving active duty as a captain. He was decorated for valor in 2002 while leading a platoon of light infantry in Afghanistan. Subsequently, he led a platoon of Army Rangers into Iraq in 2003 and into Afghanistan in 2004. After leaving the Army, Exum earned a master's degree in Middle Eastern Studies at the American University of Beirut. In 2006-2007, he was a Soref fellow at The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, where he focused on contemporary Middle Eastern insurgencies and counter-insurgency strategies. He is the author of This Man's Army: A Soldier's Story from the Front Lines of the War on Terrorism (2005) and Hizballah at War: A Military Assessment (2006). Exum is also the founder of the counterinsurgency-related blog Abu Muqawama

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

From the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy:

No One in PD Conducts PD Overseas

By Matt Armstrong - Cross-posted at MountainRunner

Strong words from the U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. Strong and brutally honest. The Commission, an organization reporting directly to the President, unlike any other report before, whether from the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service, the Defense Sciences Board, or any other body, assessed the human resource elements of U.S. Public Diplomacy. The topic for this report originated in the Commission. The findings will be presented tomorrow, Wednesday, 25 June 2008, but the report is available at the Commission's website now or at MountainRunner (PDF, 2.2mb).

The function of the Commission is to provide independent oversight and make recommendations on the activities and effectiveness of America's information activities and education and cultural exchanges. It was was established by the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and was two bodies, one the Advisory Commission on Information and the other Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange.

Earlier this evening, I had the opportunity to sit down with the chairman of the Commission, Bill Hybl, to discuss the report to be publicly presented tomorrow. Bill said that a core requirement is to address people and issues in local terms, including identifying common ground. This requires engagement, something Bill noted is absent. It also requires continuity at the very highest level, which he noted has also been missing with the turnover at the Under Secretary position.

A driving factor of the report, and a repeated refrain from Bill, is that the U.S. "should be able to do better." To this end, Bill emphasized that public diplomacy officers want to communicate with foreign populations but can't because 90% of their job descriptions and work requirements are something else, like administration.

For the first time, we have a report that (while pulling some punches) looks at the impediments to implementing an effective public diplomacy. This report is of particular interest for those like myself who are more interested in the structure of how public diplomacy and information activities are conducted than about the specific messages employed.

The 41-page report is split into seven sections, plus the introduction. It is an easy read, even for the beginner not conversant in public diplomacy. Each section begins with a background statement, followed by findings and analysis, and closes with recommendations. The recommendations are real and often substantial. Many are obvious, some may be easy, several will take a strong commitment and leadership from State, the White House, and Congress to implement.

This is the first report to point out that there is no one overseas whose primary job responsibility is to interface with foreign audiences. The Commission surveyed employee evaluation reports and found that direct foreign engagement was a low priority and had little, if any, positive impact on performance reviews. This fits in with a five year old 2003 GAO report that surveyed public affairs officers and found 77% did not have a goal of "mutual understanding" in their FY04 plan. As the report asks, if no one in the field has primary responsibility to engage and influence foreign publics, who job is it?

For a Department short on funds, precious time and money spent on training public diplomacy officers in cultural and linguistic awareness and skills are wasted. The report portrays these officers as having little opportunity, and even less expectation, to engage foreign audiences. Further, when they are trained, training is better described as identifying public diplomacy and not engaging in it. Little to no instruction is done on practicing persuasion and culturally and linguistically specific engagement. If DOD can use simulators, real and virtual, why not State? The report's discussion on what was and wasn't included in employee evaluations is startling. For example, the first five (out of eleven) work requirements for a "senior-level public diplomacy officer at a mid-sized African post" were: "Plan, develop and implement programs...", "Administer...", "Supervise, counsel and support staff members...", "Oversee the operations...", and "Utilize opportunities to explain U.S. foreign and domestic". Largely, if not entirely, absent from the sample of work requirements surveyed by the commission where phrases like "Influence public discourse...", "Shape the terms of the debate...", "Persuade key interlocutors...", "Correct inaccuracies and misrepresentations appearing in the local media...", and "Appear on talk shows on television and radio...".

To the question of whether the PD officer had an impact on how the U.S. or U.S. policy was viewed in country, the answer was typically no. The problem is perhaps that State went too far to integrate public diplomacy, pushing a square into a round hole. Performance reviews, the report says, are often writing in ways that it is impossible to know what country the officer serves in.

Back in the United States, the fate of public diplomacy officers is no better. Nearly ten years after the merger, or "abolishing", of USIA, dozens of public diplomacy officers at Main State, Washington, D.C., headquarters, are administrators and liaisons that do not perform public diplomacy.

The report also points out these significant shortcomings:

- State does not recruit for public diplomacy

- State does not test for public diplomacy

- State does not train for public diplomacy

- State has a glass ceiling for public diplomats

The last bullet raises the specter that State does not value the skills or have confidence in the public diplomacy officers. While it is noteworthy a public diplomacy officer has never held the Under Secretary position, more interesting is the under-representation of public diplomacy in senior management positions. While State has made progress incorporating public diplomacy, it still has a way to go. This report says, among other things, that those in the public diplomacy "cone" (career track) are not promoted to senior positions on par with their numbers vis a vis other State cones, economics, political, consular, and management.

Bill Hybl commented that it "felt different" investigating the present public diplomacy arrangement as compared to the USIA.

The Commissions recommendations are not binding but will hopefully spur action in vested parties from State, the White House, and Congress. Public diplomacy is a keystone of our national security and must be treated as such. It was at one time and it must be again. We must move beyond claims that money is short and realize this is a national security imperative. Engaging in information and ideas is ultimately cheaper than engaging with bullets, bombs, and combat boots.

As my conversation with Bill came to a close, he said that "if we don't do this effectively, those who wish to do harm to us will beat us in an area where we should dominate... we can do better." Agreed. We can and must do better.

U.S. Army's new strategy in Iraq—launched in February 2007, along with a surge of 25,000 additional American troops—qualifies neither as particularly new nor even as a strategy. Better to call it, instead, an enhanced reliance on tactics and operational concepts previously in use. Or, put less charitably, an over-hyped shift in emphasis that, on the one hand, will not necessarily yield an American victory in Iraq but, on the other, might well leave the United States Army crippled in future wars.

Properly understood, the surge narrative is really not about Iraq at all. It is about the past and future of the U.S. Army. It resurrects dubious battlefield lessons from the past—Vietnam, principally—applies them to Iraq, and extrapolates from there into an unknown future. On all three counts—past, present, and future—the narrative suffers from numerous and irreparable defects. Its reading of the past, grounded in the cliché that General Creighton Abrams's "hearts and minds" program "won" the war in Vietnam, is a self-serving fiction. Its version of the more recent past and even the present is contrived and largely fanciful, relying on a distorted version of both to tell a tale in which U.S. forces triumphed in Iraq in 2007 and did so despite the misguided efforts of their predecessors even a year before. More than anything else, the surge narrative stakes a claim on the future, instructing us that its methods of counterinsurgency will be uniquely suited to the next war and to the one after that.

From the surge, its most fervent advocates have extracted a single maxim: that they and only they have uncovered the secret to defeating insurgencies. Prior to the surge, in this telling, only a few exceptional units were engaged in proper counterinsurgent operations...

Much more at World Affairs.

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

UPDATE: With a hat tip to Charlie at Abu Muqawama, here is a good campanion piece to Gian's World Affairs article - Review Symposium on the New U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Manual at Perspectives on Politics Journal.

UPDATE 2: More - Gentile, Not Gentle by Dr. iRack at Abu Muqawama.

From today's Washington Post - 4 Americans Die in Attack During Sadr City Meeting by Ernesto Londoí±o:

Steven L. Farley, a State Department official working to build up the local government in the Baghdad enclave of Sadr City, knew he and his colleagues had taken a bold step, his son Brett recalled Tuesday.

Farley and other U.S. officials had learned that the Sadr City District Council's acting chairman was loyal to the anti-American Shiite cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and had urged other members of the local advisory group to force the man to resign.

That was last week. On Tuesday, Farley, 57, and three other Americans were killed when a bomb exploded in the District Council building, just minutes before the selection of a new chairman was to begin.

Capitalizing on recent security gains in Iraq, U.S. soldiers and diplomats have waded deep into Iraqi politics in an effort to build moderate and responsive government bodies that they hope will erode the appeal of extremists...

The article has much more on Steven Farley's work as a PRT member in Iraq and American Embassy, Baghdad, issued a statement by Ambassador Ryan Crocker.

A BAE Systems press release provides some background on Nicole Suveges:

Nicole Suveges, a BAE Systems political scientist, was killed Tuesday in a bombing in Sadr City, Baghdad, Iraq. She was supporting the U.S. Army's 3rd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 4th Infantry Division, as part of the Human Terrain System (HTS) program.

"We are deeply saddened by the loss of Nicole Suveges," said Doug Belair, president of the company's Technology Solutions & Services (TSS) line of business. "She came to us to give freely of herself in an effort to make a better world. Nicole was a leading academic who studied for years on how to improve conditions for others. She also believed in translating what she learned into action. Our thoughts and prayers are with her family, friends and colleagues."

Suveges began her current tour in Iraq in April of this year. Before joining BAE Systems, she had worked in Iraq for one year as a civilian contractor. Previously, Suveges served as a U.S. Army reservist in Sarajevo, Bosnia-Herzegovina, supporting the multinational SFOR/NATO Combined Joint Psychological Operations Task Force.

More by Mike Innes at CTLab and Noah Shachtman at Danger Room.

Brian McAllister Linn's The Echo of Battle: The Army's Way of War is an important and profoundly disturbing book for anyone who loves the United States Army or cares about the security of the Western world. Linn, the foremost historian of the Army's counter-insurgency effort in the Philippines at the start of the last century, fundamentally challenges the Army's self-concept in the twenty-first century. Linn notes that for the majority of the Army's history, it has been at peace, preparing for the next war -- and, all too often, getting that preparation not just wrong, but almost completely wrong...

Read the entire review here at Small Wars Journal. You can also read a "review of the review" by Mark Safranski at ZenPundit.

John Nagl is a Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security. A retired US Army officer, his last assignment was as Commanding Officer of 1st Battalion, 34th Armor at Fort Riley, Kansas. He led a tank platoon in Operation Desert Storm and served as the operations officer of a tank battalion task force in Operation Iraqi Freedom. A West Point graduate and Rhodes Scholar, Nagl earned his doctorate from Oxford University, taught national security studies at West Point, and served as a Military Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of Defense. He is the author of Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam and was on the writing team that produced the Army's Counterinsurgency Field Manual.

Discuss at Small Wars Council.