By Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute

Foreward:

For over sixty years, the United States has sought to build the capabilities of its allies and security partners. This is a mission that has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and it is one that any administration, be it Democratic or Republican, will inherit in January 2009. As a longstanding strategic goal, building partnership capacity has also dredged up a series of contradictions and conundrums for American policymaking, as officials attempt to foster governance without fueling dictatorships, engage "frontline states" without becoming enmeshed in their internal feuds, and manage the details of convoluted international partnerships from the confines of Washington. Resolving these contradictions - or at least mitigating them - is the principal ongoing challenge of American security cooperation programs.

In this report, we provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs, as well as a modest proposal for how they may be improved in the future. We find that many of the authorities and instruments for engagement already exist, but that they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the "frontline country team," in which the ambassador is responsible for coordinating and directing American policy. We argue that the country team is the point at which the rubber of American policy hits the road and where it will ultimately succeed or fail.

As we prepared this report, we benefited tremendously from the insight, advice, and support of several friends and colleagues. Our colleague Gary J. Schmitt both worked with us to develop the frontline country team concept and, in his capacity as director of the American Enterprise Institute's Program on Advanced Strategic Studies, provided crucial support to get this project off the ground. Col. Robert Killebrew (USA, Ret.) was a key partner as we developed the "frontline country team" proposal, as well as the seminar game in which we tested it. A wide number of current and former U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and officials provided crucial input based upon their experiences in the field and in Washington. The Smith Richardson Foundation generously provided support for the Indonesia seminar game. This project could not have been completed without the tireless efforts of AEI research assistants Tim Sullivan and Catherine Hamilton. Needless to say, all errors and omissions in this report are those of the authors.

Army Cols. Sean B. MacFarland and H.R. McMaster Jr. have been selected for brigadier general pending Senate confirmation, officials said.

MacFarland was commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in May 2006 when the unit was sent to Ramadi, then one of the worst places in Iraq for US troops.

During his tenure in Ramadi, MacFarland's troops worked with local tribes and established combat outposts to take the initiative away from the insurgents...

McMaster, then commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, ordered his troops to treat detainees humanely, reached out to local Sunni Arabs to separate them from the insurgents, and he established patrol bases throughout the city, The Washington Post reported in 2006.

In late 2005, he launched Operation Restore Rights to take back the city from insurgents.

By the time the unit left in early 2006, the mayor of Tal Afar wrote a letter to the commander of US troops in Iraq praising the regiment...

Got the following in an e-mail today - will follow up here as I hope to get a spot on a Thursday teleconference with the author of the report...

(Links and emphasis by SWJ)

Dear Dave,

In a post about AFRICOM last year, you wrote: "Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right." Refugees International is releasing a report this Thursday, July 17 that lays out recommendations for the US to get AFRICOM right, and much of it has to do with the interagency collaboration you proposed.

The report also analyzes the ways in which US foreign aid in Africa—and the world over—is becoming increasingly militarized, in some cases to the detriment of long-term security and humanitarian and development investment. On Thursday, July 17 at 12pm ET, there will be a phone briefing on the report with the report's author, Mark Malan, and Ken Bacon, President of Refugees International.

In the report, Mark Malan (Peace Building Program Manager for Refugees International and former head of research for Kofi Annan's International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana) asserts that AFRICOM is enabling the Department of Defense to take over funds that were previously managed by the State Department and USAID. For example, the percentage of Official Development Assistance that the Pentagon controls has skyrocketed from 3.5% to nearly 22% in the past decade, while the percentage controlled by USAID has shrunk from 65% to 40%.

The report argues Pentagon programs in Africa fund immediate, short-term security programs rather than the broader US commitment to aid the growth of prosperous, stable countries. For example, more than half of the FY09 requested budget for Foreign Military Financing in Africa is for just two countries -- Djibouti and Ethiopia -- that are considered key partners in the continental War on Terror. As a result, 17 African Union member states have refused to host AFRICOM operations on their soil, viewing the US agency as an occupying force rather than a solution to long-term stability and security needs.

In spite of AFRICOM's drawbacks, however, Refugees International contends that AFRICOM could have an extremely positive impact on the region. A meaningful collaboration among the State Department, USAID and the Defense Department could kill three birds with one stone: help the US and African nations to fight terrorism, assist African countries with sustainable economic development, and build goodwill on the ground among humanitarian agencies, African legislators and civilians.

The report will be available for download at 12 am, July 17 at www.refugeesinternational.org.

Summary of Contents:

(1) Describes Civil-Military Operations across the Range of Military Operations and the Levels of War

(2) Discusses the Objectives of Civil-Military Operations

(3) Discusses the Role of Civil-Military Operations within the Phases of a Joint Campaign

(4) Describes the Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

(5) Describes Commander Responsibilities for Civil-Military Operations

(6) Discusses the Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities

(7) Describes Civil-Military Operations Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations

(8) Discusses Civil-Military Operations Coordination Requirements and Organizations

Summary of Changes:

(1) Consolidates JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, and JP 3-57 formerly titled Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

(2) Emphasizes that civil-military operations (CMO) are an inherent responsibility of command and facilitate accomplishment of the Commander's mission

(3) Amplifies the use of CMO as a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats in the 21st century

(4) Addresses provincial reconstruction teams

(5) Enhances the discussion of CMO objectives

(6) Discusses the relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations

(7) Addresses how CMO support operations and activities as they relate to the phasing model (i.e., Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, Enable Civil Authorities)

(8) Relates Chapter III, "Planning," to the planning process as addressed in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and provides an Appendix B, "Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations"

(9) Provides an in-depth discussion of the relationship between CMO and the interagency, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector

(10) Updates Appendix A, "Service Capabilities"

(11) Provides definitions for civil affairs operations, indigenous populations and institutions, private sector, and provincial reconstruction team

(12) Modifies the definition of Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

By J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton

Recently I was privileged to witness a small piece of history. While visiting a friend at the Pentagon, I stood next to the office door of Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne as he left the building for the last time. After he left, and while all the rooms were still empty, I was given a quick tour of the offices. Surrounded by giant paintings of airpower, it was difficult not to reflect upon the current situation and how he got there.

My friend is Special Assistant to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Richard Andres, and once the Secretary had left, we sat down and had a long discussion on current topics. Rick and I have discussed our opinions on air power and the military many times before, and while I consider myself to be service agnostic, Rick is very much biased toward the Air Force, and I think with good reason.

Something I've often heard Rick say, and I believe he is correct, is that the Army does not understand air power. Often their plans minimize its use, and their after action reports under report its effectiveness. Case in point, the surge in Iraq. While sitting in Ricks E ring office, he asked me point blank whether or not I believed a 20% increase (or "surge") in troop strength could really make much difference to the situation. It was obviously a baited question, but it wasn't one I had to think about much. To my mind, the increase could not have been that effective; there had to have been some fundamental doctrinal change in order for that small an increase to have had the dramatic effect that it's had. Prior to this discussion, I'd already been pondering the issue for some time.

Sadly, civilians like me who do not have a clearance are left to fend for themselves when it comes to gathering information. Between the coverage of American Idol contestants and Britney Spears' mental condition, we're occasionally treated to an update of what's going on in the world. Taken at face value, all we ever needed in Iraq was an extra 20% troop strength and we'd have had the place stabilized years ago. Unfortunately the penetrating analysis of CNN only goes about that far, but the more discerning among us know that that cannot possibly be the whole story.

But the Army hasn't helped the perception. According to them, those extra boots on the ground was all that it took to better stabilize the country. Patreus has even said as much in his testimony to congress and in the reports he's signed off on in the field. So here is where Rick drops the bomb.

Rick's office was unconvinced. So they initiated an investigation to see exactly what had changed, other than boots on the ground. As is turned out, not only had the number of troops on the ground increased by 20%, but air strike missions had also increased by 400%. What's more, air munitions released had increased by over 1000%, all since the beginning of the surge.

What had changed was clear. It wasn't the extra boots on the ground that was turning the tide, it was the increase in HUMINT and the ability to hit a target with precision munitions from the air within a time frame of only 7 minutes. Gatherings as small as only 3 insurgents were being targeted for strikes, while predators and forces on the ground monitored the movements of any suspected insurgent. This aggressive doctrinal change was preventing insurgents from gathering, planning, and pulling off operations. It was classic COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, conducted almost entirely from the air. But if we accept the Army's version of things, it never happened.

One reason that I like to consider myself service agnostic is that I happen to think that service rivalries are counterproductive to the national interest. This discussion so far is but one example. Once upon a time, the defense budget was stated simply as an amount, and the services then vied with one another for their slice of that pie. The role of the SECDEF was more or less an arbiter of the struggle. The various services consistently requested 30% over what was available in order to justify an increase in their share. Because oversight between the services and their budget allotments was scarce, there were many overlaps in procurement, each vying to accomplish the same mission. It wasn't until Robert Strange McNamara and his controversial "Wizkids" that this inefficient and redundant process was overhauled in the 1960s. Vestiges of it still remain today. The most apparent are the service rivalries.

As I said earlier, Rick is fond of saying that the Army does not understand airpower. He's right, they clearly do not; so much so that they are unaware of the role air power has and is playing in Iraq. Once the news of the percentage increases I mentioned earlier circulate more broadly, the Air Force will certainly rub the Army's nose in it, further discouraging the Army from wanting to think about airpower.

I was not at the Pentagon just to visit with Rick. I also met with several folks in the Irregular Warfare office in PA&E, OSD (Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense). I had a long discussion there with one old timer who was very direct about the current situation at the Pentagon. He related that the perception of the Air Force among the other services and civilians was that they were arrogant. So much so, in fact, that it was hampering communication and cooperation with them.

The Air Force has good reason to feel proud of itself. They command the largest share among the services of the defense budget, at just under 30%, their capability is unmatched by any other nation, they are perhaps the most progressive of the services in soliciting new warfighting ideas from the civilian sector, and, as they are now demonstrating, can put in place an array of sensors and firepower that is very effective at COIN operations.

Unfortunately, all of this has been done in a culture that appears to take its own prestige too seriously. The figures on percentage increases I mentioned earlier were not just compiled to help build a broad consensus picture of force effectiveness in Iraq, they were also done to discredit the Army's take on the situation. That is the sort of thing the old timer in PA&E was talking about. However, I'm not letting the Army off the hook either. That they should not even consider the contribution of the Air Force in the effectiveness of the surge in Iraq can charitably be described as petty. At worst it should be described as damagingly misleading, especially for future doctrine planners.

In the news we are lead to believe that Secretary Wynne (and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley) was fired due to the mistaken shipment of nuclear detonators to Taiwan. This is nonsense.

Right now the Air Force has a problem. Its fleet of transports and tankers are aging and need to be replaced. However, the policy in Washington, or at least that of the SECDEF, is that we are at war, and that all procurement must be for the war effort. Instead of obeying the policy of the civilian head of the DoD, Wynne went to congress and advocated to update the fleet. I'd have fired him too.

Wynne is correct to want to replace the ageing fleet. However, the outside observer must ask a simple question: why wasn't the Air Force dealing with this problem before now? Given that the Air Force commands the largest share of the defense budget, and given that it seems to have had the foresight and budget to develop and procure a fighter plane that not even our own Navy is capable of flying against in a world where the adversaries we're actually fighting don't even have an air capability, one wonders what is going on in the planning. Again, it comes down to prestige over substance. As early as the 1960's, Enthoven and Smith in their book How Much is Enough identify the tendency of the services to develop and procure new items at the expense of the readiness of the inventory they already possess. The F-22 is a classic example of this tendency.

Although I felt privileged to be present at the Pentagon as Secretary Wynne departed the building for the last time, there is no doubt in my mind that he deserved to be fired. Under his watch he allowed a culture to exist that valued its own prestige over readiness and cooperation. He defied his civilian boss in order to improve readiness of the Air Force infrastructure while billions of dollars were sunk into a fighter that is, by most measures, unnecessary. Perhaps the new Air Force leadership can make headway, but only time will tell.

-----

Five Good Reads - Galrahn, Information Dissemination

If you read one thing today, J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton's assessment on why Secretary Wynne was fired should top your list. This is an interesting assessment, because the rivalry thinking we have observed in Iraq between the Army and Air Force exists at the same level, just in different ways, between the Navy and Marines. The data revealed is also very interesting and counter to so much of the conventional wisdom put forward regarding the role of the Air Force with COIN. There appears to be data worthy of further research here, without the service rivalry interference.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

I had the honor of communicating with Tony on a weekly basis while I was assigned to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) as the chief spokesman. During this extraordinarily challenging period of time Tony continually provided me, and everyone else, with a renewed sense of pride in our mission. As a personal friend and mentor, he was an adamant supporter of our efforts to communicate all that was being accomplished by the Coalition Force and the Iraqi people during a very tumultuous period in our Nation's history. Even though his own health was failing, he provided us in Iraq with a renewed sense of purpose and enthusiasm every time we spoke.

Tony leaves behind a loving wife, Jill and three beautiful children, son Robbie and daughters, Kendall and Kristi. I would ask each of you to keep Jill and the children in your thoughts and prayers.

He also leaves behind a legacy of character in leadership, compassion for the hurting, and commitment to serving others. Each of us who had the honor of knowing him has been deeply enriched by his friendship.

I think the following clip by Bret Baier, Fox News correspondent, summarizes the enduring legacy Tony left behind for us all.

George Washington once said "Few men have virtue to withstand the highest bidder."

Tony Snow was one of those few men.

Bill Caldwell

The U.S. Army has done something remarkable in its new history of the disastrous first 18 months of the American occupation of Iraq: It has conducted a rigorous self-critique of how bad decisions were made, so that the Army won't make them again.

Civilian leaders are still mostly engaged in a blame game about Iraq, pointing fingers to explain what went wrong and to justify their own actions. That's certainly the tone of recent memoirs by Douglas Feith, the former undersecretary of defense, and L. Paul Bremer, the onetime head of the Coalition Provisional Authority. These were the people making policy, yet they treat the key mistakes as other people's fault. Feith criticizes Bremer and the CIA, while Bremer chides former defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld and the military for ignoring his advice that the United States didn't have enough troops.

The Army can't afford this sort of retroactive self-justification. Its commanders and soldiers are the ones who got stuck with the situation in Iraq and had to make it work as best they could. And this internal history, published last month under the title "On Point II," testifies to the Army's strength as a learning organization. (This study covers May 2003 to January 2005. An earlier volume, "On Point," chronicled the initial assault on Baghdad.)...

Key Quote

Politicians repeat, ad nauseam, the maxim that "those who cannot learn from history are doomed to repeat it." The U.S. Army is that rare institution in American life that is actually putting this precept into practice.

Links

On Point - Through 1 May 2003.

On Point II - May 2003 to January 2005.

... Most people still believe that the MOD is essentially a military organisation. It is not. It is an organisation dominated numerically, culturally and structurally by civil servants and consultants, many of whom are unsympathetic to its underlying purpose or even hostile to the military and its ethos. You just have to spend a few days at the MOD before you realise that the culture there is not just non-military, but anti-military...

The contrast with the US Department of Defense could not be greater. The Pentagon is a first-rate military organisation (at least in terms of status) where the MOD is not. At the Pentagon, every military person is expected to be in uniform; and it's the civilians who feel and recognise that they are the supporting cast. Military officers are frequently loaned to other ministries such as the State Department and they continue to wear their uniforms there. The reverse is true in the UK where the Civil Service and its "unions" not only resist the wearing of uniforms but also any systematic secondments (as opposed to hand-picked placements) from the military.

The MOD has slipped from being one of the top five ministries to one of second or even third rank. Moreover, even if our top generals wanted to oppose some aspect of defence policy, they would find the MOD's structure is now rigged so that civil servants increasingly come between them and the government...

Worse still, the civil servants who now dominate the MOD are a different breed from those who staffed it in the 1980s. In those days there were still many civil servants who had served in the Second World War or Korea, or who had at least done national service. They respected and understood the armed services; they believed an effective military was important and had usually learnt essential skills of leadership and management. They were loyal to the Queen (then the head of the Civil Service), to the Civil Service itself and to its code, and to the service arm they were working for. They have all gone.

Their successors tend to see the services as a tiresome anachronism, peopled by unsympathetic, old-fashioned social types. For many of them the MOD, with its part-time minister, is merely a stepping stone to greater things...

Because the services haven't had the budget increases they need to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military is running out of everything. We're running out of trucks, for instance. And when things break they aren't being replaced. Increasingly one gets the impression that the civil servants don't care if the forces are broken - their careers will not be affected. But it may also be that some civil servants and a body of politicians, from both Left and Right, would actually be happy for the military to be broken in Iraq and Afghanistan. Then they will have truly achieved the Europeanisation of Britain's armed forces along the lines of a purely defensive "UK Defence Force". War will somehow have been abolished - until, of course, it returns at a time of our enemies' choosing.

Read the entire article at Standpoint.

The first problem with that self-righteous bull is that Jefferson never said it. On the contrary, he warned of the dangers of political dissension carried to extremes.

The earliest traceable provenance of the slogan goes back to an obscure 1960s lefty who just made it up.

Dissent can be patriotic - it's essential to have an ongoing public debate about the major issues confronting us. But that dissent must be based on facts, not sloppy emotions.

Instead, we get dissent worn as a fashion statement. And fanatic dissent (as Jefferson noted) is the enemy of a democratic system.

--Ralph Peters