Small Wars Journal

Civilian Response Corps Launched

Wed, 07/16/2008 - 6:04pm
Launch of the Civilian Response Corps of the United States of America (Links Added by SWJ)

Secretary Rice delivers remarks at the State Department for the announcement of the Civilian Response Corps, 16 July 2008.

Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice formally launched the interagency Civilian Response Corps in a ceremony held at the Department of State today.

The Civilian Response Corps will consist initially of Active and Standby components. Both are composed of full-time federal employees that are trained and equipped to deploy rapidly to countries in crisis or emerging from conflict, to provide reconstruction and stabilization assistance. They are diplomats, development specialists, public health officials, law enforcement and corrections officers, engineers, economists, lawyers, public administrators, agronomists and others -- offering the full range of skills needed to help fragile states restore stability and the rule of law, and achieve economic recovery and sustainable growth as quickly as possible.

The primary responsibility of Active members is to be prepared to deploy within 48-72 hours to points of crisis. Standby members have other jobs within the federal government, but have volunteered to undertake additional training and to be available to serve in stabilization missions in case of need.

The Civilian Response Corps is a partnership of the Department of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Health and Human Services, Homeland Security, Justice, and Treasury. Senior officials from each of these agencies joined Secretary Rice at the ceremony.

At the conclusion of the ceremony, Secretary Rice was "inducted" as an Honorary Member of the Civilian Response Corps by the Director of United States Foreign Assistance and Administrator of USAID, Henrietta Fore, and the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, Ambassador John Herbst.

The President has empowered the Secretary of State to coordinate and lead integrated U.S. Government efforts to prepare, plan for, and conduct stabilization and reconstruction activities, and to coordinate with the Secretary of Defense to harmonize civilian and military activities.

This launch was made possible by the decision of Congress to appropriate up to $75 million for this purpose in the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2008 (PL 110-252). For Fiscal Year 2009, the Administration has requested funding to significantly expand the Active and Standby components of the Civilian Response Corps (to 250 and 2000 members respectively) and to create a Reserve component, made up of 2000 volunteers from the private sector and state and local governments who will bring additional skills and capabilities to the Corps that do not exist in sufficient quantities in the federal government.

For more information on the Civilian Response Corps, please contact the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization at scrs_info@state.gov or visit www.state.gov/s/crs/.

Related:

Rice Hails Corps to Rebuild Nations - Washington Times

Civilian Response Corps Gains Ground - Washington Post, 15 February 2008

Civilian Response Corps Archives - MountainRunner

Securing the Peace - Foreign Policy in Focus

Secretary Gates at the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign

Wed, 07/16/2008 - 1:49pm

Gates Highlights Role of Diplomacy, Development in U.S. Foreign Policy - John Kruzel, AFPS

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates yesterday said diplomacy and development should lead American efforts abroad, and he warned against a "creeping militarization" of U.S. foreign policy.

"Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is -- and is clearly seen to be -- in a supporting role to civilian agencies," he said.

In a speech interrupted several times by rousing applause, Gates told the audience at a dinner organized by the U.S. Global Leadership Campaign that America cannot simply "kill or capture our way to victory" over the long term.

"What the Pentagon calls 'kinetic' operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which terrorists recruit," he said.

In remarks imbued with a spirit of cooperation between the departments of Defense and State -- a relationship that in the past has been marked by contention, Gates said -- the defense secretary hailed his working relationship with Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had presented him the group's leadership award earlier in the evening...

As Delivered by Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Washington, D.C. , Tuesday, July 15, 2008 (Full Text)

Excerpts:

War on Terror

Over the long term, we cannot kill or capture our way to victory. What the Pentagon calls "kinetic" operations should be subordinate to measures to promote participation in government, economic programs to spur development, and efforts to address the grievances that often lie at the heart of insurgencies and among the discontented from which terrorists recruit. It will take the patient accumulation of quiet successes over time to discredit and defeat extremist movements and their ideology.

Failing States

I believe the most persistent and potentially dangerous threats will come less from emerging ambitious states, than from failing ones that cannot meet the basic needs - much less the aspirations - of their people.

U.S. Reputation Abroad

In my travels to foreign capitals, I have been struck by the eagerness of so many foreign governments to forge closer diplomatic and security ties with the United States - ranging from old enemies like Vietnam to new partners like India. Nonetheless, regard for the U.S. remains low amongst the populations of many key nations - especially those of our moderate Muslim allies.

This is important because much of our national security strategy depends on securing the cooperation of other nations, which will depend heavily on the extent to which our efforts abroad are viewed as legitimate by their publics. The solution is not to be found in some slick PR campaign or by trying to out propagandize al-Qaeda, but through the steady accumulation of actions and results that build trust and credibility over time.

Plus-up Civilian Agencies

It has become clear that America's civilian institutions of diplomacy and development have been chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long - relative to what we traditionally spend on the military, and more importantly, relative to the responsibilities and challenges our nation has around the world. Though I cannot pretend to know the right dollar amount - I do know it's a good deal more than the one percent of the federal budget that it is right now. Because the numbers we are talking about are relatively small compared to the rest of government, a steep increase in these capabilities is well within reach - as long as there is the political will and wisdom to do it.

Afghanistan Challenge

The vastly larger, more complex international effort in Afghanistan presents a different set of challenges. There are dozens of nations, hundreds of NGOs, universities, development banks, the United Nations, NATO, the EU - all working to help a nation beset by crushing poverty, a bumper opium crop, and a ruthless and resilient insurgency. Getting all these different elements to coordinate operations and share best practices has been a colossal - and so far an all too often unsuccessful - undertaking.

Shift to Building Capacity

Repeating an Afghanistan or Iraq - forced regime change followed by nation-building under fire - may be unlikely in the future. What is likely though, even a certainty, is the need to work with and through local governments to avoid the next insurgency, to rescue the next failing state, or to head off the next humanitarian disaster.

Militarization in Foreign Policy?

Overall, even outside Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. military has become more involved in a range of activities that in the past were perceived to be the exclusive province of civilian agencies and organizations. This has led to concern among many organizations - including probably many represented here tonight - about what's seen as a creeping "militarization" of some aspects of America's foreign policy.

This is not an entirely unreasonable sentiment. As a career CIA officer I watched with some dismay the increasing dominance of the defense 800 pound gorilla in the intelligence arena over years. But that scenario can be avoided if - as is the case with the intelligence community today - there is the right leadership, adequate funding of civilian agencies, effective coordination on the ground, and a clear understanding of the authorities, roles, and missions of military versus civilian efforts, and how they fit, or in some cases don't fit, together...

Civilian vs. Military Roles

Broadly speaking, when it comes to America's engagement with the rest of the world, it is important that the military is - and is clearly seen to be - in a supporting role to civilian agencies. Our diplomatic leaders - be they in ambassadors' suites or on the State Department's seventh floor - must have the resources and political support needed to fully exercise their statutory responsibilities in leading American foreign policy.

The challenge facing our institutions is to adapt to new realities while preserving those core competencies and institutional traits that have made them so successful in the past. The Foreign Service is not the Foreign Legion, and the U.S. military should never be mistaken for a Peace Corps with guns.

U.S. Leadership

In closing, I am convinced, irrespective of what is reported in global opinion surveys, or recounted in the latest speculation about American decline, that around the world, men and women seeking freedom from despotism, want, and fear will continue to look to the United States for leadership.

As a nation, we have, over more than two centuries, made our share of mistakes. From time to time, we have strayed from our values; and, on occasion, we have become arrogant in our dealings with others. But we have always corrected our course. And that is why today, as throughout our history, this country remains the world's most powerful force for good - the ultimate protector of what Vaclav Havel once called "civilization's thin veneer." A nation Abraham Lincoln described as mankind's "last, best hope." For any given cause or crisis, if America does not lead, then more often than not, what needs to get done simply won't get done.

Shaping the Iraq Inheritance

Wed, 07/16/2008 - 8:02am
Shaping the Iraq Inheritance

By Colin Kahl, Michele A. Flournoy and Shawn Brimley, Center for a New American Security

Synopsis:

American policy in Iraq will undergo two critical transitions throughout the remainder of 2008 and into early 2009: movement to a new U.S. posture in Iraq; and a wartime transition to a new administration. It is vital that both are handled in a way that best advances U.S. interests in Iraq and the region. Yet neither is being paid sufficient attention. Shaping the Iraq Inheritance outlines America's interests in Iraq and the region, analyzes recent security and political trends, presents a framework for understanding U.S. strategic options, and makes recommendations for how the Bush administration, the military, and Congress can best prepare for the dangerous period ahead.

The report places America's interests in Iraq within a regional and global context, and suggests that the United States must simultaneously attempt to avoid a failed state in Iraq while not strategically over-committing to Iraq. The report examines current security and political trends, and suggests that success in Iraq requires additional steps toward political accommodation and improved governance. The report then outlines a policy of conditional engagement—a strategy that initiates a phased, negotiated redeployment of U.S. forces from Iraq while conditioning residual support to the Iraqi government on continued political progress—and argues that it offers the best chance of achieving sustainable stability in Iraq while balancing U.S. commitments worldwide.

Finally, the report outlines steps that must be taken to smooth the handover of Iraq policy from this administration to the next. The Bush administration must prioritize preparation in three areas over the next six months: the development of an interagency transition plan; enhancing the situational awareness of both the Republican and Democratic Presidential candidates and their top national security advisers on Iraq; and hand-tooling personnel transitions for senior positions critical to Iraq policy and operations.

The Frontline Country Team

Wed, 07/16/2008 - 8:01am
The Frontline Country Team

A Model for Engagement

By Christopher Griffin and Thomas Donnelly, American Enterprise Institute

Foreward:

For over sixty years, the United States has sought to build the capabilities of its allies and security partners. This is a mission that has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and it is one that any administration, be it Democratic or Republican, will inherit in January 2009. As a longstanding strategic goal, building partnership capacity has also dredged up a series of contradictions and conundrums for American policymaking, as officials attempt to foster governance without fueling dictatorships, engage "frontline states" without becoming enmeshed in their internal feuds, and manage the details of convoluted international partnerships from the confines of Washington. Resolving these contradictions - or at least mitigating them - is the principal ongoing challenge of American security cooperation programs.

In this report, we provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs, as well as a modest proposal for how they may be improved in the future. We find that many of the authorities and instruments for engagement already exist, but that they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the "frontline country team," in which the ambassador is responsible for coordinating and directing American policy. We argue that the country team is the point at which the rubber of American policy hits the road and where it will ultimately succeed or fail.

As we prepared this report, we benefited tremendously from the insight, advice, and support of several friends and colleagues. Our colleague Gary J. Schmitt both worked with us to develop the frontline country team concept and, in his capacity as director of the American Enterprise Institute's Program on Advanced Strategic Studies, provided crucial support to get this project off the ground. Col. Robert Killebrew (USA, Ret.) was a key partner as we developed the "frontline country team" proposal, as well as the seminar game in which we tested it. A wide number of current and former U.S. diplomats, soldiers, and officials provided crucial input based upon their experiences in the field and in Washington. The Smith Richardson Foundation generously provided support for the Indonesia seminar game. This project could not have been completed without the tireless efforts of AEI research assistants Tim Sullivan and Catherine Hamilton. Needless to say, all errors and omissions in this report are those of the authors.

MacFarland and McMaster to Get First Star

Tue, 07/15/2008 - 7:03pm
Heroes of Ramadi, Tal Afar to Get First Star by Jeff Schogol, Stars and Stripes.

Army Cols. Sean B. MacFarland and H.R. McMaster Jr. have been selected for brigadier general pending Senate confirmation, officials said.

MacFarland was commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division in May 2006 when the unit was sent to Ramadi, then one of the worst places in Iraq for US troops.

During his tenure in Ramadi, MacFarland's troops worked with local tribes and established combat outposts to take the initiative away from the insurgents...

McMaster, then commander of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment, ordered his troops to treat detainees humanely, reached out to local Sunni Arabs to separate them from the insurgents, and he established patrol bases throughout the city, The Washington Post reported in 2006.

In late 2005, he launched Operation Restore Rights to take back the city from insurgents.

By the time the unit left in early 2006, the mayor of Tal Afar wrote a letter to the commander of US troops in Iraq praising the regiment...

Report: AFRICOM Criticized by Refugees International

Tue, 07/15/2008 - 6:32pm

Got the following in an e-mail today - will follow up here as I hope to get a spot on a Thursday teleconference with the author of the report...

(Links and emphasis by SWJ)

Dear Dave,

In a post about AFRICOM last year, you wrote: "Regardless of where you might stand on the value of establishing this new command, it is happening and we need to get it right." Refugees International is releasing a report this Thursday, July 17 that lays out recommendations for the US to get AFRICOM right, and much of it has to do with the interagency collaboration you proposed.

The report also analyzes the ways in which US foreign aid in Africa—and the world over—is becoming increasingly militarized, in some cases to the detriment of long-term security and humanitarian and development investment. On Thursday, July 17 at 12pm ET, there will be a phone briefing on the report with the report's author, Mark Malan, and Ken Bacon, President of Refugees International.

In the report, Mark Malan (Peace Building Program Manager for Refugees International and former head of research for Kofi Annan's International Peacekeeping Centre in Ghana) asserts that AFRICOM is enabling the Department of Defense to take over funds that were previously managed by the State Department and USAID. For example, the percentage of Official Development Assistance that the Pentagon controls has skyrocketed from 3.5% to nearly 22% in the past decade, while the percentage controlled by USAID has shrunk from 65% to 40%.

The report argues Pentagon programs in Africa fund immediate, short-term security programs rather than the broader US commitment to aid the growth of prosperous, stable countries. For example, more than half of the FY09 requested budget for Foreign Military Financing in Africa is for just two countries -- Djibouti and Ethiopia -- that are considered key partners in the continental War on Terror. As a result, 17 African Union member states have refused to host AFRICOM operations on their soil, viewing the US agency as an occupying force rather than a solution to long-term stability and security needs.

In spite of AFRICOM's drawbacks, however, Refugees International contends that AFRICOM could have an extremely positive impact on the region. A meaningful collaboration among the State Department, USAID and the Defense Department could kill three birds with one stone: help the US and African nations to fight terrorism, assist African countries with sustainable economic development, and build goodwill on the ground among humanitarian agencies, African legislators and civilians.

The report will be available for download at 12 am, July 17 at www.refugeesinternational.org.

JP 3-57: Civil-Military Operations

Tue, 07/15/2008 - 6:07pm
Joint Publication (JP) 3-57, Civil-Military Operations, was revised and approved 8 July 2008 and supersedes JP 3-57, dated 8 February 2001; and JP 3-57.1, dated 14 April 2008.

Summary of Contents:

(1) Describes Civil-Military Operations across the Range of Military Operations and the Levels of War

(2) Discusses the Objectives of Civil-Military Operations

(3) Discusses the Role of Civil-Military Operations within the Phases of a Joint Campaign

(4) Describes the Relationships Between Civil-Military Operations and Civil Affairs Operations

(5) Describes Commander Responsibilities for Civil-Military Operations

(6) Discusses the Organizations Providing Civil-Military Operations Capabilities

(7) Describes Civil-Military Operations Strategic and Operational Planning Considerations

(8) Discusses Civil-Military Operations Coordination Requirements and Organizations

Summary of Changes:

(1) Consolidates JP 3-57.1, Joint Doctrine for Civil Affairs, and JP 3-57 formerly titled Joint Doctrine for Civil-Military Operations

(2) Emphasizes that civil-military operations (CMO) are an inherent responsibility of command and facilitate accomplishment of the Commander's mission

(3) Amplifies the use of CMO as a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats in the 21st century

(4) Addresses provincial reconstruction teams

(5) Enhances the discussion of CMO objectives

(6) Discusses the relationship between CMO and civil affairs operations

(7) Addresses how CMO support operations and activities as they relate to the phasing model (i.e., Shape, Deter, Seize Initiative, Dominate, Stabilize, Enable Civil Authorities)

(8) Relates Chapter III, "Planning," to the planning process as addressed in JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, and provides an Appendix B, "Planning Considerations for Civil Affairs Operations"

(9) Provides an in-depth discussion of the relationship between CMO and the interagency, intergovernmental organizations, nongovernmental organizations, indigenous populations and institutions, and the private sector

(10) Updates Appendix A, "Service Capabilities"

(11) Provides definitions for civil affairs operations, indigenous populations and institutions, private sector, and provincial reconstruction team

(12) Modifies the definition of Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC)

The Demise of Secretary Wynne

Mon, 07/14/2008 - 6:30pm
The Demise of Secretary Wynne

By J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton

Recently I was privileged to witness a small piece of history. While visiting a friend at the Pentagon, I stood next to the office door of Secretary of the Air Force Michael W. Wynne as he left the building for the last time. After he left, and while all the rooms were still empty, I was given a quick tour of the offices. Surrounded by giant paintings of airpower, it was difficult not to reflect upon the current situation and how he got there.

My friend is Special Assistant to Secretary Wynne, Dr. Richard Andres, and once the Secretary had left, we sat down and had a long discussion on current topics. Rick and I have discussed our opinions on air power and the military many times before, and while I consider myself to be service agnostic, Rick is very much biased toward the Air Force, and I think with good reason.

Something I've often heard Rick say, and I believe he is correct, is that the Army does not understand air power. Often their plans minimize its use, and their after action reports under report its effectiveness. Case in point, the surge in Iraq. While sitting in Ricks E ring office, he asked me point blank whether or not I believed a 20% increase (or "surge") in troop strength could really make much difference to the situation. It was obviously a baited question, but it wasn't one I had to think about much. To my mind, the increase could not have been that effective; there had to have been some fundamental doctrinal change in order for that small an increase to have had the dramatic effect that it's had. Prior to this discussion, I'd already been pondering the issue for some time.

Sadly, civilians like me who do not have a clearance are left to fend for themselves when it comes to gathering information. Between the coverage of American Idol contestants and Britney Spears' mental condition, we're occasionally treated to an update of what's going on in the world. Taken at face value, all we ever needed in Iraq was an extra 20% troop strength and we'd have had the place stabilized years ago. Unfortunately the penetrating analysis of CNN only goes about that far, but the more discerning among us know that that cannot possibly be the whole story.

But the Army hasn't helped the perception. According to them, those extra boots on the ground was all that it took to better stabilize the country. Patreus has even said as much in his testimony to congress and in the reports he's signed off on in the field. So here is where Rick drops the bomb.

Rick's office was unconvinced. So they initiated an investigation to see exactly what had changed, other than boots on the ground. As is turned out, not only had the number of troops on the ground increased by 20%, but air strike missions had also increased by 400%. What's more, air munitions released had increased by over 1000%, all since the beginning of the surge.

What had changed was clear. It wasn't the extra boots on the ground that was turning the tide, it was the increase in HUMINT and the ability to hit a target with precision munitions from the air within a time frame of only 7 minutes. Gatherings as small as only 3 insurgents were being targeted for strikes, while predators and forces on the ground monitored the movements of any suspected insurgent. This aggressive doctrinal change was preventing insurgents from gathering, planning, and pulling off operations. It was classic COIN (Counterinsurgency) operations, conducted almost entirely from the air. But if we accept the Army's version of things, it never happened.

One reason that I like to consider myself service agnostic is that I happen to think that service rivalries are counterproductive to the national interest. This discussion so far is but one example. Once upon a time, the defense budget was stated simply as an amount, and the services then vied with one another for their slice of that pie. The role of the SECDEF was more or less an arbiter of the struggle. The various services consistently requested 30% over what was available in order to justify an increase in their share. Because oversight between the services and their budget allotments was scarce, there were many overlaps in procurement, each vying to accomplish the same mission. It wasn't until Robert Strange McNamara and his controversial "Wizkids" that this inefficient and redundant process was overhauled in the 1960s. Vestiges of it still remain today. The most apparent are the service rivalries.

As I said earlier, Rick is fond of saying that the Army does not understand airpower. He's right, they clearly do not; so much so that they are unaware of the role air power has and is playing in Iraq. Once the news of the percentage increases I mentioned earlier circulate more broadly, the Air Force will certainly rub the Army's nose in it, further discouraging the Army from wanting to think about airpower.

I was not at the Pentagon just to visit with Rick. I also met with several folks in the Irregular Warfare office in PA&E, OSD (Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of Secretary of Defense). I had a long discussion there with one old timer who was very direct about the current situation at the Pentagon. He related that the perception of the Air Force among the other services and civilians was that they were arrogant. So much so, in fact, that it was hampering communication and cooperation with them.

The Air Force has good reason to feel proud of itself. They command the largest share among the services of the defense budget, at just under 30%, their capability is unmatched by any other nation, they are perhaps the most progressive of the services in soliciting new warfighting ideas from the civilian sector, and, as they are now demonstrating, can put in place an array of sensors and firepower that is very effective at COIN operations.

Unfortunately, all of this has been done in a culture that appears to take its own prestige too seriously. The figures on percentage increases I mentioned earlier were not just compiled to help build a broad consensus picture of force effectiveness in Iraq, they were also done to discredit the Army's take on the situation. That is the sort of thing the old timer in PA&E was talking about. However, I'm not letting the Army off the hook either. That they should not even consider the contribution of the Air Force in the effectiveness of the surge in Iraq can charitably be described as petty. At worst it should be described as damagingly misleading, especially for future doctrine planners.

In the news we are lead to believe that Secretary Wynne (and Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Michael Moseley) was fired due to the mistaken shipment of nuclear detonators to Taiwan. This is nonsense.

Right now the Air Force has a problem. Its fleet of transports and tankers are aging and need to be replaced. However, the policy in Washington, or at least that of the SECDEF, is that we are at war, and that all procurement must be for the war effort. Instead of obeying the policy of the civilian head of the DoD, Wynne went to congress and advocated to update the fleet. I'd have fired him too.

Wynne is correct to want to replace the ageing fleet. However, the outside observer must ask a simple question: why wasn't the Air Force dealing with this problem before now? Given that the Air Force commands the largest share of the defense budget, and given that it seems to have had the foresight and budget to develop and procure a fighter plane that not even our own Navy is capable of flying against in a world where the adversaries we're actually fighting don't even have an air capability, one wonders what is going on in the planning. Again, it comes down to prestige over substance. As early as the 1960's, Enthoven and Smith in their book How Much is Enough identify the tendency of the services to develop and procure new items at the expense of the readiness of the inventory they already possess. The F-22 is a classic example of this tendency.

Although I felt privileged to be present at the Pentagon as Secretary Wynne departed the building for the last time, there is no doubt in my mind that he deserved to be fired. Under his watch he allowed a culture to exist that valued its own prestige over readiness and cooperation. He defied his civilian boss in order to improve readiness of the Air Force infrastructure while billions of dollars were sunk into a fighter that is, by most measures, unnecessary. Perhaps the new Air Force leadership can make headway, but only time will tell.

-----

Five Good Reads - Galrahn, Information Dissemination

If you read one thing today, J. Bernhard "Jon" Compton's assessment on why Secretary Wynne was fired should top your list. This is an interesting assessment, because the rivalry thinking we have observed in Iraq between the Army and Air Force exists at the same level, just in different ways, between the Navy and Marines. The data revealed is also very interesting and counter to so much of the conventional wisdom put forward regarding the role of the Air Force with COIN. There appears to be data worthy of further research here, without the service rivalry interference.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Remembering Tony Snow

Sun, 07/13/2008 - 5:11pm
Yesterday our Nation lost one of our finest leaders, Tony Snow, who passed away at age 53 after a long struggle with cancer. Tony was a man who was deeply committed to his faith, family, and to his fellow man. Tony also passionately supported our men and women serving in uniform and was deeply moved anytime he had the opportunity to speak with them and hear the stories of their bravery and sacrifice.

I had the honor of communicating with Tony on a weekly basis while I was assigned to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) as the chief spokesman. During this extraordinarily challenging period of time Tony continually provided me, and everyone else, with a renewed sense of pride in our mission. As a personal friend and mentor, he was an adamant supporter of our efforts to communicate all that was being accomplished by the Coalition Force and the Iraqi people during a very tumultuous period in our Nation's history. Even though his own health was failing, he provided us in Iraq with a renewed sense of purpose and enthusiasm every time we spoke.

Tony leaves behind a loving wife, Jill and three beautiful children, son Robbie and daughters, Kendall and Kristi. I would ask each of you to keep Jill and the children in your thoughts and prayers.

He also leaves behind a legacy of character in leadership, compassion for the hurting, and commitment to serving others. Each of us who had the honor of knowing him has been deeply enriched by his friendship.

I think the following clip by Bret Baier, Fox News correspondent, summarizes the enduring legacy Tony left behind for us all.

George Washington once said "Few men have virtue to withstand the highest bidder."

Tony Snow was one of those few men.

Bill Caldwell