While The Times article is generally sympathetic to Miller's claim that General Kelly's decision was "absolute censorship"

I took pictures of something they didn't like, and they removed me. Deciding what I can and cannot document, I don't see a clearer definition of censorship.

and evokes the now standard-issue Vietnam War comparison,

If the conflict in Vietnam was notable for open access given to journalists - too much, many critics said, as the war played out nightly in bloody newscasts - the Iraq war may mark an opposite extreme: after five years and more than 4,000 American combat deaths, searches and interviews turned up fewer than a half-dozen graphic photographs of dead American soldiers.

credit must be given to the authors, Michael Kamber and Tim Arango, for presenting the bottom-line concerning this dust-up (bolded emphasis by SWJ):

It is a complex issue, with competing claims often difficult to weigh in an age of instant communication around the globe via the Internet, in which such images can add to the immediate grief of families and the anger of comrades still in the field.

While the Bush administration faced criticism for overt political manipulation in not permitting photos of flag-draped coffins, the issue is more emotional on the battlefield: local military commanders worry about security in publishing images of the American dead as well as an affront to the dignity of fallen comrades. Most newspapers refuse to publish such pictures as a matter of policy.

But opponents of the war, civil liberties advocates and journalists argue that the public portrayal of the war is being sanitized and that Americans who choose to do so have the right to see - in whatever medium - the human cost of a war that polls consistently show is unpopular with Americans.

Those who know General Kelly will tell you -- he is the consummate professional - and would not take such action lightly. As a commander in combat, responsible for the lives of thousands of US and Iraqi military personnel and civilians -- as well as protecting the emotional well-being and privacy rights of the families of his Marines, he made a tough call -- the right call.

Times have changed, this ain't Vietnam, in this era of global instantaneous communication it would be foolish to cede the 'war of ideas' to our murderous adversaries by presenting them propaganda fodder, presenting those same murderers with near real-time "battlefield damage assessment" and assume away the notion that family members will never receive notification of a loved-ones death via an Internet image or blog post. This is just plain common sense as well as common decency.

Miller is a very talented photographer and should be admired for his courage to go in harm's way in pursuit of his chosen profession. He should recognize that equally talented and courageous professionals are tasked with a responsibility well beyond that of an independent photojournalist -- they make the day-to-day tough decisions and move on to other pressing matters. Miller and his cheerleaders should do likewise.

Synopsis: The next president of the United States must forge a new national security strategy in a world marked by enormous tumult and change and at a time when America's international standing and strategic position are at an historic nadir. Many of our allies question our motives and methods; our enemies doubt American rhetoric and resolve. Now, more than at any time since the late 1940s, it is vital to chart a new direction for America's global role.

About the Phoenix Initiative: The Phoenix Initiative is a collective effort to provide an intellectual and policy framework for the next administration. The group initially came together three years ago to discuss on a regular basis the state of the world, America's place in it, and the best ways for advancing America's interest and values. Our goal was to develop ideas and concepts that made sense from a policy—as opposed to a political—perspective and to make the case for them on that basis alone. That is also the basis of this first report—a manifesto meant to marshal the best practices and ideas of the progressive tradition in U.S. foreign policy and adapt them to a rapidly changing world.

Preface by Susan E. Rice: As one of the founders of the original Phoenix Initiative in early 2005, I felt strongly that it was time for a group of younger foreign policy thinkers to come together and work through common positions not only on a set of specific issues, but also on how America should define and pursue its interests in a post-Cold War world, a world still resistant to tidy categorization. The point was not to write a paper in support of a specific candidate or for a specific occasion or political purpose, but instead to consider a fresh strategic perspective. I regret that my responsibilities as a Senior Advisor to the Obama campaign prevented me from seeing this project to fruition.

Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy is the product of over three years of discussions and debate on everything from fundamental assumptions about the nature of the international order in the 21st century to US policy toward the Middle East. At a time when the United States truly must rise from the ashes of a failed foreign policy, this report breaks away from such traditional concepts as containment, engagement, and enlargement and rejects standard dichotomies of realist power politics versus liberal idealism. It starts from a set of US national interests as old as the nation itself and asks how we can safeguard and pursue those interests in this 21st century world. Without pretense of answering all questions and addressing all issues, the report offers bold and genuinely new thinking about America's role in such a world.

Strategic Leadership: Framework for a 21st Century National Security Strategy

The Council on Foreign Relations has posted an interview with Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict & Interdependent Capabilities) Michael Vickers concerning current and future trends in special operations warfare.

CFR: Michael G. Vickers was among the key architects behind the paramilitary operation that drove the Soviets out of Afghanistan. Now, three decades later, he is the top civilian advisor in the Pentagon on the capabilities of US Special Operations forces, the fastest growing branch of the US military. That growth is likely to continue. In Iraq, for example, Vickers says he expects Special Operations Forces to "remain at their current levels for a significant period of time" after the majority of conventional US forces leave. He also expects a protracted Special Operations presence in Afghanistan.

Beyond the current war zones, Vickers says the Pentagon is watching "scores" of high-priority countries in the global fight against terror. And while Vickers says the battle against extremism "is fundamentally winnable," victory will take years. "Most irregular wars take time to win. They typically take a decade or more when they involve a single country," he says. "One that takes advantage of globalization and spans continents can be expected to take at least that amount of time, or more."

Current and Future Trends in Special Operations Warfare - CFR interview by Greg Bruno.

... combines the culinary mastery of "Iron Chef" with the biting and acerbic wit of Jon Stewart's "Daily Show".

Mess hall chow or MRE's got you down? Yes? Then you might want to go native - Chris Fair's Cuisines of the Axis of Evil and Other Irritating States: A Dinner Party Approach to International Relations can certainly get you started. The SWJ editors plan on serving up Kabob Qabergha and Pullow at our next Small Wars Council non-virtual get-together.

From the Inside Flap: Chris Fair has dined with soldiers in the Khyber Pass and with prostitutes in Delhi, rummaged for fish in Jaffna city, the epicenter of Tamil Tiger violence in Sri Lanka; and sipped Taliban tea in Peshawar. Both gastronomically and geographically speaking, she has been there, done that—and, above all, eaten that.

Cuisines of the Axis of Evil is a lively, provocative, and highly entertaining cookbook with a twist: a whole host of delectable, easy-to-follow recipes straight out of the kitchens of America's biggest foreign policy headaches, whether friends or foes—from Iraq, Israel, and Pakistan to Iran, North Korea, and Cuba. Fair takes us country by country across the globe and then back to the heart of the Good Ol' U.S. of A. Recipes include Iranian chicken in a walnut pomegranate stew, Iraqi kibbe, and North Korean spicy cucumber, as well as special teas, mango salads, beverage suggestions, and more.

Sardonic, satiric, grouchy, and just plain funny, with a heaping scoop of hyperbole, this mouthwatering masterpiece shows us that the only way to defeat (or befriend) your enemies is to know precisely what they eat. What could be a more unique gift for an intrepid host or hostess, or a better resource for unforgettable dinner parties? Cuisines of the Axis of Evil is food for thought - and for the taste buds... Ladies and gentlemen, sharpen your knives and start your blenders!

Chris Fair is a Washington, DC-based analyst of South Asian political and military affairs. She has lived, studied, traveled, worked, and otherwise eaten her way through the Middle East and South and Southeast Asia. She lives bunkered down in an undisclosed location with her beloved spouse who now feels he must wear high-velocity bullet-repellent evening wear.

The Summer 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Since its inception more than 30 years ago our journal has provided a forum for the presentation of contemporary issues and contending ideas from within the defense community, academe, and the media. In this issue we are indeed fortunate to be able to present an eclectic array of articles supporting that tradition. The diversity of topics and subject matter experts provides an opportunity to address a number of pressing defense and security issues; chief among which are the principles supporting successful leadership of America's military in the twenty-first century...

Reflections on Leadership by Robert Gates

Last year I read Partners in Command, a book by Mark Perry. It is an account of the unique relationship between General Dwight D. Eisenhower and General George Marshall, and how they played a significant role in the American victory in World War II and laid the foundations for future success in the earliest years of the Cold War. Eisenhower and Marshall are, of course, icons, legends etched in granite. Their portraits hang in my office.

One of the things I found compelling in Partners in Command is how they were both influenced by another senior Army officer who is not nearly as well-known and in fact, as a reader of history, I had never heard of. His name is General Fox Conner, a tutor and mentor to both Eisenhower and Marshall. Conner and Marshall first became friends when they served together on the staff of General "Black Jack" Pershing during World War I. In the 1920s, Eisenhower served as staff assistant under Brigadier General Conner in the Panama Canal Zone.

Aligning "Soft" with "Hard" Power by Henrietta Holsman Fore

Last November, Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates gave a speech that was described as "groundbreaking" in the manner in which it addressed the role of development and defense in meeting the national security challenges facing the United States. "One of the most important lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan is that military success is not sufficient to win," Secretary Gates stated:

Economic development, institution-building, and the rule of law, promoting internal reconciliation, good governance, providing basic services to the people, training and equipping indigenous military and police forces, strategic communications, and more—these, along with security, are essential ingredients for long-term success.

This article will address the importance of collaboration between American development agencies and the US military, the new means of driving that collaboration deeper into the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the interagency process, and the ways USAID will evolve in its relationship with the Department of Defense in the twenty-first century; especially as related to the role of development in achieving national security imperatives. Few subjects could be timelier or more important.

Theory of Victory by J. Boone Bartholomees

The United States is developing a reputation much like Germany had in the twentieth century of being tactically and operationally superb but strategically inept. Often stated as a tendency to win the war but lose the peace, this problem has a huge theoretical component that the national security community has only recently begun to address. In fact, the concept of victory is the biggest theoretical challenge facing security professionals today.

The security profession needs a basic theoretical construct within which to think about winning wars. Gallons of ink have been expended over the centuries on how to win wars, but that effort has largely been uninformed by even a rudimentary theory of victory. Many existing theories pay little attention to what victory is and why one wins, going instead to the more difficult issue of how one wins. When theorists do address winning, it is usually in passing, as an assumption, or as an excursion from their primary topic. Clausewitz is an exception to this assertion, but his musings on winning are scattered and incomplete. There is a school of thought that claims theory is not necessary for competent performance. While that might explain how mankind has gone without a theory of victory for so long, it does not negate the utility of theory. Existing theories of war are not necessarily wrong; they simply might benefit from some supplemental thought specifically devoted to victory. Fortunately, the extant theoretical literature contains enough material to begin constructing a theory of victory.

Waging Communication War by Kenneth Payne

In Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States is fighting wars in which the effective communication of ideas and information is vital. Strategists in both these conflicts increasingly share with classic counterinsurgency theorists a keen appreciation that they are fighting for the support of the population, and that communication is a key part of the struggle.

This article sets out to explore the ramifications of this feature of modern war. Communications may be vital, but how should the operational and tactical commander use them to best advantage? Why have US military and civilian authorities found effective communication so difficult in the current struggle against militant Islamism?

The US military has now formally incorporated what might be called communication war into doctrine, both in its dedicated counterinsurgency field manual and in its newly updated operational field manual, cornerstone of overall doctrine. Both manuals go into some detail about the importance of communication and related concepts, such as the media, public affairs, psychological operations, and information operations. While the manuals offer compelling advice on what should be achieved in the information domain, guidance on how to achieve it is somewhat lacking. This distinction reflects the complexity of communication in warfare, particularly in wars involving irregular forces engaged in insurgency. Many actors and variables are involved, and few of them are under the direct control of those in the operational chain of command.

Making Revolutionary Change: Airpower in COIN Today by Charles J. Dunlap, Jr.

What a difference a year makes. The idea that airpower would be playing a critical role in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars would hardly have been predicted in December 2006, when the Army and Marine Corps issued a completely revised—but airpower "lite"—counterinsurgency (COIN) manual commonly known as Field Manual (FM) 3-24. Complimentary reviews appeared in unlikely venues such as The New York Times Book Review. What seems to have captured the imagination of many who might otherwise be hostile to any military doctrine were the manual's much-discussed "Zen-like" characteristics, particularly its popular "Paradoxes" section. This part of the manual contained such trendy (if ultimately opaque) dictums as "sometimes, the more force is used, the less effective it is" and "some of the best weapons for counterinsurgents do not shoot."

These maxims helped create the perception that the new doctrine was a "kinder and gentler" form of COIN that largely eschewed the concept of "killing or capturing" enemy fighters as a means of suppressing an insurgency. Supporting this interpretation is the fact that FM 3-24 favors deploying enormous numbers of forces—20 per 1,000 residents—each of whom, according to the manual, "must be prepared to become . . . a social worker, a civil engineer, a school teacher, a nurse, a boy scout." Further, as popularly understood, the aim of this revamped force was not to confront the insurgents themselves, but rather to win "hearts and minds" of the indigenous population. To do so, the manual prefers a low-tech approach compatible with traditional Army culture that has individual soldiers engaging in close, personal contact with the "target." In FM 3-24's interpretation of COIN, that target is a country's populace.

Collaborative Strategic Planning and Action: A New Approach by Fred T. Krawchuk

The complexity of the contemporary US security environment demands a new, comprehensive way of assessing and contending with the ongoing challenges. The current method can be characterized as a symptomatic rather than systemic approach. The present interagency and multinational mechanism consists of reacting to immediate threats and opportunities, dealing with the conditions of violent extremism, and responding to each crisis as it arises. Such actions are often slow, isolated, and wholly inadequate. Government planners and operators focus on immediate response to a crisis without considering the long-term implications. Academicians and members of think tanks focus on long-term solutions and potential policy changes, without means of testing their proposals or getting the information to those who would act on it. The private sector pays for forecasts and data-mining to understand and profile the same areas of concern, yet military planners do not benefit because they lack adequate access to academic endeavors or private-sector reports.

Combatant Commands (COCOMs) need to find methods of integrating the agility and innovation of the private sector with the foundational knowledge of academic efforts to meet the emergent needs of military commanders and planners. With the proper kind of creative thinkers and pragmatic project managers, COCOMs can forge helpful bonds with —partners, while leveraging the knowledge and experience of the private and public sectors. This integration of resources and expertise will help foment and nurture the conditions for peace and stability in conflict-prone regions.

With Friends Like These: Grievance, Governance, and Capacity-Building in COIN by Robert M. Chamberlain

A consensus is emerging in the Army about the standard template for counterinsurgency: first clear an area of insurgent fighters; then implement population control measures to ensure the insurgents do not come back; and finally focus efforts on building governmental capacity so the population embraces the state and rejects the insurgents. This template makes a critical assumption about the government being restored—namely, that enhancing the power of the state will make the population less likely to support insurgents. This article questions that assumption by applying the doctrine outlined in Field Manual (FM) 3-24, Counterinsurgency, to the 1980-91 insurgency in El Salvador. While the Salvadoran insurgency ended 17 years ago, its lessons are a valuable guide for leaders attempting to make sense of the contradictions inherent in fighting the Long War.

To understand the war in El Salvador, it is necessary to explore the structure of Salvadoran society. The interwoven structures of economic, political, and military power and their human consequences are critical to understanding the motivations of the insurgents of the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the government response, and the overall progression of the war.

Retiring Hitler and "Appeasement" from the National Security Debate by Jeffrey Record

It is high time to retire Adolf Hitler and "appeasement" from the national security debate. The repeated analogizing of current threats to the menace of Hitler in the 1930s, and comparing diplomatic efforts to Anglo-French placating of the Nazi dictator, has spoiled the true meaning of appeasement, distorted sound thinking regarding national security challenges and responses, and falsified history. For the past six decades every President except Jimmy Carter has routinely invoked the Munich analogy as a means of inflating national security threats and demonizing dictators. Presidents and their spokespersons have not only believed the analogy but also used it to mobilize public opinion for war. After all, if the enemy really is another Hitler, then force becomes mandatory, and the sooner it is used the better. More recently, neoconservatives and their allies in government have branded as appeasers any and all proponents of using nonviolent conflict resolution to negotiate with hostile dictatorships. For neoconservatives, to appease is to be naí¯ve, cowardly, and soft on the threat du jour, be it terrorism, a rogue state, or a rising great power. To appease is to be a Chamberlain rather than a Churchill, to comprise with evil rather than slay it.

Lost for Words: The Intelligence Community's Struggle to Find its Voice by Josh Kerbel

In the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the Iraq intervention, most of the national security components of the US government have had some—mostly overdue—introspective moments. Such reviews can only be considered healthy. For as Sun Tzu, the Chinese military and intelligence theorist, said, "Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundred battles you will never be in peril." The fact is, however, that many of those governmental components did not necessarily like what they saw looking back at them from the mirror. This result was particularly true of the intelligence community, which found its own self-identity issues staring back with an unnerving intensity.

To be blunt, the intelligence community, which for the purposes of this article refers mainly to the analytic component, still does not "know itself." That is to say, 60-plus years after its creation as a "community"—making the point that this identity crisis is not solely the product of post-9/11 and Iraq soul-searching—America's intelligence analysts still cannot agree on an answer to that most fundamental question of analytic identity: What exactly is intelligence analysis?

Quite possibly, this analytic identity crisis has been summarized best in writing by the intelligence community itself. In 2005, the Central Intelligence Agency's Center for the Study of Intelligence published an unclassified ethnographic study of the community's analytic component which, based on hundreds of interviews with analysts and countless hours watching them work, found that "heterogeneous descriptions and definitions of intelligence analysis as a professional discipline were consistent findings." Consequently, the study went on to conclude, there still "needs to be a clear articulation and dissemination of the identity and epistemology of intelligence analysis."

Editor's Shelf

Book Reviews

Off the Press

Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles J. Dunlap Jr. is not a fighter pilot, wing commander or war planner. But he is waging what many officers consider a crucial battle: ensuring that the U.S. military is ready for a major war.

Dunlap, like many officers across the military, believes the armed forces must prepare for a large-scale war against technologically sophisticated, well-equipped adversaries, rather than long-term ground conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan.

First, however, they face an adversary much closer to home -- Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates...

Many veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan side squarely with Gates. They believe future conflicts will look like the current wars, and argue that the U.S. must not lose its newfound expertise in counterinsurgency warfare.

"I think that nation-state and conventional war is in a state of hibernation," said Marine Gen. James N. Mattis, who commanded U.S. forces in Fallouja in 2004. "I don't think it's gone away, but the most likely threats probably today are not going to be conventional or from another state."

Mattis argues that the current fight is not an interlude.

"I recognize some people want to say: 'Let's hold our breath. The irregular world will go away, then we can get back to good old soldiering again,' " he said. "Unfortunately, in war, the enemy gets a vote."...

A Battle Over 'the Next War'