By Jason Port

As we have moved from the dynamic fight of the high intensity conflict into the counterinsurgency aspects of today's endeavors, we find our lower leaders being used more as strategic assets and less so as the pointy end of the spear. Solutions for problems are no longer counted in rounds expended, and diplomacy at the muzzle end of the rifle is no longer an option. Over the past five years our company, CC Intelligent Solutions, working with units like the XVIII Airborne Corps and the 82nd Airborne Division found that by mining tactical data at the forward edge, soldiers on the ground were leaving on patrols better prepared to meet the current threats. In addition, we found that analysts on high were better able to forecast the actions of the enemy. It is our belief that by tracking the non-kinetic aspects of our operations in a similar, digital fashion, we would be able to better predict the benefits we receive by taking certain actions over others. Further, we would be able to help commanders make decisions based on facts and history, rather than gut instincts alone.

These ideas are based on what we saw as the combat events reporting and management system for the Coalition Joint Task Force in Afghanistan during OEF 06-08 and for Multinational Corps-Iraq (XVIII Airborne Corps) in OIF 05-07. Our system fundamentally collected operational reports from the forward leaders via a browser based interface and stored the information for retrieval and reporting later. Further, these reports were managed based on priority and matching certain criteria, moving them up the chain of command as required by the policies in place. Once captured the data was disseminated around the world within 45 minutes so that experts in the Pentagon and elsewhere had the same data as the next patrol out of the gate. Further, as we focused on interoperability between systems, we shared the data via a variety of mechanisms to get the information into other tools like Analysts Notebook, Command Post of the Future (CPoF) and Maneuver Control Systems (MCS). This approach enabled soldiers throughout the SIPRNet cloud to see the information and respond to it in near real time.

The Theory

We posit that by taking a similar approach with non-kinetic reports, we would allow our Civil Affairs (CA) elements and non-governmental organizations to make more effective use of resources by employing them at locations which will receive the highest return on investment. Further, by tracking these projects centrally, enablers across the battlespace can eliminate redundant efforts at the earliest available time rather than waiting until completion to see two wells dug 100 yards apart.

During our work in Iraq, an anecdote was told to one of our analysts. A CA leader working in a village set about building a bridge which would connect two towns, improving commerce and building cross-community relationships. The CA leader went to the local construction crew and paid them to build a bridge which would meet this need. A Department of State field officer came to a similar conclusion around the value of a bridge, and she too went about contracting with the same builder to build a bridge in the same location for the same purposes. Shortly thereafter, a representative from an NGO came to the town and they too paid this same crew for a bridge in the same location. The bridge builder successfully built this bridge, and then left town to perform similar work on the other side of the country, leaving with three times the pay, and only one bridge. This story was related to us three years ago, while we were working in Iraq, but as we helped the transition to CJTF-101 in OEF recently, the systems in place had not significantly improved.

Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) -- The First Step in the Solution

By aligning project development under a common collaboration system, the warfigher and their counterparts above could have ensured that they were sharing their project data. CJTF-82, under BG David Rodriguez was moving in this direction by controlling the flow of project dollars. They had automated the process of submitting for funding for commander sponsored projects; for example, battalion commanders could request funding for development of a new school in their area of operations. The associated workflow allowed the request to move through channels digitally, and ensured that the dollars were being spent on relevant projects. By doing this, BG Rodriguez was able to ensure requests were properly handled and that he could roll up the spending against information like the type of project or the requestor, to identify successes or failures, or to quickly identify problems in the request process.

Further, because most users had access to the CERP database, all users could quickly see projects in certain areas, as they were geo-referenced, reducing the opportunity for redundancy. Lastly, our intent was to be able to take this data and overlay it with tactical events over time, to understand how projects affected the community at large. Our stopping point came when we couldn't readily identify the other projects in the region sponsored by non-military agencies (to include the Corps of Engineers).

The Easy Solution

In speaking with soldiers from an Army Reserve Civil Affairs section recently returned from missions around the world, they were asked where they kept project files. For example, when a school is being built, where did they keep information about the school, why it was built or when it was due to go into operation. Their responses varied from filing cabinets to Word documents. They typically submitted a periodic (weekly, monthly) report via Excel or e-mail. Where the data went, they didn't really know, and very little came back to them in exchange for their report submission. This sounded strangely familiar to when we were sitting with then-LTG Vines, commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, as he described where his company commanders kept their report data prior to our beginning to work for him. By aggregating the operational data, we were able to create a mine-able data set which analysts could use as a base of data on which to base their intelligence assessments. We believe that the solution to managing project data is as easy.

The non-kinetic community needs a set of tools which spans across organizations; accessible to the non-governmental organization, USAID, Department of State and the many others who operate in the battlespace. For example, the Asian World Bank, a key financial influencer in the economic development of Afghanistan, needs the project data as much as the PRT commander on the ground if they are to coax an investor into building a factory near Kandahar as it can demonstrate that certain regions are progressing faster than others.

Fundamentally, project data is relatively basic information which describes "what", "when", "why", and "how much?" Each project sponsor should be able to provide this data before a project is ever started. However, once a project is begun, status reporting is key, as we can associate these status reports with specific laborers, providing a factual basis for hiring them again.

Once the project is completed and the project is being used, we can then begin to report on the usage of the project. For many of the projects we develop in theater, there are specific metrics which show success. Patient beds in hospitals, student count for schools, gallons of water pumped, or kilowatts generated are a few of the more common. By reporting on these metrics, we can define a return on the investment like never before.

While we perform these actions today at the team, company, and battalion level, we do not have a comprehensive picture of the projects in progress today. Further, we have no ability to mine this data to review it in a different light. We might know that we have built X number of schools in Tal Afar, but we have no automated/easy way to look at student count per school to indentify gaps in the education system, or that there was any benefit at all to building that many schools to begin with. Further, we are unable to look at the economic and demographic make-up of Tal Afar and the school count and compare their success there to other towns with a similar make-up. For example, if we built a factory in town A which raised the employment rate from 55% to 90% and in turn IEDs dropped from 9 per month to less than 1 per month, what happens if we build a factory in town B with similar economic and demographic data? Answering this today is all but impossible without a team of people, a box of pencils and hours of research. However, the commander in Town A above likely already knows a lot of this information, as does the commander in town B. They will only share today, if they run into each other at the Career Captain's Course, long after it was important to them.

Looking Beyond the Camouflage

By centralizing the data, as we did with kinetic data, we offer the ability to mine it. Further, by allowing its access at the company level, we give those operating at the edge of the empire more tools in their kit than the 32-pound sledgehammer. However, to be successful, we must offer this system to the other enablers in the field. USAID and Department of State manage large budgets in the reconstruction efforts. We must ensure that they are brought to the table early as their adoption of the system is equally as important as those in uniform.

Further, we must look to extend this sort of system to all who would want to use it for the purposes of helping nations re-build. For example, allowing the host nation government to contribute only makes the data more accurate and gives the host nation more of a stake in the rebuilding effort. In an ideal world, non-governmental organizations, like the Red Cross, or Doctors Without Borders would participate as well, but we recognize that their need to remain outside of governmental affiliation may supersede our need to obtain and mine this data. Their projects represent a minority of cases and could be handled through a liaison between agencies.

The Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT)

In cases where there is a PRT and where the PRT has both military and civilian representation, the case has been made that through their interaction as a middle ground between civilian and military organizations, that we eliminate the redundancies and ensure effective use of resources. We do not dispute this, but suggest that the tools described above provide these key decision makers a resource which facilitates inter- and intra-agency coordination and offer them a more detailed and accurate history.

In both cases, with a PRT or without, the history of the region is subject to failure in transmission from one leader to another as rotations for many range between 6-18 months. For those who have been forward-deployed, we return telling ourselves about how valuable our left-seat/right-seat rides were for our incoming replacements. However, I personally will never forget my excitement at coming home, and while I am sure I tried to help my replacement, I know I missed something.

Having watched now from the sidelines for three Transfers of Authority, each commander leaves thinking he made significant improvement in his area of operations, and his replacement looks at what he has been handed like it is a disaster he will handle differently. While we like to think this is not the case, the replacement is coming in after 6 months of rest ready to take on the world again, and the incumbent just can't wait for that first night of sleep in his own bed.

A digital record of these non-kinetic actions can enable the incoming commander to learn more about his area of operations, while still sitting at home drinking coffee on Sunday morning with his family. The sharing of data is real time, and two weeks prior to arrival, the new leader knows what he can expect. He can also begin to take over some of the future planning for his area, building upon what is there and not starting from scratch. Up the chain of command, his commanders are doing the same with the roll up data, as they evaluate the regional activities. This can expedite TOA, and ensure a more seamless transition. Even better, the military incoming leader can begin to understand how his civilian counterpart works prior to arrival, again smoothing the transition, building the key relationships before the pressure is really on.

Conclusion

Our hope is that this has provided our leadership some ideas on the gaps which are present in the current information systems. There are many attempts to coordinate much of this information, but it is occurring in such a dysfunctional fashion, that the data sits in filing cabinets or Excel files and in the worst case, flies out with the outgoing commander as he heads home with his personal laptop computer. This effort is not designed to armchair quarterback. We are trying to highlight this gap in the hope that the leadership can see this as a mechanism to assist the civil assistance leader in making decisions with limited resources and in turn to learn from our actions to help us shape decisions in the future.

We desperately need a system in place in theater today for this specific purpose, across these enablers, but it must be provided at echelons above the Army. The reality that today's military thinks the center of the universe has become Southwest Asia. And yet humanitarian operations in Central and South America, or New Orleans during and after Katrina could all benefit from this sort of tool kit. Until we have something like this, we will continue to rely upon paper, Excel, and commander's instincts. While all are valuable tools, we are advancing into an age where we can do better.

Jason Port is a 14-year veteran of the US Army, having served in a variety of Cavalry and Infantry NCO leadership positions in National Guard, Army Reserve and Active Army assignments. Most recently he was assigned as a Scout Detachment Leader/Platoon Sergeant for SFOR 12 in 2002-2003 where he assisted the Civil-Military liaison team in the development of RC-East in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He is currently working for CC Intelligent Solutions, a Defense Contractor in Raleigh, North Carolina, specializing in forward deployed information management solutions.

How The Surge Worked by Peter Mansoor, Washington Post, 10 August 2008.

Pete Mansoor served as General David Petraeus's executive officer at Multi-National Force - Iraq from February 2007 to May 2008. He holds the General Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at Ohio State University and is the author of the forthcoming book "Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq."

Mansoor is also the founding director of the US Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Under his leadership, the Counterinsurgency Center helped to revise the final version of the new Counterinsurgency Field Manual 3-24, which was published jointly by the Army and Marine Corps in December 2006. This document was the first revision of US counterinsurgency operations in more than 20 years, incorporating lessons learned during conflicts throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.

In 2003-04, Mansoor served as Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, in Iraq, which was responsible for security and stability in the Rusafa and Adhamiya districts of Baghdad, an area of 195 square kilometers and 2.1 million people. After the April 2004 uprising of militia loyal to the Shiite cleric Muqtada Al-Sadr, Mansoor's brigade combat team restored the holy city of Karbala to coalition control within three weeks, an operation that earned the organization a Presidential Unit Citation for collective valor in combat.

Pete Mansoor on The Surge (italicized emphasis SWJ):

Given the divisive debate over the Iraq war, perhaps it was inevitable that the accomplishments of the recently concluded "surge" would become shrouded in the fog of 30-second sound bites. Too often we hear that the dramatic security improvement in Iraq is due not to the surge but to other, unrelated factors and that the positive developments of the past 18 months have been merely a coincidence.

To realize how misleading these assertions are, one must understand that the "surge" was more than an infusion of reinforcements into Iraq. Of greater importance was the change in the way US forces were employed starting in February 2007, when Gen. David Petraeus ordered them to position themselves with Iraqi forces out in neighborhoods. This repositioning was based on newly published counterinsurgency doctrine that emphasized the protection of the population and recognized that the only way to secure people is to live among them...

The arrival of additional US forces signaled renewed resolve. Sunni tribal leaders, having glimpsed the dismal future in store for their people under a regime controlled by al-Qaeda in Iraq and fearful of abandonment, were ready to throw in their lot with the coalition. The surge did not create the first of the tribal "awakenings," but it was the catalyst for their expansion and eventual success. The tribal revolt took off after the arrival of reinforcements and as US and Iraqi units fought to make the Iraqi people secure...

The Iraq war is not over, but our war effort is on a firmer foundation. In the end, the Iraqis, appropriately, will determine their future. The surge has created the space and time for the competition for power and resources in Iraq to play out in the political realm, with words instead of bombs. Success is not guaranteed, but such an outcome would be a fitting tribute to the sacrifices of the men and women of Multi-National Force-Iraq and their ongoing efforts, along with their Iraqi partners, to turn around a war that was nearly lost less than two years ago.

More at The Washington Post.

Update: The Importance of The Surge - Max Boot, Contentions

By now the improvement in conditions in Iraq is undeniable. But opponents of the surge are still loath to give credit where it's due. Too often we hear that the "surge" was just one factor among many--and not necessarily the most important--in the improving security situation. Other factors are often cited, including the Sunni Awakening, the growing size and effectiveness of the Iraqi Security Forces, and Moqtada al Sadr's retreat. Those other developments are real and important, but they would not have been game-changers were it not for the additional influx of American soldiers and a change of strategy in how they were employed.

Flashback: Don't Confuse the "Surge" with the Strategy - Dave Kilcullen, Small Wars Journal, 19 January 2007

Much discussion of the new Iraq strategy centers on the "surge" to increase forces in-theater by 21,500 troops. I offer no comment on administration policy here. But as counterinsurgency professionals, it should be clear to us that focusing on the "surge" misses what is actually new in the strategy - its population-centric approach...

What matters here is not the size of forces (though the strategy will not work without a certain minimum force size), but rather their tasks. The key element of the plan, as outlined in the President's speech, is to concentrate security forces within Baghdad, to secure the local people where they live. Troops will operate in small, local groups closely partnered with Iraqi military and police units, with each unit permanently assigned to an area and working its "beat".

This is different from early strategies which were enemy-centric (focusing on killing insurgents), or more recent approaches that relied on training and supporting Iraqi forces and expected them to secure the population.

The new strategy reflects counterinsurgency best practice as demonstrated over dozens of campaigns in the last several decades: enemy-centric approaches that focus on the enemy, assuming that killing insurgents is the key task, rarely succeed. Population-centric approaches, that center on protecting local people and gaining their support, succeed more often.

The extra forces are needed because a residential, population-centric strategy demands enough troops per city block to provide real and immediate security. It demands the ability to "flood" areas, and so deter enemy interference with the population. This is less like conventional warfare, and more like a cop patrolling a beat to prevent violent crime.

This does not mean there will be less fighting indeed, there will probably be more in the short-term, as security forces get in at the grass-roots level and compete for influence with insurgents, sectarian militias and terrorist gangs. But the aim is different: in the new strategy what matters is providing security and order for the population, rather than directly targeting the enemy -- though this strategy will effectively marginalize them...

It's taken a while but the Bush administration is slowly and belatedly starting to correct some of the deficiencies which have cost us so much in the post-9/11 wars. The best known and most successful course correction was the surge in Iraq. Now in Afghanistan, Secretary of Defense Bob Gates is finally proposing to increase the size of the Afghan National Army from fewer than 70,000 today to a projected level of 120,000 in five years. That is a badly needed expansion given that the Afghan army has to police a country larger than Iraq with a force of less than one-third the size of the Iraqi army...

Receiving less notice (in fact no notice at all), but potentially of great long-term significance, was the overdue decision by Congress in July to give $75 million, as part of the supplemental appropriation for Afghanistan and Iraq, to the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction. This office was created a few years ago to provide the civilian component in places like Afghanistan and Iraq so the armed forces won't have to do all the heavy lifting. But it couldn't do much because Congress wouldn't fund it...

More.

I'm a cautious book buyer, normally waiting several weeks to months after a book has been released to get the low down on whether I really want a particular item for my personal library. I just made an exception and preordered Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq by Colonel Peter Mansoor. I can't imagine anything by COL Mansoor being less than outstanding and figure the pre-release reviewers (an impressive list at that) can't be all wrong.

From the Amazon.com Baghdad at Sunrise page:

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after U.S. forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003. Army Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, the on-the-ground commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division—the "Ready First Combat Team"—describes his brigade's first year in Iraq, from the sweltering, chaotic summer after the Ba'athists' defeat to the transfer of sovereignty to an interim Iraqi government a year later. Uniquely positioned to observe, record, and assess the events of that fateful year, Mansoor now explains what went right and wrong as the U.S. military confronted an insurgency of unexpected strength and tenacity.

Drawing not only on his own daily combat journal but also on observations by embedded reporters, news reports, combat logs, archived e-mails, and many other sources, Mansoor offers a contemporary record of the valor, motivations, and resolve of the 1st Brigade and its attachments during Operation Iraqi Freedom. Yet this book has a deeper significance than a personal memoir or unit history. Baghdad at Sunrise provides a detailed, nuanced analysis of U.S. counterinsurgency operations in Iraq, and along with it critically important lessons for America's military and political leaders of the twenty-first century.

Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute

"This book will be read by students at military academies and war colleges for years to come. It also speaks to general readers interested in Iraq, in the voices of our soldiers, and in understanding the problems we faced and those we created, without the hyperbole and politicization of most first-person accounts of the early years of this conflict."

Conrad Crane, lead author of the Army/Marine Corps Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency

"This is the best personal memoir of the Iraq War that I have seen."

General David H. Petraeus, US Army, Commanding General, Multi-National Force - Iraq

"Baghdad at Sunrise is a masterful account of command in counterinsurgency operations. Colonel Peter Mansoor''s superb description of his brigade''s experiences during our first year in Iraq is a must read for soldiers, scholars, and policymakers, alike-and all would do well to examine the lessons he draws from his experiences."

Colonel H. R. McMaster, US Army, author of Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies that Led to Vietnam

"A moving, insightful, and unique account of a combat brigade''s experience in Iraq crafted by a gifted soldier-historian-a must-read for anyone who wants to understand how the U.S. military is coping with counterinsurgency warfare in the 21st century."

Thomas E. Ricks, military correspondent, The Washington Post, and author of Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

"The Iraq war has produced many good books by sergeants and lieutenants, but few notable memoirs by senior officers. Finally, in Baghdad at Sunrise, Colonel Mansoor gives us an account of a year''s combat in the Iraqi capital as seen by a brigade commander. What''s more, he brings the eye of a trained historian to the task. He is candid about both the successes and the failures of the U.S. military. Read it."

Williamson Murray, author of A War To Be Won: Fighting the Second World War

"Colonel Mansoor has provided us with an exceptional memoir from mid-level of the tragic course of post-conflict operations in Iraq. It represents an account by a first-rate soldier and perceptive historian that is a must read for anyone interested in what really happened."

Preorder Baghdad Sunrise at Amazon.com.

Hardcover: 432 pages

Publisher: Yale University Press (September 15, 2008)

Language: English

ISBN-10: 030014069X

ISBN-13: 978-0300140699

Small Wars Journal has received an advance copy of Bing West's newest book The Strongest Tribe. We will be posting a review and SWJ interview with Bing in the near future. The early pages and reviews indicate that The Strongest Tribe will be acknowledged as a classic work on counterinsurgency in Iraq -- much like The Village defined COIN in Vietnam. The Strongest Tribe can be pre-ordered (highly recommended -- 12 August release date) at Amazon. The publisher's book description, video, several short endorsements and a Random House interview with Bing follow.

Description: From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around--and the choice now facing America.

During the fierce battle for Fallujah, Bing West asked an Iraqi colonel why the archterrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi had fled in women's clothes. The colonel pointed to a Marine patrol walking by and said, "Americans are the strongest tribe."

In Iraq, America made mistake after mistake. Many gave up on the war. Then the war took a sharp U-turn. Two generals--David Petraeus and Raymond Odierno--displayed the leadership America expected. Bringing the reader from the White House to the fighting in the streets, this remarkable narrative explains the turnaround by U.S. forces.

In the course of fourteen extended trips over five years, West embedded with more than sixty front-line units, discussing strategy with generals and tactics with corporals. He provides an expert's account of counterinsurgency, disposing of myths. By describing the characters and combat in city after city, West gives the reader an in-depth understanding that will inform the debate about the war. This is the definitive study of how American soldiers actually fought --a gripping and visceral book that changes the way we think about the war, and essential reading for understanding the next critical steps to be taken.

"Balanced, panoramic assessment of the Iraq War by former Marine and Reagan administration veteran West, who heralds American soldiers as its unsung heroes amid the "fog of Washington"... A timely, eye-opening historical analysis that provides clarity around the difficult choices the next president faces."

--Kirkus

"In this important new chronicle of the war in Iraq, Bing West reveals how America reached the brink of defeat in 2006 and then managed in 2007 to stage a stunning turnaround. With its vivid, on-the-ground reporting, his book is a fitting tribute to the honor, valor, and toughness of our soldiers. Notwithstanding numerous mistakes by their leaders, West shows that their sacrifices have made success possible--as long we do not withdraw prematurely."

--Senator John S. McCain

"Sometimes the best way to support the troops is to criticize the generals. Bing West does both well in this book, showing a sympathy for our soldiers and Marines, but also a great ear for military truth and a determination to render events accurately. This is his third and most important book about the Iraq war. Read it."

-- Thomas E. Ricks, author of FIASCO: The American Military Adventure in Iraq

"A brilliant exposition. Based on extensive experience in the war zone, Bing West recounts how Soldiers and Marines showed the President and the Pentagon the way to solve the Iraq insurgency problem. Echoing the admonition that "all politics are local", The Strongest Tribe convincingly argues that it was a grass roots strategy developed by on-scene officers who forged ties at the tribal level that brought stability to Iraq's turbulent Anbar Province and provided hope for all Iraq."

-- Lt. Gen. Bernard E. Trainor USMC (Ret.) Co-author of The Generals' War

and COBRA II

"Some four decades ago I told Bing West that his book, The Village, would become a classic in counterinsurgency warfare. And so it did. "The Strongest Tribe" will surely be West's second classic - a moving and detailed account of almost six years of war in Iraq."

-- Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Director of Central Intelligence Agency, Secretary of Defense

A Conversation with Bing West, author of The Strongest Tribe

What does your title, The Strongest Tribe, mean? During the battle for Fallujah, I asked an Iraqi colonel why the terrorist, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, had fled, disguised as a woman. The colonel pointed to the Marines rushing past us and said, "Because Americans are the strongest tribe."

What is the book's basic message? Industrial Age armies, like in World War II, don't fight us anymore. In future wars, our enemies will wear civilian clothes and hide among the people. Our soldiers are learning how to adapt; our society has not yet learned. We cannot treat tens of thousands of enemy soldiers as petitioners in our civil courts.

What was the main mistake in the war? Handing complete sovereignty to sectarian, incompetent Iraqi politicians, typified by the serpentine Mr. Maliki. Since we were dying for them, we should have controlled the promotions in their security forces. That would have shortened the war.

You say General Petraeus didn't turn the war around. (p 364) The war turned because the Sunni tribes came over to the American side before Petraeus arrived. Petraeus, a fine general, reinforced that success. But did not create it. The war was won from the bottom up due to the tenacity of our soldiers. It's a dangerous delusion to believe any general can bring quick success. That belief allows the rest of us to feel we don't have to commit or sacrifice in wartime. It's up to the generals. That lets us off the hook, so we can vote for a war, and then disown it.

We're doing well now. So why not pull out, as Senator Obama has proposed? We should pull out most of our forces. General Petraeus has earned our trust. He is best qualified to determine the rate of withdrawal. A fixed timetable is militarily rash. A fixed timetable doesn't mean Iraq will fall apart. A timetable does tell al Qaeda when we are leaving -- and from where. Al Qaeda will concentrate on the weak areas. The weaker Iraqi battalions will pull back, conceding sanctuaries. Al Qaeda, now on the ropes, will not be finished off. We must avoid saying we are leaving because the Iraqis have not done enough. That makes us look like quitters. If you quit, people treat you as a loser. Al Qaeda will be encouraged and the war in Afghanistan will be harder to fight.

In Iraq, the U.S. military became a nation-building force. Is this the future? A soldier is a rifleman. It is not a military mission to rebuild Islamic societies. Senator Obama says he is going to take the fight to al Qaeda in Pakistan and help Afghans grow their economy from the bottom up. If he's serious, get ready for a long, bloody war and nation-building on a staggering scale. It is the wrong use of our military.

You write, "The greatest technical failure in the police war was the inability to identify the male population." Why? (p 368) Iraq was a police war. Ten insurgents were imprisoned for each one killed. Our military do not understand police techniques and do not fingerprint the population. If we had done so, many of the insurgents in civilian clothes could have been identified, shortening the war. Our military does not understand how to act as police.

You are critical of the president. Why? (pp 167, 199) The president didn't study. The US military wanted to hand off the war to the Iraqis to win or lose. The president wanted the US military to win the war, not hand it off. He let this basic contradiction in strategy go unchallenged for years. Contrary to the public image, he and Secretary Rice were indecisive, letting the war drift until 2007.

You write, "The president must have someone --the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Secretary of Defense -- with responsibility for assessing risk, separate from the commander in the field." Why was that overlooked? (p 363) Every military man has a "can do" spirit; he never admits defeat. So the reports up the chain of command are always positive. The president must insist on an independent risk assessor. President Bush failed to do that.

You're equally rough on some senators. Why? (p171) For fecklessness. When we are at war, you support the troops. For a senator like Harry Reid to say the war was lost while our soldiers were fighting disgraced our country.

Why did our top generals believe that American soldiers were an antibody in an Arab culture that had to be removed fast? (p 78) That was shallow thinking. The real issue is whether you are providing security. For too long, in Baghdad our soldiers were living on bases. That allowed terrorists and militias to control the population. In Anbar to the west, the Marines were staying in the towns. The people got to know them and slowly the tribes changed sides. Then Petraeus did the same thing in and around Baghdad. No more commuting to work. Once the Americans provided real security, they were welcomed.

Has the $22 billion in US reconstruction funds been spent wisely? (p 369) It was thrown away because we never had a sensible plan. Are funds intended to help our soldiers by creating goodwill (I say yes) or to restructure the Iraqi economy? (I say no)

Are domestic politics causing us to deny what our soldiers accomplished? Absolutely. Today, despite the success of the military surge, 50% of Americans deny any military progress in Iraq. Why? Because they oppose the war. Ideology has overwhelmed facts. In World War II, the US military publicly hanged over 140 soldiers for rape and murder. The press never highlighted a single hanging. In Iraq, Haditha received twenty times the publicity of all the acts of valor in the war. In World War II, we highlighted valor. Today, we highlight mistakes. In the future, we will fight again. Will we be united? The evidence suggests not. That's unsettling.

Defense Secretary Bob Gates has been talking recently about how to rebuild America's national security architecture so that it fits the 21st century. The next president should think about assigning Gates to fix what he rightly says is broken.

Gates is an anomaly in this lame-duck administration. He is still firing on all cylinders, working to repair the damage done at the Pentagon by his arrogant and aloof predecessor, Donald Rumsfeld. Gates has restored accountability in the military services by firing the secretaries of the Army and Air Force when they failed to respond forthrightly to problems. And he has been an early and persuasive internal administration critic of US military action against Iran.

Amazingly for a defense secretary, Gates has been arguing against the "creeping militarization" of foreign policy. In a speech last month, he urged more funding for the State Department and other civilian agencies, saying they have been "chronically undermanned and underfunded for far too long." In Washington, that's almost unheard of -- sticking your neck out for the other guy -- and it's one reason Gates's reputation has been steadily rising...

More to include a proposal for a 'Gates Commission' to revise the basic framework of the National Security Act of 1947.

The Pentagon is funding academic research to better understand the attraction of terrorism and violent groups in the Middle East -- among other things. But some scholars are concerned the military is only interested in funding research that reinforces its world view. We discuss the complex relationship between the Pentagon and academia.

Guests were William S. Rees, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Laboratories and Basic Sciences; David Vine, Professor, American University; and Patrick Cronin, Director, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University.

From a DoD 16 July press release - Department of Defense Partners With Universities For Social Science Research:

The DoD has launched a university-based social science initiative to support basic research in topic areas of importance to current and future US national security.

The initiative, called Minerva, will support multi- and interdisciplinary and cross-institutional efforts addressing a range of social science topic areas. It will bring together universities, research institutions and individual scholars into a partnership to tackle topics of interest to DoD. For example, DoD could pursue topics such as foriegn military and technology research, terrorism or cultural studies. The initial funding is $10-20 million annually.

The objectives include:

(1) To foster and improve the Defense Department's social science intellectual capital and ability to understand and address security challenges.

(2) To support and develop basic research and expertise within the social sciences community in subject areas which may provide insight to current and future challenges.

(3) To improve the Defense Department's relationship with the social science community.

To achieve the secretary of defense's vision, DoD will pilot a number of approaches for engaging the social science community. This multi-pronged strategy will enable the department to solicit a broad range of proposals from the social science community and to leverage the expertise and infrastructures of a wide range of existing mechanisms for funding basic research.

The Minerva initiative will have several components to solicit and manage proposals. The first of these has been released through a DoD broad agency announcement (BAA). Additionally, DoD signed a memorandum of understanding with the National Science Foundation on July 2, 2008, to work together on a range of projects related to DoD's Minerva initiative, which might include a solicitation of proposals. Submission to DoD's open BAA will not preclude any offerer from submitting proposals to future solicitations.

Links:

Remarks by Secretary of Defense Gates on the Minerva initiative.

The currently open DoD BAA.

NSF's Press Release regarding the signing of the memorandum of agreement with the DoD.

Here is a bit from the intro and a bit from the conclusion. Lots of good stuff in between to include a conceptual framework, a Chechnya case study, a Peru case study and a Palestine case study.

As America's first serious involvement with counterinsurgency for several decades, Iraq has become a laboratory and schoolroom for new thinking about this dangerous and complex endeavor. The way that Americans have approached that conflict reflects broader assumptions about security and armed violence. Take the bursts of optimism that accompanied the killings of Qusay and Uday Hussein in July 2003, the capture of Saddam Hussein in December 2003, and the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006. In each instance, large segments of the American public and a number of political leaders concluded that the removal of these figures would alter the trajectory of the insurgency, possibly even pave the way to victory. This was easy to understand: rather than believe that armed conflict arises from deep, sometimes even irresolvable structural or cultural causes, Americans attribute it to the nefarious action of evil people. Remove these evil people and stability and comity—the "natural" state of human affairs—returns. For this reason, "high value targeting"—the killing or capture of key insurgents—has great appeal when Americans grapple with counterinsurgency.

Yet if high value targeting is mentioned to counterinsurgency experts, many immediately retort that it does not work. In fact, they argue, it can actually be counterproductive, distracting effort and attention from the difficult, often infuriating processes of establishing security, building effective law enforcement and intelligence systems, political reform, and economic development. As is often the case, the truth lies between the extremes...

... Obtaining actionable operational and tactical intelligence is always a challenge for high value targeting. By definition, only wily and security conscious insurgents become important enough to warrant the effort. Those who are easy to kill or capture are not worth the effort. Those worth the effort are not easy to kill or capture. But an accurate strategic assessment can be even more difficult than obtaining actionable intelligence because of the complex interplay of multiple effects and because it requires prediction rather than simply collection and analysis. Since insurgency is quintessentially psychological and the insurgents themselves have a major say in determining the strategic effects of high value targeting, the best that a strategist or intelligence professional can do is assign probabilities to certain actions or patterns of actions.

To integrate high value targeting into strategy, counterinsurgents must first identify the desired outcome...

High Value Targeting and Counterinsurgency