US, Pakistani Military Leaders Meet Aboard USS Lincoln - Jim Garamone, American Forces Press Service

US and Pakistani military leaders continued their ongoing dialogue about the war on terrorism during an Aug. 26 meeting aboard the USS Abraham Lincoln in the Indian Ocean.

Navy Adm. Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told Pentagon reporters today his meeting with Gen. Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, the Pakistani army's chief of staff, was constructive and focused on the challenges posed by extremists in the federally administered tribal area and the North West Frontier in Pakistan. The Taliban and al-Qaida are using the areas to plan and train for attacks in Afghanistan.

"There is... a growing complexity and coordination among extremist groups there -- an almost syndicate-like behavior -- that has resulted in new and ever more sophisticated attacks on coalition forces," Mullen said. He pointed to attacks against French forces near Kabul last week and against US forces in the Wanat Valley near Afghanistan's border with Pakistan last month.

"The safe havens in the border regions provide launching pads for these sorts of attacks, and they need to be shut down," the admiral said.

Accompanying Mullen at the conference was Army Gen. David D. McKiernan, commander of NATO forces in Afghanistan; Army Lt. Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, acting US Central Command chief; Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the soon-to-be commander of US Central Command who now commands Multinational Force Iraq; and Navy Adm. Eric T. Olson, commander of US Special Operations Command.

Mullen said he came away from the long-planned meeting "very encouraged that the focus is where it needs to be and that the... military-to-military relationship we're building with Pakistan is getting stronger every day."

This was the fifth visit Mullen has made with Kayani since February, and was a chance to keep the lines of communication open between the two militaries.

"For me, more than anything, this was a chance to better understand a very complex challenge in a critical part of the world and to try to do that through the eyes of the leadership who live and work and fight there every single day," Mullen said.

Kayani understands the threat extremists pose to his country, Mullen said. The US and Pakistani leaders went over the specifics of the threat facing Pakistan and Afghanistan and what can be done about it. The meeting was important in "terms of learning as well as continuing to look at where... we can support and how we can understand each other better, with a... very clear need from the United States' standpoint and from the Pakistani standpoint, that we have got to figure out a way to get at this problem," the chairman said.

The Pakistani military faces a conventional military challenge from India and the extremist challenge. Kayani understands the situation, Mullen said, and is moving toward combating the extremist problem on the border with Afghanistan.

"I'm pleased that he's moving in that direction and that he is, actually, operating," Mullen said. "And again, we're trying to figure out... how that fits into bringing pressure onto that border to work to minimize the cross-border operations from Pakistan into Afghanistan on the case of the insurgents. It's just going to take some time.

Different areas of Pakistan's border with Afghanistan pose different challenges, Mullen said, and long-term solutions must be in place to address the root causes of extremism.

"It continues to be an extraordinarily complex problem [in Pakistan]," the chairman said. "We need to continue to press on it. There are areas that we can do better. There are areas that the Pakistan military can do better. We understand that. It's an area, I think, we can all improve on. But it is not going to be something that gets solved overnight."

The United States will continue to work with Kayani and will continue to reach out to improve the military-to-military relationship.

"As I have come to know him... his goal... is to do the right thing by Pakistan," Mullen said. "He's an extraordinary individual, and his ultimate... principles and goals are to do what's best for Pakistan. And everything he's done in our engagement indicates that's absolutely the case."

Anbar Handover Could Free Marines for Afghanistan Missions

By Donna Miles

American Forces Press Service

Iraq's once-deadly Anbar province could within the next few days become the 11th province to be turned over to Iraqi control, paving the way for a reduced US Marine Corps presence there, the Marine Corps commandant said today.

Gen. James T. Conway told Pentagon reporters the marked drop in violence in Anbar sets the stage for a drawdown of Marine forces that could be freed up for duty in Afghanistan, if needed.

"The change in the al-Anbar province is real and perceptible," with attacks at an all-time daily low of two to three, Conway said. He cited assessments by Marine Maj. Gen. John Kelly, commander of Multinational Force West, that a reduced US force in the region could keep violence in check.

"Anbar remains a dangerous place, but the ever-growing ability of the Iraqi security forces continues to move us closer to seeing Iraqi control of the province," he said. Once believed to be "the last [Iraqi province] to turn for the better," he added, it is expected to return to Iraqi control "in just a few days."

Conway noted that signs of construction and rebuilding -- not violence -- were ever-present during his drive through the Anbar cities of Fallujah and Ramadi earlier this summer.

It's become evident, he said, that "the force we needed in the Anbar province in 2005, 2006 to fight the insurgent at its height is not the force that we need there now to do nation-building and to try to bring the government and the Sunnis closer together."

Marines deployed to Anbar "are doing a very good job of this nation-building business," he said, but are more suited to other missions.

"It's our view that if there is a stiffer fight going someplace else in a much more expeditionary environment where the Marine Air-Ground Task Force really seems to have a true and enduring value, then that's where we need to be," he said.

Conway cited increased violence in Afghanistan, where "the Taliban are growing bolder in their tactics and clearly doing their best to exploit security gaps where they exist."

"Everyone seems to agree that additional forces are the ideal course of action for preventing a Taliban comeback, but just where they're going to come from is still up for discussion," he said.

Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates ordered additional Marine forces to Afghanistan earlier this year over concerns about a possible spring offensive. The 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit, operating in the south, and 2nd Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment, training Afghan security forces, are slated to return in late November after a one-month extension of their deployment.

Conway called it "a good idea" to backfill the Marines after they redeploy from Afghanistan, but he said the Corps can't do it without cutting its current commitments in other parts of the world, including Iraq.

"Should our leadership determine that more US forces are needed in the fight in Afghanistan, it's no secret that the Marine Corps would be proud to be part of that undertaking," he said. "However, in order to do more in Afghanistan, our Marines have got to see relief elsewhere."

More: Washington Post, New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Voice of America, Associated Press, Reuters, Stars and Stripes, Agence France-Presse.

The Iraq Decisions That the Next President, Whether It's Obama or McCain, Will Face: In a new book, war correspondent Linda Robinson also assesses the performance of Gen. David Petraeus - Linda Robinson, US News and World Report

As this nation prepares to elect a new president, there is a sense that America's involvement in Iraq has turned a corner. Much of the credit for the diminished bloodshed and the prospects for political progress has gone to the US commander, Gen. David Petraeus, who leaves Iraq next month to take up expanded regional responsibilities as head of US Central Command. In her new book, Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search for a Way Out of Iraq, former US News Senior Writer Linda Robinson draws on 11 reporting trips to Iraq and extensive interviews with Petraeus and his team to document the evolution of American actions in Iraq. She offers recommendations on how to move forward in Iraq.

By June 2008, Iraq was calmer than it had been since April 2004. The war was not over, but it clearly had reached a new stage. When Gen. David Petraeus took command a year and a half earlier, Iraq was on fire. The majority in the United States believed there was no way to avoid an ignominious defeat such as America had not suffered in a quarter century. Petraeus, with the help of many others, pulled Iraq back from the brink of civil war and created an opportunity for the next administration to bring the war to a soft landing.

Accomplishing that will not be easy, but what had seemed inconceivable to most onlookers in 2006 is now distinctly possible—if the 44th American president has the fortitude and wisdom to capitalize on what has been achieved. The new president has the great advantage of starting with a clean slate and no special relationships or past commitments. He can adopt a new policy that builds on the successes achieved in 2007 and 2008 and provides the critical missing ingredients that can be supplied only by presidential authority. The basic conceptual change needed is to shift the paradigm from war-making to peacemaking and to elevate achievement of the elusive political solution to be the policy's central goal.

More at US News and World Report.

AFGHANISTAN

The Taliban 'Advance': No Time To Wobble - Paul Smyth, Head, Operational Studies, Military Sciences Department, RUSI

The ambush and the loss of French soldiers in Afghanistan may well be described as a tactical setback if not defeat, but at a strategic level, the insurgents are nowhere near victorious.

This week's violent encounter in Afghanistan's Surobi district is a timely example of how a tactical event can have strategic impact. In this case, it brought a Head of State rushing to Kabul and it generated some unscheduled messages of France's clear determination to support the ISAF mission, an outcome which some may say, cannot be seen as a Taliban victory.

For the families, friends and colleagues of the ten dead and twenty-one wounded French soldiers, the incident was an obvious tragedy of enduring effect. Every casualty in Afghanistan causes personal suffering and, in an expeditionary intervention that is based on choice not national survival, major losses inevitably raise questions which cast doubt on the purpose, validity and future of the endeavour. But without wishing to dismiss the reality of bereavement, when making strategic decisions of international importance, government leaders and military commanders must be beware of placing undue emphasis on the genuine heartbreak that can accompany their policy choices. For although it is true that some tactical events have strategic impact, it is a gross error to assume that all tactical incidents hold strategic relevance.

More at RUSI.

Farewell to an American Hero - Joe Galloway, McClatchy Newspapers

For the better part of 60 years, two old Army pilots who loved each other argued over many a meal and drink as to which of them was the second best pilot in the world.

The two shared the cockpits of old Beaver prop planes and Huey helicopters; they shared rooms in military hooches all over the world; they shared a love of practical and impractical jokes and they shared an undying love of flying and soldiers and the Army.

They also shared membership in a very small and revered fraternity of fewer than 105 men who are entitled to wear around their necks the light blue ribbon and gold pointed star that is the Medal of Honor, America's highest decoration for heroism above and beyond the call of duty.

Their story was told in a book my buddy Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and I wrote 15 years ago titled "We Were Soldiers Once... and Young" and in the Mel Gibson movie, "We Were Soldiers," released in the spring of 2002. Too Tall and Old Snake were ably portrayed in the movie.

Their argument over which of them is the Best Pilot in the Whole World sadly came to an end this week when our friend and comrade-in-arms Maj. Ed (Too Tall to Fly) Freeman slipped the surly bonds of earth and headed off to Fiddler's Green, where the souls of departed cavalrymen gather by dispensation of God Himself.

More at McClatchy Newspapers.

After Action Report, IA DRANG Valley - LTC Hal Moore

LZ X-Ray - More about LZ X-ray and LZ-Albany

LZ X-Ray - Battle Overview

We Were Soldiers - Joe Galloway's Photos

Bing West, The Strongest Tribe: War, Politics, and the Endgame in Iraq, New York: Random House, 2008, 410 pgs, $28.00.

This author needs no introduction. Francis "Bing" West is the author of The Village, the definitive depiction of the Marine Combined Action Program in Southeast Asia. He is also is a Marine combat veteran of the Vietnam war, a former RAND analyst, and at one time occupied the hallowed halls of the Pentagon as a political appointee during the Reagan Administration. Over the years, he has been a staunch advocate of the infantryman, that long overlooked asset in our national arsenal.

Since the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom, West has been one of the most prolific and most respected reporters of the war. No author has matched, both in volume and in grim color, the past five years of fighting better than this author. His The March Up coauthored with MajGen Ray Smith, USMC) captured the drive of I Marine Expeditionary Force from Kuwait up to Baghdad from the grunt's perspective. Mixing his broad grasp of national policy to the basic tactics that keeps a young Marine alert and alive, West's battlefield narrative outshone all competitors for its tactical detail and marked sympathy for today's young Marines and all that they endured to topple Hussein's regime. The heat, fine sand, and fear of that campaign are captured with greater granularity and credibility because the authors lived through it at the front line, embedded with the 1st Marine Division, General Jim Mattis' beloved "Blue Diamond."

No True Glory came next. This book centered over the Marines again and their two fights in the caldron of the Iraqi insurgency in Fallujah. West's masterful overview of the epic battle for Fallujah of November 2004 laid bare the tissue thin connections between American policy makers in Washington and the fearsome combat conditions of Al Anbar. I strongly recommend that our Presidential candidates and their prospective team read each page of that book as preparation for their duties in the White House.

West's latest effort may also become required reading for future policy makers, most of which, given the demographic make up of the United States, will not have worn their country's uniform or ever visited a combat zone.

In The Strongest Tribe West takes a step back and looks at the war in a comprehensive manner. The prose is clipped and the action concise and to the point. He briefly reviews the early "successful" military phase of 2003, and cursorily covers the planning failures and slow adaptation that allowed the insurgency to build in 2004. These four chapters serve as a useful foundation for the following section of three chapters which describe the inadequate means, contradictory goals and lack of understanding that perpetuated American actions in Iraq in 2005.

The book is centered on what the author calls the Second War, the fight against Al Qaeda in 2006. This section provides the most detailed account of the efforts by the coalition to stiffen resistance against Al Qaeda's campaign of coercion and assassination. It also connects the dots in the Bermuda triangle between perspectives in Washington, Baghdad and Al Anbar. Here West provides some very original reporting on how the White House eventually came to the conclusion that simply "staying the course" was a losing strategy. Eventually, the President, his NSC staff, and a new team at the Pentagon came to agreement on a new strategy and a new team to implement it. In this chapter, the author proves that he can report on the machinations of the NSC bureaucracy and the even more turgid thinking of the Joint Staff with the same relentless quest for ground truth that he did in Baghdad, Ramadi and Fallujah.

West does not pull punches, and the incident in Haditha in 2006 comes in for close examination. Leadership and tactics deplorable. But West saves his strongest condemnation for politicians, including Congressman Murpha, for rushing to judgment.

The best parts of the book involve the implementation of that new strategy by Generals David Petraeus and LtGen Raymond Ordinero in 2007. Petraeus's COIN manual, which was developed in cooperation with a team of Marines led by General James Mattis when he was the CG at Quantico comes in for some unsubstantiated criticism as an academic exercise in sociology. While FM 3-24 has imperfections, it was written with great urgency by solid professionals who provided a historically-grounded approach for Iraq in 2006. While the manual may be a bit long winded in sections, it has served its purpose well and The Strongest Tribe provides ample testimony for its utility.

There is much in this book to commend it to Marine readers. Now is the time to begin to draw lessons from Iraq. Some of the conclusions in The Strongest Tribe will not surprise you, others infuriated me. It lays bare the failings of our military leadership early in the war, as well as the faults of our political leadership who too often ignored inconvenient facts and too readily embraced news when it fit preconceptions. West is fair with his litany of mistakes, and gives credit where due to Army and Marine leaders like General Petraeus, BGen John Allen, USMC; LtCol Dale Alford, USMC; and Army Colonels H.R. McMaster and McFarland for their intellect and professional acumen. The best parts of this book depict how the U.S. military persisted in its mission and how it adapted itself to the point where success over Al Qaeda can now be claimed.

The strongest test of our profession will be how ruthlessly and objectively we can assess ourselves and move forward to best posture ourselves for the ever evolving character of conflict in the 21st century. The Strongest Tribe is a great product to start our self-assessment with.

Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after US forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003.

The Strongest Tribe - Bing West

From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around--and the choice now facing America.

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

We Are Soldiers Still - Hal Moore and Joe Galloway

In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results.

Pete, Bing, Linda, Joe -- Again, we are humbled and grateful for your support -- congratulations on your contribution to understanding the critical issues that will define and shape our nation's future.

Job well done!

As Yogi Berra once said, this is déjí  vu all over again. The United States Government has many talented employees with critical skills and expertise, but its departments and agencies don't always play well together. Even when they share common interests and common goals, they often fail to coordinate effectively, if at all. This can cause agencies to duplicate efforts, or worse, to work at cross purposes, which hardly makes the most of our resources to achieve our strategic objectives.

While not a new problem, the issue has lately taken on new urgency, particularly in the area of national security. The post-9/11 challenges that confront our nation -- such as fighting the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, combating terrorism, and preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction -- require strategies that embrace the capabilities of all government agencies. Unfortunately, eight years into the twenty-first century, our institutions and policies maintain a lot of Cold War organization and thinking, but lack the common focus of the Soviet threat.

The few existing mechanisms to bring together the departments that should play a role in developing national security policy and translating that policy into action are weak. These mechanisms are usually the ad hoc efforts of those directly engaged in the challenge of the moment, and not the result of a broader deliberative process. The experiences of U.S. service members and civilians working with Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Iraq and Afghanistan are prime examples that show how interagency solutions can be forged by necessity in the field. But there must be a better way -- we shouldn't have to reinvent the wheel each time agencies need to join forces...

More at CAC.

Senior Pentagon officials have prepared a memo for Defense Secretary Robert Gates' signature that would give US Special Operations Command the lead in overseeing US efforts to train foreign security forces, defense officials tell Inside the Army.

The decision to pick SOCOM for the job of managing the field of "security force assistance," or SFA, is all but made, according to sources. But publicly, officials are tight-lipped about the move because senior leaders are still reviewing what one official dubbed the "implementation memo" that would finalize the arrangement...

The memo, drafted by Michael Vickers, the assistant secretary of defense for special operations, low-intensity conflict and interdependent capabilities, has yet to be blessed by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Michael Mullen, according to sources familiar with the document.

According to several officials, SOCOM chief Adm. Eric Olson has long been lobbying Pentagon leaders for the SFA lead.

Gates last year said the US military must increasingly take on the role of training and advising foreign security forces to prevent terrorists from destabilizing regions around the world where stability is crucial to American interests.

In Iraq and Afghanistan, officials believe a capable police and army are a prerequisite for the eventual withdrawal of US forces. "Arguably the most important military component in the war on terror is not the fighting we do ourselves, but how well we enable and empower our partners to defend and govern their own countries," Gates said in an Oct. 10, 2007, speech at the annual conference of the Association of the US Army in Washington.

According to defense officials, the debate in the Army about how to prepare the ground service for a greater role in mentoring foreign security forces centers around two questions: Does the service need a dedicated force structure for the mission, and should specialized forces or general-purpose forces take on the brunt of the work?...

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. JOINT FORCES COMMAND

Subject: Assessment of Effects Based Operations

1. Attached are my thoughts and Commander's guidance regarding Effects Based Operations (EBO). The paper is designed to provide the JFCOM staff with clear guidance and a new direction on how EBO will be addressed in joint doctrine and used in joint training, concept development, and experimentation. I am convinced that the various interpretations of EBO have caused confusion throughout the joint force and amongst our multinational partners that we must correct. It is my view that EBO has been misapplied and overextended to the point that it actually hinders rather than helps joint operations.

2. Therefore, we must return to time honored principles and terminology that our forces have tested in the crucible of battle and are well grounded in the theory and nature of war. At the same time, we must retain and adopt those aspects of effect based thinking that are useful. We must stress the importance of mission type orders that contain clear Commander's Intent, unambiguous tasks and purpose, and most importantly, links ways and means with achievable ends. To augment these tenets, we must leverage non-military capabilities and strive to better understand the different operating variables that make up today's more complex operating environments.

3. My assessment is shaped by my own personal experiences and the experience of others in a variety of operational situations. I'm convinced we must keep the following in mind: First, operations in the future will require a balance of regular and irregular competencies. Second, the enemy is smart, and adaptive. Third, all operating environments are dynamic with an infinite number of variables; therefore, it is not scientifically possible to accurately predict the outcome of an action. To suggest otherwise runs contrary to historical experience and the nature of war. Fourth, we are in error when we think that what works (or does not work) in one theater is universally applicable to all theaters. Finally, to quote Sherman, "Every attempt to make war easy and safe will result in humiliation and disaster." History is replete with such examples and further denies us any confidence that the acute predictability promised by EBO's long assessment cycle can strengthen our doctrine.

4. The joint force must act in uncertainty and thrive in chaos, sensing opportunity therein and not retreating into a need for more information. JFCOM's purpose is to ensure that joint doctrine smoothes and simplifies joint operations while reducing friendly friction. My goal is to return clarity to our planning processes and operational concepts. Ultimately, my aim is to ensure leaders convey their intent in clearly understood terms and empower their subordinates to act decisively.

5. While NATO and many Partner Nations have adopted the EBO nomenclature, NATO's policy focuses on the whole of government/Comprehensive Approach. In short, NATO's Effects Based Approach to Operations (EBAO) does not fully mirror U.S. EBO. NATO's use of EBAO is left unaddressed in this USJFCOM Commander's Guidance.

6. A pre-decisional working draft of this document was prematurely circulated and should be discarded. I regret any confusion resulting from the unintended early release of this draft document.

J. N. MATTIS

General, U.S. Marine Corps

Commander's Guidance Regarding Effects Based Operations - US Joint Forces Command

Update: The Council Weighs In (Bill Moore):

When I first heard of EBO, I admit I had high hopes for it, that was until I was actually trained in it, and saw the seriously flawed concepts of SoSA, ONA, and worse, much worse, MOE and MOP. Then I noted every one assumed their actions (unilaterally) we're creating these magical effects. At first I thought it was intended to flatten the organization and harmonize the interagency actors by arming everyone with the objectives and the associated effects, thus if you didn't have guidance from higher, you knew what needed to be done on the ground. However, after studying it and watching it in practice in the real world and during exercises it is clear that General Mattis's memo is spot on in most aspects.

I was a small bit player in one of the most successful interagency and multinational operations in recent history and that was JTF Liberia in 2003. Fortunately, it didn't receive much press outside of Africa, so we had considerable freedom of movement. During this operation the multinational forces and interagency were successfully harmonized with clear objectives that resulted in orders with clear cut task(s)/purpose(s). In this case leadership was decisive (both State Department and Military). I think we would have failed miserbly if we used EBO doctrine.

Unfortunately, this EBO like process has manifested itself in other ways, where U.S. forces inappropriately apply a CARVER matrix to terrorist and insurgent organizations, which resulted in the failed network approach where one attempts to destroy an insurgency by killing or capturing its so called key nodes (important individuals). In limited cases this method will work, and most cases it is a key supporting role, but not at the expense of failing to protect the population. What worked in Iraq was large scale population control measures that the surge enabled, where the focus was protecting the populace. I'm confident history will show that the much bragged about approach "it's the network stupid" was actually a failure or at most a minor enabler. Like EBO this was based on faulty assumptions that an insurgency is a simple system or simple system of systems like an electric power grid. It isn't, and surgical actions won't when the fight anymore than surgical bombings. That brings me to the key question, is EBO entirely flawed or is our practice (based on faulty assumptions) of it flawed? I think the answer is both, and if we focused on the objective of defeating the insurgency, vice all the sub effects, we would have realized from day one we needed more forces (Iraqi or otherwise) to get control initially.

Prior to EBO, I think the most damaging concept to our military was the force protection bureaucracy which was an off shoot of General Downey's investigation of the Khobar Towers incident. Force protection was always an inherit responsibility, and there were several anti-terrorism courses long before force protection level I thru IV training. This resulted in yet another cottage industry of contractors, wasted military manpower and in too many cases operational paralysis. Force protection is important, it has always been our second priority, which in order are the mission, the men, then yourself. Prior to 9/11 we let force protection (the men) trump accomplishing the mission as a priority. I would like to see General Mattis tackle this one, and while he is at it take a hard look at Information Operations. I'm not anti-IO, but it would be helpful for all to see some clarity here also.

EBO is not the only practice in our military that lacks common sense.