Dealing with Iran and its nuclear program will be an urgent priority for the next president. In order to evaluate US policy options, the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) convened a bipartisan group of experts on foreign policy and national security, retired military personnel, former diplomats and other government officials, and specialists on Iran and the region. Ambassador Dennis Ross presented a paper on diplomatic strategies for dealing with Iran, and Dr. Suzanne Maloney wrote on potential Iranian responses. Dr. Ashton Carter evaluated various US military options, and Dr. Vali Nasr described likely Iranian reactions and other potential impacts. Ambassador Richard Haass considered the challenges of living with a nuclear Iran. Each of these papers represents an important contribution to a much-needed national discussion on US policy toward Iran. Based on these papers and expert group discussion, as well as additional research and analysis, three CNAS authors (Dr. James Miller, Christine Parthemore, and Dr. Kurt Campbell) proposed that the next administration pursue "game-changing diplomacy" with Iran. While both Iran and the international community would be better off if Iran plays ball, game-changing diplomacy is designed to improve prospects for the United States and the international community irrespective of how Iran responds.

More at CNAS.

"Any good soldier can handle guerrillas."

Krepinevich, 1986:37

"Our enemies understand that irregular warfare

is the bane of regular military traditions."

Cassidy, 2007:44

The first quote is attributed to the U.S. Army Chief of Staff during 1961 when the U.S. Army was on the verge of escalating its commitment to help fight insurgents in the jungles of Vietnam. The officer to whom the first quote is attributed was steeped in the conventions of regular Army forces' organization, training, and education. The second quote is an inference about the difficulties that obtain when big power militaries attempt to fight against irregular adversaries without adapting their methods to meet the exigencies of irregular warfare. U.S military operations in Somalia from 1992 to 1994 under the aegis of the UN saw the operation evolve from peace enforcement into what was essentially irregular warfare in and around Mogadishu. By June 1993, U.S. Soldiers and Marines were fighting a counter-guerrilla war against Mohammed Farah Aideed's irregulars. The October 3rd -- 4th, 1993, battle in Mogadishu was the culminating battle which saw U.S. regular and elite infantry battalions, along with special operators, fighting out of the city against swarming irregulars. In fact, the battle in Mogadishu that night represented the most intense light infantry battle experienced by the U.S. Army since Vietnam at that time. Rangers, special operators, and the infantrymen of the 10th Mountain Division acquitted themselves with courage and élan in the most difficult of circumstances. However, the ultimate outcome of Somalia, where the U.S. pulled its military forces out, would seem to refute the veracity of the first quote above and attest to the merit of the second one. In Somalia, American forces possessed a technological advantage and an ostensible numerical advantage in regular military formations. Yet in this first experiment with irregular warfare after the end of the Cold War, the big conventional war military cultural orientation of the American military was manifest, as it had for many years almost exclusively focused on regular or, conventional war. The regular military forces of the U.S. faced Somali indigenous forces which employed the irregular methods of the insurgent...

More at Baltic Security and Defence Review.

Multi-National Force-Iraq Commander's Counterinsurgency Guidance - General David H. Petraeus, U.S. Army

General Petraeus outlines the essential tasks necessary for successful counterinsurgency operations in Iraq.

The Baby and the Bathwater: Changing Times or Changing Principles? - Colonel John Mark Mattox, U.S. Army

Principles of war have not changed, even if tactics, techniques, and procedures have.

Discipline, Punishment, and Counterinsurgency- Scott Andrew Ewing

Vague regulations encourages NCOs to disguise arbitrary punishments as extra training may

be contributing to abuse of civilians during operations.

Institutionalizing Adaptation: It's Time for an Army Advisor Command - Dr. John A. Nagl, LTC, U.S. Army, Retired

Institutionalizing and professionalizing the manning and training of combat advisors is an American strategic necessity.

Integrating the Advisory Effort in the Army: A Full Spectrum Solution - Major Michael D. Jason, U.S. Army

The author proposes creating a new U.S. Army "Advisor Command" at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, under control of Forces Command in collaboration with Training and Doctrine Command.

From Tactical Planning to Operational Design - Major Ketti Davison, U.S. Army

"Effects-based operations" may be banished from the joint lexicon, but a coherent operational design remains necessary for effectively understanding the emergent qualities of complex environments.

An Innovative Approach to Blast Injury Recovery - Colonel Karl D. Reed, U.S. Army

Caring for mild traumatic brain injury is challenging for the military and the Department of Veterans Affairs. Sports medicine's "best practices" can revolutionize treatment of such injuries for Soldiers.

In Uncle Sam's Backyard: China's Military Influence in Latin America - Loro Horta

Beijing's rising economic and political influence in Latin America may pave the way for major Chinese arms sales and expansion of China's military influence.

Waging Counterinsurgency in Algeria: A French Point of View - Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Francois, French Marine Infantry

The history of the French-Algerian War contains illuminating lessons that can help shape COIN operations today.

Operation BOA: A Counterfactual History of the Battle for Shah-I-Kot - Colonel Robert D. Hyde, USAF; and Colonel Mark D. Kelly, USAF; Colonel William F. Andrews, USA

The authors present a counterfactual version of what might have happened in Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan.

Leadership Success Strategies of U.S. Army Women General Officers - Lieutenant Colonel Yvonne Doll, U.S. Army, Retired

Women general officers reflect on what it took to succeed.

Amnesty, Reintegration, and Reconciliation in Rwanda - Major Jeffrey H. Powell, U.S. Army

Failure to grant amnesty has mired the reconciliation process in Rwanda after the genocide there in 1994.

Winning Battles but Losing Wars: Three Ways Successes in Combat Promote Failures in Peace - Christopher E. Housenick, Ph.D.

The American way of war may be an obstacle to the best outcomes in a workable peace.

A National Security Strategy for the Next Administration - Amitai Etzioni

Professor Etzioni analyzes a recent proposal for post-Bush foreign policy and America's future strategic posture.

Finding the Flow: Shadow Economies, Ethnic Networks, and Counterinsurgency - Captain Robert M. Chamberlain, U.S. Army

Does reuniting Iraq's religious communities represent the best hope for the fledgling democracy, or is it a hopeless quest to turn back the clock?

Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

Wednesday, 10 September

Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at SAIS

Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq

4:30 p.m. - Kenney Auditorium, Nitze Building

Linda Robinson, author-in-residence at the Merrill Center, will discuss Tell Me How This Ends: General David Petraeus and the Search For a Way Out of Iraq, her new book about General David Petraeus, the surge and the future of Iraq policy. John Nagl, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security and a retired Army officer who served in Iraq; Michael O'Hanlon, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution and senior author of the Iraq Index; and Thomas Keaney (moderator), acting director of the Merrill Center; will provide commentary. A reception and booking signing will follow the discussion. For more information and to RSVP, contact ckunkel4@jhu.edu or 202.663.5772.

BAGRAM AIRFIELD, Afghanistan, Sept. 2, 2008 -- Intense enemy fire justified actions taken by Afghan and U.S. forces during an Aug. 22 engagement in which several civilians and more than 30 Taliban fighters were killed in western Afghanistan, a coalition investigation has concluded.

The investigation found that Afghan and U.S. forces began taking fire from Taliban militants as the combined force approached its objective in Azizabad, Herat province, during a planned offensive operation in the pre-dawn hours.

The intensity of the enemy fire justified use of well-aimed small-arms fire and close-air support to defend the combined force, investigators concluded, adding that the type and application of fires were used in accordance with existing rules of engagement.

The investigation found that 30 to 35 Taliban militants were killed, and it revealed evidence suggesting a known Taliban commander, Mullah Sadiq, was among them, officials said. Five to seven civilians were killed, the investigation determined. Two civilians were injured and were treated by coalition forces, and five Taliban were detained.

Officials said investigators determined the range in the casualty numbers by observation of the enemy movements during the engagement as well as on-site observations immediately following the engagement.

In addition, investigators discovered firm evidence that the militants planned to attack a nearby coalition base, officials said. Other evidence collected included weapons, explosives, intelligence materials, and an access badge to a nearby base, as well as photographs from inside and outside of the base.

The engagement disrupted any planned attack, officials said.

The investigating officer took statements from more than 30 Afghan and U.S. participants. The investigating officer also reviewed reports made by ground and air personnel during the engagement; video taken during the engagement; topographic photo comparisons of the area before and after the event, including analysis of burial sites; reports from local medical clinics and hospitals; intelligence reports; and physical data and photographs collected on the site, coalition officials said.

Local government officials and Afghan coalition forces were denied entry into the village the day following the event. No other evidence that may have been collected by other organizations was provided to the U.S. investigating officer and therefore could not be considered in the findings, Combined Joint Task Force 101 officials reported.

The results of the investigation were provided to Army Gen. David McKiernan, commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, for his use as part of a joint inquiry into the incident.

Coalition officials said the investigating officer conducted the investigation using methods prescribed by U.S. Army Regulation 15-6, Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers.

(From a Combined Joint Task Force 101 news release.)

US Rejects Claims of Afghan Deaths - Candace Rondeaux and Javed Hamdard, Washington Post

US military officials on Tuesday flatly rejected claims by the United Nations and the Afghan government that a US airstrike in western Afghanistan two weeks ago killed at least 90 Afghan civilians, saying that a complete investigation into the incident found that only five civilians were killed.

A review of video footage and photos, and an analysis of burial sites after the strike in Azizabad village in Herat province in the early morning of Aug. 22, found that 30 to 35 Taliban insurgents and five civilian relatives of a Taliban commander died in the attack, according to a summary of the findings released Tuesday. Two other civilians were injured, it said.

Interviews with 30 American and Afghan participants in the military operation further reinforced the conclusion that the incident's toll was considerably lower than those suggested by eyewitnesses, the summary said.

More at the Washington Post, New York Times and Washington Times.

Related Sites:

Combined Joint Task Force 101

NATO International Security Assistance Force

When President Bush speaks to the Republican convention on Monday, he is expected to tout the "surge" of forces in Iraq as one of his proudest achievements. But that decision, one of his most consequential as commander in chief, was made only after months of tumultuous debate within the administration, according to still-secret memorandums and interviews with a broad range of current and former officials.

In January 2007, at a time when the situation in Iraq appeared the bleakest, Mr. Bush chose a bold option that was at odds with what many of his civilian and military advisers, including his field commander, initially recommended. Mr. Bush's plan to send more than 20,000 troops to carry out a new counterinsurgency strategy has helped to reverse the spiral of sectarian killings in Iraq.

But Mr. Bush's penchant to defer to commanders in the field and to a powerful defense secretary delayed the development of a new approach until conditions in Iraq, in the words of a November 2006 analysis by the Central Intelligence Agency, resembled anarchy and "civil war." ...

In the end, the troop reinforcement proposal split the military. Even after the president had made the basic decision to send additional troops, Gen. George W. Casey Jr., the top American commander in Iraq, never sought more than two brigades, about 8,000 troops in all, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates reported to Mr. Bush in late December. But General Casey's approach substantially differed from those of two officers who wanted a much bigger effort: the No. 2 commander in Iraq, Lt. Gen Raymond T. Odierno, and Gen. David H. Petraeus, who helped oversee the military's new counterinsurgency manual and whose views were known by the White House before he was publicly named to replace General Casey, administration officials said.

Current and former officials from the Bush administration and the military agreed to disclose new details about the debate over the troop increase in response to repeated requests. Most insisted on anonymity because the documents were still classified, but said they believed the historical record should reflect the considerations that were being weighed at the time...

Much more at The New York Times.

Christopher J. Castelli of Inside Defense (subscription required) has more on General Jim Mattis' Effects Based Operations memo and the "vigorous debate" that followed. Excerpts from the article:

Marine Corps Gen. James Mattis' decision to exorcise the term "effects-based operations" from US Joint Forces Command's vocabulary is sparking passionate debate as the military mulls potentially sweeping implications for doctrine, training and operations.

Over the last decade, the Air Force has promoted effects-based operations (EBO) as a revolution in warfare -- operations aimed at producing certain effects, as opposed to merely damaging or destroying targets. It is supposed to be backed by a framework called operational net assessment (ONA) enabling commanders to capitalize on unprecedented high-tech information about the battlespace as well as an analytical process called system of systems analysis (SoSA) focused on exploiting enemy vulnerabilities.

But somewhere along the way it all stopped making sense, according to Mattis, who writes in an Aug. 14 memo that EBO, ONA and SoSA are "fundamentally flawed" and must be removed from the military's lexicon, training and operations...

There has been a spirited debate about EBO in recent years. Critics such as retired Marine Lt. Gen. Paul Van Riper and Naval War College professor Milan Vego have vivisected the concept, while Air Force Lt. Gen. David Deptula, one of EBO's main proponents, and other advocates like Naval War College professor James Ellsworth have repeatedly argued its merits.

Mattis' memo is not the end of the debate, but the start of a new chapter. Deptula is defending EBO while welcoming further discussions that will follow from JFCOM's guidance.

"I stand by the efficacy of EBO as a proven joint planning construct and welcome internal discussions on the topic as different viewpoints in joint doctrine are important in raising dialogues that ultimately result in enhancing joint force operations," Deptula tells Inside the Pentagon...

Not surprisingly, the memo is ruffling feathers in Air Force circles.

Before Deptula provided comments on the missive to ITP, Air Force headquarters referred questions on the topic to retired officers like McInerney (retired Air Force Lt. Gen. Thomas McInerney) , who unloaded heaps of criticism.

"Even though I am no longer on active duty I am embarrassed for a combatant commander to publish such a document," McInerney says. "I am a fan of Mattis but this is too much."

McInerney even encouraged combatant commanders to "ignore" what he sees as a shocking memo.

In an e-mail to ITP, McInerney calls JFCOM's missive the "most parochial, un-joint, biased, one-sided document launched against a concept that was key in the transformation of warfare -- and proven in the most successful U.S. military conflicts of the past 20 years (Desert Storm and Allied Force)."...

McInerney concedes EBO has been twisted and over-hyped, but he blames JFCOM.

Much, much more at ITP -- praise, criticism and "between the lines" - this article alone is worth the price of a subscription. Also, the discussion continues at Small Wars Council.

The security situation in Iraq has improved markedly. The US "Surge," along with several other factors appear to have had a positive effect. A window of opportunity has opened. Iraq's future nevertheless remains uncertain and the possibility that the situation could deteriorate into a broader regional crisis remains.

To date, debate over Iraq in Germany and Europe has focused primarily on the wisdom and success of the US-led 2003 invasion. Five years later, however, experts are beginning to recognize that the time has come for a renewed discussion of Germany's own interests in Iraq.

This paper identifies key German interests and assesses German policy options.

More at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs.