The massive explosion that devastated the Marriott Hotel in Pakistan's capital, Islamabad, Saturday -- killing at least 53 people and wounding hundreds -- is being seen as a warning from Islamist militants over the Pakistani government's cooperation with the United States.

The hotel, which is popular with both diplomats and other foreigners, was struck by at least one truck filled with more than a ton of explosives in one of the country's worst acts of terrorism. The Czech ambassador and two Americans and about a dozen foreigners were among the dead.

"This was definitely a clear signal that this is no longer a safe place for foreigners, especially Americans," says Ayesha Siddiqa, an independent security analyst based in the city. "And it's a message to the Pakistani government: 'Can you handle us?' "

Though there was no immediate claim of responsibility for the attack, the main suspect is the Pakistani Taliban, which is made up of myriad Islamist militant groups and is believed to be linked to Al Qaeda.

Last month Ayman al-Zawahri, Al Qaeda's deputy leader, accused Pakistan's political leaders of acting on behalf of the US and called on his followers to rise up against them. But Saturday's explosion is also expected to exacerbate tensions between the US and Pakistan over how aggressively Pakistan is perceived to be cracking down on militants. A rising wave of violence has killed nearly 1,300 people in Pakistan this year alone.

India, too, believes it is feeling the effect of Pakistan's mounting insurgency. On the day of the Islamabad bombing, police in New Delhi claimed that the Pakistani Islamist militant group, Lashkar-i-Tayyaba, was behind bombs that ripped through busy Delhi markets on Sept. 13, killing at least 22 people.

More at the The Christian Science Monitor.

Additional Reporting and Commentary

Blast Kills Dozens in Pakistan - Washington Post

More Bodies Pulled From Hotel Rubble in Pakistan - New York Times

Pakistan Toll Rises to 53; 2 US Service Members - Los Angeles Times

Al-Qaeda Blamed as Suicide Bomber Kills 53 - The Times

Carnage: Pakistan's Reality Check - Sydney Morning Herald

Terrorists' Message for Zardari - The Australian

Bloodshed of Desperation Becomes the Real Threat - The Times

Pakistan Blames Al-Qaeda for Hotel Bombing - Agence France-Presse

Pakistan Faces its 9/11, Vows No Retreat - The Australian

Pakistan Security Officials Describe Hotel Attack - Voice of America

Rescuers Comb Pakistan Bomb Hotel - BBC News

Pakistan Must Wake Up - Daily Telegraph editorial

Pakistan's Contradictory Faces - Christian Science Monitor opinion

Pakistan's Double Game - Washington Times editorial

Washington has good reason to be wary of the Pakistani government and military, and it's no secret what the problem is: The Pakistani army has been heavily infiltrated by Taliban and al Qaeda sympathizers, and the same is true of Pakistan's security service, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). In important respects, the current difficulties between the United States and Pakistan are but the latest chapter of a long-running dispute between the two nations over Pakistan's relationships with al Qaeda and other radical Islamist forces in the region. During the 1990s, Pakistani governments headed by the late Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her successor as prime minister, Nawaz Sharif, and then Gen. Pervez Musharraf, went out of their way to placate the Taliban regime in neighboring Afghanistan while the ISI was known to maintain good relations with al Qaeda. This situation changed to some degree after September 11, when Gen. Musharraf began in essence playing a double game (in exchange for $10 billion in assistance from the US taxpayer): assisting US forces in capturing and killing al Qaeda operatives part of the time, while providing the terrorists with sanctuary, bases and protection the other part of the time.

This approach may have seemed bearable to US policymakers several years ago, when the Taliban appeared to have been routed in neighboring Afghanistan. That situation no longer exists, and Pakistan's role in sheltering jihadists has become less and less tolerable. Pakistan's continued refusal to take action against terrorists operating on its soil may be on the verge of opening a dark new chapter in relations with the United States.

More at The Washington Times.

For those with Army Knowledge Online (AKO) access check out the completed research on the Research and Analysis page of the Urban Warfare Analysis Center (UWAC). A relatively new organization, UWAC prides itself on its "fusion" approach to research and analysis:

The UWAC Analysis Team utilizes a fusion cell approach to foster innovation and collaboration. In contrast to the old "stovepipe" approach in which information and expertise is rarely shared across teams, the fusion cell model brings together people with diverse experiences and skill sets. Thus, the two main ingredients for the creation of innovative ideas -- collaboration and multidisciplinary expertise -- are both captured.

The UWAC team is comprised of three disciplines -- military specialists, technology experts, and social science analysts -- to produce research and analysis across multiple functional areas.

UWAC participated in a USJFCOM / USMC project I worked on earlier this year in my "day job" and provided top-notch support. Here is a listing of their current urban operations related products:

• Implications of Iranian Media in Iraq

• Using Ocean Waves to Power Port Cities during Stability Operations

• Islamification of the Chechen Wars

• Virtual Worlds and Terrorist Attack Planning

• How a Boy Becomes a Martyr - The Dangers of Web 2.0 Technology

• Weapons Review: SCAR

• Aquaponic Technology in Urban Operations

• Virtual Worlds and Money Laundering

• Web 2.0 and Enemy Recruitment

• Impact of Off-the-Shelf Global Telecommunications Technology

• Urban Jihad: Militant Exploitation of the Koran

• Lessons Learned From the Israeli-Hezbollah War of 2006

• How the Iranian Media Help Build Support for Hezbollah

• Virtual Worlds and their Implications for Urban Warfare

• Hezbollah's Use of Arab Media to Galvanize Support

• Iran's Evolving Urban Warfare Doctrine

• Cell Phone Use by Insurgents in Iraq

• Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq: Assessment and Outlook

• Sistani's Future Role in Iraq

• Suicide Bombings in Urban Warfare: Trends in Motives and Targets

• Attacking Urban Insurgents: Choking Off the Money Supply

• Influence Operations in Iraq: Discussion Paper for JUW08 War Game

• Information Operations: Lessons from Private Marketing Companies on Cultural Awareness

• Text Messaging by Insurgents and Terrorists: A Potent Force Multiplier

• Tamil Tigers: Trendsetters of Urban Suicide Bombings Pursuing Airborne Capabilities

• Virtual Worlds and Enemy Attack Planning

• Emerging Nanotechnologies for Urban Warfare: Piezoelectric Devices

• Influence Operations: Print-on-Demand Printing

• Case Study of Urban Warfare: Compilation of Lessons Learned from the Chechen Wars

• Nanotechnology in Urban Operations: Overview of Capabilities and the Way Forward

• Emerging Nanotechnologies for Urban Warfare: Shear Thickening Fluids

• Contract Airborne Surveillance Support to Balkan Urban Operations

• Case Study: U.S. Marines in Beirut (1982-1984)

• Urban Warfare: Learning Best Practices on Biometrics from Casino Operations

• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: Radio Frequency Identification -- Tracking the Possibilities

• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: New Carbon Fibers to Produce Stronger, Lighter Body Armor

• Urban IED Threat in Somalia

• Sun Tzu and Modern Urban Warfare

• West Africa: Drug Trade and Communication Schemes

• Colombia's Counterdrug Operations

• Emerging Technologies for Urban Warfare: Nanotechnology and Battlefield Medical Care

Not bad for a young organization.

Petraeus tapped Col. (P) H.R. McMaster to lead the Joint Strategic Assessment Team, or JSAT, according to multiple sources.

McMaster is widely regarded as one of the Army's most capable officers. He is the author of Dereliction of Duty, an examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's performance during the Vietnam War, and he commanded the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment in Tal Afar in western Iraq, a deployment that came to be seen as a model of how to conduct counterinsurgency at the local level.

The team will include people from government, the military and academia.

Petraeus takes charge at CentCom on Oct. 31 and the JSAT will begin its work immediately thereafter.

Sources said the work would likely be completed in February.

General Petraeus, along with Ambassador Ryan Crocker, utilized a JSAT in 2007 that contributed much to the creation of the classified Joint Campaign Plan for Iraq. Among other recommendations the JSAT provided the framework for a new population-centric counterinsurgency strategy intended to provide a bridge for the Iraqi government and security forces to eventual handover of day to day political and security functions.

Michael Gordon of the New York Times and Ann Scott Tyson of the Washington Post reported on JSAT efforts in US Is Seen in Iraq Until at Least '09 and New Strategy for War Stresses Iraqi Politics, respectively.

The overarching aim of the plan, which sets goals for the end of this year and the end of 2008, is more political than military: to negotiate settlements between warring factions in Iraq from the national level down to the local level. In essence, it is as much about the political deals needed to defuse a civil war as about the military operations aimed at quelling a complex insurgency, said officials with knowledge of the plan.

The groundwork for the campaign plan was laid out in an assessment formulated by Petraeus's senior counterinsurgency adviser, David J. Kilcullen, with about 20 military officers, State Department officials and other experts in Baghdad known as the Joint Strategic Assessment Team. Their report, finished last month, was approved by Petraeus and Crocker as the basis of a formal campaign plan that will assign specific tasks for military commands and civilian agencies in Iraq.

The plan anticipates keeping US troop levels elevated into next year but also intends to significantly increase the size of the 144,000-strong Iraqi army, considered one of the more reliable institutions in the country and without which a US withdrawal would spell chaos. "You will have to do something about the sucking noise when we leave," said a US officer familiar with the plan.

The plan has three pillars to be carried out simultaneously -- in contrast to the prior sequential strategy of "clear, hold and build." One shifts the immediate emphasis of military operations away from transitioning to Iraqi security forces -- the primary focus under the former top US commander, Gen. George W. Casey Jr. -- toward protecting Iraq's population in trouble areas, a central objective of the troop increase that President Bush announced in January.

"The revised counterinsurgency approach we're taking now really focuses on protecting those people 24/7 . . . and that competent non-sectarian institutions take the baton from us," said Kilcullen, offering an overview of the campaign plan.

With mounting pressure to "get Afghanistan under control" - and many pundits and politicians advocating an Iraq-like "surge" of US and NATO troops into that country - the formation of a Central Command JSAT is very good news. A critical counterinsurgency lesson learned (and at times unlearned) is one size does not fit all and while a new strategy may include a substantial increase in ground combat forces circumstances warrant a comprehensive approach based on factors peculiar to Afghanistan.

Moreover, JSAT recommendations for Afghanistan must be an integral part of a regional strategy that includes Pakistan and India - as Dr. T.X. Hammes rightly argues in his recent Small Wars Journal blog post - The Good War?

Even worse, to date, the candidates are discussing only Afghanistan without mentioning Pakistan or India. Yet both these Southwest Asian nations are much more critical to the United States future than Afghanistan. Neither candidate has questioned the wisdom of bombing, and likely destabilizing Pakistan, a nuclear-armed nation of almost 170 million people, in order to help our security efforts in Afghanistan. Nor has there been a discussion whether dedicating more resources to Afghanistan is more effective than dedicating different but equivalent resources to support Pakistan. This is despite the fact that 80% of the supplies for the forces we have in Afghanistan come by road directly through one of the least stable parts of Pakistan. In short, if Pakistan destabilizes we probably lose in Afghanistan -- the converse is not true.

Yet, our position in Afghanistan appears to be largely shaping our policy toward Pakistan. And our actions in Pakistan inevitably have a major impact on our relationship with India -- a rising nation destined to be the most important of the three.

We entered Afghanistan to destroy Al Qaeda's operating forces and eliminate its training bases. We successfully eliminated the bases and hurt Al Qaeda badly. One reason often given for our presence in Afghanistan is that we must stabilize it as a nation so that Al Qaeda can never use it as a terrorist base again. Unfortunately, Al Qaeda has moved its forces and its bases into Pakistan. The subsequent conflict inside Pakistan is contributing to increasing instability in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas and has greatly increased the strain on the Pakistani government.

Before we rush more troops into Afghanistan, we must answer basic questions about our strategy for the region and how our efforts in Afghanistan support that strategy. Good tactics and more troops are not a substitute for a strategy -- and in fact can significantly raise the cost of a bad strategy.

While not mentioned by T.X., Iran shares a border and long history with Afghanistan and if recent reporting holds true is increasingly taking an active role in supporting the Taliban.

For additional background on the Iraq JSAT and the issues facing decision-makers in 2007 see The New Yorker's The General's Dilemma by Steve Coll, Newsweek Magazine's Brainiac Brigade by Babak Dehghanpisheh and John Barry, and Dave Kilcullen's posts here at Small Wars Journal (scroll down to 2007 entries).

In the Philippines, the government of President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo recently reached an agreement with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) to end decades of conflict by granting self-determination and self-governance to the Moro minority in Moro dominated parts of the southern island of Mindanao. Non-Moro opponents of the concessions challenged the agreement in the Supreme Court. Violence erupted, as some MILF units rampaged and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) struck back. Negotiations to settle the ethnic conflict have ceased.

From 2003 to 2007, Eugene Martin was executive director of USIP's Philippine Facilitation Project, which aimed to further the peace process between the government and the MILF. A retired senior Foreign Service officer, Martin served twice in the Philippines, as deputy chief of mission in 1996--99 and as a political military officer in 1987--90. He now is the director of the Washington Office of Johns Hopkins University's Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies.

Martin's work on the Philippine reconciliation project was summarized in a USIP Special Report (February 2008) and highlighted in a recent National Journal article about USIP.

USIP interview with Eugene Martin on developments in the Philippines.

Is NATO losing the Afghan war, as the Soviet Union did in the 1980s and the British Empire in the 19th century? Notwithstanding NATO and US denials, the answer is affirmative. And abundant evidence is provided in a detailed 113-page report released by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. The author is Anthony Cordesman, CSIS' senior strategic thinker.

The situation in Afghanistan, Cordesman writes, has been deteriorating for the past five years "and is now reaching a crisis level." Both Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Adm. Mike Mullen have acknowledged that it is now an Afghan-Pakistani conflict "and one lacking in both military and civilian resources. It is also becoming increasingly more deadly for civilians, aid workers, and US and NATO forces."

Titled "Losing the Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat," the CSIS report documents "changes in the character of the threat and the rise in Afghan and allied casualties." UN and declassified US intelligence maps detail the steady expansion of threat influence and the regions that are unsafe for aid workers. Other data show how Afghan drug growing has steadily moved south "and become a major source of financing for the Taliban."

The CSIS report shows that the next US president will "face a critical challenge with a war that is probably being lost at the political and strategic level, and is not being won at the tactical level." It is clear why the senior US and NATO commanders in Afghanistan are calling for substantially more troops than Bush decided to deploy this September, and the problems in this briefing are compounded by critical problems in Afghan and Pakistani governance and economic development.

More at United Press International.

Losing The Afghan-Pakistan War? The Rising Threat - Anthony Cordesman, Center for Strategic and International Studies

The situation in Afghanistan has been deteriorating for nearly half a decade, and is now reaching a crisis level. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen have acknowledged that it is now an Afghan-Pakistan conflict, and one lacking in both military and civilian resources. It is also a war that is becoming increasingly more deadly for civilians, aid workers, and US and NATO forces.

Resurgent Taliban, Haqqani, and HIG forces have turned much of Afghanistan into "no-go" zones for aid workers and civilians. These forces, benefiting from a rise in poppy cultivation and safe havens in the FATA regions of Pakistan, are steadily expanding their capabilities and geographic reach.

This report includes a graphic and map analysis of the fighting in Pakistan, changes in the character of the threat, and the rise in Afghan and allied casualties. UN and declassified US intelligence maps detail the steady expansion of threat influence and the regions that are unsafe for aid workers. Other data show how Afghan drug growing has steadily moved south and become a major source of financing for the Taliban.

It shows that the next President will face a critical challenge in dealing with a war that is probably being lost at the political and strategic level, and is not being won at the tactical level. It is clear why the senior US and NATO/ISAF commanders in Afghanistan are calling for substantially more troops than President Bush decided to deploy this September, and the problems in this briefing are compounded by critical problems in Afghan and Pakistani governance and economic development.

More at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

Key Points:

Success in the highly political and ambiguous conflicts likely to dominate the global security environment in the coming decades will require a framework that balances the relationships between civilian and military leaders and makes the most effective use of their different strengths. These challenges are expected to require better integrated, whole-of-government approaches, the cooperation of host governments and allies, and strategic patience.

Irregular warfare introduces new complications to what Eliot Cohen has called an "unequal dialogue" between civilian and military leaders in which civilian leaders hold the true power but must modulate their intervention into "military" affairs as a matter of prudence rather than principle. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have demonstrated that irregular warfare - which is profoundly political, intensely local, and protracted—breaks from the traditional understanding of how military and civilian leaders should contribute to the overall effort.

One of the key challenges rising from irregular warfare is how to measure progress. While there is disagreement about the feasibility or utility of developing metrics, the political pressure for marking progress is unrelenting. Most data collection efforts focus on the number of different types of kinetic events, major political milestones such as elections, and resource inputs such as personnel, money, and materiel. None of these data points serves easily in discerning what is most needed - namely, outputs or results.

A second major challenge centers on choosing leaders for irregular warfare and stability and reconstruction operations. How to produce civilian leaders capable of asking the right and most difficult questions is not easily addressed. Meanwhile, there has been a general erosion of the traditional Soldier's Code whereby a military member can express dissent, based on legitimate facts, in private to one's superiors up to the point that a decision has been made. Many see the need to shore up this longstanding tradition among both the leadership and the ranks.

A third significant challenge is how to forge integrated strategies and approaches. Professional relationships, not organizational fixes, are vital to succeeding in irregular war. In this sense, the push for new doctrine for the military and civilian leadership is a step in the right direction to clarifying the conflated lanes of authority.

Irregular Warfare: New Challenges for Civil-Military Relations (Full PDF Article)

Book Review: 'The Strongest Tribe'

By Westhawk - Cross Posted at Westhawk

The Strongest Tribe is Bing West's third book on the Iraq War. It is a capstone volume, covering the conflict from 2003 until the summer of 2008. The book also covers the war from bottom to top, from foot patrols in Iraq's slums to meetings with President Bush and his top advisors at the White House. Although rushed into print (there is no index yet plenty of grammatical errors), I predict that a decade from now, The Strongest Tribe will hold up very well as a history of America's intervention in Iraq.

The Strongest Tribe will hold up well because Bing West may be the single most qualified person on the planet to tell this story. As a young Marine Corps officer in Vietnam, Mr. West personally implemented counterinsurgency doctrine. He later wrote about his experiences at RAND and in his book about Vietnam, The Village. As for the dilemmas faced by the generals and those in the top echelons of the government, Mr. West brings his experience as an Assistant Secretary of Defense in the Reagan administration.

Although the U.S. looks set to achieve its goals in Iraq, it goes without saying that the campaign was a mismanaged, costly, and ultimately Pyrrhic victory. Mr. West spares almost no one from blame: President Bush for abruptly adopting grandiose goals for Iraq in May 2003, but failing to choose the proper leaders and military strategy to achieve those lofty ambitions; Secretary Rumsfeld for tacitly undermining his President by seeking to get out of Iraq as quickly as possible; General George Casey for failing to admit that the Iraqis were unable to assume significant responsibilities as quickly as he had asserted to his superiors; and Prime Minister al-Maliki and virtually all other senior Iraqi officials for either being sectarian zealots, or for being outright thieves.

On fifteen extended trips to Iraq, it is clear that Mr. West spent most of his time where the war was actually won, on patrols with basic American infantrymen. Although General David Petraeus is now hailed as the greatest American officer in six decades, the truth is that no general or senior American official, to include General Petraeus, can justly claim credit for winning the war. One might say this about any war, but it is especially true in the case of Iraq.

As Mr. West makes clear, in 2005, perhaps even in 2004, America's junior officers and sergeants actually out on patrol in Iraq's cities and villages knew exactly how to stabilize the country and reduce the violence. The simple and ancient answer was to empower local leaders, sheikhs, and tribes to hunt down the al Qaeda killers and Shi'ite enforcers that had moved into the neighborhoods. Yet until late 2006, top U.S. commanders forbade their subordinates from working with "unauthorized militia-type groups." Mr. West repeatedly documents how local Iraqi leaders pleaded with the Americans to allow them to go after the criminals who had moved in. But until nearly 2007, American junior officers were compelled to work only through corrupt and ill-led Iraqi police and army units which were rarely locally recruited.

The change finally came around November 2006 when some junior U.S. Marine Corps officers staged a minor rebellion against official policy. On pages 212-215, Mr. West describes how some fed-up Sunni tribesmen, supported by some frustrated American advisors, took it on themselves to clean out the town of Khalidiyah, deep in Anbar province. Nothing succeeds like success. The famed Sunni "Awakening" was now in action and later would be granted retroactive approval by the generals in Baghdad. One has to wonder how many lives could have been saved if the generals and Bush administration officials had permitted a locally-organized, bottom-up approach to security two years earlier.

Bing West covers a lot of history in less than 400 pages. Naturally, there are many more issues for future historians to explore. Mr. West introduces some of these topics, but leaves their development to others.

1. The "Great Man" theory and its road to rebellion. The most grievous conceptual error the U.S. made was to attempt to impose a centralized, top-down solution to the governance of Iraq. No where was this more apparent than with the approach of Ambassador Paul Bremer and his term with the CPA. Bremer, President Bush, and those advising them subscribed to the "Great Man" theory, believing that if they issued a command, it surely must be followed. Instead, this thinking merely incited rebellion. Why did this fundamental error occur?

2. The murky month of May 2003. As best as we can tell, the Pentagon's pre-war intention was to appoint a provisional government of Iraqis (as had happened with Afghanistan), sweep up Iraq's WMD, and then largely exit the country. In May 2003, President Bush sent that plan to the shredder when he appointed Proconsul Bremer and fired General Garner. But exactly how and why that abrupt change occurred remains murky to this day. We will have to await the memoirs of President Bush, Secretary Rice, and Secretary Rumsfeld to find out more. Needless to say, President Bush's snap decisions in May 2003 sent history onto a consequential trajectory.

3. How Pyrrhic is the victory in Iraq? The U.S. will succeed in Iraq. But has the price been so painful that America's military will be politically unusable for the foreseeable future? Has the conflict in Iraq essentially disarmed the next President, at least as it pertains to the use of general-purpose ground forces? If so, what will be the consequences for future military operations? And what should be the consequences for defense planning and procurement?

4. Who will fight for America? In The Strongest Tribe, Bing West discusses numerous problems the U.S. is experiencing with civil-military relations. He deplores the defeatism expressed by many members of Congress and in the mainstream media. He examines the cultural divide in America between the vast majority who have no knowledge or contact with the military and the tiny fraction, much based on family tradition, who actually volunteer and fight for the country. He questions how the country can prevail in future conflicts under these conditions.

Americans who read the newspapers or watched the nightly news didn't learn very much about what America's soldiers actually did in Iraq. They saw a tabulation of roadside bombings but almost nothing concerning the thinking and tactics employed by U.S. captains, lieutenants, and sergeants. In The Strongest Tribe, Bing West explains in detail how U.S. infantrymen won the war in Iraq. In doing so, he raises new questions for future historians to answer.

The US focus in Iraq is fast shifting from fighting a war to preparing for its aftermath.

The cornerstone of the transition is an effort to rehabilitate and release thousands of Iraqi detainees, including many former insurgents. According to the military, there are more than 19,000 Iraqi detainees in American custody, down from 26,000 in November 2007.

The effort, centered in Baghdad and Basra, includes courses in literacy, mathematics and moderate Islamic thought. The military hopes the courses will temper the detainees' religious beliefs and give them the skills to find and hold a steady job.

"The idea is to move from punishment to rehabilitation," said Lt. Col. Paul Yingling, one of the officers leading the push. "It's not enough to simply lock these guys up and hope they somehow turn into productive members of Iraqi society."

Few in the military question the need for the rehabilitation effort, but some wonder whether troops should be leading it. Some officers privately complain the program is turning them into social workers who coddle violent extremists. But few are —to voice those criticisms because the effort is a favored project of Gen. David Petraeus, the former commander of US forces in Iraq. Gen. Petraeus believes the country's stability will be shaped by how well former insurgents are integrated back into Iraqi society. He sees the rehabilitation push as a powerful weapon in that fight...

More at The Wall Street Journal.

Senior Officers from the US Navy, Marine Corps and Coast Guard will present the new Maritime Strategy -- "A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower" - 18 September, from 0900 to 1430. You can follow the discussion live on BlogTalk Radio.