... As Gen. Petraeus sets his sights now on the broader Central Command region, and US presidential candidates together with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates assert the need for more international forces in Afghanistan, it is becoming safe to assume that the international presence in Afghanistan will further strengthen over the coming months, perhaps from its current total of some 62,000 troops to 75,000 or more. There is talk, not surprisingly, of a "surge" for Afghanistan, and hope that we can soon accomplish there what has begun to take root in Iraq.

But we must avoid viewing the situation entirely in this light. Combined Iraqi and international forces numbered 600,000 or more personnel in the crucial months of the surge. In Afghanistan, the current figure is less than 200,000 and will grow only modestly in coming months - for a country even larger and more populous than Iraq. Afghanistan does not have the economic resources, or the historical track record of operating as a strong and cohesive polity, that Iraq enjoys. And for all the trouble Syria and Iran have caused in Iraq, by shipping in weaponry and tolerating the flow of al Qaeda fighters into the country, they have never represented the kind of sanctuary for main insurgent groups that Pakistan's tribal regions provide in regard to Afghanistan.

As such, it is difficult to spell out a convincing strategy for turning things around in Afghanistan. Almost surely, we will not find a silver bullet strategy as we did in Iraq; the first goal will be to arrest the deterioration of the situation, and only thereafter to turn the momentum in favor of the Afghan people and government as well as the international community. We need to do what is possible across four main fronts, and then hope that over time small positive developments within each strengthen and reinforce each...

More at The Washington Times.

Trends across the security, political and economic landscape of Iraq continue to improve, but the fundamental character of the conflict remains unchanged, according to a Defense Department report submitted to Congress yesterday.

The improved security in Iraq has opened the doors for dialogue between the leading parties in the country's government and communities and has made room for other institutional developments. But results are still tenuous and long-term stability will only be realized if the Iraqi government continues to build its legitimacy and take on existing challenges, the report says.

The quarterly report is required by the 2008 DoD Appropriations Act and measures the stability and security in Iraq.

The report states that security in the country has continued to improve, even as coalition forces have drawn down, with security incidents at levels last seen in 2004. Civilian deaths across Iraq have declined by 77 percent compared to the same reporting period last year. Major contributions include the surge of coalition forces, the growth of the Iraqi security forces and the efforts of the "Sons of Iraq" citizen security groups, according to the report.

High-profile suicide attacks have taken fewer lives, and they have not been as successful at inciting subsequent violent acts, the report says.

At the same time, coalition forces have drawn down significantly. All five U.S. surge brigade combat teams, two Marine battalions and other coalition forces have left Iraq. The transfers to provincial Iraqi control of Qadisiyah province in July and of Anbar province this month highlight the report's assessment of security achievements during the drawdown of coalition forces.

The Iraqi security forces also are making progress and earning the respect of the Iraqi people, and with coalition forces, they have had many successes in the past several months against local and Iranian-supported militias, the report says. This has led to a shift in the people's attitude toward the militias, and has led to more Iraqis choosing to address their differences politically rather than through violence, according to the report.

The security successes have also led to the degradation of al-Qaida in Iraq's capabilities, the report says, and have led to broader political support for the Iraqi government.

But the report also states that while trends continue to remain positive, "they remain fragile, reversible, and uneven."

"While security has improved dramatically, the fundamental character of the conflict in Iraq remains unchanged—a communal struggle for power and resources," the report reads.

The report calls on the Iraqi government to continue building legitimacy by serving its people while taking on challenges that remain.

Some of those challenges facing the government include expanding its ministries of Defense and Interior to properly man, train and sustain their field forces. It needs to improve its defense budget and distribution of resources, the report says, and it calls on the defense ministry to successfully integrate former militia members into the Iraqi security forces.

Iranian influence in illegal militias known as "special groups" continues to plague Iraqi security efforts, the report says.

"Malign Iranian influence continues to pose the most significant threat to long-term stability in Iraq," the report reads. "Despite continued Iranian promises to the contrary, it appears clear that Iran continues to fund, train, arm, and direct [special groups] intent on destabilizing the situation in Iraq."

The nearly 100,000 Sons of Iraq helping with local security are slowly transitioning into the traditional Iraqi security forces, but the process needs to be faster and more efficient, according to the report.

Iraqi leaders continue to make incremental but steady political progress, the report says, thanks largely to the security gains.

"The current security environment is more hospitable to compromise across sectarian and ethnic divides, while expanding oil revenues have generated the funds needed to support development and reconciliation programs," the report reads.

Report to Congress: Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq - Full Report

Now that he has left Iraq in better shape than he found it, can Gen. David Petraeus save Afghanistan and the rest of the region? He'll need to apply some tough lessons from Baghdad to his new challenge- just not the ones you think.

General David Petraeus left Iraq last week with proper fanfare for his success in dramatically reducing the violence that had steadily engulfed the country until late last summer. At the end of October, he'll take the helm of the four-star Central Command that oversees US military affairs in all of the Middle East and South Asia. His new to-do list will be long and complex. The general will no doubt be applying a number of important lessons from Iraq in his new command. They aren't necessarily the lessons most people think, but they just might be the lessons that America - struggling to contain a growing two-country war in Pakistan and Afghanistan and locked in a tense regional showdown with Iran - urgently needs to learn...

When Petraeus takes the reins at CENTCOM, he'll need to take a similar long, hard look at Pakistan's border region and Afghanistan to arrive at the same fundamental diagnosis of the problem. As in Iraq, he is likely to conclude that the solution lays not in merely pumping more troops into the region but rather in how those troops are used. Nor, with apologies to Bob Woodward, will there be some silver-bullet technical solution to kill or capture the al Qaeda leadership. Troop numbers and technology were not the key factors that turned the tide in Iraq...

The lesson of Iraq is that there is no magic formula for any of the complex foreign policy challenges facing the United States. The right expertise must be brought to bear on all these problems - whether it's South Asia, finishing the job in Iraq, or containing Iran. A dangerous fantasy has taken hold in Washington that the Iraq war is "over" and that the United States can now turn its hammer on another problem. Yes, the remaining tasks in the Middle East are less combat than conflict termination - a primarily political and diplomatic job that requires military leverage to accomplish - but they are what the mission is all about. When will America learn that hasty exits do not make for stable endgames? The next president, whoever he is, would be wise to keep Petraeus at CENTCOM for long enough to bring some of these needed efforts to fruition.

Much more at Foreign Policy.

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

Secretary Gates at National Defense University (Full Transcript). Highlight excerpts follow.

Balance

The defining principle driving our strategy is balance. I note at the outset that balance is not the same as treating all challenges as having equal priority. We cannot expect to eliminate risk through higher defense budgets, to, in effect "do everything, buy everything."

The War We Are In

As we think about the security challenges on the horizon, it is important to establish upfront that America's ability to deal with threats for years to come will depend importantly on our performance in the conflicts of today... In the past I have expressed frustration over the defense bureaucracy's priorities and lack of urgency when it came to the current conflicts - that for too many in the Pentagon it has been business as usual, as opposed to a wartime footing and a wartime mentality. When referring to "Next-War-itis," I was not expressing opposition to thinking about and preparing for the future. It would be irresponsible not to do so - and the overwhelming majority of people in the Pentagon, the services, and the defense industry do just that.

COIN and Stability Operations

... the recent past vividly demonstrated the consequences of failing adequately to address the dangers posed by insurgencies or failing states. Terrorist networks can find sanctuary within the borders of a weak nation and strength within the chaos of social breakdown. A nuclear-armed state could collapse into chaos, and criminality. Let's be honest with ourselves. The most likely catastrophic threats to our homeland - for example, an American city poisoned or reduced to rubble by a terrorist attack - are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states.

The kinds of capabilities needed to deal with these scenarios cannot be considered exotic distractions or temporary diversions. We do not have the luxury of opting out because they do not conform to preferred notions of the American way of war.

Strategic Communications

The Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the importance of strategic communications as a vital capability, and good work has been done since. However, we can't lapse into using communications as a crutch for shortcomings in policy or execution. As Admiral Mullen has noted, in the broader battle for hearts and minds abroad, we have to be as good at listening to others as we are at telling our story to them. And when it comes to perceptions at home, when all is said and done, the best way to convince the American people we're winning a war is through credible and demonstrable results, as we have been able to do in Iraq.

China

Other nations may be un—to challenge the United States fighter to fighter, ship to ship, tank to tank. But they are developing other disruptive means to blunt the impact of American power, narrow our military options, and deny freedom of movement and action. In the case of China, investments in cyber and anti-satellite warfare, anti-air and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles could threaten America's primary means to project power and help allies in the Pacific: our bases, air and sea assets, and the networks that support them. This will put a premium on America's ability to strike from over the horizon, employ missile defenses, and will require shifts from short-range to longer-range systems such as the Next Generation Bomber.

Conventional Dominance

...although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. It is true that the United States would be hard pressed to fight a major conventional ground war elsewhere on short notice, but as I've said before, where on Earth would we seriously do that? We have ample, untapped striking power in our air and sea forces should the need arise to deter or punish aggression - whether on the Korean Peninsula, in the Persian Gulf, or across the Taiwan Strait. So while we are knowingly assuming some additional risk in this area, that risk is, I believe, a prudent and manageable one.

Procurement

As we can expect a blended, high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflict, so too should America seek a better balance in the portfolio of capabilities we have - the types of units we field, the weapons we buy, the training we do.

When it comes to procurement, for the better part of five decades, the trend has gone towards lower numbers as technology gains made each system more capable. In recent years these platforms have grown ever more baroque, ever more costly, are taking longer to build, and are being fielded in ever dwindling quantities. Given that resources are not unlimited, the dynamic of exchanging numbers for capability is reaching a point of diminishing returns. A given ship or aircraft -- no matter how capable, or well-equipped - can only be in one place at one time - and, to state the obvious, when one is sunk or shot down, there is one less of them.

In addition, the prevailing view for decades was that weapons and units designed for the so-called high-end could also be used for the low...The need for the state of the art systems - particularly longer range capabilities - will never go away, as we strive to offset the countermeasures being developed by other nations. But at a certain point, given the types of situations we are likely to face - and given, for example, the struggles to field up-armored HUMVEES, MRAPs, and ISR in Iraq - it begs the question whether specialized, often relatively low-tech equipment for stability and counterinsurgency missions is also needed.

The key is to make sure that the strategy and risk assessment drives the procurement, rather than the other way around.

Institutions

In Iraq, we've seen how an army that was basically a smaller version of the Cold War force can over time become an effective instrument of counterinsurgency. But that came at a frightful human, financial, and political cost. For every heroic and resourceful innovation by troops and commanders on the battlefield, there was some institutional shortcoming at the Pentagon they had to overcome. Your task, particularly for those going back to your services, is to support the institutional changes necessary so the next set of colonels, captains, and sergeants will not have to be quite so heroic or quite so resourceful.

Constituencies and Institutions

...the reality is that conventional and strategic force modernization programs are strongly supported in the services, in the Congress, and by the defense industry. For reasons laid out today, I also support them. For example, this year's base budget request contains more than $180 billion in procurement, research and development, the overwhelming preponderance of which is for conventional systems. However, apart from the Special Forces community and some dissident colonels, for decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing our capabilities to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict - and to quickly meet the ever-changing needs of our forces engaged in these conflicts...

In the end, the military capabilities we need cannot be separated from the cultural traits and reward structure of the institutions we have: the signals sent by what gets funded, who gets promoted, what is taught in the academies and staff colleges, and how we train.

Limits and Modesty

First, limits about what the United States - still the strongest and greatest nation on earth - can do. The power of our military's global reach has been an indispensable contributor to world peace - and must remain so. But not every outrage, every act of aggression, every crisis can or should elicit an American military response, and we should acknowledge such.

Be modest about what military force can accomplish, and what technology can accomplish. The advances in precision, sensor, information and satellite technology have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. The Taliban dispatched within three months, Saddam's regime toppled in three weeks. Where a button is pushed in Nevada and seconds later a pickup truck explodes in Mosul. Where a bomb destroys the targeted house on the right, leaving intact the one on the left.

But also never neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare, which is inevitably tragic, inefficient, and uncertain. Be skeptical of systems analysis, computer models, game theories, or doctrines that suggest otherwise. Look askance at idealized, triumphalist, or ethnocentric notions of future conflict that aspire to upend the immutable principles of war: where the enemy is killed, but our troops and innocent civilians are spared. Where adversaries can be cowed, shocked, or awed into submission, instead of being tracked down, hilltop by hilltop, house by house, block by bloody block.

More:

Gates Criticizes Conventional Focus At Start of Iraq War - Washington Post

Defense Chief Criticizes Bureaucracy at the Pentagon - New York Times

Gates: Military Force, Technology Have Limits - Los Angeles Times

Balance at Heart of National Defense Strategy, Gates Says - AFPS

US Defense Chief Calls for a Balanced US Military Strategy - Voice of America

Iran Remains Unyielding, Gates Says - AFPS

Balance at Heart of National Defense Strategy, Gates Says - AFPS

US Defense Chief Calls for a Balanced US Military Strategy - Voice of America

Gates Calls for a Balanced Military - Associated Press

Gates Predicts No Sharp Cuts in US Defense Budgets - Reuters

Gates Warns of the Limits of US Military Power - Agence France-Presse

Gates: US Troops Likely to Stay in Iraq - United Press International

Technology is No Cure-all, Gates Tells Military - Reuters

The editors of Red Team Journal are pleased to mark the relaunch and redesign of www.redteamjournal.com with the first annual Red Team Journal essay contest. We are also pleased to announce that Amenaza Technologies, The Center for Advantage, Total Security Solutions International, and Watermark Risk Management International have joined us as this year's co-sponsors.

The theme of the contest "Think ... Think again." emphasizes the importance of red teaming and alternative analysis to today's decisionmakers. In their submissions, essayists should describe a national security issue of future concern from a traditional perspective and then reconsider the same issue from an unconventional or alternative perspective. We encourage essayists to interpret national security broadly and to look beyond the current slate of well-known issues to consider the "problem after next."

More at Red Team Journal.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies is hosting a rollout event on Tuesday, October 7 from 1:00 PM - 3:00 PM featuring:

Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, USA, Commanding General, United States Army Combined Arms Center and Ft. Leavenworth

Ambassador John Herbst

Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State

Ambassador Dick Solomon

President, United States Institute for Peace

Ambassador Michael Hess

Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International Development

Samuel A. Worthington

CEO and President, InterAction

Please see this invitation if you are interested in attending.

Baghdad at Sunrise - Peter Mansoor

This compelling book presents an unparalleled record of what happened after US forces seized Baghdad in the spring of 2003.

The Strongest Tribe - Bing West

From a universally respected combat journalist, a gripping history based on five years of front-line reporting about how the war was turned around--and the choice now facing America.

Tell Me How This Ends - Linda Robinson

After a series of disastrous missteps in its conduct of the war, the White House in 2006 appointed General David Petraeus as the Commanding General of the coalition forces. Tell Me How This Ends is an inside account of his attempt to turn around a failing war.

The War Within - Bob Woodward

Woodward interviewed key players, obtained dozens of never-before-published documents, and had nearly three hours of exclusive interviews with President Bush. The result is a stunning, firsthand history of the years from mid-2006, when the White House realizes the Iraq strategy is not working, through the decision to surge another 30,000 U.S. troops in 2007, and into mid-2008, when the war becomes a fault line in the presidential election.

We Are Soldiers Still - Joe Galloway

In their stunning follow-up to the classic bestseller We Were Soldiers Once... and Young, Lt. Gen. Hal Moore and Joe Galloway return to Vietnam and reflect on how the war changed them, their men, their enemies, and both countries - often with surprising results.

In a Time of War - Bill Murphy

The West Point cadets Murphy follows through their baptism by fire are an admirable sample of young American men and women: intelligent, ambitious and intensely patriotic.

To be released soon:

Iraq and the Evolution of American Strategy - Steven Metz

Today the US military is more nimble, mobile, and focused on rapid responses against smaller powers than ever before. One could argue that the Gulf War and the postwar standoff with Saddam Hussein hastened needed military transformation and strategic reassessments in the post--Cold War era. But the preoccupation with Iraq also mired the United States in the Middle East and led to a bloody occupation. What will American strategy look like after US troops leave Iraq?

Wednesday, October 1, 2008, 10:30 a.m.--1:30 p.m.

Wohlstetter Conference Center, Twelfth Floor, AEI

1150 Seventeenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

The October 1st operational launch of U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), on the eve of new American Presidential Administration, provides an unprecedented opportunity to reconceive and reshape U.S. strategy toward Africa. However, while significant attention has been devoted to the structure and functions of AFRICOM—and to its "strategic communications" challenges—less thought has been given to identifying the core security interests that should guide U.S. strategy on the continent, and the new forms of partnership with a more self-assured Africa that are most likely to advance those interests.

With its capacity for political as well as military engagement, for conflict prevention as well as kinetic operations, AFRICOM has the potential to serve as a model for future interagency security cooperation efforts in the Long War. But what AFRICOM does is more important than how the command is structured. What is the strategic rationale for increased U.S. security engagement with African countries, in light of America's core global challenges? What are the emerging threats and challenges in Africa, and how should the United States best organize itself to address them? On October 1st, AEI scholars Mauro De Lorenzo and Thomas Donnelly will host a public panel to address these and other questions.