The army's new stability operations doctrine calls for a comprehensive approach to stabilization efforts that envisions integration of a variety of stakeholders not traditionally combined as full partners in complex contingencies. The CSIS panel discussion included Ambassador John Herbst. Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization, United States Department of State; Ambassador Dick Solomon, President, United States Institute for Peace; Ambassador Michael Hess, Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, United States Agency for International Development; Samuel A. Worthington, CEO and president of InterAction, Nathan Freier, a senior fellow at CSIS, and Rick Barton, codirector of the Post-Conflict Reconstruction Project.

Location: Counterinsurgency Center For Excellence (COIN CFE), Camp Taji, Iraq

Qualifications: Instructor should have a PhD in Arab political / cultural studies. Candidates who have an MA and are currently working toward a PhD are acceptable. Instructor must be able to travel throughout Iraq when required as part of Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) and COIN Survey Teams (CSTs) augmenting information collection efforts for both the COIN CFE (Counterinsurgency Center For Excellence) and the ICS (Iraqi Counterinsurgency School). Wide ranging discovery and analysis of this kind should be presented to the Commander, Iraqi COIN School and his mission design team as part of the overall criteria that will ultimately shape the mature form and purpose of the Iraqi COIN School. Instructor must have a working knowledge of both historical and contemporary Iraqi government and the ability to instruct coalition forces about the nature of this system and its effects on day-to-day military operations; have an understanding of the structure of the Iraqi Army Division and its components and the processes and politics of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command, the Ministry of Defense and the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq. Instructor should be familiar with the current civil-military situation in Iraq as it relates to basic counterinsurgency doctrine as taught by the COIN CFE and the ICS.

Duties: Educates coalition military and inter-agency personnel on Arab political and cultural topics and their relationship with and significance to the Contemporary Operating Environment (COE) and ongoing counterinsurgency operations. Maintains situational awareness of day-to-day political / military events in the Iraqi theater of operations and incorporates this information into presentations as required. Infuses instruction with practical linkages between political/cultural issues and military operations. Assists in the collection, analysis and summation of COIN best practices for distribution to US and Iraqi training centers. Assists in curriculum development and course content design as it relates to political/cultural learning objectives in order to insure continuity, validity and currency of coalition and Iraqi COIN curricula.

Contact: William Rebarick, Raytheon Company, 321.235.1750 office, DSN 312.960.8647, wrebarick@raytheon.com

Important as these doctrinal manuals are in correctly understanding the nature of conflict in the 21st century - one in which weak states rather than strong ones are the greatest threat to our security and the smooth functioning of the international system - they are but a first step. Doctrine drives the way we organize and train our forces, educate our leaders, and select and promote our people. The Army now faces the difficult task of implementing significant changes in all of those areas to build the military we need for the 21st century.

Nearly three years ago, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 stated that "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department of Defense shall be prepared to conduct and support. They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations and be explicitly addressed and integrated across all DoD activities including doctrine, organizations, training, education, exercises, materiel, leadership, personnel, facilities, and planning." Since then, much progress has been made, but much more work remains to be done. Secretary of Defense Gates felt compelled to note just a week ago today that "Support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in our budget, in our bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and in Congress. My fundamental concern is that there is not commensurate institutional support - including in the Pentagon - for the capabilities needed to win the wars we are in, and of the kinds of missions we are most likely to undertake in the future."

The publication of FM 3.07 is an important step in the direction of preparing the Army for the wars we are in and the kinds of missions we are most likely to undertake in the future. Now comes the hard part of building the capabilities we need to win the wars of today and tomorrow.

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SWJ Editors Notes:

FM 3.07, Stability Operations was released / posted this morning by the US Army Combined Arms Center.

Also see It's Time for an Army Advisor Corps by Dr. John Nagl.

"The lion of the people will turn on you," warned Mullah Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil, a former Taliban foreign minister, as we sipped green tea at his home in Kabul a few weeks ago. He noted that while Americans had been shocked by a series of spectacular insurgent attacks over the summer, the United States-led coalition faced a far greater danger than the resurgent Taliban: growing despair among average Afghans that their government is fundamentally illegitimate.

Every aspect of sound counterinsurgency strategy revolves around bolstering the government's legitimacy. When ordinary people lose their faith in their government, then they also lose faith in the foreigners who prop it up. The day that happens across Afghanistan is the day we lose the war.

With more than 230 military deaths since January, this year is on track to be the deadliest yet for the coalition in Afghanistan. July alone saw a brazen attack on the Indian Embassy in Kabul, the deaths of nine Americans at a combat outpost in Nuristan and the killing of 10 French soldiers on the outskirts of Kabul. The response has been a growing consensus around sending two to four more combat brigades to Afghanistan - 8,000 to 16,000 troops.

Although larger and more populous than Iraq, Afghanistan has fewer than half the coalition forces, and critical programs to advise the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police operate at one-third to one-half of their authorized strength. As the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Michael Mullen, told Congress last year, "In Afghanistan we do what we can; in Iraq we do what we must."

More at The New York Times.

The rising violence in Afghanistan and fractious political situation in Pakistan have become leading issues in the American presidential campaign and the debates between the candidates. Indeed, after seven years of war in the region, it's time to ask a very impolite set of questions: If we did, by chance, capture or kill Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri, would Afghanistan still matter? Would there be public support for sending more American troops to stabilize a country that has rarely in its history enjoyed strong central government and that abuts a tribal area in Pakistan that neither the British nor the Pakistanis have ever been able to control? Is the war in Afghanistan, deep down, anything more than a manhunt for a handful of individuals? And if it is, how do we define victory there?

After all, Afghanistan is not the only ungovernable space with an Islamic setting around the world that can provide a base for terrorists who want to attack the United States. The world is full of them: from Somalia to the southern Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago. Better, perhaps, not to be tied down with thousands of troops in one or two places, and instead use sophisticated, high-tech covert means to hunt down hostile groups wherever they crop up. The problem with Osama bin Laden, one could argue, was not that he had a haven in Afghanistan in the 1990s but that he was not pursued there with sufficient vigor.

So, here's my answer: In fact, Afghanistan is more than a manhunt, and it does matter, for reasons that have not been fully fleshed out by policy makers or the military.

More at The New York Times.

The Army on Monday will unveil an unprecedented doctrine that declares nation-building missions will probably become more important than conventional warfare and defines "fragile states" that breed crime, terrorism and religious and ethnic strife as the greatest threat to US national security.

The doctrine, which has generated intense debate in the US military establishment and government, holds that in coming years, American troops are not likely to engage in major ground combat against hostile states as they did in Iraq and Afghanistan, but instead will frequently be called upon to operate in lawless areas to safeguard populations and rebuild countries.

Such "stability operations" will last longer and ultimately contribute more to the military's success than "traditional combat operations," according to the Army's new Stability Operations Field Manual, a copy of which was obtained by The Washington Post...

But as the Army struggles to define its long-term future beyond Iraq and Afghanistan, some critics within the military warn that the new emphasis on nation-building is a dangerous distraction from what they believe should be the Army's focus: strengthening its core war-fighting skills to prepare for large-scale ground combat.

The critics challenge the assumption that major wars are unlikely in the future, pointing to the risk of high-intensity conflict that could require sizable Army deployments to North Korea, Iran, Pakistan or elsewhere. "All we need to do is look at Russia and Georgia a few months ago. That suggests the description . . . of future war is too narrow," said Col. Gian P. Gentile, an Iraq war veteran with a doctorate in history who is a leading thinker in the Army camp opposed to the new doctrine...

Civilian officials and nongovernmental groups voice a different concern: that the military's push to expand its exercise of "soft power," while perhaps inevitable, given the dearth of civilian resources, marks a growing militarization of US foreign policy...

More at The Washington Post.

At the end of the third inning we declared victory and said the game's over. It ain't over. It isn't going to be over in future wars. If we're talking about the future, we need to talk about not how you win the peace as a separate part of the war, but you've got to look at this thing from start to finish. It's not a phased conflict; there isn't a fighting part and then another part. It is nine innings. And at the end of the game, somebody's going to declare victory. And whatever blood is poured onto the battlefield could be wasted if we don't follow it up with understanding what victory is.

--General Anthony Zinni- Naval Institute Forum, Sept. 2003

First item - Blast Kills 7 Russian Troops in S. Ossetia - Philip Pan, Washington Post

A car bomb exploded outside Russia's military headquarters in South Ossetia on Friday, killing seven soldiers and two others in what leaders of the Kremlin-backed separatist region immediately described as a terrorist attack launched by Georgia.

The blast in Tskhinvali, the South Ossetian capital, came amid continuing tensions as a cease-fire deadline approached for Russian troops to withdraw from territory around the breakaway region, which has declared its independence from Georgia.

Russian troops had seized the car in a Georgian village outside South Ossetia and taken it to Tskhinvali to be searched after detaining four individuals who were carrying guns and grenades, Maj. Gen. Marat Kulakhmetov, the commander of the Russian forces, told the Interfax news agency.

More at the Washington Post, New York Times, Agence France-Presse and Associated Press.

And this broader item - in tomorrow's Post - Behind the Bluster, Russia Is Collapsing by Murray Feshbach

The bear is back. That's what all too many Russia-watchers have been saying since Russian troops steamrolled Georgia in August, warning that the country's strongman, Vladimir Putin, was clawing his way back toward superpower status. The new Russia's resurgence has been fueled -- quite literally -- by windfall profits from gas and oil, a big jump in defense spending and the cocky attitude on such display during the mauling of Georgia, its US-backed neighbor to the south. Many now believe that the powerful Russian bear of the Cold War years is coming out of hibernation.

Not so fast. Predictions that Russia will again become powerful, rich and influential ignore some simply devastating problems at home that block any march to power. Sure, Russia's army could take tiny Georgia. But Putin's military is still in tatters, armed with rusting weaponry and staffed with indifferent recruits. Meanwhile, a declining population is robbing the military of a new generation of soldiers. Russia's economy is almost totally dependent on the price of oil. And, worst of all, it's facing a public health crisis that verges on the catastrophic.

To be sure, the skylines of Russia's cities are chock-a-block with cranes. Industrial lofts are now the rage in Moscow, Russian tourists crowd far-flung locales from Thailand to the Caribbean, and Russian moguls are snapping up real estate and art in London almost as quickly as their oil-rich counterparts from the Persian Gulf. But behind the shiny surface, Russian society may actually be weaker than it was even during Soviet times. The Kremlin's recent military adventures and tough talk are the bluster of the frail, not the swagger of the strong.

While Russia has capitalized impressively on its oil industry, the volatility of the world oil market means that Putin cannot count on a long-term pipeline of cash flowing from high oil prices. A predicted drop of about one-third in the price of a barrel of oil will surely constrain Putin's ability to carry out his ambitious agendas, both foreign and domestic.

That makes Moscow's announced plan to boost defense spending by close to 26 percent in 2009 - in order to fully re-arm its military with state-of-the-art weaponry - a dicey proposition. What the world saw in Georgia was a badly outdated arsenal, one that would take many years to replace - even assuming the country could afford the $200 billion cost.

Something even larger is blocking Russia's march. Recent decades, most notably since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, have seen an appalling deterioration in the health of the Russian population, anchoring Russia not in the forefront of developed countries but among the most backward of nations.

Much more at The Washington Post.

Synopsis:

Most of the literature on the cost of the Iraq War, Afghan War, and "war on terrorism" focuses on the burden these wars place on the federal budget and the US economy. These are very real issues, but they also have deflected attention from another key issue: whether the war in Afghanistan is being properly funded and being given the resources necessary to win.

Anthony H. Cordesman, the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at CSIS, has prepared a new report showing that the US has consistently failed to provide the financial and military resources necessary to win the war, and that these failures may well mean the US is losing it.

Follow the Money: Why the US is Losing the War in Afghanistan

Same, same for the Combined Arms Center blog.

Both are great examples of what Frontier 6 (aka LTG William Caldwell) had in mind when he posted here at SWJ on changing the organizational culture.