Baghdad at Sunrise: A Brigade Commander's War in Iraq - Peter R. Mansoor, Yale University Press, 2008, 376 pgs, $28.00.

It is hard to objectively evaluate a book that is "blurbed" on the back by the likes of General David Petraeus (now Commander, U.S. Central Command), Dr. Conrad Crane (chief editor of FM 3-24 Counterinsurgency), H.R. McMaster, Tom Ricks and Wick Murray. They have all endorsed the book as a masterful memoir of the post-conflict period in Iraq's capital from a commander's viewpoint. What can anyone else find to say that this suite of insightful soldiers and scholars have not?

Even worse, the book includes a brief foreword from Donald and Fred Kagan, about as powerful a father-son pairing as one will ever find among historians and public intellectuals today. The former is a highly respected historian of classics who teaches at Yale, from which the latter also graduated. Fred Kagan, after a decade at West Point, is now a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. They supervise a series for that school's university press which is intended to "present the keenest analyses of war in its different aspects, the sharpest evaluations of political and military decision making, and descriptive accounts of military activity that illuminate its human elements."

They certainly scored a home run with Baghdad at Sunrise. It offers a compassionate, candid and comprehensive account of a brigade commander's tour in Iraq. The author served as the Commander of the 1st Brigade, 1st Armored Division known as the Ready First Combat Team" during that confusing period after the toppling of the Bathist regime and the all too quick transfer of responsibility to an interim Iraqi governing group. The author provides a keen depiction of events on the ground, and his understanding of the decision making that was guiding his unit's activities in the grim and grimy streets of Rusafa and Adhamiya in central and northeast Baghdad. This sector is sandwiched between the Tigris and the slums of Sadr City. Mansoor's "Ready First" struggled to bring order out of chaos, neutralized the national insurgents, and fought the increasing influx of Islamic militants from late May of 2003 until relieved in July 2004. In an area of some 75 square miles that was once home to over 2 million Iraqis, his brigade struggled to overcome the poor planning and lack of follow through that occurred back in Washington's policy making circles.

Mansoor's lens is often focused on the human dimension of this conflict, especially his own soldiers. The book is dedicated to his entire brigade, but especially those that made the ultimate sacrifice. The circumstances around the loss of each soldier, including his Command Sergeant Major Eric Cooke, is carefully detailed. These soldiers "made their stand in the cradle of civilization in an effort to ensure that the progress of mankind continues, and that it will be an evolution worthy of the twenty-first century, not the seventh."

The author is very well equipped and well positioned to evaluate the historical underpinning and decisions about the war. He is one of those unique soldier-scholars, able to apply perceptive insights from history with a rigorously trained and analytical mind, with the skills of a senior combat commander. Colonel Mansoor earned a PhD from Ohio State University in military history, and has taught at the U.S. Military Academy. He is now the Raymond Mason Chair of Military History at Ohio State University. After command in Iraq, he served as the founding director of the U.S. Army and Marine Counterinsurgency Center at Leavenworth, and was detailed to the Chairman, JCS study group of colonels that evaluated U.S. military strategy in Iraq (the dust jacket inaccurately states that this group proposed the surge strategy). From 2007-2008, he was General Petraeus's executive officer at Multi-National Force-Iraq where he got to see the evolutionary progress he and his brigade has so relentless worked towards. The return to civilization in Mesopotamia is now within grasp, but only if the Iraqis want it.

The author concludes with a chapter titled "Reflections" that alone is worth the price of the book. This chapter synthesizes his year of command and provides battle-hardened lessons learned about insurgency. Underscoring points made by now retired LtCol John Nagl, Mansoor forcefully presents a need for greater adaptation by the U.S. Army. Its culture "must change, or the organization will be unprepared to fight and win the wars of the twenty-first century. While retaining the ability to conduct major combat operations, the Army must change its culture to embrace missions other than conventional land force combat"

Echoing concerns raised by Bing West in his highly regarded The Strongest Tribe, Mansoor worries about the relationship between the American people and its professional army. "American cannot long remain a superpower if we think that our wars can be fought solely by the small sliver of society that populates our professional military forces," he observes. However, the author provides no recommendations on how we can best attain this closer relationship. This reviewer is of the opinion that the fault does not lie with the American people, but with our senior elected officials.

This is an exceptional memoir that decades from now will still be ranked as an insightful but especially candid history of the war. Mansoor is the rarest of commanders, —to point out where his own decisions or judgments were flawed. It will appeal to general readers looking for intimate details and honest assessments on a daily basis from a commander's lens. It is highly recommended for prospective military leaders as part of their preparation for higher command. Simply stated, it is an impressive account that all prospective brigade, regimental and battalion commanders should read.

Frank Hoffman is a retired Marine infantryman who serves as a research fellow at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. He is also a non-resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute, Phila, PA.

By Captain Timothy Hsia

Iraq today is at a critical juncture which could mark the beginning of further stabilization or increased internecine struggle. The surge of troops has created additional breathing room for the Nouri Al-Maliki government and General Petraeus' leadership has greatly assisted in ensuring a more peaceful and secure Iraq. For the past two years, Iraq has been the scene of multiple sectarian battles between Sunnis and Shia, and internally within the two sects. The Sunni insurgency has died down as the Sons of Iraq (or Concerned Local Citizens) have turned against foreign jihadists and extremist Sunni groups. Similarly the Shia internal struggle has been won by Maliki and the Government of Iraq over Moktada Al-Sadr's Mahdi Army.

The next phase of the Iraq war could become less of a sectarian struggle and more of an ethnic conflict. The inability of Iraq's parliament to resolve the situation in Kirkuk and the threat of violence in Khanaqin has highlighted the unresolved pressing issue of the Kurdish people and its Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).

The current Iraq war has strengthened the Kurdish people as it has demographically consolidated the Kurdish people in Northern Iraq. Kurdish peoples displaced to Northern Iraq because they were now free to return to their ancestral homes after being evicted previously by Saddam and also because they were seeking refuge from regions besieged by sectarian violence. Simultaneously, the KRG has lured Kurdish people back to the Kurdish heartland in Northern Iraq with promises of land, wages, and security. Estimates today of the total population of Kurdish people living in the Middle East ranges around 30 million people. Based off these numbers, the Kurdish people are often described as the largest ethnic minority without a country. Hitherto, the Kurdish region has been comparatively stabile due to its homogenous demographics. And currently the Kurdish provinces in Northern Iraq enjoy a level of economic prosperity and political autonomy unmatched by any other region within Iraq.

Kirkuk

Iraq's provincial elections will not be held this year due to disagreements over the fate of Kirkuk. Kirkuk is Iraq's fourth largest city with a population of about 700,000. Kurds adamantly believe that Kirkuk should be governed under the KRG. However, Kirkuk is also highly coveted by Turkoman and Iraqi Arabs. Although Sunnis and Shias disagree on a preponderance of issues, the one thing that unites them is their staunch opposition to a perceived expansion of Kurdish influence, and a possible Kurdish annexation of Kirkuk has become a rallying cry for Arabs opposed to Kurdish expansion. As a result of the internal disagreements within the country concerning Kirkuk, the Iraqi government has grinded to a standstill affecting a broad range of issues from oil contracts and how revenues will be disbursed to new provincial elections.

Kirkuk is desired by all parties mainly because of the revenues which will be generated once the oil rich city begins pumping its vast oil reservoir. As a result, Kirkuk has become a symbol of the political struggle over defining the limits of federalism within Iraq. Will the central government in Baghdad be able to peacefully govern the Kurdish region, and which has had de facto independence since 1991? Or will the Kurds proudly wave their own flag and chafe under the current Iraqi government much as it did under Saddam's rule?

Turkey and Iran

Today's Kurds find themselves straddling the borders of four countries: Syria, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. All four countries have sought to stifle the Kurdish people's attempt to expand geographically. Nonetheless the Kurds seem more than ever determined to one day establish an independent Kurdistan despite the attempts by these countries to limit Kurdish expansion.

The Turkish government stands the most to lose if the KRG seeks to become a country. Turkey's less populated eastern areas has a sizable population of Kurdish minority who might choose to leave Turkey or assist Kurdish independence. The Turkish government has responded to alleged Kurdish terrorist activities by launching air attacks and indirect fires on the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and on groups associated with the PKK. Turkey has also closed its borders with Iraq on several occasions in order to eliminate lines of communication between Kurdish groups operating within Turkey and their logistical bases in Northern Iraq. The Turkish government is also sympathetic to the cause of the Turkomans in Kirkuk, and wish to avoid having Turkomans in Kirkuk marginalized by the more populous Kurdish people and the KRG.

While the Iraqi government has denounced Turkey's forays in Northern Iraq, there is little which the Iraqi government can do to limit Turkish military activity. The Iraqi military simply does not have the military means and capabilities to influence or eliminate PKK strongholds with forces already spread out from Basra in the far south to Sadr City and upwards to the Diyala province. Furthermore, the government in Baghdad has little to no soft power influence in Kurdish regions in Northern Iraq. Kirkuk's economic success will also hinge largely on Turkey, as the pipeline from Kirkuk to the West runs through Turkey to the port at Ceyhan. If relations sour between the KRG and Turkey then Turkey could quickly destabilize the KRG by imposing economic sanctions and by halting oil flow across the Kirkuk-Ceyhan pipeline.

The Kurdish border problems in Northern Iraq include not just Turkey but also Iran. This past June the Associated Press reported that Turkey and Iran had united forces to attack Kurdish rebels. A Turkish general was reported as stating that "We are sharing intelligence with Iran, we are talking, we are coordinating."Syria too has vocally supported Turkey's assaults against Kurdish rebels. Iranian and Turkish attacks on Kurdish forces are not simply the problems of the KRG. Any attack on the KRG is also an attack on Iraqi sovereign soil.

Peshmerga

Since the fall of Saddam, the Kurds have greatly expanded and improved the Peshmerga, its army. The Peshmerga have moved into trouble spots such as Mosul in hopes of expanding its sphere of influence. Nonetheless, the Peshmerga are deeply distrusted by non-Kurdish Iraqis. The Iraqi government has yet to deploy forces into the KRGs provinces for fear that it would unnecessarily escalate violence between the Iraqi Army and the Peshmerga.

The very existence of the Peshmerga in Iraq raises serious questions as to how the Iraqi government can tolerate an armed force independent of its control. United countries do not have two armies or with one army that answers only to a regional government. The Peshmerga are not a ragtag army but are a seasoned force whose professionalism, discipline, logistical abilities, and fighting power rival that of the Iraqi Army. Iraqi Security Forces mirror the deep anxiety shared by Iraqi Arabs in that they are equally distrustful of the Peshmerga, and assume Peshmerga activity in any locale is an attempt to exert Kurdish influence. American forces however are not biased against Peshmerga forces and oftentimes work in conjunction with them in areas such as Mosul where they find them to be competent partners in arms.

Recent events in the city of Khanaqin highlight the tension and danger with having two armies in one country. Khanaqin located in the Western portion of the Diyala province near the Iranian border is a disputed city much like Kirkuk. The Kurdish presence in Khanaqin included not only Peshmerga troops but also the Kurdish intelligence service, Asayesh. Although geographically separated from the Kurdish region the city is predominately populated by Kurdish people. Khanaqin located in the Diyala province is an oddity in terms of demographics as the province as a whole is an Arab dominated region. Peshmerga forces had already been stationed in the surrounding region, the Hamrin basin area, and the arrival of Iraqi Army soldiers escalated the possibility of conflict between the two forces. The potential for a civil war to begin in Khanaqin cannot be understated. Peshmerga forces occupied positions and traffic control points which were down the road from where Iraqi Army Soldiers manned.

Violence in Khanaqin could not only have started a civil war but would have also destabilized border relations between Iran as it is situated near the Iran-Iraq border. More ominously, the recent Khanaqin episode could easily have been exploited by insurgent groups whom are focused on destabilize the country. For example, an Improvised Explosive Device or unclaimed ambush against either side could easily have propelled the other military force to claim that the other side had directly sought to attack them through subterfuge or proxy forces. An incident like the above example did happen on September 14th as reported by the New York Times when eight Kurdish soldiers were killed in a roadside bomb. Fortunately this was an isolated incident which did not provoke any action by the Peshmerga against Arab citizens or the Iraqi Army.

The recent events in Khanaqin could perhaps simply be a strategic gambit by the KRG to overreach. By claiming Khanaqin now, the KRG can later appear more accommodating and compromising in future debates concerning Kirkuk. The KRG would be far more —to cede Khanaqin than Kirkuk which is by far the economically desirable of the two cities. Nonetheless, Khanaqin's geographic location makes it conducive for any defensive force coming from central Iraq as the Hamrin Mountains provide any attacking force very few avenues of approach into the city.

Regional Government or Separate Government?

The Asayesh like the Peshmerga are not beholden to the Iraqi central government but rather the KRG. The KRG's government apparatus is unmatched compared to Iraq's other provinces or regions. On September 18th 2008, the KRG's Minister of Foreign Relations wrote a letter in the Washington Post concerning the security situation in Khanaqin and voiced his displeasure with the central government by stating that "The KRG is fully committed to a peaceful, democratic and federal Iraq, but we reject such intimidation from the prime minister." The very existence of a minister for foreign relations seems to emphasize the KRG's solidarity and complete autonomy from the government in Baghdad.

Kurdish authorities have also negotiated separate contracts with Western oil companies. These contracts flouted central government laws which required the KRG to cede to the Iraqi central government in dealings related to oil contracts. These separate oil contracts have only confirmed many Arabs view that the Kurds are focused on expanding their wealth and also their blatant disregard for the rule of the central government. The KRG also benefits greatly by positioning its own lobbyists in Washington and in other major foreign capitals. The KRG's ability to shape its own foreign policy agenda is unmatched by a regional government within Iraq, and to a larger degree for any regional government on the globe.

The Past and the Future

At the end of the 20th century, the Kurdish people faced a dilemma akin to the Polish people in the 19th century. The Kurds were surrounded by great powers; Iran, Saddam Hussein, and a westernized Turkish military. Moreover they had no real allies and could not rely on western support. Hence, the Kurdish people's dreams of independence quickly turned into a nightmare of gas attacks and an absence of foreign aid. Although much has changed in the Middle East in the past five years, the Kurdish situation has not. Turkey, Iraq, and Iran all continue to seek to prevent an independent Kurdistan.

The United States today does not have a consistent policy as to the future of the KRG. The current goal of strengthening the central government oftentimes runs counter to assisting the Kurdish people. To many policy makers the Kurdish state of affairs seems to be a zero sum game, when the Kurdish position strengthens, the power of the Baghdad government wanes. The Kurds have nonetheless positioned themselves so that whatever the outcome of the KRG, they will be at a minimum able to influence their future. They have done this by hedging their expansionist efforts with ensuring that the politically astute Jalal Talabani remains entrenched within the Iraqi government in Baghdad, and thus have hedged their bets of regional expansionist efforts. The United States will most likely seek to avoid jeopardizing its historical alliance with Turkey and thus dissuade the Kurdish people from seeking greater autonomy. At first glance it would also that it would serve the US interests to limit Kurdish efforts to expand into Iran, as this action could also jeopardize negotiations with Iran concerning closing down its nuclear weapons program.

The Kurdish people are wary of American support and have learned from the first Persian Gulf War that any expectation of assistance would be foolish. Currently, America's priorities in the region do not align with the KRG. The political and military realities on the ground are not favorable to a Kurdish state. However, culturally the United States and the West have much more in common with the Kurdish people then with the vast majority of states in the region. Despite the lack of clear American support for greater Kurdish autonomy, one should not be surprised if the Kurdish people independently launch an effort to create an independent state. Momentum has been gradually building within the Kurdish community to establish statehood. And if this happens, volatility in the Middle East could increase as Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Turkey would most likely take steps to quash an independent Kurdistan.

I first came across Brian Williams - or rather, his work - a few years ago when I was starting to research sanctuary concepts and practices in the war on terror. Plumbing the depths of the International Studies Association's online paper archive, I stumbled across one that was unforgettably titled "Operation Enduring Freedom, 2001-2005. Waging Counter-Jihad in Central Eurasia." It was an anomaly among IR papers, written by an historian, offering a deep contemporary narrative of Al Qaeda - and a page turner, written with great style.

Since then, I've had the great privilege to work with Brian on several occasions, including his work in two books that I've edited, with a third forthcoming. He was one of the first scholars I contacted when I was thinking about putting together CTlab. He is, perhaps, the most generous scholar with whom I've ever dealt. It was thus no great surprise, when I asked him if he'd consider drafting a blog post about his recent field research in Turkey, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, that he instead provided a detailed, 5000 word account of his role in the Hamdan trial...

Much of this has been mired in misunderstanding, hysterics and partisan politics. It made sense to leverage from Brian's generosity a unique opportunity to engage with these problems in an open, informal forum. We also wanted to explore the enabling potential of digital spaces in CTlab's development and offerings. About a month ago we starting polling potential participants, and here we are today.

Our multidisciplinary cohort of invited scholars, including representatives from across the disciplines - history, political science, psychology, sociology, anthropology, law - is truly global, based in the US, Canada, the UK, Australia, and New Zealand. They've published extensively and widely, and a fair number of them are inveterate bloggers. With that, I'd like to welcome our participants, as I cede the ether to them.

Panel:

John Matthew Barlow (History, Concordia University)

David Betz (War Studies, King's College London)

Christian Bleuer (Political Science, Australian National University)

Craig Hayden (Int'l Communications, American University)

Kevin Jon Heller (Law, University of Auckland/University of Melbourne)

John Horgan (Psychology, Pennsylvania State University)

Thomas Johnson (Cultural Studies, Naval Postgraduate School)

Jason Ralph (Politics & International Studies, University of Leeds)

William Snyder (Law, University of Syracuse/Maxwell School)

Marc Tyrrell (Anthropology, Carleton University)

Tony Waters (Sociology, California State University, Chico)

L.L. Wynn (Anthropology, Macquarie University)

More at CTLab.

One weekday afternoon in May 2004, General George Casey bounded up the stairs to the third floor of his government-furnished quarters, a beautiful old brick mansion on the Potomac River at Fort McNair in Washington, D.C. His wife, Sheila, was packing for a move across the river to Fort Myer, in Virginia, the designated quarters of the Army's vice chief of staff.

"Please, sit down," Casey said.

In 34 years of marriage, he had never made such a request.

President Bush, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and the Army chief of staff had asked him to become the top U.S. commander in Iraq, he said.

Sheila Casey burst into tears. Like any military spouse, she dreaded the long absences and endless anxieties of separation, the strains of a marriage carried out half a world apart. But she also recognized it was an incredible opportunity for her husband. Casey saw the Iraq War as a pivot point, one of history's hinges, a conflict that would likely define America's future standing in the world, Bush's legacy and his own reputation as a general.

"This is going to be hard," Casey said, but he felt as qualified as anyone else.

Casey's climb to four-star status had been unusual. Instead of graduating from West Point, he had studied international relations at Georgetown University. He'd been there during the Vietnam War and was a member of ROTC, the Reserve Officers' Training Corps. He remembered how some students had spit on him and hurled things when he crossed campus in uniform. In 1970, after his graduation and commissioning as an Army second lieutenant, his father and namesake, a two-star Army general commanding the celebrated 1st Cavalry Division, was killed in Vietnam when his helicopter crashed en route to visit wounded soldiers.

Casey had never intended to make the Army his career. And yet he fell in love with the sense of total responsibility that even a young second lieutenant was given for the well-being of his men. Now, after 34 years in the Army, he was going to be the commander on the ground, as General William Westmoreland had been in Vietnam from 1965 to 1968. Casey had no intention of ending up like Westmoreland, whom history had judged as that era's poster boy for quagmire and failure.

Casey had never been in combat. His most relevant experience was in the Balkans - Bosnia and Kosovo - where irregular warfare had been the order of the day. He had held some of the most visible "thinker" positions in the Pentagon - head of the Joint Staff strategic plans and policy directorate, J-5, and then the prestigious directorship of the Joint Staff, which served the chiefs. But aside from a 1981 stint in Cairo as a United Nations military observer, he had spent little time in the Middle East.

Much more at The New York Times.

Asif Ali Zardari, Pakistan's new president and the widower of Benazir Bhutto, does not mince words in his determination to defeat a growing Taliban insurgency.

"It is my decision that we will go after them, we will free this country," he told me in an interview. "Yes, this is my first priority because I will have no country otherwise. I will be president of what?"

After the massive bomb attack on the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad, that's a fair question. Its finances in a free fall, its security crumbling, nuclear-armed Pakistan stands at the brink just as a civilian takes charge after the futile zigzagging of General Pervez Musharraf's U.S.-supported rule.

I asked Zardari, who took office this month, if the assassination of his wife last year motivated him to confront Islamic militancy. "Of course," he said, "It's my revenge. I take it every day."

He continued: "I will fight them because they are a cancer to my society, not because of my wife only, but because they are a cancer, yes, and they did kill the mother of my children, so their way of life is what I want to kill. I will suck the oxygen out of their system so there will be no Talibs."

More at The International Herald Tribune

If there was one foreign policy issue on which Barack Obama and John McCain agreed during Friday night's debate, it was that the United States should send more troops to Afghanistan. The bipartisan enthusiasm for this surge is so strong that there has been relatively little discussion of whether this strategy makes sense.

So here's a skeptical look at the issue, drawn from conversations during a visit to Afghanistan this month with Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Rather than more troops, the real game-changer in Afghanistan may be Gates's plan to spend an extra $1.3 billion on surveillance technology to find and destroy the leadership of the insurgency.

The case for more troops was made forcefully by the new US commander, Gen. David McKiernan. He said in a briefing in Kabul that to cope with rising violence, he needs three more combat brigades, in addition to the extra brigade already promised for early next year. That could add at least 15,000 troops to the current force of about 35,000. Other senior officers made similar pitches in briefings at Bagram and Jalalabad.

But the commanders' description of the enemy that these troops will be fighting was fuzzy. The adversary isn't al-Qaeda; it's not even the Taliban. It's what McKiernan called a "nexus of insurgency" and what other officers described as a "syndicate" of insurgents and criminal groups.

More at The Washington Post.

Green Warriors

Army Environmental Considerations for Contingency Operations from Planning Through Post-Conflict

By David E. Mosher, Beth E. Lachman, Michael D. Greenberg, Tiffany Nichols, Brian Rosen and Henry H. Willis of Rand

Rand says:

Recent experiences in Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Balkans have highlighted the importance of environmental considerations. These range from protecting soldier health and disposing of hazardous waste to building water supply systems and other activities that help achieve national goals in the post-conflict phase of contingency operations. The Army has become increasingly involved with environmental issues in every contingency operation and must be better prepared to deal with them. This study assesses whether existing policy, doctrine, and guidance adequately address environmental activities in post-conflict military operations and reconstruction. Findings are based on reviews of top-level policy and doctrine, analysis of operational experience, extensive interviews with diverse Army personnel, and a review of operational documentation and literature. From these sources, a database of 111 case studies was created. The research showed that environmental concerns can have far-reaching and significant impacts on the Army, both direct and indirect, especially in terms of cost, current operations, soldier health, diplomatic relations, reconstruction activities, and the ultimate success of the operation or the broader mission. Some evidence suggests that environmental problems may have even contributed to insurgency in Iraq. Recommendations include updating current policy and doctrine to fully address environmental considerations in contingency operations; ensuring that contractors are carefully selected and managed; and transmitting proactive field environmental practices and lessons throughout the Army.

What say you?

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Many now see future warfare as a matter of nonstate actors employing irregular methods against Western states. This expectation has given rise to a range of sweeping proposals for transforming the US military to meet such threats. In this context, Hezbollah's 2006 campaign in southern Lebanon has been receiving increasing attention as a prominent recent example of a nonstate actor fighting a Westernized state. In particular, critics of irregular-warfare transformation often cite the 2006 case as evidence that non-state actors can nevertheless wage conventional warfare in state-like ways. This monograph assesses this claim via a detailed analysis of Hezbollah's military behavior, coupled with deductive inference from observable Hezbollah behavior in the field to findings for their larger strategic intent for the campaign.

The 2006 Lebanon Campaign and the Future of Warfare: Implications for Army and Defense Policy

(H/T Mark Vinson)