JFCOM Commander General James Mattis has directed that the command "make irregular warfare a command core competency."

In "The Price of the Surge" (May/June 2008), Steven Simon correctly observes that the Sunni turn against al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), known as the Sunni Awakening, has been a key factor in security progress during the period of "the surge." Simon is also on point when he notes that the Awakening, which began before the surge, was not a direct consequence of additional US troops. But although Simon gets much of the past right, he ultimately draws the wrong lessons for US policy moving forward.

Rather than unilaterally and unconditionally withdrawing from Iraq and hoping that the international community will fill the void and push the Iraqis toward accommodation -- a very unlikely scenario -- the United States must embrace a policy of "conditional engagement." This approach would couple a phased redeployment of combat forces with a commitment to providing residual support for the Iraqi government if and only if it moves toward genuine reconciliation. Conditional engagement -- rather than Simon's policy of unconditional disengagement -- would incorporate the real lesson from the Sunni Awakening...

Simon provides a brilliant analysis of Iraq's political realities, past and present, exposing the effects of the U.S. occupation. Sadly, neither the administration nor all but a few outside analysts foresaw them. More recently, most media reporting has wholly ignored the political dynamics of the new "surge" tactic. And peripatetic experts in Washington regularly return from their brief visits to Iraq to assure the public that it is lowering violence but fail to explain why. They presume that progress toward political consolidation has also been occurring, or soon will be. Instead, as Simon explains, political regression has resulted, a "retribalization" of the same nature as that which both the British colonial rulers and the Baathist Party tried to overcome in order to create a modern state in Iraq.

This should hardly come as a surprise. The history of tribalism in Iraq is well known. When the United States replaced the British in the Middle East after World War II, it set "stability" above all other interests there, maintaining it through a regional balance of power. President Bush's invasion of Iraq broke radically with this half-century-old strategy. The prospects of success, as Simon shows, were worse than poor...

When to Leave Iraq

The Pentagon is making a pointed effort to ensure that the transition to a new administration in January 2009 -- the first time in 40 years that a handover of power will take place during wartime -- goes smoothly, minimizing the risk of disruptions or attacks on military operations during the changeover....

Well worth reading in its entirety - and we even get a plug.

Meanwhile, Gates's reputation for demanding accountability without trumpeting his own personality is popular across the department and in Congress, too. "I think he may be the best secretary of defense we ever had," says one active-duty Army officer in high-level circles.

Now, some would like him to stay on. One respected website devoted to irregular warfare called the Small Wars Journal contains an open letter to the new administration asking that whoever wins to consider keeping Gates.

Shortest, but Most Important SWJ Post to Date - Small Wars Journal, 13 June 2008

Sent: Tuesday, June 17, 2008 2:32 PM

Subject: CSA Sends - Transition Team Commanders (UNCLASSIFIED)

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Caveats: NONE

CSA SENDS

Soldiers that serve on our Transition Teams (TTs) and our Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are developing exactly the type of knowledge, skills and abilities that are vital for our Army to be effective in an era of persistent conflict. These are tough, demanding positions and the members of these teams are required to influence indigenous or surrogate forces as they execute missions that are of vital interest to this Nation. The tasks associated with Transition Teams, from direct combat to stability operations, will be a major part of full spectrum engagement in theaters of interest now and for the foreseeable future. I want to ensure that the officers that lead these teams are recognized and given the credit they deserve.

I am directing that the Major's positions on these teams be immediately designated and codified in DA PAM 600-3, for all branches, as Key and Developmental (KD). Any officer holding one of these positions will be considered "KD" for his or her branch as a Major. Additionally, these officers will be afforded the opportunity, should they desire, to hold an additional 12/24 months of a branch specific KD position (e.g. XO, S-3, etc). Our promotion board guidance already stresses the importance of these positions and this additional information will be added to all upcoming board instructions. Additionally, because the success of these teams requires our best leaders, I have directed HRC to award Centralized Selection List (CSL) Credit for LTCs serving specifically in the TT Commander positions that have direct leadership responsibility for a training/transition team.

Therefore, we are creating a new CSL sub-category called "Combat Arms Operations". It will be open to all eligible officers in the Maneuver, Fires and Effects (MFE) branches and to Foreign Area Officers (FAO). It will fall under the Operations category and will be effective on the FY 10 CSL board which meets this September.

As a bridging strategy, for FY09 we will activate officers for these command positions from the alternate lists of all four major MFE command categories - Operations, Strategic Support, Training, and Installation. Officers accepting and who serve will be awarded CSL credit in the Operations category for serving as a Transition Team Commander. Additionally, if selected by the FY 10 CSL board, the officer may opt to command in the category they are selected after completion of their TT Command. Those that do command will receive credit for a second CSL command. If chosen, and they opt not to command, they will still receive credit for their TT command.

Our ability to train and operate effectively with indigenous forces will be a key element of 21st century land power. We need our best involved.

GEN Casey

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Discuss at Small Wars Council

From the AEI synopsis:

For over sixty years, the United States has sought to build the capabilities of its allies and security partners. This is a mission that has accelerated since the terrorist attacks of September 2001, and it is one that any administration, be it Democratic or Republican, will inherit in January 2009. As a longstanding strategic goal, building partnership capacity has also dredged up a series of contradictions and conundrums for American policymaking, as officials attempt to foster governance without fueling dictatorships, engage "frontline states" without becoming enmeshed in their internal feuds, and manage the details of convoluted international partnerships from the confines of Washington. Resolving these contradictions--or at least mitigating them--is the principal ongoing challenge of American security cooperation programs.

In this report, we provide a critique of the development and current practice of American security cooperation programs, as well as a modest proposal for how they may be improved in the future. We find that many of the authorities and instruments for engagement already exist, but that they may be more effectively harnessed if leadership is devolved from Washington to the "frontline country team," in which the ambassador is responsible for coordinating and directing American policy. We argue that the country team is the point at which the rubber of American policy hits the road and where it will ultimately succeed or fail.

The Frontline Country Team: A Model for Engagement

The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine

By Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army

A critically important security transition task that is often a secondary effort is the development of host nation military doctrine. This effort is paramount to the creation of a successful and independent force. When the world's focus has moved on to other issues, and the coalition advisory effort draws to an end, the Afghan National Army (ANA) security foundation will rely heavily on their doctrine to continue the fight and provide national security and stability. So a few critical questions one must ask is; are we on track with the current doctrine development program? Do we have the right formula for developing doctrine on behalf of the ANA? Is developing doctrine for the ANA the right approach?

Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as the "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." It is important to note that this definition of doctrine does not describe doctrine as how the Army wishes to fight, or how it may be able to fight at some point in the distant future. Obviously, doctrine profoundly affects a nation's military development, but it should not be used too heavily as the catalyst for change in terms of simultaneously trying to quickly modernize an immature force. In the writing of Afghan doctrine we fail to account for Afghanistan's history, technology, social constructs, and the nature of the threats that its armed forces face. We should no longer attempt to gift the ANA tactical, strategic or operational doctrine. Current ANA doctrine that has been "Afganisized", consists of manuals that have been cut copied and replaced... M4 for M16 or AK, Javelin for RPG. The utility of such an approach remains questionable, when manuals like the 7-8 MTP instruct Patrol Leader's to submit overlays with route classification formulas. (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-2000), suggests the use of soft rounds when clearing staircases (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-1000), or describes the use of integrated BOS (Battlefield Operating System) in the ANA 7-20 MTP. In fairness, none of these items are tactically obtuse, far from it. However when taken on the whole they are not part of the "fundamental principles by which these military forces guide their actions". This doctrine is generally light years ahead of anything that Afghan Army is capable of now or can be in the foreseeable future. To be clear this is not a slight towards the ANA, they can function without map overlays at the platoon level and continual BDE MDMP (Brigade Military Decision Making Process) seminars, they could get by with a few TACSOPs and GARSOP's (Tactical and Garrison Standing Operating Procedures) that are linked with each other.

No one is asking the ultimate customer, the Afghans, "How do you do a...," "Do you need to...," or "Can you...?"

The root problems with Afghan doctrine are easily traced back to the approach. We are not collecting enough lessons learned from the field detailing and documenting how this Army truly fights, we are not asking the ANA commanders in the field what right is, nor are we involving the right people in doctrine development. We are attempting to shape the ANA through doctrine that does not take the 'boots on the ground' realities fully into account.

Current ANA doctrine is a vision of what we want the ANA to be in the future. However, this has caused an unexpected and crucial problem. Since the doctrine is not applicable to how the unit fights in the field now, it is being largely ignored and underutilized. Literacy is always touted as the number one problem with ANA doctrine. The command is solving literacy through several aggressive training programs, admittedly it will take time. However something we can and must fix now is applicability. How will the ANA see a benefit in improving doctrine if they are not involved in the process and cannot find the intrinsic value of manuals that provide current, sound, guidance and instruction? The result thus far has been a national Army with limited base doctrine with little effort made to document developing Afghan tactics, techniques, and procedures along with a process of infusing this into existing US style Afghan doctrine.

Major General Robert Cone, the Commanding General of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has accurately said "51% of ANA doctrine is what they are doing in the field now." With this in mind, although US manuals may serve as initial framework, a greater effort must be made to flesh out doctrine by Afghan field commanders and the doctrine cell at the Afghan National Army Training Command. The ANA doctrine directorate remains outside the information loop as to what manuals have been produced and what are being worked on until very recently despite the fact that ANATC has been in place for over a year. Implementation thus far has been an afterthought with units being directed to "pick-up your manuals." When a manual is approved though the current process, they are burnt onto CD's and given to ARSIC-C and ETT Chiefs. Hard copies are given to the ANA, but no one can say where the manuals go below the CORP and BDE level, only that distribution isn't working well. Manuals are produced according to the statement of work and on time, even when multiple priorities are given. The U.S. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate has a catch phrase that fits well "speed, quality, quantity... pick two" We have continually over pressured the doctrinal effort in Afghanistan for speed and quantity.

The Combined Training Advisor Group- Afghanistan (CTAG) is now calling for the ANA doctrine cell to start going back through the completed manuals and "Afghanisize" them. This is definitely a step in the right direction. But so far the outcomes of these meetings focus on font, translation, and grammar. A good example is one manual currently under review that deals with plans and orders. Contract doctrine writers (retired US military) along with ANA staff officers make up the panel reviewing current doctrine. This panel has neither the field experience nor is it attempting to gather data from the field in support of this project. Obviously this effort is woefully inadequate in revising doctrine based on observations, insights, and lessons learned from the Afghan field forces. Clearly the output will be marginal at best in making current doctrine reflect "Afghan right" being utilized in the field.

If we continue the current approach in the development of doctrine for the ANA, it should be expected that neither contractors nor the current doctrine directorate staff can provide the quality or to be more precise the applicability in doctrine that the ANA deserve and need. Even in ideal conditions under current structures this doctrine will fail the "Afghan right test." Although the concept of pulling in commanders from the field for doctrinal input is the most desirable, it is far from simplistic; there are several factors that prevent this from happening. To bring the right people here, ANA Soldiers would lose combat pay during their doctrinal sabbatical. Plus there is a requirement for MoD (Ministry of Defence) General Staff approval to move these needed subject matter expert's temporarily to ANATC (to put that into context, you need a company commander from the 82nd to go to Leavenworth and write doctrine, no problem call the Pentagon). Additionally, who would willingly take their best horse out of the race, to write doctrine?

Aside from the fact that these manuals do not have the weighted input of Afghan field commanders, the individuals stamping these manuals approved are predominately U.S. trained. A lot of Afghan General Officers have U.S. schooling. So when they read a manual that refers to SOEO (Scheme Of Engineer Operations) when planning a defense, or some other U.S. doctrine jargon developed over the last decade they accept it. The same cannot be said at the lowest user level -- the Afghan Soldier. These problems are solvable but only begin to outline other issues. It leaves the impression that ANATC is a coalition good idea that is still struggling to get a foothold in policy and decision making amongst the ANA elite.

The main problems with current doctrine development can be amended to keep better pace with the overall development of the Afghan National Army. The first change should be a focused meeting by CSTC-A T&E, Phoenix J-3 (to represent the ARSIC commanders), the contractors working doctrine development, the ANATC DD staff (with the authority from the ANA MoD to make decisions), and the CTAG staff. Currently five separate stake holders are all trying to do the same thing to varying degrees - improve the capabilities of the ANA through doctrine and other means. The outcome of this meeting should provide a single proponent for Doctrine Development. This proponent should be given the authority to make organizational and contractual changes on the coalition side, and receive personnel, resources, and advice on the ANA side in regards to doctrine. This meeting should also determine doctrinal duties and responsibilities for the individual players. Who staffs a manual? What is the time frame? How is it vetted? Who sets priority? Who is the approval authority? How many copies are made? How do they get to the right level? How to make changes to existing manuals, etc...

This "doctrinal conference" should only serve as the beginning. Coupled with this conference it is time to get doctrine teams into the field that observe combat operations. This effort will assess doctrinal needs, not staff estimates from the top that "feels" what ANA commanders and Embedded Training Teams need. The issuance of new equipment should not be the only litmus test for doctrinal need.

It's time to stop giving manuals, and have the ANA write manuals based on US doctrine framework only, with our advice and support. These manuals must address the operational realities of what the ANA are capable of now. They should not try to shape the ANA into our image. We must set the example and display the unity of effort that our own doctrine prescribes us to have. We must pull together and assist the ANA in doctrine development, not do it for them.

Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army, is currently an advisor in Kabul at the Afghan National Army Training Command.

By Judah Grunstein - Cross-posted at World Politics Review

France's Livre Blanc was finally released today (French version here and here, parts 1&2, both .pdf), and the only real shock is seeing in print what's basically trickled out in leaks and declarations over the past few months. It's a very well-written document, coherently argued and convincingly articulated. As expected, counterterrorism and the integration of defense with homeland security play a prominent role, with an emphasis on developing intelligence capacity, both human and satellite-based, in the context of a newly added Anticipation component. There's also a significant reduction of the French armed forces, from a total of 271,000 to 225,000 by 2015 (Army 131k, Navy 44k, Air Force 50k), mainly from the administrative back office, but which will necessitate politically unpopular base closings.

But the real story to my eyes is the prominence of Asia as a strategic focus of interest, which surprised me even after having already called attention to it in last week's series. The document doesn't make a case for intervention so much as careful management, calling for the West to take a greater interest in stabilization of region. It makes mention of the continent's three nuclear powers, three major unresolved crises (Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Straits and Kashmir), and the lack of any real regional, multilateral security instrument.

Europe is central as a strategic actor, principally through the ESPD, but there's also a call for a European Livre Blanc, and the need for an articulation of European energy security polcy. As for the Euro-Atlantic partnership, there's an explicit refusal to relegate the EU to a civil role in low-intensity conflicts, as compared to NATO's military role. It makes the distinction between NATO as a mutual defense instrument and the EU as full-spectrum entity combining civil, military, diplomatic, humanitarian and political intervention capacities.

With regard to reintegrating NATO, I've seen some reporting that seems to be based more on premature conclusions than the document itself, which makes an unapologetic case for reintegrating, but clearly states that NATO and ESDP are indissociable and must advance at the same speed. It also places three operational conditions on any final decision to formally reintegrate the NATO command structure: autonomy of France's nuclear deterrent, autonomy of France's participation in any operations, and autonomy of French command over its peacetime forces.

Besides that the major innovations are the emphasis on mobilizing information and knowledge (ie. think tanks) around strategic questions, with a particular goal of using diplomatic and academic means to achieve cultural familiarity with potential areas of intervention (e.g. Asia and Latin America). Homeland security, in addition to being reinforced by a greater integration of the interior and exterior defense apparatus, is to be assured through development of anti-satellite, anti-missile, and anti-cyberattack defense systems.

France's prepositioned base structure in Africa will be reduced from three to two, one on the Western coast, and Djibouti on the Eastern coast working in close relation with the new base in Abu Dhabi to assure the Indian Ocean Persian Gulf presence. The reduced presence, as I mentioned last week, is in combination with a dramatically reduced "operational contract" for France's expeditionary capacity, which will be cut from 50,000 troops deployable for up to a year within 6 months to 30,000. That force will be complemented by a 5,000 troop rapid deployment reserve, deployable within a perimeter of 8,000 km in days. Foreseeable operations are multilateral in nature, unless France's vital interests are at stake, and there's a noticeable emphasis on maritime stability missions.

The reduction in force size will be offset in a first phase by continued modernization of France's aging equipment, with mobility and force protection for ground forces, and strategic and tactical airlift (A400M and helicopters) both priorities. Aerial reconnaissance in the form of unmanned drones is also mentioned.

Finally, the document calls for administrative reform, in the form of a national defense and security council serving the president, and a proposal for requiring Parliament to be advised within 3 days of any foreign intervention, and Parliamentary approval for a deployment of greater than 4 months, with both measures to be written into constitution. It concludes with a discussion of the need for a European level strategy for developing defense industry and research to compete with America's technical and budgetary dominance in defense industries.

As I said, it's an impressive document that manages to coherently make its case for achieving a smaller, more mobile and more effective force, without ever really addressing the difficulties that creates for a country with a widening regional focus, increasing global ambition, and increasingly limited budget. There's also a tension between the kind of army the Livre Blanc foresees, which is almost Rumsfeldian, and the missions it foresees being called upon to carry out, which are distinctly Petraeussian.

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SWJ Editors' Links

France's Strategic Posture - SWJ Editors, Small Wars Journal

Judah Grunstein has an interesting series posted over at World Politics Review on France's strategic posture. The series is a very good read, providing excellent background and insights on the complex issues facing France as it looks ahead in regards to that country's national security interests.

Here are links to each segment of the series:

France's Strategic Posture: Series Introduction

NATO Reingtegration and European Defense

A Widening Focus

The Temptation of Forward Defense

An Interview with Hubert Védrine

Defense Policy: France Joins Allies - Erlanger and Beinnhold, New York Times

In its first new national defense policy in 14 years, France has decided that its security lies within Europe and the NATO alliance, establishing a significant shift from the country's longstanding notions of moral and military self-sufficiency. More than four decades ago, Gen. Charles de Gaulle, angry with American and British domination of NATO, said that France's military integration into the alliance had been "stripped of justification." But now that the Soviet Union is gone and the European Union is more fully established, President Nicolas Sarkozy has decided that France is best served by participating fully with Washington and NATO, in part because the vast majority of members of the European Union are also members of the alliance.

Sarkozy Marches France Back to NATO - Charles Bremner, Times of London

Four decades after President de Gaulle broke with the NATO command President Sarkozy announced France's return to the heart of the alliance - with conditions on EU defence that may unsettle Britain. Setting out a big shift in doctrine and spending yesterday, France's most pro-Atlanticist President said that nothing prevented a return to the integrated command from which de Gaulle withdrew in 1966 in dispute with the United States. "In Europe, nearly all our partners are members of the alliance. They do not understand why we persist in standing apart," he said. The return to NATO would come as France cuts 50,000 military posts to reduce forces to 225,000 personnel, while diverting funds to new equipment and expanded intelligence systems.

Major Reassessment of Defense Policies - Molly Moore, Washington Post

President Nicolas Sarkozy Tuesday announced a major new defense policy that would integrate French troops into the command structure of the NATO alliance for the first time in more than four decades. Sarkozy also proposed a leaner military with fewer troops and bases, a slow-down in the deployment of expensive aircraft and warships and more money for intelligence-gathering satellites and other equipment needed to fight terrorism, cyber-crime and drug trafficking on French territory. The new military doctrine, the first major reassessment of the country's defense policies in 14 years, reflects the realities of shrinking military budgets and changing security threats. It also underscores Sarkozy's efforts to mend rifts with the United States and his European neighbors.

France Plans Smaller, Harder-hitting Army - Tamora Vidaillet, Reuters

France aims to create a smaller, more mobile and better equipped army, able to respond to threats ranging from terrorism to cyber attacks, under plans to be formally presented by President Nicolas Sarkozy on Tuesday. A government policy document outlines plans to trim the fat from the military, spend more on equipment and pay greater attention to intelligence and home security, while maintaining France's independent nuclear deterrent.

France: Aux Armes - Times of London editorial

Cutting the strength of the French Army by 24 per cent seems, on first sight, an odd way of modernising France's armed forces when Afghanistan and the demands of peacekeeping are straining the military capabilities of most NATO members. But President Sarkozy's ambitious proposals, outlined to 3,000 officers yesterday in the first major review of military strategy in 14 years, are as sensible as they are far-reaching. The military aim is to make the French Army leaner, supplied with better intelligence and modern weaponry and more focused on today's terrorist threats rather than the Cold War danger of conflict in Europe. But there is also a significant shift in defence doctrine. France is reconfiguring its armed forces with the intention of rejoining NATO's unified military command and boosting the European Union's role in defence. More than 40 years after France gave NATO notice to quit Paris, Mr Sarkozy has told his allies and his countrymen that the Gaullist dream of military independence is over.

By Noah Shachtman - Cross-posted at Danger Room

Iraq cooled from a raging boil to a slow simmer, thanks mostly to tactics taken from the military's counterinsurgency manual. Or, at least, that's the accepted wisdom. But a group of military thinkers and Iraq veterans says the established narrative is all wrong. According to them, Iraq may not even be an insurgency at all.

In the classic insurgency scenario, you've got a group of guerrillas on one side, and an otherwise-legitimate host government on the other. It's the job of a military like America's to tip the balance towards stability and order, by keeping the insurgents from overthrowing that government.

But in Iraq, the bulk; of what used to be the insurgents have now realigned themselves with the American forces against the nihilistic-Islamist terrorist Al Qaeda in Iraq. Lt. Col. Douglass Ollivant notes in the latest edition of Perspectives on Politics, which is devoted to a critique of the now-famous counterinsurgency manual. With the Sunni nationalists at least temporarily allied and AQI deprived of its sanctuary among the Sunni population, just who are the insurgents in Iraq against whom a counterinsurgency might be conducted?

Instead, what seems to be going on in Iraq is a "

href="http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org/strategist/2008/05/military_strategy_for_democrat_1.php">competition among ethnic and sectarian communities for power and resources

America isn't exactly following its new manual for fighting such conflicts, writes Council on Foreign Relations scholar and former Petraeus advisor Stephen Biddle

href="http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayIssue?jid=PPS&volumeId=6&issueId=02#">Perspectives on Politics

That's not to say the counterinsurgency manual hasn't been useful. " Some aspects of the manual have proven very helpful in Iraq, Biddle writes.

In particular, its guidance, for example, on unity of action, limitation of violence, the need to accept risk in population security, the importance of human intelligence, respect for the laws of war, adaptive small-unit leadership, accounting for the greater difficulty of logistics, or understanding the local society and culture are all sound and important, whether the conflict is ideological, ethnic, sectarian, or merely criminal. In these respects, the manual has contributed importantly to Iraq's recent decline in violence as these provisions have been implemented. And its emphasis on adaptability has proven helpful in reacting to a war whose premises differ in important ways from those on which the manual was based.

And Petraeus, in an interview last August, argued that Iraq wasn't simply a matter of guerilla vs. government. The counterinsurgency operations we're doing in Iraq are a mix of a number of different operations -- offense, defense and stability and support," he told me.

I mean, there will be major combat operations. There's no other way to describe the clearance of Ramadi or Baqoubah than major combat operations. Then you'll have counter-terrorism -- in other words, very precision-targeted operations. Then you'll have what again you might call stability and support operations -- [what] we used to do in Bosnia. And it then starts to trend into peace enforcement, and peace keeping. There's also arguably major crime operations, counter gang. There is nation building, big time. There's even economic development. I mean, you're doing a mix of all of those.

Mark Lynch has more outtakes from this roundtable on the counterinsurgency manual. And

href="http://globalguerrillas.typepad.com/about.html">John Robb