The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine

The Problems with Afghan Army Doctrine

By Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army

A critically important security transition task that is often a secondary effort is the development of host nation military doctrine. This effort is paramount to the creation of a successful and independent force. When the world's focus has moved on to other issues, and the coalition advisory effort draws to an end, the Afghan National Army (ANA) security foundation will rely heavily on their doctrine to continue the fight and provide national security and stability. So a few critical questions one must ask is; are we on track with the current doctrine development program? Do we have the right formula for developing doctrine on behalf of the ANA? Is developing doctrine for the ANA the right approach?

Joint Pub 1-02 defines doctrine as the "Fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." It is important to note that this definition of doctrine does not describe doctrine as how the Army wishes to fight, or how it may be able to fight at some point in the distant future. Obviously, doctrine profoundly affects a nation's military development, but it should not be used too heavily as the catalyst for change in terms of simultaneously trying to quickly modernize an immature force. In the writing of Afghan doctrine we fail to account for Afghanistan's history, technology, social constructs, and the nature of the threats that its armed forces face. We should no longer attempt to gift the ANA tactical, strategic or operational doctrine. Current ANA doctrine that has been "Afganisized", consists of manuals that have been cut copied and replaced... M4 for M16 or AK, Javelin for RPG. The utility of such an approach remains questionable, when manuals like the 7-8 MTP instruct Patrol Leader's to submit overlays with route classification formulas. (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-2000), suggests the use of soft rounds when clearing staircases (ANA 7-8MTP TSK# 07-3-1000), or describes the use of integrated BOS (Battlefield Operating System) in the ANA 7-20 MTP. In fairness, none of these items are tactically obtuse, far from it. However when taken on the whole they are not part of the "fundamental principles by which these military forces guide their actions". This doctrine is generally light years ahead of anything that Afghan Army is capable of now or can be in the foreseeable future. To be clear this is not a slight towards the ANA, they can function without map overlays at the platoon level and continual BDE MDMP (Brigade Military Decision Making Process) seminars, they could get by with a few TACSOPs and GARSOP's (Tactical and Garrison Standing Operating Procedures) that are linked with each other.

No one is asking the ultimate customer, the Afghans, "How do you do a...," "Do you need to...," or "Can you...?"

The root problems with Afghan doctrine are easily traced back to the approach. We are not collecting enough lessons learned from the field detailing and documenting how this Army truly fights, we are not asking the ANA commanders in the field what right is, nor are we involving the right people in doctrine development. We are attempting to shape the ANA through doctrine that does not take the 'boots on the ground' realities fully into account.

Current ANA doctrine is a vision of what we want the ANA to be in the future. However, this has caused an unexpected and crucial problem. Since the doctrine is not applicable to how the unit fights in the field now, it is being largely ignored and underutilized. Literacy is always touted as the number one problem with ANA doctrine. The command is solving literacy through several aggressive training programs, admittedly it will take time. However something we can and must fix now is applicability. How will the ANA see a benefit in improving doctrine if they are not involved in the process and cannot find the intrinsic value of manuals that provide current, sound, guidance and instruction? The result thus far has been a national Army with limited base doctrine with little effort made to document developing Afghan tactics, techniques, and procedures along with a process of infusing this into existing US style Afghan doctrine.

Major General Robert Cone, the Commanding General of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), has accurately said "51% of ANA doctrine is what they are doing in the field now." With this in mind, although US manuals may serve as initial framework, a greater effort must be made to flesh out doctrine by Afghan field commanders and the doctrine cell at the Afghan National Army Training Command. The ANA doctrine directorate remains outside the information loop as to what manuals have been produced and what are being worked on until very recently despite the fact that ANATC has been in place for over a year. Implementation thus far has been an afterthought with units being directed to "pick-up your manuals." When a manual is approved though the current process, they are burnt onto CD's and given to ARSIC-C and ETT Chiefs. Hard copies are given to the ANA, but no one can say where the manuals go below the CORP and BDE level, only that distribution isn't working well. Manuals are produced according to the statement of work and on time, even when multiple priorities are given. The U.S. Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate has a catch phrase that fits well "speed, quality, quantity... pick two" We have continually over pressured the doctrinal effort in Afghanistan for speed and quantity.

The Combined Training Advisor Group- Afghanistan (CTAG) is now calling for the ANA doctrine cell to start going back through the completed manuals and "Afghanisize" them. This is definitely a step in the right direction. But so far the outcomes of these meetings focus on font, translation, and grammar. A good example is one manual currently under review that deals with plans and orders. Contract doctrine writers (retired US military) along with ANA staff officers make up the panel reviewing current doctrine. This panel has neither the field experience nor is it attempting to gather data from the field in support of this project. Obviously this effort is woefully inadequate in revising doctrine based on observations, insights, and lessons learned from the Afghan field forces. Clearly the output will be marginal at best in making current doctrine reflect "Afghan right" being utilized in the field.

If we continue the current approach in the development of doctrine for the ANA, it should be expected that neither contractors nor the current doctrine directorate staff can provide the quality or to be more precise the applicability in doctrine that the ANA deserve and need. Even in ideal conditions under current structures this doctrine will fail the "Afghan right test." Although the concept of pulling in commanders from the field for doctrinal input is the most desirable, it is far from simplistic; there are several factors that prevent this from happening. To bring the right people here, ANA Soldiers would lose combat pay during their doctrinal sabbatical. Plus there is a requirement for MoD (Ministry of Defence) General Staff approval to move these needed subject matter expert's temporarily to ANATC (to put that into context, you need a company commander from the 82nd to go to Leavenworth and write doctrine, no problem call the Pentagon). Additionally, who would willingly take their best horse out of the race, to write doctrine?

Aside from the fact that these manuals do not have the weighted input of Afghan field commanders, the individuals stamping these manuals approved are predominately U.S. trained. A lot of Afghan General Officers have U.S. schooling. So when they read a manual that refers to SOEO (Scheme Of Engineer Operations) when planning a defense, or some other U.S. doctrine jargon developed over the last decade they accept it. The same cannot be said at the lowest user level -- the Afghan Soldier. These problems are solvable but only begin to outline other issues. It leaves the impression that ANATC is a coalition good idea that is still struggling to get a foothold in policy and decision making amongst the ANA elite.

The main problems with current doctrine development can be amended to keep better pace with the overall development of the Afghan National Army. The first change should be a focused meeting by CSTC-A T&E, Phoenix J-3 (to represent the ARSIC commanders), the contractors working doctrine development, the ANATC DD staff (with the authority from the ANA MoD to make decisions), and the CTAG staff. Currently five separate stake holders are all trying to do the same thing to varying degrees - improve the capabilities of the ANA through doctrine and other means. The outcome of this meeting should provide a single proponent for Doctrine Development. This proponent should be given the authority to make organizational and contractual changes on the coalition side, and receive personnel, resources, and advice on the ANA side in regards to doctrine. This meeting should also determine doctrinal duties and responsibilities for the individual players. Who staffs a manual? What is the time frame? How is it vetted? Who sets priority? Who is the approval authority? How many copies are made? How do they get to the right level? How to make changes to existing manuals, etc...

This "doctrinal conference" should only serve as the beginning. Coupled with this conference it is time to get doctrine teams into the field that observe combat operations. This effort will assess doctrinal needs, not staff estimates from the top that "feels" what ANA commanders and Embedded Training Teams need. The issuance of new equipment should not be the only litmus test for doctrinal need.

It's time to stop giving manuals, and have the ANA write manuals based on US doctrine framework only, with our advice and support. These manuals must address the operational realities of what the ANA are capable of now. They should not try to shape the ANA into our image. We must set the example and display the unity of effort that our own doctrine prescribes us to have. We must pull together and assist the ANA in doctrine development, not do it for them.

Sergeant First Class Anthony Hoh, US Army, is currently an advisor in Kabul at the Afghan National Army Training Command.