Bloggers Roundtable

U.S. Army Colonel Thomas McGrath, commander of the Afghanistan Regional Security Integration Command-South, described operations in response to the Taliban's raid on a prison in Kandahar province on 13 June 2008. (Transcript, Audio)

AFPS Article

General Cites Security, Development, Governance Gains in Afghanistan

By Gerry J. Gilmore

American Forces Press Service

WASHINGTON, June 24, 2008 -- U.S., coalition and Afghan security forces are hunting down the Taliban and other insurgents operating in Afghanistan, while vital reconstruction and governance programs continue to spread across the country, a senior U.S. military officer said today.

Steady progress is being made in Afghanistan in the areas of security, development and governance, Army Maj. Gen. Jeffrey J. Schloesser, commander of Combined Joint Task Force 101 and 101st Airborne Division, told Pentagon reporters during a satellite-carried news conference.

"We're clearly not done, and I'm nowhere near yet able to say that we've reached irreversible momentum," said Schloesser, who arrived in Afghanistan in April and also heads counterinsurgency operations for NATO's Regional Command East. "But I do know that we're making good progress, and each and every day we're making a difference in the Afghan people's lives."

Noting a 40-percent increase in enemy attacks in his sector in the January-to-May timeframe compared to a year ago, Schloesser pointed out that attacks on U.S., coalition and Afghan security forces have gone up each year since 2002. The general also acknowledged that 40 soldiers, sailors, Marines, airmen and civilians have been killed since his command took responsibility for the region in early April.

"And again, our heart goes out ... to their selfless sacrifice," Schloesser said. Czech and Polish soldiers, he noted, were among the fallen.

The rise in attacks is attributable, in part, to increased activity against the enemy, Schloesser said. An improved Afghan army, as well as U.S. and NATO troops, he noted, are taking the fight to the enemy in places that hadn't been patrolled before.

"Clearly, the Afghan National Army is better than it was last year, and to be truthful, we are going to places that they did not operate in last year or the year prior," Schloesser said.

U.S., coalition and Afghan forces are "hunting down the enemy of the Afghan people and trying to rout them," the general said.

Insurgents have a choice: leave Afghanistan, stay and make peace, or be captured or killed, Schloesser said. "So we're taking the fight to the enemy," the general said, "but we are working in support areas that we had not been before inside of Afghanistan."

The insurgents are attacking schools, killing students and teachers in the process, while also targeting county and provincial government centers as well as road-building projects, Schloesser said. In fact, he added, they're attacking "anything that will improve the quality of life for the normal Afghan citizen" in an effort to separate the Afghan people from their government.

However, the insurgents' destructive efforts "don't offer any kind of positive effect" for the Afghan people, Schloesser said.

Meanwhile, U.S. military officials are working with Afghan authorities and international agencies to build schools, roads and improve infrastructure across Afghanistan. Today, he said, about $240 million in reconstruction projects are planned.

In addition, the Texas and Missouri National Guard have brought agricultural teams to Afghanistan to help out Afghan farmers, Schloesser reported. "We're seeing good results already," he said.

The symbol of security and governance for the Afghan people is their army, Schloesser said.

"I personally believe that we are right at the point where we're almost at the tipping point, where the momentum of the Afghan National Army will not be able to go backwards," Schloesser said. "We look forward to seeing some increases in their capability and their numbers and capacity in the future, and I've just got to say it's a real pleasure to all of us to work with such a group of professionals."

- Secure and serve the population. The Iraqi people are the decisive "terrain." Together with our Iraqi partners, work to provide the people security, to give them respect, to gain their support, and to facilitate establishment of local governance, restoration of basic services, and revival of local economies.

- Live among the people. You can't commute to this fight. Position Joint Security Stations, Combat Outposts, and Patrol Bases in the neighborhoods we intend to secure. Living among the people is essential to securing them and defeating the insurgents.

- Hold areas that have been secured. Once we clear an area, we must retain it. Develop the plan for holding an area before starting to clear it. The people need to know that we and our Iraqi partners will not abandon their neighborhoods. When reducing forces and presence, gradually thin the line rather than handing off or withdrawing completely. Ensure situational awareness even after transfer of responsibility to Iraqi forces.

- Pursue the enemy relentlessly. Identify and pursue AQI and other extremist elements tenaciously. Do not let them retain support areas or sanctuaries. Force the enemy to respond to us. Deny the enemy the ability to plan and conduct deliberate operations.

- Generate unity of effort. Coordinate operations and initiatives with our embassy and interagency partners, our Iraqi counterparts, local governmental leaders, and nongovernmental organizations to ensure all are working to achieve a common purpose.

- Promote reconciliation. We cannot kill our way out of this endeavor. We and our Iraqi partners must identify and separate the "reconcilables" from the "irreconcilables" through engagement, population control measures, information operations, kinetic operations, and political activities. We must strive to make the reconcilables a part of the solution, even as we identify, pursue, and kill, capture, or drive out the irreconcilables.

- Defeat the network, not just the attack. Defeat the insurgent networks to the "left" of the explosion. Focus intelligence assets to identify the network behind an attack, and go after its leaders, financiers, suppliers, and operators.

- Foster Iraqi legitimacy. Encourage Iraqi leadership and initiative; recognize that their success is our success. Partner in all that we do and support local involvement in security, governance, economic revival, and provision of basic services. Find the right balance between Coalition Forces leading and the Iraqis exercising their leadership and initiative, and encourage the latter. Legitimacy in the eyes of the Iraqi people is essential to overall success.

- Employ all assets to isolate and defeat the terrorists and insurgents. Counter-terrorist forces alone cannot defeat Al-Qaeda and the other extremists; success requires all forces and all means at our disposal—non-kinetic as well as kinetic. Employ Coalition and Iraqi conventional and special operations forces, Sons of Iraq, and all other available multipliers. Integrate civilian and military efforts to cement security gains. Resource and fight decentralized. Push assets down to those who most need them and can actually use them.

- Employ money as a weapon system. Use a targeting board process to ensure the greatest effect for each "round" expended, and to ensure that each engagement using money contributes to the achievement of the unit's overall objectives. Ensure contracting activities support the security effort, employing locals wherever possible. Employ a "matching fund" concept when feasible in order to ensure Iraqi involvement and commitment.

- Fight for intelligence. A nuanced understanding of the situation is everything. Analyze the intelligence that is gathered, share it, and fight for more. Every patrol should have tasks designed to augment understanding of the area of operations and the enemy. Operate on a "need to share" rather than a "need to know" basis; disseminate intelligence as soon as possible to all who can benefit from it.

- Walk. Move mounted, work dismounted. Stop by, don't drive by. Patrol on foot and engage the population. Situational awareness can only be gained by interacting with the people face-to-face, not separated by ballistic glass.

- Understand the neighborhood. Map the human terrain and study it in detail. Understand local culture and history. Learn about the tribes, formal and informal leaders, governmental structures, and local security forces. Understand how local systems are supposed to work—including governance, basic services, maintenance of infrastructure, and the economy—and how they really work.

- Build relationships. Relationships are a critical component of counterinsurgency operations. Together with our Iraqi counterparts, strive to establish productive links with local leaders, tribal sheikhs, governmental officials, religious leaders, and interagency partners.

- Look for Sustainable Solutions. Build mechanisms by which the Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi community leaders, and local Iraqis under the control of governmental institutions can continue to secure local areas and sustain governance and economic gains in their communities as the Coalition Force presence is reduced. Figure out the Iraqi systems and

help Iraqis make them work.

- Maintain continuity and tempo through transitions. Start to build the information you'll provide to your successors on the day you take over. Allow those who will

follow you to virtually "look over your shoulder" while they're still at home station by giving them access to your daily updates and other items on SIPRNET. Encourage extra time on the ground during transition periods, and strive to maintain operational tempo and local relationships to avoid giving the enemy respite.

- Manage expectations. Be cautious and measured in announcing progress. Note what has been accomplished, but also acknowledge what still needs to be done. Avoid premature declarations of success. Ensure our troopers and our partners are aware of our assessments and recognize that any counterinsurgency operation has innumerable challenges, that enemies get a vote, and that progress is likely to be slow.

- Be first with the truth. Get accurate information of significant activities to your chain of command, to Iraqi leaders, and to the press as soon as is possible. Beat the insurgents, extremists, and criminals to the headlines, and pre-empt rumors. Integrity is critical to this fight. Don't put lipstick on pigs. Acknowledge setbacks and failures, and then state what we've learned and how we'll respond. Hold the press (and ourselves) accountable for accuracy, characterization, and context. Avoid spin and let facts speak for themselves. Challenge enemy disinformation. Turn our enemies' bankrupt messages, extremist ideologies, oppressive practices, and indiscriminate violence against them.

- Fight the information war relentlessly. Realize that we are in a struggle for legitimacy that in the end will be won or lost in the perception of the Iraqi people. Every action taken by the enemy and United States has implications in the public arena. Develop and sustain a narrative that works and continually drive the themes home through all forms of media.

- Live our values. Do not hesitate to kill or capture the enemy, but stay true to the values we hold dear. This is what distinguishes us from our enemies. There is no tougher endeavor than the one in which we are engaged. It is often brutal, physically demanding, and frustrating. All of us experience moments of anger, but we can neither give in to dark impulses nor tolerate unacceptable actions by others.

- Exercise initiative. In the absence of guidance or orders, determine what they should be and execute aggressively. Higher level leaders will provide broad vision and paint "white lines on the road," but it will be up to those at tactical levels to turn "big ideas" into specific actions.

- Prepare for and exploit opportunities. "Luck is what happens when preparation meets opportunity" (Seneca the Younger). Develop concepts (such as that of "reconcilables" and "irreconcilables") in anticipation of possible opportunities, and be prepared to take risk as necessary to take advantage of them.

- Learn and adapt. Continually assess the situation and adjust tactics, policies, and programs as required. Share good ideas (none of us is smarter than all of us together). Avoid mental or physical complacency. Never forget that what works in an area today may not work there tomorrow, and may or may not be transferable to another part of Iraq.

SWJ Book Review by Bill Van Horn

With more and more of the World War II generation passing away, oral history has become an important component of much recent scholarship, adding the memories and experiences of those who took part in the battles to what might otherwise be standard battlefield histories. Interest in Iwo Jima was revived by director Clint Eastwood's two fine movies (Flags of our Fathers and Letters from Iwo Jima), so it seems fitting that a book would come along combining the finest elements of oral history with the conflagration on Iwo Jima. Larry Smith has crafted such a work with Iwo Jima. Any reader with an interest in how combat impacts the individuals involved, and in seeing how a single battle can touch many different areas of military activity, would do well to read and re-read Iwo Jima.

Smith's Iwo Jima is not a conventional battle history. Nor does it blend the two elements in the same way as Bill Sloan's works on Peleliu and Okinawa. In many ways Smith's work is similar to the oral history done by Henry Berry, whose books follow Marines in combat through World War I, World War II, and Korea. Smith allows the veterans (and a handful of others who have impacted the story of Iwo Jima) to tell their stories with a minimum of narrative intrusion. Smith's masterful introduction sets the stage, explaining for the reader both the basics of the Iwo Jima campaign and the narrative's organization. From there the reader is in the hands of the veterans themselves.\

Iwo Jima does a superb job of bringing together a wide variety of perspectives on the battle. Not only do we hear from regular Marines like corporals Richard Nummer and James Hathaway, but more unique individuals like Samuel Tso (one of the Navajo "Code Talkers"), Thomas McPhatter (an African-American Marine who served with the Eighth Marine Ammo Company), and Charles Lindberg (the last surviving member of the group that raised the first flag on Mount Suribachi) are also represented. Smith also brings in the LST operators (the men who ran the landing craft that brought Marines on shore), pilots and other aviators who landed at Iwo Jima during and after the battle (which provides an interesting perspective on the necessity of the battle), and closes with a section on the aftermath of the battle. Two Medal of Honor winners also tell their stories here, accompanied by the official citations for their medals. The section devoted to John Ripley and his attempts to preserve Marine access to Iwo Jima is (in this reviewer's opinion) one of the most interesting of the entire book.

All of the veterans Smith interviewed were in their late 70s or early 80s when these stories were told. Some have since passed away, never able to see their words in print. All were chosen, it seems, for their ability to shed light on aspects of the battle that may have been missed in other accounts, or to provide a variety of perspectives on the same subject (such as the interviews devoted to the flag raisings and Joe Rosenthal's famous photograph). What strikes the reader throughout is the modesty of these men. No matter their accomplishments (ranging from surviving the war to winning the Medal of Honor on Iwo), they all speak of themselves as "regular Joes" doing a nasty job that needed to be done.

With both officers and enlisted men interviewed, it is interesting to see the gap in information between the two groups. In most cases the enlisted men had only a hazy idea of their role in the battle, aside from who was next to them and perhaps an immediate objective. The officers tended to be better-informed, but still less than standard battlefield histories might lead one to believe. The fog of war hangs heavy over most narratives, thinning only when the distance between direct combat increases. This is most obvious when reading the air crew interviews. These men often knew more about the battle than the men who were fighting. Smith's multitude of perspectives helps the lay reader gain a new appreciation for the lack of information common to most battlefields.

In the final section of the book, Smith focuses on the fate of Iwo Jima in the postwar years, including the struggle to preserve U.S. access to the island. Smith brings out the strong feelings held by some of the veterans regarding the return of Iwo Jima to Japan in 1968, and also the efforts by Colonel John Ripley to create and preserve a Marine presence on the island. Ripley's account closes out the book, and his passion for the battle comes through in every word. Many might be surprised to read that the American flag now flies over Iwo Jima only one day a year, according to Ripley's account. Ripley also has strong words for those who try to downplay the importance of Iwo Jima as a strategic objective; a wise caution for those who might be tempted to examine history without looking at the context of the events. This last section shows how battles in one time period can create cascading effects throughout the years; a factor often missed in more conventional battlefield histories.

While focused on a "big war" scenario as opposed to a small war, Iwo Jima repays reading by any individual interested in combat and the impact it has on those who take part. It is also an important look into the minds of those who fight. Smith's wide scope of interviews gives a reader a unique look at the motivations of a diverse group of people and also preserves the context of their role in the battle. Read in conjunction with a more conventional battlefield history, it shows the gaps that appear between the knowledge of individual fighting men and the results of their battles. The "fog of war" and Clausewitz's friction are both apparent in many of these accounts. Smith's uncluttered narrative allows these men to speak directly to readers in their own words. And taken as a whole it shows the remarkable achievements of these men, called on to serve in one of the bloodiest battles in the Pacific Theater.

Highly recommended.

By Gerry J. Gilmore

American Forces Press Service

VIRGINIA BEACH, Va., June 19, 2008 -- The U.S. military will be engaged in irregular warfare operations for some time to come, a senior U.S. military officer said here today.

"Irregular warfare, from my perspective, is the key problem that we face today," Marine Corps Gen. James N. Mattis, NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Transformation and commander of U.S. Joint Forces Command, told attendees at the 2008 Joint Warfighting Conference.

The U.S. military is now locked in battle with transnational terrorists like al-Qaida, but it also must be prepared to fight conventional conflicts, Mattis said.

Meanwhile, American sailors, soldiers, airmen and Marines will be fighting terrorists during the next decade or so, Mattis predicted.

"The enemy won't fight us conventionally," Mattis pointed out, noting the terrorists realize they're outmatched on traditional battlefields.

He cited his belief that technology, although welcome and helpful, isn't a panacea for all of the unknowns inherent in warfighting, where the human dimension of conflict reigns supreme.

Terrorists embrace irregular warfare as a countermeasure to U.S. military supremacy, Mattis explained, noting they are intelligent, persistent and patient.

"This enemy is not going away any time soon," the general observed.

Anyone who believes the terrorists can be reasoned with are wrong, Mattis said, noting their worldview is totally at odds with that of civilized societies.

The United States, the Soviet Union and China did not want to use their nuclear weapons during the Cold War, Mattis said. However, he said, it'd be different if al Qaida terrorists acquired nuclear or chemical weapons. "I firmly believe that if they got chemical or nuclear weapons they would use them," he emphasized.

To achieve victory over terrorism the U.S. military must become intellectually focused on understanding the enemy and how he operates, Mattis said. Winning this battle depends on U.S. servicemembers being adaptive and capable of improvisation, he added.

Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, commander of Multinational Force-Iraq, and his troops have severely disrupted al-Qaida in Iraq operations by adapting counterinsurgency doctrine to separate terrorists from the Iraqi populace, Mattis said.

The U.S. military does a good job of destroying or finishing the enemy once he has been "fixed," or cornered, Mattis said. However, he said, more work needs to be done in areas related to finding the foe.

Mattis told military contractors in the audience that the U.S. military needs to devise a way to blow up improvised explosive devices while they're still in terrorists' hands.

"We have to take the IED and turn it against the enemy by pre-detonation," Mattis said.

Here are the take-aways:

1) The Department of State (DoS) like the Army needs to greatly expand in order to have the proper force structure for the wars we are fighting.

2) Although there has been bureaucratic tension between the DoS and the military, at the lower levels both agencies work well as demonstrated by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT).

3) The dysfunction of the higher levels is demonstrated by the creation of Lieutenant General Douglas Lute's position of "war czar" and the need for a better organized National Security Council. The best way to fuse the DoS and the Department of Defense is to expand on the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 and create a Foreign Policy Director (FPD) who would manage both departments. If this happened, bureaucratic rivalries would diminish much like Goldwater-Nichols eliminated much inter-service rivalry.

4) Goldwater-Nichols has been a tremendous success, in Iraq today we have Navy and Air Force personnel serving with Army Soldiers at the platoon level. Building on this, we should in turn have the DoS and the Army work at battalion and lower levels.

5) Counterinsurgency is not only the realm of the military but also the State Department. The DoS has the personnel who have the intellectual capabilities to tackle many of the issues relating to Counterinsurgency. They should be the "spoon" for eating the soup we call insurgency.

6) The PRT model should be preserved even after the conflicts at hand are over. Its predecessor, the CORDS program, was quickly eliminated in Vietnam. The PRT has many uses beyond just counterinsurgency, e.g. humanitarian missions and building military and diplomatic ties at the midlevel between the US and other nations.

By Mike Innes - Cross-Posted at CTLab

I've been reporting on the Opinio Juris Insta-Symposium (OPJIS) on the Boumediene Case in dribs and drabs as I stumble through the wealth of offerings from various contributors. My cherry-picking certainly doesn't do justice to the whole of it, and I'm not certain I'll have the time to review the proceedings in toto for CTLab. Suffice it that anyone looking for first-round responses on the case from the law-bloggigentsia should go to it and start digging in. Meanwhile, I cite the bits that catch my eye, the parts that I can relate back to my own research on sanctuary concepts and practices.

Much of the discussion at OPJIS turned on issues of territoriality and territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. Constitution. OPJIS convener Roger Alford introduced the issue in his post, "The Territorial Reach of the Constitution". Citing earlier spatial models of Constitutional jurisdiction - "universalism, membership, territorial, and a balancing approach of global due process" being the major ones - he asks:

So where does Boumediene fall among those models? It is difficult to say, because in some respects the question is limited by the Court's determination that Guantanamo Bay effectively is within the territory of the United States. But there definitely is some language in the opinion that seems to suggest a much broader approach than simple territoriality.

More:

My first blush reading of the [Boumediene] case is that the Court is adopting a rule that the Constitution applies abroad provided the United States exercises de facto sovereignty. I'm not sure if that is closer to a territorial model, the balancing global due process model, or something in between. At a minimum it appears that the Court is rejecting the broad universalist and the narrow membership models.

Peter Spiro, in his entry "What Difference Does Citizenship Make? Even Less, After Boumediene," noting Alford's emphasis on "territory in marking the boundaries of citizenship," suggests "The other key element in constitutional cartography has been citizenship status, at least since Reid v. Covert. When it comes to enjoying the protection of the Constitution abroad, as a general matter citizens get it, noncitizens don't."

Alford elaborates. "I want to return to the issue of the Court's discussion of de facto sovereignty," he writes in a later post, "which has the potential to be one of the most important holdings of Boumediene. The reason it is so important is that the Court's articulation of de facto sovereignty has the potential to be the new test for the application of constitutional guarantees to noncitizens abroad. This has ramifications far beyond the narrow issue of habeas corpus."

My ignorance of legal scholarship notwithstanding, Alford presents what I think is an intriguing typology:

The territorial model. First, de facto sovereignty could mean something quite narrow. The narrowest reading of de facto sovereignty would emphasize that Guantanamo is almost unique in that it effectively falls within the territory of the United States but for the fact that Cuba retains ultimate de jure sovereignty. Under this definition, Guantanamo Bay would constitute a data set of one.

The occupation zone model. A second definition would focus on all territories that the United States physically occupies and controls. This would encompass a much broader category of territory, including the American zone in Germany after the Second World War and arguably all of Iraq during the period when Iraq was governed by the Coalition Provisional Authority. It also would apply to the Green Zone today.

The military base model. A third definition would focus on the individual facilities that we occupy and control subject to lease agreements with other nations. Under this definition the Constitution would extend to any alien physically located in any United States military base anywhere in the world. It also would extend to aliens held in any United States prison, barracks, or detention facility anywhere in the world that is within the practical control of the United States.

The effective control model. A fourth definition is even broader and would emphasize effective control of a detention facility. The Court emphasized that "Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this. The Constitution grants Congress and the President the power to acquire, dispose of, and govern territory, not the power to decide when and where its terms apply." So the Constitution would apply if the United States exercised effective control over a detention facility even though the detainees are held by coalition forces or military personnel from other nations pursuant to an agreement with the United States.

The physical custody model. A fifth possible definition of de facto sovereignty would emphasize physical custody over the person rather than the territory. This definition would essentially define de facto sovereignty as equivalent to control over the individual's physical movement. If a person has been arrested and his movement is forcibly circumscribed by United States authorities, then the United States is exercising control over that person and the Constitution applies to their conduct.

The exercise of power model. The broadest possible definition of de facto sovereignty is that the Constitution applies to noncitizens abroad any time the United States exercises authority over those individuals. This definition parallels Justice Brennan's dissent in Verdugo-Urquidez: If the Constitution authorizes our Government to enforce our laws abroad, then when the Government agents exercise this authority, the Constitution travels with them. Under this definition, the Constitution is an unavoidable correlative of the Government's power to enforce the law.

This parsing of legal and material space usefully expands on problems that many have addressed over the last seven or so odd years: the limits of sovereign entitlements and protections, the partisan portrayal of certain legal exemptions as legal "black holes", and the like. Bill Banks addressed some of these in "Legal Sanctuaries and Predator Strikes in the War on Terror", his contribution to Denial of Sanctuary: Understanding Terrorist Safe Havens (yes, shameless plug).

Where I think this relates well is to corollary efforts to typologize problems of refuge - everything from the Westphalian model of failed and rogue states (with all the shades of dysfunction and nefarious intent in between), to the guerrilla warfare model of territorially contiguous rear bases and its expeditionary variants in the long war. Chimene Keitner, in a follow up OPJIS post ("Function Over Form"), notes "In the end, this is a case about borders: the borders of habeas jurisdiction, and the border between law and politics. The first has been clarified somewhat, but both remain contested." Indeed. But this is a good start.

By Robert Lamb

I was the lead author of the DoD report Ungoverned Areas and Threats From Safe Havens that William McCallister cites in his SWJ Blog piece, "Operations in Pakistan's Tribal Areas". With full respect for the author, I would like to clarify what seems to me a serious misreading of the report's central argument.

Mr. McCallister begins his article by criticizing the UGA/SH report's definition of "governance" as implying "a social service centric function for government emphasizing 'delivery' and distribution of social services. It further implies that only democratic institutions are a safeguard against militancy, extremism and terrorism."

In fact, the definition implies nothing of the sort; it is a fairly standard academic definition of governance: "delivery of public goods," with "public goods" spelled out for non-academic audiences.

More importantly, the report itself says explicitly that U.S. efforts to build what we consider to be "democratic" or "good" governance usually fail to counter militancy, extremism, and terrorism precisely because we fail to account for how local populations view what counts as legitimate ways of governing -- the same point Mr. McCallister makes in his next sentence: "Not all cultures view the role and function of government in quite the same way. Tribal society, particularly along the North-West frontier between Pakistan and Afghanistan judges the role and function of effective government quite differently."

As the report's lead author, I couldn't agree more!

As the report's second main finding states: "In many cases, provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous governments ... are simply better positioned than the central government to address the local conditions that enable illicit actors to operate there." It goes on to suggest that "capacity-building" as a foreign-assistance model for countering safe havens is generally not effective unless it facilitates "legitimacy-building": That is, if we want local populations (e.g. tribal leaders) to be inhospitable to terrorists, imposing outside control or foreign models of governance on them will probably backfire spectacularly. Instead, we need to do something more difficult: help build relationships with them, taking their own views of what counts as "legitimate" as given.

The report defines "legitimacy" as "the political support or loyalty that a local population provides to a central, provincial, local, tribal, or autonomous government because the population believes the government has a right to govern or is worthy of their support or loyalty" -- it purposely mentions nothing about social services or democracy. (For the record, I am a strong supporter of democracy -- but there are many forms that "rule by the people" can take, and democracy is more enduring when its form is defined locally.)

In short, Mr. McCallister gets it exactly right, and his article is important for the precisely the reasons the UGA/SH report gives for why our efforts to counter illicit "safe havens" are often less than successful in places such as Pakistan.

11-12 September - DNI Open Source Conferece 2008 (Public Event - Conference). Washington DC. Sponsored by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence.

The Office of the DNI is pleased to announce the "DNI Open Source Conference 2008" to be held on Thursday, 11 September and Friday, 12 September, 2008 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center in Washington DC.

The conference is free; however, all who wish to attend must register online in advance (deadline 31 July). The two-day conference will explore a wide range of open source issues and open source best practices for the Intelligence Community and its partners. We invite participants from the broader open source community of interest including academia, think tanks, private industry, federal, state, local and tribal entities, international partners, and the media to attend. The conference will include speakers from across the broader open source community participating in panel discussions and focus group sessions.

Information about the agenda and break-out sessions is now available. The DNI Open Source Conference 2007 was held 16-17 July 2007 at the Ronald Reagan Building and International Trade Center. More than 900 registered participants and speakers attended. Presentations made at the conference break-out sessions are available on the DNI Open Source Conference 2007 website.