Security / Stability / Humanitarian Operations

Doctrine / TTP

JP 3-07.3: Joint TTP for Peace Operations

JP 3-07.6: Joint TTP for Foreign Humanitarian Assistance

Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations

Multiservice Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Conducting Peace Operations

FM 3-07: Stability Operations and Support Operations (USA)

Concepts

Stability Operations Joint Operating Concept

Issues / Lessons

Implications of DoD Directive 3000 - Douglas Johnson. US Army Strategic Studies Institute paper, July 2005. Department of Defense (DoD) Directive 3000: Department of Defense Capabilities for Stability Operations (DRAFT) has now progressed through two or three iterations and appears to be approaching formal publication. The directive could be one of the most important documents of this decade, whether properly or improperly written and interpreted. Beginning with a statement of DoD policy “that Stability Operations are a core U.S. military mission and . . . shall be accorded priority and attention comparable to combat operations,” it is clear that what has been done since at least 1846, when Major General Winfield Scott’s forces occupied and administered Mexico City, is about to be formalized and more importantly resourced in meaningful terms. The thrust of the directive’s early evolutions strongly suggests a significant commitment of resources, as well as the extension of stability operations awareness into every campaign plan and specifically the full development of the stability operations phase.

Progressive Reconstruction: A Methodology for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations - Major Karl Rohr, US Marine Corps. Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, June 2006.  The intent of the author is to establish a methodology for future forcible interventions in the affairs of failed, failing or rogue and terrorist sponsoring states in order to stabilize and democratize these nations in accordance with stated United States goals. The argument follows closely current and developing United States military doctrine on stabilization, reconstruction and counterinsurgency operations. Further the author reviews several past interventions from 1844 to the present. Conducting a survey of colonial, imperialist as well as pre and post WWII, Cold War, post Cold War and post September 11^th interventions to determine the techniques and procedures that proved most successful, the author proposes a program of intervention and reconstruction called Progressive Reconstruction that incorporates many of the successful activities of these past and present doctrines. The cornerstone of the methodology is the combination of rapid decisive combat and stabilization operations leading into a series of governmental transitions from foreign direct and indirect to indigenous independent rule.  The purpose of this thesis is to assess the prospects of a “Progressive Reconstruction” methodology for state building during and after military intervention in failed, failing or rogue states. Progressive Reconstruction requires cooperative civil-military intervention and coordinated pre-intervention planning. It relies upon superior military force for rapid decisive operations, stabilization and sufficient resources for reconstruction in order to generate a stable peace. This is not peacekeeping, or even peace enforcement,; it is military - political intervention into the sovereign affairs of a targeted state. It is an extreme measure taken in response to catastrophic events or in pre-emption of catastrophic circumstances. In this regard, the argument as to why an intervention was initiated is not relevant to this discussion. What is relevant is that these operations are on going, and the United States will continue to play a significant role in them as long as it maintains its global leadership position.  Therefore, the US must develop a strong and flexible doctrine for interventions and state building that both complements and supplements other national strategies for expeditionary operations.

Small Wars Project: Disarming the Local Population - Arthur Lewis Speyer III. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, May 2006. Disarmament operations are a critical component of security and stability operations (SASO).  Despite the frequency and importance of disarmament missions to SASO, limited current guidance exists to aid commanders.  Disarmament operations do not lend themselves to simple checklists for success.  The single, most significant factor in predicting a successful disarmament operation is the psychological aspects or perception of security by the local population.  In addition, disarmament operations require the careful balance of incentives and punishments through voluntary and coercive methods. Disarmament operations do not take place in a neutral environment, but inside a complex cultural, religious, historical context.  To successfully conduct a disarmament operation, one must understand the role weapons play within the targeted culture. By working within local cultural hierarchies and understanding the cultural terrain, tact and diplomacy are powerful toolsets.  As Marines continue to conduct disarmament missions worldwide, more detailed guidance is needed so Marines do not have to re-learn the same lessons from conflict to conflict.  Disarmament operations will be a central focus of future battlefields.  The lessons learned go well beyond Iraq and Afghanistan.  The millions of unaccounted small arms will be a permanent feature on all future threat environments.  The proper neutralizations of these weapons is a core tenet of SASO missions and critical to force protection.  The absorption of these issues into training and doctrine is essential for Marines to succeed in the wars of the future.

Stability Operations in Strategic Perspective: A Skeptical View - Dr. Colin Gray. Parameters article, Summer 2006. Because this article is friendly to much of the content of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review Report (QDR), it will pull no punches in offering constructive criticism. The subject of stability (and reconstruction) operations will be discussed explicitly, but it should be understood that this subject has to be regarded as a highly dependent variable. Stability operations, the demand for them and the provision of new capabilities to perform them well, are the downstream product of larger decisions on foreign policy and strategy.  We can pick one of two rival judgments on the QDR and its novel endorsement of the need for competence in irregular warfare and postwar stability operations. On the one hand, we can choose to see the QDR’s thrust toward countering irregular and asymmetric foes, and in favor of developing the skills to enhance social and political stability, as an overdue course correction in American policy and strategy. On the other hand, we may prefer to be less generous and instead suggest that the vision in the QDR amounts to a gross overreaction to the problems most characteristic of the present day. This is the sin of “presentism.” The Defense Department has peered out through the fog of the future to 2025 and has seen—guess what?—a future that is very much like today. We are warned to expect surprises and we are told repeatedly that ours is an era of uncertainty, but nonetheless no reader could possibly miss the report’s central message on threats. The perils of the near- to medium-term future will be largely irregular. We dare to ask, “Is this likely to be true?” and, even if it is true, “What should it imply for US national security policy?” I suggest that a QDR composed at the current juncture of events in Iraq and Afghanistan is not entirely to be trusted as a source of balanced guidance for the future. But, to be fair, no analysis can escape influence by the major preoccupation of its drafters. That granted, the QDR does suffer from a heavy, indeed an unduly heavy, burden of “presentism.” That is to say, it is seeing the future with terms of reference that derive excessively from today. What is more, I am concerned about the number and significance of truly major political and strategic assumptions that are simply passed over in silence. 

Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations - Edited by Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson. National Defense University Center for Technology and National Security Policy study, November 2003.  Recent military operations in Afghanistan and Iraq were characterized by the rapid defeat of the enemy’s military forces, by the relatively small size of the U.S. force, and by a very limited destruction of the critical civilian infrastructure. This success can be credited in large part to the ongoing transformation of the U.S. military evident in its effective use of information superiority, precision strike, and rapid maneuver on the battlefield.  U.S. forces were not nearly as well prepared to respond promptly to the lawlessness, destruction of the civilian infrastructure, and attacks on coalition forces that followed hard on the defeat of the Iraqi military. This has set back plans to restore essential services and to pass the reins to a representative Iraqi government.  It is precisely the success of the U.S. military in transforming its forces to execute rapid decisive operations that makes it imperative to transform how it prepares for and executes stabilization and reconstruction (S&R) operations. The very rapid defeat of the enemy military means the U.S. must be ready to field the resources needed to secure stability and begin the reconstruction process promptly—ideally concurrently—with the end of major combat.

Humanitarian Intervention and the War in Iraq: Norms, Discourse, and State Practice - Dr. Eric A. Heinze. Parameters article, Spring 2006.  The failure to find weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Iraq inevitably led to attempts by President George W. Bush and others in his Administration to use humanitarian justifications to defend the removal of Saddam Hussein’s regime. This argument has predictably triggered an intense debate among scholars, the media, and human rights advocacy groups as to whether the Iraq invasion constitutes a “humanitarian intervention,” which means using military force in other states to halt human rights abuses or otherwise promote human rights. A particularly outspoken critic of this tactic has been the director of Human Rights Watch, Kenneth Roth, whose compelling essay in the 2004 Human Rights Watch World Report contends that the invasion of Iraq was not a legitimate humanitarian intervention, nor should it be considered such. It is true, as Roth and others argue, that the principal justifications originally given for the war in Iraq were Saddam’s alleged possession of WMD—including his failure to reveal and discontinue relevant weapons programs as required by various Security Council resolutions—as well as the regime’s purported ties to terrorists linked with al Qaeda. As of this writing, no weapons have been found and there has been no credible evidence presented of a link between Saddam Hussein and al Qaeda prior to the war. Herein lies the appeal to the United States of the humanitarian argument. As Alex Bellamy writes, “The 2003 war in Iraq is important because it represents the first time a group of intervening states have justified their actions by referring to the humanitarian outcomes that were produced by acts primarily motivated by non-humanitarian concerns.”

Winning the Peace: The Requirement for Full-Spectrum Operations - Major General General Peter Chiarelli (USA) and Major Patrick Michaelis (USA). Military Review article, July-August 2005. For the last 3 decades serving as an Army officer, the traditional military training model prepared me to win our Nation’s wars on the plains of Europe, or the deserts of the Middle East. I envisioned large, sweeping formations; coordinating and synchronizing the battlefield functions to create that “point of penetration;” and rapidly exploiting the initiative of that penetration to achieve a decisive maneuver against the armies that threatened the sovereignty of my country. But in Baghdad, that envisioned 3-decade-old concept of reality was replaced by a far greater sense of purpose and cause. Synchronization and coordination of the battlespace was not to win the war, but to win the peace. Penetration did not occur merely through synchronization of the battlefield functions, but that and more: local infrastructure improvement; training of security forces, understanding and educating the fundamentals of democracy; creating long-lasting jobs that would carry beyond short-term infrastructure improvement; and, an information operations (IO) campaign that supported the cultural realities of the area of operations. The proverbial “point of penetration” for the 1st Cavalry Division and the coalition occurred on 30 January 2005. Millions of eligible Iraqi citizens, from across the sectarian divides, triumphed over a fractured insurgency and terrorist threat in a show of defiance never before seen across the Middle East. The purple index finger, proudly displayed, became a symbol of defiance and hope. The Iraqi people proved to the world their willingness to try democracy in whatever unique form evolves. Task Force Baghdad’s campaign to “win the peace” in Iraq has forced us, as an instrument of national power, to change the very nature of what it means to fight.2 Although trained in the controlled application of combat power, we quickly became fluent in the controlled application of national power. We witnessed in Baghdad that it was no longer adequate as a military force to accept classic military modes of thought. Our own mentality of a phased approach to operations boxed our potential into neat piles the insurgent and terrorist initially exploited.

The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development - Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Natsios, USAR. Parameters article, Autumn 2005. The US foreign assistance community is in the midst of the most fundamental shift in policy since the inception of the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II. The events of 11 September 2001 suddenly and unexpectedly forced the United States to confront a historic challenge equal in magnitude to the Soviet threat of the Cold War. The tragedy initiated a series of changes leading to the most extensive government reorganization since the Truman Administration created the National Security Council and the Department of Defense. No agency has undergone a greater degree of internal review and transformation than the US Agency for International Development (USAID). For better or worse, USAID is on the front lines of the dominating news stories of the day, whether engaging in reconstruction work in Afghanistan or providing tsunami relief in South Asia. This renewed prominence is not an accident. On the contrary, President George W. Bush’s Administration has made development work a national security priority; the September 2002 National Security Strategy underscores development as one of three strategic areas of emphasis (along with diplomacy and defense), and clearly states that “including all of the world’s poor in an expanding circle of development—and opportunity—is a moral imperative and one of the top priorities of US international policy." This new development climate has brought about internal recognition in the agency that it requires a more uniform and consistent set of guiding principles, and that these principles must accurately reflect how USAID approaches development from all levels—from day-to-day project operations to high-level policy decisions. Drawing on more than 40 years of institutional development experience and building on a series of recent policy strategies, including U.S. Foreign Aid: Meeting the Challenges of the Twenty-first Century and the Fragile States Strategy,² this article presents the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development, comprising ownership, capacity building, sustainability, selectivity, assessment, results, partnership, flexibility, and accountability. The purpose of this article is to introduce and analyze the Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development to the military community.

“Stay the Course”: Nine Planning Themes for Stability and Reconstruction Operations - Lieutenant Colonel David Cavaleri, USA (Ret.). Military Review article, July-August 2005. When U.S. President George W. Bush declared an end to Phase III (Decisive Operations) of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) on 1 May 2003, one could almost hear the global sigh of relief from a world that naively assumed the “hard work” was finished. But those in a position to appreciate the complex operational environment understood all too well that the hard work was far from over. Operation Iraqi Freedom has been underway for over 2 years, during which time the Army has conducted decisive combat operations as well as stability and reconstruction operations. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, explains why the United States executed OIF: “When other instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, and informational) are unable or inappropriate to achieve national objectives or protect national interests, the U.S. national leadership may decide to conduct large-scale, sustained combat operations. . . . In such cases the goal is to win as quickly and with as few casualties as possible, achieving national objectives and concluding hostilities in terms favorable to the United States and its multinational partners.” “Win quickly” the coalition did, if one defines “winning” only in terms of defeating an enemy’s conventional combat capabilities. However, JP 3-0 recognizes that achieving the intended end state of a campaign is much more complex: “Successful military operations may not, by themselves, achieve the desired strategic end state. Military activities across the full range of military operations need to be integrated and synchronized with other instruments of national power and focused on common national goals.” In other words, the Army becomes involved in stability and reconstruction operations in addition to decisive combat when both are required to attain strategic objectives.

Policing in Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Problems and Proposed Solutions - Nina Serafino. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress, March 2004.  One of the most crucial and difficult tasks in peacekeeping and related stability operations is creating a secure and stable environment, both for the foreign peacekeepers and for the indigenous population. During the past decade, the United States and the international community have tried various approaches to providing that security. Most of these approaches have included the use of United Nations International Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL), whose forces are contributed on a case by case basis by U.N. Member states. (While other countries usually contribute police personnel from their own national forces, the United States contracts those it contributes through a private corporation.) In a few cases, such as Afghanistan and Iraq at this time, coalition and U.S. military forces, and not the United Nations, train and work with indigenous police forces to provide security.  Despite continuing improvements over the past decade, the current system has several drawbacks. UNCIVPOL has been unable to provide an adequate number of well-trained policemen for individual operations and to deploy them rapidly. Their police forces experience a lack of consistency in the type and levels of training and a shortage of needed skills. Military forces, on the other hand, are usually not trained to deal effectively with police situations. These deficiencies lead to three gaps that impede the establishment of law and order, particularly those cases where not all parties to the conflict are dedicated to peace or where criminal networks have taken root. The first is the deployment gap, when international police are not available as quickly as needed. The second is the enforcement gap, where those deployed lack necessary skills, in particular combined military and policing “constabulary” skills, as well as investigative and intelligence gathering skills to deal with organized crime. The third is the institution gap, where competent judicial and penal personnel are needed to provide follow-up services to police work.

Peacekeeping Then, Now, and Always - Dr. A. Walter Dorn. Canadian Military Journal article, Winter 2005 - 2006. In the thought-provoking article “Peacekeeping and Public Opinion” (Canadian Military Journal, Vol. 6, No. 2, Summer 2005), Lane Anker postulates that there exists a “disconnect” or “gap” in Canadian public opinion regarding peacekeeping. Anker points out that polls consistently show strong public support for peacekeeping in general, but weak (and decreasing) support for a Canadian Forces (CF) presence in Afghanistan. Anker accuses the public of having an anachronistic view of the evolving practice of peacekeeping. While I agree that peacekeeping has evolved, I believe there is no disconnect or anachronism in public opinion, and that the public’s views on Afghanistan operations are quite understandable.  The simple truth is that not all of the CF activities in Afghanistan have been peacekeeping. As part of the US-led “war against terrorism,” our soldiers have hunted down former government (Taliban) and al Qaeda forces, turned over “detainees” to US forces for transport to Guantanamo Bay, and generally supported the US forces after the American invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Canadian society is right to question these activities and certainly correct in not calling them peacekeeping..

Preparing foe War, Stumbling to Peace. Planning for Post Conflict Operations in Iraq. - Major James Howard, British Army.  US Army School of Advanced Military Studies monograph, 2004.  This monograph discusses planning for the post-conflict phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom. More specifically, it examines whether a disparate focus on war-fighting operations during the planning and execution phase of Operation Iraqi Freddom is to blame for the lack of progress towards reconstruction. It examines the factors and influences that led political and military leaders to make certain decisions during the preparatory and combat phases of operations to depose Saddam Hussein. Moreover, it asks whether military leaders could have acted differently in pursuit of the Bush Administration’s strategic objectives for Iraq.

Small Unit Leadership in Future Security and Stability Operations - Colonel Michael Bohn, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, November 2004. As the United States enters a new era of military interventions, it needs to look at transforming its military to meet the challenges of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). As we become involved in more operations to depose evil dictators and free people from oppressive regimes, our forces will become more involved in fighting radical groups of ideological fighters vice nation states. There will be a need to place more emphasis upon SASO, while not losing the ability to conduct major offensive operations. Military units, working directly with diplomatic agencies and nongovernmental organizations, will be required to possess the ability to be fierce enemies as well as compassionate friends in order to help countries win a lasting and productive peace. The very nature of SASO—operating in areas where extreme turmoil exists among a population whose culture, language, values, and mores are much different than our own—makes the tactical and operational situation confusing and ever-changing. Only professionally trained leaders of high moral character can possess the confidence and ability to operate in such a volatile arena. Any mistakes or misunderstandings will have an enormous impact on the overall outcome of the mission due to the highly politicized environment under which most of these operations will take place.

American Civilian Police in UN Peace Operations - William Hayden.  United States Institute of Peace report, July 2001. This report presents the major issues, concerns and recommendations that emerged from the United States Institute of Peace symposium "American Civilian Police in International Peace Operations: What have we learned?"

Prosperity or Perdition: Do Lines of Operations Apply in Stability Operations? - Major Mario Diaz, USA. US Army School of Advanced Warfighting monograph 2003. Conflict in the twenty-first century involves a complex interaction of variables. Equally complex are modern stability operations that occur concurrently or immediately following war or combat operations. This study examines planning methodology for stability operations, focusing on the specific doctrinal planning construct of “lines of operation”, one of the “Elements of Operational Design” contained in the US Army’s Field Manual 3-0, Operations.  “Lines of operations” is, and will continue to be, an enduring part of the military lexicon regarding the geographic orientation of an armed force. Additionally, as a planning construct, it is a useful method for visualizing and developing operational plans.  However, when applied to hyper-complex operations, the suitability of “lines of operation” as a planning construct decreases relative to an increase in the amount of complexity present in the military problem. The monograph recommends the development of a holistic planning construct that merges current operational planning constructs—based on linear and nonlinear principles— with twenty-first century information-based tools and technology. Additional recommendations address steps to be taken in the areas of doctrine, training, and education, in order to improve the “lines of operations” planning construct and the overall approach to complex military problem solving at the operational level.

Campaign Planning for Operations Other Than War - Colonel Gary Anderson, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article, February 1996.  Operations other than war (OOTW) is not a popular term, but it seems to be the best we can do in the area of putting a label on what the Marine Corps used to call small wars.  This article will argue that while deliberate planning in OOTW is more difficult than in Major Regional Conflicts, it can be done and should be done if the Marine Corps is to continue to be the tip of the spear in OOTW response.

In Search of a New Type of Army: Nation Building and Occupation - Major Mark Camarena, USA. US Army School of Advanced Warfighting, 2004. This report includes two case studies, Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995 until present) and Iraq (2003 until present). The case studies examine the events leading up to the conflicts, the introduction of the American military forces, and the major lessons learned about stability and support operations. The research revealed that there are reoccurring themes and lessons of nation building and occupation. First, that nation building and occupation are protracted operations. Second, that a secure environment is of utmost importance. Third, that unity of effort is vital for success in these types of operations. Lastly, that the level of national commitment on the part of the United States is usually the determining factor of success.

Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness - Jennifer Taw, David Persselin, Maren Leed. Rand report, 1996. Peace operations (POs) are arguably the military operations other than war most likely to stress the U.S. Army's ability to maintain combat readiness. POs require: a higher ratio of combat support/combat service support units and special operations forces relative to combat arms units than do major theater wars (MTWs); smaller, more tailored deployments; training for some new tasks and, more important, for a more restrictive and sensitive operational environment; and readier access to--and more of--some kinds of equipment (such as crowd and riot-control gear, nonlethal weapons, and vehicles). At a time when the Army is shrinking, changing its posture, and participating in a rising number of both exercises and operational deployments, its challenge is to both maintain MTW readiness (its primary mission) and meet the very different requirements of POs. As long as MTWs remain the national priority--and thus the Army's--the Army can make some marginal changes to force structure, training, and doctrine that will help improve PO performance while also mitigating the effects of PO deployments on MTW readiness. If POs become a higher priority, and resources remain constrained, the Army will have to trade off some MTW capabilities to better meet PO requirements. These challenges must also be viewed in light of existing Army problems (such as maintaining units at levels below normal strength and overestimating the readiness of the reserve component), which transcend POs but are severely exacerbated by PO deployments.

Force Requirements in Stability Operations - James Quinlivan. Parameters article, Winter 1995. Military requirements for the post-Cold War environment are the central question of a large, somewhat disorganized, debate. The concept of conducting frequent and extended "peace operations" has produced a significant effort to understand both their political context and their military requirements. One category of peace operations, interventions to restore and maintain order and stability, continues its prominence as current news and as a recurring theme in nightmare visions of the future.  It is sometimes difficult to anticipate the force size and the time required to restore and maintain order in a failed or failing state. The force size is driven by two demographic revolutions of the last decades: dramatic growth in the populations of troubled states, and the movement of a considerable portion of that population to the cities. The movement from rural to urban settings is so significant that the populations of some cities exceeds that of many states. The duration of such operations is affected both by their inherent difficulty and by the implicit need in most cases to recreate internal forces of order. Duration adds another dimension, defined by the force available to conduct the intervention and the duration of each unit's stay in the region.  This article investigates the numbers required for stability operations, both for entire countries and individual cities, and explores the implications of those numbers for deployment, rotation, readiness, and personnel retention.

From Three to One: Rethinking the "Three Block War" and Humanitarian Operations in Combat - Dr. Reuben E. Brigety II, American University. In the mid-1990's, U.S. Marine Corps Commandant Gen. Charles Krulak conceived of the notion of the "three-block war" in which Marine forces engaged in urban combat would have to perform humanitarian and peacekeeping functions while simultaneously conducting combat operations. Recent conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq suggest not only that Gen. Krulak's concept was prescient, but also that it may not have gone far enough. In Afghanistan and Iraq, both U.S. air and ground forces have had to deal with the tactical and doctrinal demands of providing humanitarian assistance in the course of active combat operations. Such endeavors have been undertaken for a variety of reasons: meeting humanitarian needs for civilians, complying with international legal obligations, and demonstrating American "good will" to a skeptical international audience. Regardless of the motives, these activities have sparked a debate about the appropriateness and implications of partisan military forces performing what should be impartial humanitarian activities. Yet the presence of civilians on the battlefield and the operational and political imperatives of caring for them are recurring features of modern warfare that demand study. This paper explores the implications of the emerging trend of U.S. military-humanitarian operations for the beneficiaries of humanitarian aid, for the civilian international humanitarian community, and for the military forces that will prepare for and execute such missions in the future.

Brokering Peace in Sudan - Major Patrick Christian, US Army. Special Warfare Magazine, March-April 2006. In August 2004, the author found himself in just such a role when he deployed to the Darfur region of Sudan as part of a small joint-special operations advisory team dispatched there by the commander of the Joint Special Operations Task Force-Horn of Africa. The team, deployed from Camp Lemonier, Djibouti, consisted of a Navy SEAL lieutenant commander, a Marine recon major, and the author, then an Army Special Forces major. The team was tasked to work as advisers to the African Union’s 12 military-observer teams, or MILOBS, which were attempting to document cease-fire violations among the multiple parties in Sudan’s civil war. The mission was simple: to keep the MILOBS collecting information on the conflict, as well as to stay positioned between the warring parties as advisers without getting killed in the process. The mission originated when the United States partnered with the European Union, or EU, in an effort to avoid a full-scale civil war in Sudan. The coalition focus is on funding and supporting the newly formed African Union, or AU, in a role designed to mediate between the Government of Sudan, or GoS (which is primarily in the control of the Northern Arab Sudanese), and the armed rebel groups in the Darfur region. The government-supported militias were created when the GoS armed a large number of Arab nomadic civilians, known as the Janjaweed. The Janjaweed have since begun attempting to clear the African Muslim tribes out of Darfur in a form of political/cultural cleansing.

High Tea in Low Places: Adventures in Peacekeeping and Nation Building - Lieutenant Colonel Charles Armstrong, USMC (Ret). Marine Corps Gazette article, December 2004. “Wait a moment, Sirs! We must shoot some fellows!” Since I was the “sir” behind the wheel of the United Nations (U.N.) jeep (call sign UNIFIL 658) that winter morning in 1984, I hit the brake. I glanced at the Fijian officer in the passenger seat, LtCol George “Jiogi” Konrote, and at his ever-vigilant “batman” in the prone position with his rifle pointed out the back of our ride. As we paused at the gate of the Fijian Battalion compound in Qana, Lebanon, we heard three crisp, clear shots from the rifleman atop the headquarters building. Seconds later, we saw him wave and heard his instructions, “OK to proceed, Sirs. I got the chaps.” I asked Konrote—my nominal reporting senior and best friend in the Middle East—“Didn’t that rifleman just serve us tea a few minutes ago?” George replied, “And scones, Chuck, very tasty scones.” Welcome to “Peacekeeping Central,” U.N. style!

Imposing Peace: Total vs. Limited Wars, and the Need to Put Boots on the Ground - William Hawkins. Parameters article, Summer 2000. What distinguishes total war from limited war? Is it the scope of violence, directed not only against armies in the field but also against civilian populations? Is it the mobilization of an entire society with conscription and a war economy, a "nation in arms" which some would say justifies the expansion of violence to the entire society because a clear line cannot be drawn between those who are involved in the war effort and those who are not? Or is it the objective of the war which defines it, with a total war aimed at the destruction of the enemy regime and its possible conquest whereas a limited war seeks only to resolve a conflict that does not endanger the survival of either belligerent?

Stretching the Network: Using Transformed Forces in Demanding Contingencies Other Than War - David Gompert and Hans Pung. Rand report, April 2004.  Although the United States and other nations have pursued transformation to a networked force to prevail decisively in major expeditionary war, networking may also contribute to lower-scale nonpermissive contingencies short of war. This occasional paper examines the capabilities of networked forces and evaluates their utility for meeting the challenges of lesser contingencies. It should be of special interest to policymakers within the U.S. Department of Defense and other allied nations who are involved in force transformation and understanding the impact of networking on military operations. It should also interest humanitarian organizations, academics, and others who have an interest in low-intensity conflict, peacekeeping operations, and nation-building to further understand the advantages networked military forces may provide in those environments.

Combined Action Platoons: A Strategy for Peace Enforcement Major Brooks Brewington, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1996.  The concept of the Combined Action Platoon, as it evolved in Vietnam, has potential applications in operations other than war, particularly Chapter VII UN Peace Enforcement missions. FMFM 1-1, Campaigning, cites the Combined Action Program as an example of a short-lived but successful concept. If the Combined Action Platoons were successful, then how would the concept interface with today's doctrine in Peace Keeping/Enforcement missions?  The Combined Action Platoon's (CAP) genesis was not a deliberate plan from a higher headquarters, rather, it was a solution to one infantry battalion's problem of an expanding TAOR. The concept of combining a squad of marines with local Popular Forces (PF's) and assigning them a village to protect proved to be a force multiplier. The CAP concept was effective in denying the enemy a sanctuary at the local village level. The Pacification campaign seemed to work under the CAP concept, and the Marines fully embraced it. Objectively, there is no solid proof that the CAP concept was a resounding success; however, subjectively the evidence suggests otherwise.  Counterinsurgency operations and, in particular, the establishment of a foreign internal defense lends itself for the greatest utility of employing a CAP-style organization. Recent operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia suggest a CAP-style organization could accomplish the assigned mission.

Lessons Learned: Peacebuilding in Haiti - Lotta Hagman. International Peace Academy Seminar Report; Canadian Mission to the United Nations, January 2002. Peacebuilding is not merely a technical exercise - it is highly political. In a combustible political atmosphere as in Haiti, effective peacebuilding requires careful and sustained management. The importance of a long-term approach cannot be overestimated. In Haiti, the international community was successful in restoring the constitutional government, improving the respect for basic human rights, and initiating economic development. However, for these efforts to take hold and lead to a self-sustaining democratic process, continuous international engagement in Haiti is vital. From this perspective, the cutback in the UN involvement in February 2001 was premature.

Haiti: Lessons Learned - Lama Khouri-Padova. United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit discussion paper, March 2004. This paper reviews the international community’s involvement in Haiti and identifies some lessons to be learned from United Nations engagement between 1994 and 2001. Owing to time and space limits, it focuses on selected peacekeeping aspects of such involvement. It does not address other important issues such as socio-economic development, agency funding and the role of the Special Representatives of the Secretary-General. The study is a discussion paper only and does not represent the views of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Its recommendations are solely for the consideration of mission planners, and have no directive weight or intent.

Capacity Building for Latin America and the Caribbean: PKO and the Case of Haiti - Colonel Joseph Napolil, US Army.  US Army War College Strategy Research Project, 2005.  On February 29, 2004, only ten years after the United States last intervened in Haiti to reinstall President Jean Bertrand Aristide, U.S. military forces once again entered Haiti to stabilize the country after President Aristide fled as violence gripped the country. However, unlike the 20,000 troops, significant resources, and ambitious objectives of Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994, the recent intervention was executed with a much smaller force, with much more limited United States government goals, objectives, and expectations. This paper will analyze the events leading to the U.S. decision to intervene and the rationale to limit U.S. objectives and participation. It will then examine the planning, organization, objectives, and effectiveness of the Multinational Interim Force (MIF) and the transfer of responsibility to the U.N. stabilization force. The paper will conclude with recommendations on how the U.S. may build upon and strengthen the demonstrated capacity for collective security operations for Latin America and the Caribbean in the future.

Nation Building: The Inescapable Responsibility of the World's Only Superpower - James Dobbins. Rand Review article, Summer 2003. We at the Rand Corporation have compiled what we have found to be the most important lessons learned by the United States in its nation-building efforts since World War II.  Not all these hard-won lessons have yet been fully applied to America's most recent nation-building efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq.  We define nation-building as "the use of armed force in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin an enduring transition to democracy." We have compared the levels of progress toward this goal among seven historical cases: Germany, Japan, Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. These are the most important instances in which American military power has been used in the aftermath of a conflict to underpin democratization elsewhere around the world since World War II.

The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations - Simon Chesterman. New York University of Law paper for the United Nations. This paper reviews the changing approach to the use of force in UN peace operations, with particular emphasis on responses to the security vacuum that typically arises in a post-conflict environment.  The United Nations has generally been reluctant to allow military units under its command to use force. The three peace operations in which troops under UN command engaged in the use of force on a significant scale — Congo from 1960–1963, Somalia in 1993, and Bosnia and Herzegovina from 1994–1995 — were traumatic experiences for the organization. The controversies to which these operations gave rise were surpassed only by two occasions on which force was not used at all: in Rwanda and Srebrenica.  Such reluctance to use force is consistent with the traditional conception of peacekeeping as an impartial activity undertaken with the consent of all parties, in which force is used only in self-defence. Over the years, however, all three characteristics of traditional peacekeeping — consent, impartiality, minimum use of force — have been brought into question.

Operations other than War: Who Says Warriors Don’t Do Windows? - Lieutenant Colonel Charles Hasskamp, USAF. US Air Force Air University Maxwell Paper, March 1998. This study examines the rise of operations other than war (OOTW) as a new and prominent tasking for the armed services of the United States. The author is an advocate of the OOTW mission, and he argues that the US Special Forces Command is an excellent instrument for the task.  As recent experience shows, there is considerable pressure to use the American military as an arbitrator and peacemaker to the world. This study examines the arguments for and against expanding our military’s nontraditional roles and missions. It concludes that the US armed forces can do and will continue to be able to perform an excellent job in operations other than war, as they have done in the past. The danger is that this endeavor could jeopardize the readiness of a force structure necessary to maintain the more traditional war-fighting capabilities.

Peacekeeping Training in the Army National Guard - Major Angela Ewing, USAR. US Army School of Advanced Warfighting, March 2004. This study evaluates the arguments for and against the research question by using the criteria of readiness, compliance with Federal directives, and legitimacy. Divisions that regularly train on PKO tasks will sustain the unit’s PKO support. Increased proficiency at home station improves readiness. If readiness is better, then the primary research question is supported. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) dictates that the Army maintain the ability of operating in a full-spectrum environment (from smaller-scale contingencies, or SSCs, to large-scale combat operations); consequently, peacekeeping training in the ARNG should help satisfy this requirement. If units comply with Federal directives, then the primary research question is supported. FM 3-0, Operations, states that in order to achieve objectives, Army forces conducting PKO rely on legitimacy. The legitimacy envisioned by the sponsoring state, nations or international organization is critical to operational success. If legitimacy is better, then the primary research question is supported.

US Military Interaction with Humanitarian Assistance Organizations During Small-Scale Contingencies - Major David Hinson, USAF. US Air Force Air Command and Staff College thesis, 1998. How effectively does the U.S. military interact with humanitarian assistance organizations and what avenues exist for improving these relationships? During recent military operations other than war (MOOTW), now known as small-scale contingencies (SSC), the U.S. military has worked with numerous humanitarian assistance (HA) organizations such as nongovernmental organizations (NGO), private voluntary organizations (PVO), and international governmental organizations (IGO) like the United Nations. These organizations are often on site and actively working prior to the military’s arrival within the region. As a result, there are many ways that HA groups and the military can assist or complement the efforts of each other. Many experts predict that these types of SSC efforts will increase in the foreseeable future. Assuming this is the case, increased and improved interaction between military and HA organizations will become imperative. This paper is the result of a literature review conducted to examine recent U.S. military interaction with HA organizations in regional conflicts such as northern Iraq, Haiti, and Bosnia. The primary sources include periodicals, books, government and private reports, doctrine and online sources in the 1990s. It also draws on the author’s personal experience supporting HA efforts in northern Iraq as a member of Operation Provide Comfort.

Change, Security, Stability and Reconstruction - US Marine Corps Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities Principles of War Seminar report, December 2004. On Monday, November 22, 2004, the Office Force Transformation from the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Department of the Navy conducted the seventh seminar in the Principles of War Seminar Series.  The guest speaker was General James L. Jones, former Marine Corps Commandant and currently serving as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe and Commander of the United States European Command. He spoke on change and the role security, stability, and reconstruction plays in the larger theme of the principles of warfare. A summary of his comments are contained in this report.

Commander's Guidance: A Challenge of Complex Humanitarian Emergencies - Andrew Natsios. Parameters article, Summer 1996. United States military forces have now conducted operations in five complex humanitarian emergencies[1] beginning with Northern Iraq, followed by Somalia, Goma in Zaire, Haiti, and now Bosnia. None of these interventions required a conventional or even unconventional war on the battlefield. The military found itself supporting humanitarian relief operations, imposing order in chaotic circumstances, or implementing political accords to which the United States was a party. It would not be an exaggeration to suggest that the rank and file in the uniformed services are uncomfortable with this new role they have been directed to perform. Until recently they have had limited experience or training in the non-military disciplines needed to carry out these missions. Many are unsure why the military has been given duties it was never created or trained to perform.  The military should know it is in good company in its discomfort. Anyone who believes that all of the other actors who work in these emergencies--diplomats, economists, and humanitarian relief managers--are prepared for these complex humanitarian emergencies would be mistaken. Soldiers are not the only ones playing catch-up. None of the participating communities was particularly well prepared for this challenge of the post-Cold War world.

Managing Peace Operations in the Field - Mark Walsh. Parameters article, Summer 1996.  They tell this story about Fred Cuny, the Intertec relief worker and tragic victim of the hostilities in Chechnya. During the Biafran civil war in the late 1960s, the relief agencies providing assistance faced many operational challenges. Relief workers were particularly stumped by the rapidly deteriorating public health conditions. Recognizing the need for proper field sanitation to improve the quality of public health, Cuny attacked the problem at its basic level: he pointed out that somebody had to dig latrines. The response he received from the agencies was that no one knew how to construct latrines; Cuny replied that millions of manuals on the subject had been printed by the world's armies, and asked why the relief community couldn't acquire the necessary information from such manuals. The difficulty, he learned, was that no one knew whom to approach in the military to obtain them.  Nearly 30 years later, in a world struggling to cope with many complex emergencies, there is still a communications gap between the civilian and military communities that respond to the emergencies. In many respects, the mutual understanding essential to success has not moved beyond Fred Cuny's experience. The reasons why this cooperation is difficult to establish and sustain and what practitioners--civilian and military alike--can do to improve prospects for more effective peace operations are the focus of this article.

Peace(keeping) in Our Time: The UN as a Professional Military Manager - John Hillen. Parameters article, Autumn 1996.  This article presents the thesis that the United Nations does not have an inherent capacity for such professional military management, and that such capabilities were not "present but dormant" throughout the Cold War. In fact, the UN is inherently anti-professional in the military sense; at best, it is suited for managing only quasi-military and very limited operations such as observation missions and small, traditional peacekeeping missions. The recent steps taken to professionalize UN military operations have failed because the military capability of the UN cannot be separated from its political nature, from political characteristics that purposely limit and constrain its forays into the functional management of military force. To paraphrase Clausewitz, UN military operations have their own grammar (no matter how unintelligible), but their logic is the logic of the UN's political character.

Policy Challenges of UN Peace Operations - James Baker. Parameters article, Spring 1994.  As recently as 1990, a mere handful of US Army officers were seconded to the United Nations as military observers. Barely four years later, Army troops serving under the UN flag (or in direct support of United Nations operations) number in the thousands. US participation in such ventures can be expected to continue, and the Army's institutional interest in UN peace operations is rapidly rising.  Like war itself, a peace operation is a military undertaking with a political aim. But unlike warfare, with its long history, peace operations are a relatively recent military phenomenon. Historical precedents are few. This fact alone makes peace operations, in all their forms, a special challenge not only for those who implement policy but for those who make it, both in and out of uniform. The salient policy challenges are in the areas of multilateral operations, mission termination, and combat readiness.

Is the UN Peacekeeping Role in Eclipse? - Robert NcClure and Morton Orlov II. Parameters article, Autumn 1999.  To deal with the rising demand for its peacekeeping services, in 1992 the UN created a Department of Peacekeeping Operations--also called DPKO. That department underwent predictable growing pains as member states sought to have the world's premier international organization assume increasing responsibility for resolving conflict in the new world order. This article will outline those initiatives in UN peacekeeping management and describe the recent proposals to restructure DPKO. These recent initiatives, born out of member state frustration, mission/resource mismatch, and a diminished appetite for global agendas, will certainly have a significant effect, in ways yet to be determined, on the next ten years of UN peacekeeping.

Small Arms and Light Weapons Disarmament Programs: Challenges, Utility, and Lessons Learned - Jennifer Perry. Defense Threat Reduction Agency Advanced Systems and Concepts Office paper, July 2004. Small arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation has contributed to the sustaining of many of the domestic violent conflicts in the post- Cold War era. Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) programs have thus become an essential step in the internal conflict resolution processes in these affected nations. Though these programs are well-intended, and attempt to address the deep-rooted problem of SALW availability, they are not met without challenges. Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo, Mozambique, and Afghanistan each tried differing approaches to this process and in some cases achieved a varying result, though they faced similar challenges. However, cross cutting patterns in disarmament in particular, suggest that future practitioners in this area can learn from their experiences and apply those lessons to better implement future programs in other post-conflict societies.  This paper attempts to lay out the benefits and challenges of SA/LW disarmament programs in post-conflict societies, by examining four cases in varied parts of the world (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Mozambique and Afghanistan) using open-source primary and secondary sources. It notes the common challenges, common lessons learned, and varied experiences of each program to develop a cross-cutting set of common issues that disarmament program developers and executors now and in the future, should be aware of as they try to develop and execute similar programs.

The Role of the Political Advisor in Peacekeeping Operations - David Lange. Parameters article, Spring 1999. A major theme of Clausewitz's work On War was that military considerations are subordinate to the political point of view. The primacy of political influences in the conduct of war understood by Clausewitz in the 19th century equally applies to peacekeeping operations today. The negotiations that led to the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia demonstrated the truth of Clausewitz's observation. The successful application of NATO's military power created the conditions for diplomacy to achieve a political end.  And as the international community works with Bosnia to build a multi-ethnic, democratic society, NATO's military presence continues to serve political goals.

Leader's Guide for Contingency Operations: The Human Dimension - Alma Steinberg and Diane Foley. US Army Research Institute report, 1998. The US Army Research Institute conducted research examining the attitudes and opinions of soldiers who deployed in contingency operations to identify people issues impacting effectiveness.  Data was collected from soldiers participating in support of Operation Restore / Continue Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia.  This guide identifies recurring issues that impacted leader effectiveness and unit success.

Small Unit Leadership in Future Security and Stability Operations - Colonel Michael Bohn, USMC. Marine Corps Gazette article.  As the United States enters a new era of military interventions, it needs to look at transforming its military to meet the challenges of the global war on terrorism (GWOT). As we become involved in more operations to depose evil dictators and free people from oppressive regimes, our forces will become more involved in fighting radical groups of ideological fighters vice nation states. There will be a need to place more emphasis upon SASO, while not losing the ability to conduct major offensive operations. Military units, working directly with diplomatic agencies and nongovernmental organizations, will be required to possess the ability to be fierce enemies as well as compassionate friends in order to help countries win a lasting and productive peace.

Complex Emergencies: Under New Management - Mark Walsh and Michael Harwood. Parameters article, Winter 1998. It was clear to some in the US peace operations policy community during the late 1980s and early 1990s that there were serious, recurring problems in preparing for and conducting international crisis intervention missions. In the early years, the military frequently developed its plans independently of the other government agencies involved in a crisis. When identifying tasks and the resources to perform them, the absence of links between the civilian and military components of these missions led to undesirable outcomes: neglect of civil police requirements and other law and order functions, resource imbalances between humanitarian relief initiatives and military operations, and lack of attention to human rights considerations. The uncoordinated planning produced serious differences in assumptions, concepts, policy recommendations, and plans.

Protection for Humanitarian Relief Operations - Michael Dziedzic. Strategic Forum article, December 1999.  Civilian populations have always suffered the collateral effects of armed conflict, but increasingly throughout the course of the 20th century they have become both a target and the principal victim of warfare. During the post-Cold War era, the vast majority of wars have been internal to the sovereign state, which has frequently bred humanitarian catastrophes. This has included "ethnic cleansing" (Bosnia, Kosovo), genocide (Rwanda), starvation (Somalia), ruthless governmental suppression of minorities (Iraq, Sudan), wanton brutality by rebel forces (Liberia, Sierra Leone), protracted civil war (Angola, Mozambique, Afghanistan), and extreme deprivation of human rights (Haiti). These situations have resulted in massive population displacements, both internally and internationally, and have generated international action aimed at resolving the conflict and assisting the victims. They have been marked by a climate of extreme insecurity for the affected populations and those trying to help them.

ECOWAS and the Liberia Experience: Peacekeeping and Self Preservation - Natalie Brown, US Department of State. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1999. The cooperation of member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in restoring stability to Liberia was more a reflection of their individual interests than it was a group effort to ensure regional security. In 1975 West African nations convened in Lagos and adopted the ECOWAS Treaty to promote regional integration and establish an economic union of the area's Anglophone, Francophone, and Lusophone countries. ECOWAS has been moderately successful. It constructed highways, promoted anti-drug policies, and created a regional travelers' check, but the original goals remain elusive. Boundary disputes, periods of civil unrest in many of the countries, and enduring tensions between the French-speaking and English-speaking states impeded the formation of a real community. Despite its economic shortcomings, ECOWAS had one notable success. Its military arm, the Economic Community of West African States Military Observer Group (ECOMOG), restored peace and stability to Liberia. Liberia endured a violent, seven-year civil war as a result of a 1989 attempt by rebels to overthrow the government. Over the objections of some member states, ECOWAS created and deployed a military force to Liberia. The five-nation 3,500-person force that landed in Monrovia in 1990 would swell to a presence of more than 10,000 and represent the majority of the Community by 1996. Upon its 1998 departure, ECOMOG had negotiated peace accords and cease-fires, disarmed rebels, evacuated expatriates, and created conditions for transparent elections. Buoyed by its success in Liberia, ECOWAS sent peacekeeping forces to other countries in turmoil. It further proposed the formation of a stand-by crisis response force and the creation of a permanent mechanism for conflict resolution. A cursory look at the experience suggests that West Africans were united in seeking to end the carnage. Stability and the humanitarian situation were concerns, but the participating states were motivated by their unique self-interests: domestic security, a desire to exert greater influence over the region, and pursuit of a better standing in the international community.

Lessons Learned on the Start-up Phase of United Nations Mission in Liberia - Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit, April 2004. This study reviews the start-up phase of the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) and identifies lessons that should be applied to other start-up peacekeeping operations. It does not examine the mission planning process or operational activities of UNMIL.

The Responsibility to Protect: Military Intervention and the Responsibility to Protect - General Klaus Naumann, German Army. Keynote Address at the 20th Annual Seminar of the Conference of Defence Associations Institute, held in Ottawa on 26 February 2004.  Our world is full of instability, and, indeed, new risks and dangers, and it will undoubtedly remain so for quite some time to come. Therefore, politicians will probably have to consider military interventions as the last resort of crisis management more often than our societies generally, who are not really aware of the dangers, may wish to acknowledge the need for them. Some of these interventions will aim at keeping risks at a distance from their own territory. Others, presumably the most controversial ones, may seek to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) or the establishment of terrorist bases. Last but not least, others may aim towards the protection of people who suffer from brutal suppression. In the worst case, such interventions may aim at the prevention of genocide or the mass killing of human beings. This latter category is often called humanitarian intervention, although this term may lead to misconceptions. Military interventions for human protection purposes have different objectives than traditional war fighting, which is the hallmark of most interventions, and they also differ from traditional peacekeeping operations. Such interventions therefore raise a number of new, different and unique operational challenges. Because the objective of military intervention is to protect populations and not to militarily defeat or destroy an enemy, it differs from traditional war fighting. While protective intervention operations require the use of as much force as necessary – which may on occasion be a great amount – to protect the population at risk, their basic objective is always to achieve quick success with as little cost as possible in civilian lives. They must also inflict as little damage as possible, so as to enhance both recovery prospects and the chances to win the cooperation of the population in the theatre of intervention for the post-conflict phase. In war fighting interventions, by contrast, the neutralization of an opponent’s military or industrial capabilities is often the instrument needed to force surrender.

The Right to Humanitarian Assistance - Yoram Dinstein. Naval War College Review article, Autumn 2000. It is impossible to assert, at the present point, that a general right to humanitarian assistance has actually crystallized in positive international law. Such a general right, had it consolidated, could be invoked in all circumstances: in peacetime (either in the face of endemic problems of famine, malnutrition, and disease, or—perhaps especially—when natural disasters occur) as well as in the course of armed conflicts (either international or internal). In reality, however, there is no clear-cut right under existing international law to humanitarian assistance in peacetime, not even when natural disasters strike.  To the extent that the right to humanitarian assistance is vouchsafed by binding norms of international law (customary or conventional), this is so only in certain contexts of armed conflict.

Mastering Violence: An Option for Operational Military Strategy - Brigadier General Loup Francart (French Army) and Jean-Jacques Patry.  Naval War College Press article, Summer 2000.  The entry of Western nations into a new strategic era has been accompanied by a significant increase in the commitments of their armed forces. The Western states, including France, operate today within the framework of a de facto "counterwar" strategy, but no such strategy has ever been officially formulated or expressed; the employment of forces has to be adapted on a case-by-case basis. The aim of this unexpressed strategy is to contain violence—in conflicts that are different from interstate wars of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and from the wars of decolonization. Western forces are typically given international mandates that put them in the position of third parties between belligerents neither of whom they consider enemies. Consequently, the military courses of action associated with classical warfare are imperfectly adapted to the problems currently being encountered.  The key to "mastering violence" is to control certain operational domains—for instance, "land-space," mass movement, and armaments, but also information and humanitarian operations. However, no UN-mandated intervention force can be equipped and trained exclusively for mastering violence; it may also have to conduct combat operations. That contingency will not be addressed in this article.

Complex Civil Military Operations - John Gentry. Naval War College Press article, undated.  The military aspects of such complex national endeavors have been labeled, somewhat inadequately, as “low-intensity conflicts” or “military operations other than war.” Such operations have significant civil-military components. That is, in these operations armed forces have objectives or employ means that directly involve local civilians and civil institutions, including governments. In such cases American military personnel typically work closely with civilian employees of other U.S. government agencies, international organizations (including foreign-aid agencies of other governments and components of the United Nations), and nongovernmental organizations. Virtually by definition, the participation of such a variety of groups makes these operations complex.

Lessons From Somalia: The Dilemma Of Peace Enforcement - Major Robert Allen, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1997. Peace enforcement is a viable peace operation only under the conditions of a superior military command and control structure, well trained and equipped combat forces, and limited objectives. Peace enforcement is a relatively new concept which precariously lies in the gray area between the logic of peace and the logic of war. Despite the lack of well established peace enforcement doctrine, the international community has increasingly turned to peace enforcement as a mode of intervention in its efforts to maintain world peace and security in the post-Cold War environment. As a consequence, this operation is inherently complex, misunderstood, difficult to manage, and often highly contentious. Both the potential benefits and the devastating pitfalls of this mode of intervention were demonstrated in the Somalia experience. At the risk of oversimplifying two extremely complex operations, the United Task Force (UNITAF) phase is generally credited for saving hundreds of thousands of starving Somalis while the subsequent United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM II) phase is remembered for warlord hunting and the infamous Mogadishu firefight which led to the termination of the United Nations mission. The differences between these operations and the dilemmas associated with the concept of peace enforcement warrant a candid evaluation so that similar problems can be more effectively managed or circumvented in the future. Peace enforcement was no panacea to remedy the causes of the Somali conflict. The limited approach taken during the United States-led UNITAF operation provided the best possible alternative to this situation. This operation proved to be remarkably successful in stemming the tide of starvation and serves as a testimony to the fact that peace enforcement is be a viable tool under limited conditions. During the United Nations led UNOSOM II mission, the enormous gap between the ambitious mandates and the inadequate means provided to accomplish the given objectives reflected the unrealistic expectations that the international community attached to the use of force. This ends, ways, and means mismatch was coupled with inadequate command and control and resulted in inconsistency and confusion. In the end, this combination led to a situation which ultimately backfired with disastrous consequences. Superior leadership, a unified military command structure, well trained and equipped combat troops, and an unambiguous and realistic mission clearly demarcated the difference between UNITAF and UNOSOM II.

Peace and Stability Lessons from Bosnia - Max Manwarring. Parameters article, Winter 1998. The United States' civil-military involvement in the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia, with NATO and other elements of the international community, has been a major topic in the national and international security dialogue since the 1995 signing of the Dayton Peace Accords for Bosnia. Many have concluded, in light of that experience and subsequent developments, that conflict of the sort encountered in the Balkans may well be a harbinger of future US military operations. The dialogue suggests that the complex challenges of multinational peace and stability operations encountered in Bosnia-Herzegovina reflect the disorder of the post-Cold War era and could characterize other intranational conflicts. The US Army deployed a significant number of personnel to Bosnia early in 1996 to collect, consolidate, and report on hundreds of incidents and activities that were related to the deployment and subsequent operations of US forces in the region. The raw material collected by the teams under the rubric of "lessons learned" was reviewed and analyzed within the Army, emerging as lessons to be examined by all of its elements to support training, review doctrine, and develop and acquire materiel appropriate to peace support operations. One of the organizations involved in the process of learning from the experiences of the deployed force, the US Army Peacekeeping Institute, subsequently sponsored two meetings of senior US and other officers and civilians, during which the lessons were examined and validated. This article examines some of the recurring themes from those meetings, which took place in May 1996 and April 1997. The intent then and now was not to relive history as we would have liked it to have been, but to focus on the broad themes and issues that invoke the invaluable power of leader judgment and unity of effort in peace operations. The consistency of the lessons learned from these and other US and United Nations reports is impressive, and inspires confidence that the lessons are valid.

Securing Health: Lessons from Nation-Building Missions - Seth Jones, Lee Hilborne, C. Ross Anthony, Lois Davis, Federico Girosi, Cheryl Benard, Rachel Swanger, Anita Datar Garten, and Anga Timilsina.  Rand monograph, April 2006.  Rebuilding public health and health care delivery systems has been an important component of nation-building efforts conducted after major conflicts. However, few studies have attempted to examine a comprehensive set of cases, compare the quantitative and qualitative results, and outline best practices. The study assesses seven cases of nation-building operations following major conflicts: Germany and Japan immediately after World War II; Somalia, Haiti, and Kosovo in the 1990s; and Afghanistan and Iraq since 2001. It concludes that two factors increase the likelihood of successful health outcomes: planning and coordination, and infrastructure and resources. In addition, the study argues that health can have an independent impact on broader political, economic, and security objectives during nation-building operations.

What Color Is the Peacekeeper's Helmet? - Myron Nordquist. Naval War College Press article, Summer 1997. The term "peacekeeping" suffers from imprecision, and part of the reason is that the concept derived from United Nations and state practice, not from express terms in the UN Charter. The advantage of the loose, ordinary sense in which the term is commonly employed by the press and the general public is that it conveys an idea that people believe they understand. It is for that reason that the expression "peacekeeping operation" is used here to encompass both traditional peacekeeping and enforcement operations. Let me stress, however, that these two phrases refer to markedly different concepts under the UN Charter--the former to be run by the Secretariat (primarily under Chapter VI provisions) and the latter by the Security Council (in accordance with the specifications of Chapter VII or VIII).1 The most important result is that a traditional Chapter VI peacekeeping mandate implies, in principle, no need for armed force, while a typical Chapter VII enforcement action mandate authorizes, again in principle, the use of armed force. We have limited experience with Chapter VIII peacekeeping, but it may be the wave of the future. In any case, traditional peacekeepers operate at the behest of all the parties to the conflict or dispute. Enforcement troops, by contrast, are tasked to impose the will of the Security Council on non-consenting factions or states.

The Marine Corps’ Combined Action Program and Modern Peace Operations - Common Themes and Lessons - Major William Go, USMC. US Marine Corps Command and Staff College thesis, 1997. The mixed performance of U.S. forces in recent low intensity conflicts or "small wars", i.e. Vietnam (counterinsurgency) and Somalia (peace operation), has been due in part to a failure to understand the political, economic, social, and cultural factors at work in the area of operations. The Combined Action Program (CAP) of the Vietnam War has been frequently cited by military historians as an example of a successful small wars operation, this because the CAP did have cultural aspect. The U.S. Marine Corps-led Unified Task Force (UNITAF) portion of the 1992-1995 UN operation in Somalia was successful partly because it applied lessons learned from Marine Corps small wars experience from the Central American "Banana Wars" of the 1930's and the CAP in Vietnam. Counterinsurgency and peace operations are similar in that they both involve adversaries often indistinguishable from noncombatants and that operations frequently occur in an environment totally unfamiliar to Americans. Even more than conventional operations, they are characterized by ambiguity, uncertainty, and friction.  In both cases, success depends on a well defined mission, properly trained and equipped forces, intelligently designed Rules of Engagement, and an in depth knowledge of the political, economic, social, and cultural aspects of the target area. As in conventional warfare, successful resolution of the conflict will depend on a political, not a military, solution. The Combined Action Program in Vietnam and UNITAF in Somalia both demonstrated that well trained and well led conventional forces can be successfully adapted to some unconventional roles. Both cases also demonstrated that military might, no matter how skillfully or how massively applied, cannot solve the underlying political cause of a conflict. Political problems require political solutions and the viability any political solution is wholly dependent on the characteristics of the native population. Presently, there is much that the U.S. military can do to improve the ways that it prepares forces for participation in peace operations. Too much emphasis is currently placed on tactics, techniques, and procedures and not enough is placed on cultural appreciation of the target area. A common failing of virtually all of our recent small wars experience has been that our forces have deployed "culturally under armed."

Legal Issues in Peace Operations - Glenn Bowens. Parameters article, Winter 1998. The legal paradigm in peace is significantly different than in war. During Operation Desert Storm, the lead brigade crossing into Iraq was not concerned in the least with passports, visas, and customs. But in December 1995, when the lead brigade crossed into Hungary on its way to Bosnia for Operation Joint Endeavor, these types of issues were prominently in mind.  In peace operations, unlike war, the law and jurisdiction of the host nation are not displaced. Absent an agreement with the host nation, the military force and other US personnel are fully subject to the laws and jurisdiction, both criminal and civil, of the host nation and its courts.  Political settlement, not victory on the battlefield, is the ultimate measure of success in peace operations.  The purpose of this article is to identify the strategic and legal basis for peace operations and raise awareness of legal issues that can occur in contemporary, complex, multinational peace operations. Policymakers and military commanders alike need to understand the legal basis for the mission, the scope of authority for accomplishing the mission, rules of engagement, status of forces agreements, funding of the operation, and the applicability of the law of war.

Should Humanitarians Use Private Military Services? - Peter Singer. Brookings Institute article. The emergence of a global trade in hired military services, better known as the “privatised military industry,” is one of the most interesting developments in warfare over the last decade. The businesses in this industry, known as “privatised military firms” (PMFs), range from small consulting firms, comprised of retired generals, to transnational corporations that lease out wings of fighter jets or battalions of commandos.  These firms presently operate in over 50 countries. They have been the key actors in a number of conflicts, helping to win wars in Angola, Croatia, Ethiopia- Eritrea, and Sierra Leone. Even the US military has become one of the prime clients of the industry. From 1994-2002, the US Defense Department entered into over 3,000 contracts with US-based firms, estimated at a contract value of more than $300bn.

Non-Lethal Weapons and Strategic Policy Implications for 21st Century Peace Operations - Lieutenant Colonel Paul Capstick, USA. US Army War College Strategy Research Project, February 2001.  Non-lethal weapons are a relatively new and evolving area, with Department of Defense policy published in July 1996. Furthermore, peace operations have assumed a predominate role for the United States military with no reduction to these type missions in sight. For most peace operations neither conventional economic sanctions, nor a Gulf War type response provide the appropriate answer. However, scientific and technical advances in non-lethal technologies provide a valuable tool for our forces and government that could play a vital role in future peace operations. Although viewed most often as impacting the tactical level of operations, the potential impacts non-lethal weapons will have on strategic policy are important. This paper examines the pertinent technologies and policies, what issues are applicable, and concludes with recommendations for future policy.

Sphere Project Handbook - Sphere Project. In a remarkable international initiative aimed at improving the effectiveness and accountability of disaster response, the Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response sets out for the first time what people affected by disasters have a right to expect from humanitarian assistance. The aim of the Project is to improve the quality of assistance provided to people affected by disasters, and to enhance the accountability of the humanitarian system in disaster response.  This new edition of the handbook (2004) has been thoroughly revised and updated, taking into account recent developments in humanitarian practice in wat/san, food, shelter and health, together with feedback from practitioners in the field, research institutes and cross-cutting experts in protection, gender, children, older people, disabled people, HIV/AIDS and the environment. The revised handbook is the product of an extensive collaborative effort that reflects the collective will and shared experience of the humanitarian community, and its determination to improve on current knowledge in humanitarian assistance programmes.

Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations - December 2003.  As peacekeeping has evolved, particularly since the late 1980s, a growing number of United Nations peacekeeping operations have become multidimensional in nature, composed of a range of components, including military, civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, humanitarian, reconstruction, public information and gender. There are also a number of areas, such as mission support and security and safety of personnel, that remain essential to peacekeeping regardless of a particular mission’s mandate.  This Handbook is intended to serve as an introduction to the different components of multidimensional peacekeeping operations. It is not intended to provide strategic or policy guidance. Rather, it is intended to provide field personnel who are new to the United Nations, or who are being deployed to one of our multidimensional peacekeeping operations for the first time, with general background on the responsibilities of each component of our operations and how these fit together to form the whole. We have tried to make the Handbook as brief and practical as possible, while doing justice to the broad areas of work in which many of our operations are engaged.

Evolving Models of Peacekeeping: Policy Implications and Responses - Dr. Bruce Jones and Feryal Cherif. New York State University Center on International Cooperation study.  It is an open question whether 11 September 2001 ushered in a fourth phase of evolution in peacekeeping, the first elements of which – an assertive US policy, a shift in geographical focus, a more complex security environment, a challenging political terrain for the UN – are beginning to be played out. At the very least, the more assertive US security policy is producing a series of shifts in the approaches of other states and institutions to security issues (particularly in Europe), which are already altering the strategic landscape within which UN peacekeeping operates. Further, a shift in emphasis within the Security Council towards terrorism, the Middle East, and WMD proliferation is likely, over the medium term, to have an impact on the level of organizational resources devoted to strengthening peacekeeping. Ongoing changes in the pattern of conflict, and changing perceptions of security threats, may yet further reshape the peacekeeping landscape.  This paper addresses recent and ongoing evolutions in both the form and context of UN peacekeeping.

Further Research:

United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practices