Small Wars Journal

Problems and Prospects of Defense COIN Wargaming

Sun, 04/20/2008 - 2:37pm
In the Winter 2007 issue of the hobby wargaming journal Fire & Movement, the editor, Jon Compton, relates his experiences in playing counterinsurgency games at the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) conference in Monterrey, California. His last comments are worth circulating in this group and expanding upon:

All in all, it was an enlightening experience, and it was fascinating to get a glimpse of what professional wargame developers are doing in the military. Although board games are highly respected in this group, they are not taken seriously as modeling tools. To some extent I found that disappointing in that there is, in my opinion, too much dependence upon computer based agent interaction and stochastic processes, and too little upon the actual human interaction, which is where board games excel. The other problem I see is the black box issue related to computer-based simulations. This issue became very apparent as I quizzed the developers of the wargame we participated in and discovered that many of the governing assumptions were not based upon any sort of empirical or theoretical structure, but were simply invented out of whole cloth. This is information you would not know by playing the game, whereas with board games the system is open to examination and critical evaluation.

The Center For Naval Analyses (CNA) - certainly no stranger to MORS or to those well-read in counterinsurgency studies - published a very interesting monograph in September 2006 on the possibilities of wargaming such situations in board wargame formats, most notably using Card Driven Game (CDG) method pioneered by Mark Herman (currently at Booz, Allen and Hamilton) in his commercial hobby wargames. Entitled Wargaming Fourth Generation Warfare, authors Peter P. Perla, Albert A. Nofi, and Michael C. Markowitz would seem to solve some of Compton's complaints - if only commercial game designers could be taken seriously:

Our process of design then begins with identifying each player's worldviews and purposes. This leads to an assessment of the actions and means at their disposal, along with any constraints that may apply. This is perhaps the most difficult element of the design process to explain or envision. The designers must overcome the challenge of designing, in effect, multiple games, and then tying them together into a single coherent system.

We chose the currently popular mental models of DIME (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) and PMESII ( Political, Military, Economic, Social, Infrastructure, Information) as the structural underpinnings for our assessments, as well as for many of the fundamental game-design parameters. Key among these parameters is the structure of the basic cards that drive the game's play. Use of a well-defined structure helps keep the design of the basic cards focused on critical elements, and helps us knit together the cards into a coherent fabric of play. What's more, this structural framework for the cards allows us to specify a process through which the players of the game might themselves define cards according to their own creativity and insights into the processes that the game proposes to investigate.

Such a design benefits from the strengths of a rigid-kriegspiel system, in which careful research underlies most assessments of actions and outcomes. At the same time, it opens the game to free-kriegspiel-style flexibility by allowing the players (and Control, for that matter) to create and invoke new ideas, but within a strong but flexible framework of game mechanics. The game we envision is largely player driven and action-centric, unlike games whose tendencies toward a Control-centric approach are, at times, regrettable....

Many of the techniques we have sampled or envisioned are similar to or adapted from techniques employed by commercial boardgame designers of card-driven wargames. As a result, we are confident that the approach we espouse can achieve many, if not all, the goals we set for it. What is most important at this early stage is that we know, in fact, that solutions to most - and hopefully all - the basic problems of wargaming 4GW exist. We have seen them in commercial games and in Naval War College games.

The investigations we have conducted and the ideas we have proposed have only started the ball rolling. All it will take for future game designers to develop effective new techniques - grounded in proven methods - to wargame Fourth-Generation Warfare much more successfully than in the past is thorough research, careful design, and expert execution.

Why, given the ready ability for commercial wargame designers such as Herman, Perla, Nofi, and others who comfortably sit within the Department of Defense operational analysis community, do we seem to nevertheless suffer from the problems that Compton notes above?

Over my nearly 27 years of active duty service as a Marine officer and as a hobby wargamer, I have sympathesized with thoughtful observers like Compton and wondered why it seemed so difficult to integrate commercial methods into "serious games" held within DoD. Below are some opinions on the issue:

Deus Ex Machina Syndrome: It's too easy to put blind faith in those "black box" simulations and believe in the Wizard of Oz. We do this to ourselves - I've been to a number of technology demonstrations in the modeling and simulation community. These demos tend to be long on "eye candy" graphics and short on trade show personnel who had the technical knowledge to talk intelligently about the variables and algorithms behind the design. Our oracles today are computer simulations and games and we tend to trust them too much. Conversely, board game systems are usually endlessly debated and tinkered with by game designers and players who have their particular take on the variables and adjudication procedures. This makes people who like to get "the answer" (and usually only ONE answer will do) uncomfortable.

Suspicion Surrounding Entertainment Games (and their Designers): Philip Sabin of King's College in London described this best in his excellent 2007 book, Lost Battles: Reconstructing the Great Clashes of the Ancient World, in the introduction:

People have been refighting ancient battles for decades using counters on a map or miniature figures on a tabletop, but it is only recently that the activity has acquired a higher public profile through the BBC television series Time Commanders, based on the 2004 computer game Rome: Total War. The popularity of wargaming as a leisure activity brings a certain stigma that has hitherto deterred its employment by academics (even those who are themselves wargamers in their spare time), but the technique is actually of much wider application....

Many existing battle simulations produced for the popular market are compromised by inadequate research and historical documentation and by the sacrifice of entertainment value--in Rome: Total War, for instance, battles last just a few minutes but involve enormous mutual casualties rather than the one-sided losses attensted by the sources.

These computer games aimed at the popular market engender suspicion quite naturally among those pursuing serious simulation to solve real problems. Yet even Sabin will acknowledge that within the small niche market of "historical enthusiasts," there are games of such depth and thoughtfulness that he claims "put many books to shame." The problem is that these kinds of games are not widely advertised or available and their players tend to keep to themselves. Many of these games are not very accessible, comprising of what seems to the uninitiated to be thick and opaque rulebooks, many pieces, and very slow playing time. Computer games are generally faster and easier to immerse oneself into.

Imprecise Metrics of Gain Versus Investment: The last problem is that the game experience is difficult to quantify, particularly when the "operating system" is laid open for examination and debate such as boardgames provide. Game sponsors want to know what benefits accrue from playing these "serious games," particularly when they see distinguished analysts, civilian senior leaders, and military officers rolling dice and moving tokens on a paper map. Actually, the problem occurs whether computer "black box" games or manual games are used; the best games focus on human interaction between players and insights gained from that experience. Participants walk away from the experience with more questions, better questions, and better ideas of where to look for the answers than they did before the game. But how can one put a price tag on this?

Commercial wargame designers have been sinking their teeth into the counterinsurgency gaming problem for some time and we can expect the fruits of their labor to finally see publication soon. The question Jon Compton implies still remains - will Department of Defense "serious games" eventually incorporate their design features or not?

Secretary Gates on Academia and the Military

Sun, 04/20/2008 - 10:02am
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates 14 April 2008 speech to the Association of American Universities.

Topics included the state of relations between academia and the military, Human Terrain Team anthropologists in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Minerva consortia to promote research relevant to national security, China, Iraq, religion and ideology, an ROTC initiative to improve foreign languages in the military, and what universities can do to support veterans.

The full transcript can be found here.

NYT: DOD Strategic Communications

Sun, 04/20/2008 - 2:18am
Today's New York Times features two items concerning the Department of Defense and strategic communications / outreach. David Barstow's Behind TV Analysts, Pentagon's Hidden Hand makes the claim that a "Pentagon information apparatus" has used a group of retired military officers in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration's wartime performance.

To the public, these men are members of a familiar fraternity, presented tens of thousands of times on television and radio as "military analysts" whose long service has equipped them to give authoritative and unfettered judgments about the most pressing issues of the post-Sept. 11 world.

Hidden behind that appearance of objectivity, though, is a Pentagon information apparatus that has used those analysts in a campaign to generate favorable news coverage of the administration's wartime performance, an examination by The New York Times has found.

The effort, which began with the buildup to the Iraq war and continues to this day, has sought to exploit ideological and military allegiances, and also a powerful financial dynamic: Most of the analysts have ties to military contractors vested in the very war policies they are asked to assess on air...

The article continues.

In turn, members of this group have echoed administration talking points, sometimes even when they suspected the information was false or inflated. Some analysts acknowledge they suppressed doubts because they feared jeopardizing their access.

A few expressed regret for participating in what they regarded as an effort to dupe the American public with propaganda dressed as independent military analysis.

"It was them saying, 'We need to stick our hands up your back and move your mouth for you,' " Robert S. Bevelacqua, a retired Green Beret and former Fox News analyst, said.

Kenneth Allard, a former NBC military analyst who has taught information warfare at the National Defense University, said the campaign amounted to a sophisticated information operation. "This was a coherent, active policy," he said...

Much more here and at NYT's multimedia piece - How the Pentagon Spread Its Message - chapters include The General's Revolt, A Private Meeting and Deployed on the Air. Also included are the primary source documents used by the NYT.

Michael Goldfarb, Weekly Standard, comments.

The piece goes on for some ten pages, with one damning revelation after the next.The Pentagon distributes talking points, provides special access to retired generals, and even arranged a meeting for them with the Secretary of Defense. You'll also be very surprised to learn that many retired generals have business interests in the defense industry.

The paper offers no evidence that any of these men were using their influence to directly further a personal interest (unless one counts "networking"), and it offers no evidence of coercion on the part of the administration. So the charge is a lack of transparency, and it rests on the assumption that Americans are too stupid to surmise the likely ideological and institutional biases of a former general officer in the United States military.

For my money, concerning understanding the complexities and trends in strategic communications / outreach and public diplomacy, I do my research (sanity check) at MountainRunner, an excellent resource by Matt Armstrong.

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SWJ Editors' Links

Stop the Presses! - Contentions

The NYT's Method and the Commentariat - Democracy Project

NYTimes Exclusive: Generals Know People at Pentagon - Weekly Standard Blog

Attacking the Military Analysts - PrairiePundit

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Pentagon Study? Current Events in Iraq? Not so Fast... (Updated)

Fri, 04/18/2008 - 6:05pm
Today's Miami Herald carries a story on page 3 titled Pentagon Study: War is `Debacle' by Jonathan Landay and John Walcott.

The war in Iraq has become ''a major debacle'' and the outcome ''is in doubt'' despite improvements in security from the buildup in U.S. forces, according to a highly critical study published Thursday by the Pentagon's premier military educational institute.

The report released by the National Defense University raises fresh doubts about President Bush's projections of a U.S. victory in Iraq just a week after Bush announced that he was suspending U.S. troop reductions.

The report carries considerable weight because it was written by Joseph Collins, a former senior Pentagon official, and was based in part on interviews with other former senior defense and intelligence officials who played roles in prewar preparations. It was published by the university's National Institute for Strategic Studies [SWJ Note: Institute for National Security Studies], a Defense Department research center...

The Miami Herald piece on a NDU "occasional paper" (Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath), quoted alternately as a Pentagon or NDU study, raised some flags here at SWJ. So we asked the author, Joseph Collins, to provide some context. His reply:

The Miami Herald story ("Pentagon Study: War is a 'Debacle' ") distorts the nature of and intent of my personal research project. It was not an NDU study, nor was it a Pentagon study. Indeed, the implication of the Herald story was that this study was mostly about current events. Such is not the case. It was mainly about the period 2002-04. The story also hypes a number of paragraphs, many of which are quoted out of context. The study does not "lay much of the blame" on Secretary Rumsfeld for problems in the conduct of the war, nor does it say that he "bypassed the Joint Chiefs of Staff." It does not single out "Condoleeza Rice and Stephen Hadley" for criticism.

Here is a fair summary of my personal research, which formally is NDU INSS Occasional Paper 5, "Choosing War: The Decision to Invade Iraq and Its Aftermath."

This study examines how the United States chose to go to war in Iraq, how its decision-making process functioned, and what can be done to improve that process. The central finding of this study is that U.S. efforts in Iraq were hobbled by a set of faulty assumptions, a flawed planning effort, and a continuing inability to create security conditions in Iraq that could have fostered meaningful advances in stabilization, reconstruction, and governance. With the best of intentions, the United States toppled a vile, dangerous regime but has been unable to replace it with a stable entity. Even allowing for progress under the Surge, the study insists that mistakes in the Iraq operation cry out in the mid- to long-term for improvements in the U.S. decision-making and policy execution systems.

The study recommends the development of a national planning charter, improving the qualifications of national security planners, streamlining policy execution in the field, improving military education, strengthening the Department of State and USAID, and reviewing the tangled legal authorities for complex contingencies. The study ends with a plea to improve alliance relations and to exercise caution in deciding to go to war.

SWJ Editors Note: Unfortunately this is not the first instance - nor will it be the last -- of highly selective use of source quotes and excerpts as well as distortion of context by members of the "mainstream media" in reporting on recent events and trends in Iraq...

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Update 1: The Herald article is a McClatchy News item picked up by the former (H/T Charles Bird).

Update 2: SWJ Editors' Links

The "NDU" Report - Abu Muqawama

Miami Herald's "Major Debacle": a Lack of Journalism - Hot Air

Distorted Antiwar Propaganda from McClatchy - Protein Wisdom

'Classic Case Of Failure' - Think Progress

Liberal Narrative on Iraq Might Not Be Going Official Yet! - Washington Independent

Not So Fast With That "Pentagon Study" - Outside the Beltway

The McClatchy Narrative on Iraq - Red State

McClatchey Misreports Iraq War Report - Flopping Aces

Less Than Meets the Eye in "Pentagon Story" - The Glittering Eye

Small Wars Has the Details - Argghhh!

Misrepresentation at the Miami Herald - Instapundit

Iraq War "A Major Debacle," Outcome "Is In Doubt" - The Huffington Post

MSM Distorts War Report - The Jawa Report

Parameters: Spring 2008 Issue

Fri, 04/18/2008 - 8:00am

The Spring 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.

Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.

Here is the line-up:

In This Issue - Parameters Editors

Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics by Martin L. Cook

The fact that a joke like that could be told in front of an audience including the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Chief of Staff, and many other Washington dignitaries spoke volumes for the state of relations between senior military leaders and their civilian superiors. For those recently retired general officers who chose to go public with their criticisms of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (and by implication the Iraq policy), clearly the situation had reached a point where they felt it was part of their obligation to the profession of arms and the American people to dissent. Such intense criticism from military officers who previously held positions of great responsibility in implementing the Administration's policies is something rarely seen in American history. This article will attempt to assess the ethical considerations that bear on officers contemplating such action in any future civil-military crisis.

The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises by Wade Markel

Last spring, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling reignited the perennial debate regarding American generalship with his article, "General Failure." He joined a number of critics in blaming America's senior military leadership, especially Army leaders, for the situation in Iraq. In his view, US generals failed the nation by not anticipating the nature of the war, thus failing to prepare the military for the war in which it is now engaged. Worse, he asserted that they failed to conduct counterinsurgency operations with competence, poorly integrating the political, military, economic, social, and information domains, if at all. In short, Yingling believed that America's generals had waged the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time.

The Mythical Shia Crescent by Pat Proctor

Sometime in late 2006, America awoke to the realization that, by deposing Saddam Hussein and toppling his Ba'athist regime, it had inadvertently removed a major obstacle to Iranian dominance in the Middle East. Assessments of the associated events reached hyperbolic levels. Dire warnings of a growing Iranian hegemony began to surface. Sunni leaders such as Jordan's King Abdullah II began to warn the West of an emerging "Shia Crescent," led by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The idea caught fire in American media and became the dominant narrative in discourse on Middle East policy.

But how realistic is this amalgamation? Is a Shia Crescent really emerging that is capable of challenging more than a millennium of Sunni domination in the Islamic world? Will Iran lead it? On the surface, the idea appears plausible. Yet, a more in-depth examination of the prospective members of this geopolitical realignment raises numerous questions. This intellectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism.

Meddling in the Markets: Foreign Manipulation by Felix K. Chang and Jonathan Goldman

No bombs need fall from the sky. Yet damage can be inflicted on the United States through market manipulation that would be as costly to recover from as any conventional attack. The threat of financial and commodity market manipulation is not new. What is new is the ability of a foreign government to use manipulation in a way that would cause a swift and systemic economic crisis in the United States. Such actions could be taken without ever clashing with the American military—offering those without the military capability to penetrate America's defenses an asymmetric tactic for direct attack. That a foreign government could do so should be a major concern for all of America's political and military strategists.

China through Arab Eyes: American Influence in the Middle East by Chris Zambelis and Brandon Gentry

The significance of Beijing's hosting of the second annual China-Arab Cooperation Forum—an event bringing together key envoys from 22 Arab nations under the auspices of the Arab League and their Chinese counterparts—went largely unnoticed in the western media. According to Chinese and Arab news reports, however, the conference, held in May and June 2006, was a success on many levels. As Chinese and Arab dignitaries agreed to greatly strengthen and expand economic, energy, and cultural ties to unprecedented levels over the course of the twenty-first century, Chinese President Hu Jintao, speaking warmly of the blossoming Sino-Arab relationship, stated, "China thanks the Arab states for supporting China in relation to Taiwan and human rights issues and will as always support the just cause of the Arab states and people." For his part, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reaffirmed the League's support of the "One China" principle, declaring, "The world has but one China, and we only visit a China with Beijing as its capital."

The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View by Stephen Blank

Undoubtedly Central Asia's strategic importance in international affairs is growing. The rivalries among Russia, China, United States, Iran, India, and Pakistan not to mention the ever-changing pattern of relations among local states (five former Soviet republics and Afghanistan) make the region's importance obviously clear. Central Asia's strategic importance for Washington, Moscow, and Beijing varies with each nation's perception of its strategic interests. Washington focuses primarily on Central Asia as an important theater in the war on terrorism. Additionally, it is viewed as a theater where America might counter a revived Russia or China, or a place to blunt any extension of Iranian influence. Moscow and Beijing view the region as a vital locale for defending critical domestic interests. This asymmetry of interest is a major factor in the competition among states for influence in the region.

Editor's Shelf

Review Essay

Book Reviews

Off the Press

HTS and Newsweek

Thu, 04/17/2008 - 4:23am
In resposnse to a recent Newsweek article - A Gun in One Hand, A Pen in the Other by Dan Ephron and Silvia Spring - Dr. Montgomery McFate; the Senior Social Science Adviser to the U.S. Army's Human Terrain System Program; has this to say:

Dear Editors,

Having long been an admirer of Newsweek, I found your failure to fact check the story by Dan Ephron & Silvia Springs entitled "A gun in one hand, a pen in the other" (21 April issue) completely shocking. One naturally expects more from Newsweek than such sloppy journalism.

Below you will find a list of factual corrections and some more general points about the article.

FACTUAL ERRORS:

1) "the idea is to recruit academics whose area expertise and language skills" - Incorrect. In fact, the goal of HTS is to recruit social scientists with the appropriate research skills and methodological approaches. There are very, very few social scientists in the US who have the requisite knowledge of Iraq or Afghanistan, since these countries have been closed to research for many decades. However, if the social scientist on a team is not an Arabic speaker, other members of the team possess the requisite area expertise and language skills.

2) "only three speak Arabic" - Incorrect. Each team in Iraq and Afghanistan has members who speak the local language, although this person is not necessarily the social scientist. As of 14 April, there are 38 HTS personnel in Iraq distributed among 5 teams (slightly higher than normal, since we are in transition and executing some individual Reliefs in Place). 8 of those personnel are Social Scientists. 13 of those personnel speak Arabic,of which 2 are Social Scientists and 11 are Human Terrain Analysts or Research Managers.

3) "Johnson served in Afghanistan on a pilot Human Terrain team last year" - Incorrect. Tom Johnson was never a team member, but merely visited theater for two weeks.

4) Tom Johnson is a "Pashto speaker", and "spent much of his time there interviewing Afghans in their homes" - Incorrect. According to Tom Johnson, he has no idea where this information came from -- "surely not me."

5) "Omar Altalib was one of only two Iraqi-Americans in the program" - Incorrect. Actually the program currently has about 20 Iraqi Americans.

6) Social scientists earn "$300,000" a year - Overstated. This is true only if hazard pay, overtime, and danger pay are included. The base salary is a low six figures.

7) "Steve Fondacaro...........a retired Special Forces colonel.." - Incorrect. COL Fondacaro (ret'd) has never been in Army Special Forces. His experience as Special Operations Force (SOF) officer was exclusively with 75th Ranger Regiment and higher Headquarters.

8) "Fondacaro says overseers had to rush through the start-up phase because Pentagon planners wanted the terrain teams in Iraq quickly" - Incorrect. The requirement to put teams in country was in response to the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) that came from the units in the war zone. Pentagon planners actually slowed the process down to carefully analyze and validate the need.

9) the contract "was handed to British Aerospace Engineering (BAE) without a bidding process" - Overstated. BAE is the omnibus contractor for TRADOC and for a start-up program, this was a normal process. Once HTS becomes a program of record, the contract will be bid out.

10) "The rest are social scientists or former GIs" - Incorrect. Actually, much of the manpower is made up of US Army reserves.

11) "the anthropologists sent to Iraq..." - Incorrect. Not all of the social scientists on teams are anthropologists.

12) "the relationship between civilian academics and military or ex-military team members was sometimes strained" - Incorrect. The environment in the training program is very different than a year ago, which is the period the quoted sources were familiar with.

13) "40-year-old expert on trash" - Incorrect. Actually, Dr. Griffin is an anthropologist with an interest in food security and economics.

GENERAL ISSUES

1) The main input to the article came from two individuals who were terminated, and whose knowledge is outdated.

2) The article's main premise is that the majority of HTS social scientists are not Middle East specialists with fluency in Arabic. Fair enough, but Human Terrain Teams include personnel with language, regional, and local area knowledge in addition to social scientists. The teams are not just the lone social science advisor that the media has tended to focus upon. As teams, they include a variety of individuals uniquely suited to understanding the social, political, economic and cultural aspects of the population in question -- both military and civilian.

3) In the article, the significance of research methods was downplayed in favor of language and culture area skills. Certain subfields require formal area studies training, but as whole, social scientists are trained to apply their knowledge of analytical frameworks and research methodologies across different locales, based on the premise that the dynamics of human behavior exhibit certain universal features. This does not mean that social scientists cannot be area experts: many are, given their past research. However, what social scientists bring to the table is a way of looking at the social world, studying it, and analyzing it in a way that is distinct from the way the military approaches these issues.

4) That soldiers on their second- or third- tours possess inestimable knowledge about the area in which they are operating is undeniable. Yet, as currently organized, combat brigades do not possess the organic staff capability or assets to organize this knowledge and look at the broad questions that HTTs are concerned with. While civil affairs soldiers are the closest to such an organic asset, along with information operations, these assets are mission-focused and often lack the manpower to engage in the sort of question-formulation and asking that HTTs can. Nor do these assets always include personnel trained in social scientific analysis. Therefore, it is the job of HTTs to take the knowledge these soldiers have gleaned, to examine the information already being gathered on the ground on a daily basis, engage in original research, and consider this information in terms of broader issues from a different perspective in order to add to the brigade commander's situational awareness of the social, economic, political, cultural and psychological factors at work in the environment.

5) All this was explained to both Dan Ephron & Silvia Spring, but none of it is reflected in the article.

GEN Wallace, the commander of TRADOC, has written a letter to the editors of Newsweek regarding this article, which I hope you will consider publishing. You may also consider this email as a 'letter to the editor' and publish any or all of it.

I hope in the future that Newsweek will hold itself to a higher standard of journalism.

Warm regards,

Montgomery McFate, JD PhD

RCT-5 COIN Update

Tue, 04/15/2008 - 6:07pm
Marine Corps Colonel Patrick Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5 of Multi-National Force - West, briefed Pentagon reporters and the bloggers roundtable this week on success against insurgents in the western portion of Iraq's Anbar province.

U.S., Iraqi Forces Winning in Western Anbar Province by Gerry J. Gilmore, American Forces Press Service

Increased security brought about by military success against insurgents in the western portion of Iraq's Anbar province is enabling a drawdown of U.S. forces there as well as enhanced regional reconstruction efforts, a senior Marine commander told Pentagon reporters today.

"The insurgents, by and large, have been marginalized in western Anbar," Marine Corps Col. Pat Malay, commander of Regimental Combat Team 5, told Pentagon reporters during a satellite-carried news conference from Camp Ripper, Iraq. Malay's area of operations comprises about 30,000 square miles, an area about the size of South Carolina.

During a previous Iraq tour in Fallujah two years ago, Malay recalled, multitudes of foreign fighters were entering western Iraq from Syria. Today, there are very few foreign fighters in his area of operations, he observed.

"Quite frankly, I think we've killed a lot of them, and I think that the enemy is having a more difficult time recruiting to the numbers that they have in the past," Malay said. In addition, foreign fighters no longer are transiting across the Syrian border into Anbar province, the colonel said.

With insurgents "on the run" in western Anbar province, the resultant reduced violence has enabled a drawdown of U.S. forces in his sector, Malay said. Three of his command's five battalions have rotated home over the past three months, he noted...

Related Sites:

Multinational Force Iraq

Multinational Corps Iraq

Multinational Division West

Briefing Transcript

Defense Department Bloggers Roundtable

Secretary Rice's Remarks on US COIN Doctrine / Strategy

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 9:33pm
Remarks At Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base

Secretary Condoleezza Rice

Montgomery, Alabama

April 14, 2008

Secretary Rice receives the first honorary degree at Air University, Maxwell-Gunter Air Force Base, Alabama.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Thank you, General Lorenz, for that really wonderful introduction. I want to thank very much the members of the Board of Governors who are here. It's my great privilege to accept the first ever honorary degree from Air University. I want to thank you too, General, for your leadership of this great institution, for adapting the education of the U.S. Air Force to the challenges of the 21st century. From the Wright brothers to the creation of the Air Corps Tactical School, the River Region of Alabama has been at the forefront of aeronautical innovation and training for nearly one century. Today, Air University is the intellectual and leadership center of the Air Force. And as an educator myself, I want you to know that I really value the mission of this institution.

I also know what good work the men and women of Air University do for this broader community. You make Montgomery proud, as Mayor Bright would be the first to acknowledge and thank you, Mayor, for being here. And then when a tornado left hundreds of people homeless in Prattville this February, Air University was there to help, and I know Mayor Byard can attest to that and thank you, Mayor, for being here. And when Hurricane Katrina devastated our Gulf Coast, Air University was critical to the relief effort. So, as a daughter of Alabama, I want to thank you.

It is a real pleasure to be back in Alabama. I grew up, as you know, about 90 miles down I-65 in Birmingham. Now, I know that there are a lot of people who may be a little new to Alabama, so I thought I would bring along a few helpful hints for you. Now, when you address people here in Alabama, you say "y'all," but the plural of "y'all" is not "y'alls." (Laughter.) If there are a lot of people, you say, "all y'all." (Laughter.) There's also nothing called unsweetened tea in Alabama. (Laughter.) It just doesn't exist. But if you really want to understand Alabama and become a part of us, you really need only three words -- "Roll Tide, Roll!" (Laughter, applause.) Now, I know there are a few misguided souls who say, "War Eagle, fight."

General Lorenz, General Trey Obering, Secretary Beth Chapman, Dr. Bruce Murphy, distinguished guests, faculty, again, members of the Board of Visitors, ladies and gentlemen, I'd like to speak with you today about one of our most important missions and, indeed, one of our strategic opportunities, and that's Afghanistan. But I want to thank all of you by helping to make possible what we are doing there. Much attention is paid to what is happening on the ground in Afghanistan and, of course, in Iraq. But we can never forget that our gains on the ground are possible because of our superiority in the sky. With our soldiers, sailors, and Marines, many of you, both active duty and reservists, have deployed to the Afghanistan theater, often for multiple tours. And we are winning in Afghanistan because of you.

Our Air Force is essential to that difficult form of warfare that we have had to learn, or perhaps I should say relearn, in recent years. We tend to think of counterinsurgency warfare as a ground-based activity. But again, our entire effort on the ground depends on the lift, precision strike, and reconnaissance that our Air Force provides. Furthermore, our Air Force is doing things to support our mission today that few people would have imagined in 2001. In Afghanistan, for example, six American airmen are leading Provincial Reconstruction Teams. And many more are on the ground helping to do things like build roads and guard facilities and support local agriculture.

You have been called to adapt to the demands of counterinsurgency. And I must say, the State Department has been called to adapt too. And it's been hard. We've had to work not only to engage with states, but to help post-conflict societies build states. Our diplomats and development workers have had to use -- have had to get used to new and dangerous operating environments far beyond our embassy walls. American civilians are learning how to be effective partners to our men and women in uniform, and you to us.

In recent years, America has developed a counterinsurgency doctrine that fuses the tools of war with the instruments of peace to help countries in conflict shape a future of freedom and opportunity for themselves. Our armed forces can defeat any adversary, but our civilian agencies must shape the political and economic context in which our gains will endure. We're gaining the field experience to work with you to do this right.

There has been much talk, of late, about how we are doing in Afghanistan. Some of it has been positive, some of it has not. Today, I'd like to offer you my assessment. We now have a new strategic opportunity in Afghanistan, one that is a product of lessons learned from both successes and setbacks. So here is why we will win in Afghanistan.

Since 2001, there has been much that has been good and successful. First, and most importantly, we have seen that whenever the Afghan people have an opportunity to choose a course for their nation, they have voted overwhelmingly, and often at great personal risk and sacrifice, for a future of democracy and modernity and liberty under law, not for the medieval despotism of the Taliban. And we continue to have a strong partner in the elected government of President Karzai.

To support our Afghan partners, NATO is leading an International Assistance Force of 40 nations. The Afghan National Army, which we are training and equipping, is now at the forefront of many combat operations alongside international forces. Twenty-six Provincial Reconstruction Teams, including 14 led by allies, are helping our Afghan partners to turn improving security into better governance and development. The legitimate Afghan economy is now growing faster than any other in Central and South Asia, and it is benefiting more and more of Afghanistan's citizens.

America's commitment to Afghanistan is also bipartisan. Congress has played a leadership role in funding U.S. policy there. And thanks to the generosity of the American people, the United States has provided nearly $23 billion in assistance to Afghanistan, with our allies providing another 18 billion. This assistance has helped over 15 -- over 5 million Afghan refugees to return to their homes. It is supporting the construction of critical infrastructure, like the national ring road, which is nearly 75 percent complete. And it is enabling 5 million Afghan children to get an education, including, for the first time ever, 1.5 million girls.

Our mission in Afghanistan has led to substantial progress. But at times, our many good programs have amounted to less than the sum of their parts. We have grappled with a lack of coherence among a broad coalition of international partners with disparate capabilities. This partly reflects a learning curve, as we have re-engaged a nation that America and our allies had neglected for too long: a country of inhospitable terrain, many ungoverned spaces, and a long history of poverty, misrule, and weak civilian institutions and civil war. Indeed, much of the work in Afghanistan could be more properly described not as reconstruction, but as construction.

This challenge has been made more difficult too by a determined enemy, the Taliban that has regrouped after its initial defeat, and has now turned to the tactics of pure terror to further its intolerant goals. The Taliban has benefited from regional turmoil on Afghanistan's borders. And this has led many in Afghanistan and the region, some even in our alliance, maybe even some here at home in America, to question whether our coalition has what it takes to support Afghanistan's long-term success.

In recent months, our Administration has looked closely at our policy in Afghanistan, both what we're doing well, and what we can and should be doing better. We have studied the independent reports that have been issued. I went to Afghanistan myself in February, both to Kabul and out to Kandahar, to see the situation on the ground. And the President and I have recently conferred with our allies, at the NATO summit in Bucharest.

I am confident that we are now laying the foundation for a long-term commitment to the success of Afghanistan and this region. This commitment must be built on a bipartisan consensus that unites our Administration and the Congress today, but also future administrations and future congresses. This commitment must also be built on an international consensus among our allies and our Afghan partners. We must all understand and explain to our people that Afghanistan is not a peacekeeping operation. It is a hard counterinsurgency fight and the stakes could not be higher.

The United States and the entire free world have a vital interest in the victory of our Afghan partners over the Taliban, and the consolidation and empowerment of an effective democratic state. Successes in Afghanistan will roll back the drug trade in a country that produces 93 percent of the world's opium and a great deal of its heroin. Successes in Afghanistan will advance our broader regional interests in combating violent extremism, resisting the destabilizing behavior of Iran, and anchoring political and economic liberty in South and Central Asia. And success in Afghanistan is an important test for the credibility of NATO.

Let no one forget, Afghanistan is a mission of necessity, not a mission of choice. That country must never again become a haven for the kind of terrorists who attacked America on September 11th, who have attacked our friends and our allies repeatedly, and who seek to do us all even greater harm. We cannot afford, either, to think whether we will choose to succeed in Afghanistan or succeed in Iraq. That is a false choice.

In both countries, the stakes are too high, the potential benefits of success too great, and the real costs of failure too catastrophic for us to think that these missions are zero terms. The real choice, and it is a choice befitting a great people, a great power, and a great democracy, is how to forge long-term commitment to succeed both in Afghanistan and in Iraq.

This goal is not only essential, it is attainable. As in Iraq, our challenges in Afghanistan do not stem from a traditionally strong enemy. The Taliban does not offer a political vision that most Afghans embrace when free to choose. The Taliban's theory of victory is not to prevail on the battlefield, or to win hearts and minds. It is simply to undermine the elected Afghan government, fracture the international coalition, and outlast us.

Our theory of victory, and the counterinsurgency strategy that we are pursuing to achieve it, is far superior to the designs of our enemy. We can defeat the Taliban on the battlefield. But we will render the Taliban obsolete by supporting an effective, democratic Afghan state that can meet the needs of its people. Where we have been able to do this, for instance, in the east of Afghanistan, the Taliban is in retreat.

Earlier this month in Bucharest, we and our NATO allies renewed our commitment to Afghanistan. President Karzai announced that the Afghan National Army will assume responsibility for security in Kabul by August, and we are supporting our Afghan partners. The United States is deploying roughly 300 -- 3,500 additional Marines. France is sending a battalion. This has enabled Canada, whose service in Afghanistan is an inspiration for NATO, to extend its deployment through 2011. Our allies pledged to deploy additional forces, with some deciding to enter conflict zones in the south, where we are especially grateful to Canada, Britain, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Australia for shouldering most of the hardest fighting. We will continue to press our allies to lift the caveats on their military forces.

The international community is also taking new steps to increase the coherence of our assistance effort in Afghanistan, including appointing Kai Eide as the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative. Our strategy directs resources toward the central pillars of counterinsurgency: protecting the people from the enemy by strengthening Afghan security institutions, connecting people to their government by improving governance and rule of law, and fueling economic and social opportunity through reconstruction and development.

On the security front, Afghans are eager to provide more of their own security, and our plan supports that. We and our allies must step up our efforts to train and equip the national army of Afghanistan. But we must also increase our efforts to help the Afghan National Police become a more professional force that can enforce the law and police the nation's now porous borders.

At the same time, we and our allies are helping the Afghan Government to marry these security gains with good governance and economic development. Success depends on expanding the good work of our Provincial Reconstruction Teams. These teams lead our growing effort to help Afghan leaders, both national and local, to promote the rule of law, to strengthen their ministries, to deliver essential services like health and education to the people, and to lay a foundation for long-term private investment. Just last week, I had the pleasure of meeting with eight Afghan governors who play an important role in these efforts. These are local leaders who are beginning to give Afghan -- Afghanistan's government the means to deliver goods and services more directly to the people.

Within our counterinsurgency strategy, we and our Afghan partners must also expand our counternarcotics efforts. This has been one of the most difficult and vexing problems and, frankly, we've not found all the right answers. Yet, it is just as urgent as the fight against the insurgency, because the two are inextricably linked. There is an erroneous view that poppy in Afghanistan is mostly grown by poor farmers struggling to earn a living. In fact, over 70 percent of Afghanistan's poppy will likely be grown this year in the Taliban's stronghold, on vast narco-farms that benefit our enemies. These drug kingpins do not need alternative livelihoods; they need to be brought to justice.

We must step up our interdiction, eradication, and law enforcement campaign while helping those Afghan farmers who truly do need adjusting. In places where security and political will exist, this strategy has shown some promise. Two years ago, only six of Afghanistan's 34 provinces were nearly or completely poppy-free. This year, it will likely be 26.

In everything we do, we must encourage the Afghan people, empower the Afghan Government, bolster our allies, and demoralize our enemies. But success is only possible if Afghan ownership grows over time and with greater integrity. Afghanistan's democracy is already under attack from external enemies. It cannot allow corruption to undermine democracy from within. Institutions like the Independent Directorate for Local Governance are a good start and we are increasing our support for Afghan efforts to create a fair and functional system of justice.

Addressing Afghanistan's regional context is also crucial to success. A new strategic opportunity comes from the transition to democracy that is underway in Pakistan, a nation that, like Afghanistan, America had too long neglected. Pakistan has been an ally in the war on terror since September 11th and yes, this has necessitated a strong program of military assistance and cooperation. After 2001, we supported President Musharraf's efforts to chart a moderate, modern path for that nation.

Our engagement, however, has always been multidimensional. Since 2005, America has invested $300 million each year to help the Pakistani people by supporting health programs, educational reform, as well as the building of civil society. And when this progress was put at risk last November, we pushed hard, publicly and privately, for a return to civilian rule, an end to the state of emergency, and free and fair elections in February that were open to all of Pakistan's leaders.

To be sure, terrorists exacted a high toll in innocent life trying to stop this election, including the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. But not only did their violent efforts fail to disrupt the voting and plunge the country into chaos; the Pakistani people dealt the forces of political extremism a crushing defeat at the polls, including in the frontier province. Indeed, the election dispelled the myth of rising extremism in Pakistani politics, proving that a moderate, democratic center is the country's dominant political force. We salute the Pakistani people for courageously restoring their democracy.

Successful American engagement with a democratic Pakistan is vital to our national security and to the lasting success of South and Central Asia. In Pakistan, as in Afghanistan, we must help a democratic partner to meet the needs of its people and eliminate the conditions that feed continuing extremism. We will greatly expand our support for the efforts of Pakistani civilians to strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law and to reinforce the foundation of every free society: good governance, judicial independence, a free media, health and education, good jobs and social justice. We will support Pakistan's efforts to secure all of its people, and to wage a counterinsurgency fight against the violent people who still threaten Pakistan's future.

Finally, the United States will support Pakistan's efforts to develop fruitful links with its neighbors and with the community of responsible nations. This includes intensified Pakistani-Afghan dialogue on regional security, continued efforts to reduce tensions and reconcile with India, and closer economic integration with the nations of South and Central Asia.

We have a unique opportunity to foster the lasting security of a troubled region, a region that is of vital interest to our nation. From our partnerships with the newly democratic Pakistan and a free Afghanistan that is fighting the Taliban, not governed by it, to our growing strategic partnership with India and our improved relationships all the way across South and Central Asia, the United States is in a dramatically different and better position in this region than we were in 2001.

Though we and our friends face savage and determined enemies, I am confident that we will prevail, not by force of arms alone, but by the power and the promise of the values we share: the conviction that parents everywhere want their children to grow up in dignity, in liberty, and with limitless horizons. Success in Afghanistan and Pakistan will demonstrate that these values are more compelling than the spiritual poverty of suicide bombing.

The journey ahead will be difficult and often winding. Most certainly, the path toward democracy is never a straight line. We have hard work to do. But I am confident that we will succeed because we have done hard work before. I was fortunate to be the White House Soviet Specialist from 1989 to 1991 at the end of the Cold War. It doesn't get much better than that. In fact, those were very heady days. But as we went through those extraordinary days, it was important to stop and to pay homage and to think about those who had set up the possibilities and laid the foundation for the victory of our values at the end of the Cold War.

In fact, when I would go to the White House, and now, when I go to the State Department, I think about the people in 1945, in 1946, and 1947 who built a firm foundation for democracy on the ruins of Europe and Asia at the end of World War II. I think about people who faced a situation in 1946 in which the Italian Communists won 46 percent of the vote, French Communists 45 percent of the vote. I think about those people who faced a 1947 in which Europe was still starving, 2 million Europeans still starving; that in 1947, saw civil war in Greece and civil conflict in Turkey; that in 1948, saw what we all thought would be the permanent division of Germany with the Berlin crisis; the Czechoslovak coup in which the Soviet Union snuffed out the last of liberty in Eastern Europe; in 1949, a Soviet Union that exploded a nuclear device five years ahead of schedule; and when the Chinese Communists won, only to have war break out on the Korean Peninsula in 1950.

Those were not small tactical setbacks. Those were huge strategic defeats for the victory of democracy and Western values in Europe and Asia. But somehow, someway, the people who led that fight, Marshall and Truman and Kennan and Acheson -- somehow, everyday, they got up and they stayed true to their values and they believed in the power of our principles. And that is what permitted us to see, in 1989, in 1990 and '91 the overcoming of a country 5 million men strong, 30,000 nuclear warheads, and spanning 12 different time zones without firing a shot.

That is the spirit with which we must meet this new historic transition and transformation because challenges like the ones that we faced at the end of World War II and the ones that we face now can only be overcome with optimism about the power of our principles and our values. And so, as I sat at NATO next to permanent representatives from Poland and the Czech Republic and Hungary and the Baltic states in Latvia in 2006, I thought, had someone said there will be a NATO summit in Latvia in 2006, in 1946, people would have thought that they had lost their minds.

And so, I know that some Secretary of State will stand here in 10 years or 20 or 30, but most certainly, will stand here to say, of course the people of Iraq have triumphed in democracy; of course, the people of Afghanistan have triumphed in democracy. What else would you expect? Because the power of our principles is that it makes those things that one day seemed impossible seem, after, to have been inevitable.

Thank you very much and God bless you.

(Applause.)

Air University Part 2 (Q&A)

(Applause.)

GENERAL LORENZ: Thank you, Madame Secretary, for those inspiring and thought-provoking remarks. I believe our students and faculty have some questions, so if you'd go ahead and sit down, I'll tell you how the rules will be played, all y'all. (Laughter.)

Air University students and faculty, if you have a question for Secretary Rice, please make your way to one of the microphones -- there are three on each side -- and to begin with, I will recognize you in turn. Prior to asking a question, please identify yourself and your college, your school. And with that, we'll take advantage of this time. Please make your way to the microphones and let's begin. Thank you.

Over here to the left.

QUESTION: Good morning, Ms. Rice. We have the honor to have you with us today. I'm Lieutenant Colonel Alenazi from Saudi Arabia. My question is you've been traveling a lot to the Middle East all this time. Could you give us an idea of to what level has the peace process reaches, and what is the King Abdullah -- have the influence in that process?

SECRETARY RICE: Yes, thank you very much. You'd like a trip report, is that right, on my trips to the Middle East? (Laughter.) All right.

Yes, we launched -- the President launched in November of this past year what has been called the Annapolis process. And the Annapolis process is an effort to help the Palestinians and the Israelis end their conflict by getting the vision of the Palestinian state, the details, the outline of the Palestinian state, finally agreed between Israelis and Palestinians. And there's a very important reason to do that. Of course, of course, it would bring peace, and that's a very important thing. But also, the moderate, tolerant, peace-loving people of the Palestinian territories and indeed of the Middle East in general need to know that there is an alternative to extremism. And the state, the Palestinian state, provides that alternative.

Now, the Annapolis process has three tracks. On the one hand, we are trying to help the Palestinian people simply have a better life through the ability to improve movement and access so that Palestinian businesses can start and the economic life of the people can grow.

Secondly, we are trying to make progress -- the Palestinians and the Israelis several years ago undertook certain obligations on something called the Roadmap, which are a set of parallel obligations to move them toward peace. And you might want to know that one of the Air Force's own, General -- Lieutenant General Will Fraser, is the monitor for that effort and doing a very fine job.

And the third is the peace negotiations themselves. And I can tell you the following: They are talking very, very seriously about the hardest issues, about borders, about refugees, about how they're going to bring into being two states living side by side in peace and security.

Now, one reason that you hear very little about what they're actually talking about in the negotiations is they've made a very wise decision that they're not going to go to the press every day to say whether they're making progress. That says to me they're really serious. I sat with them for two and a half hours. It's going to be hard. If anyone had had an easy answer to this, they would have solved it a long time ago. But they are serious about it, and it is the President's hope and the intention that there would be a state in being, or a state in outline, by the end of this coming year. We think it is time. It's been too long. The Palestinian people need a state.

Now, King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia has been a very strong supporter of the Annapolis process. Prince Saud, the Foreign Minister of Saudi Arabia attended. It was the first time that Saudi Arabia had actually attended under its own flag at a peace conference, so that was very exciting. And I believe that King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, along with President Mubarak of Egypt and King Abdullah of Jordan, are perhaps the most influential Arabs in helping to give the kind of support to both Abu Mazen, the President of the Palestinian Authority, and to the Israelis to go ahead and make peace. And so we've been in very close contact. The President visited Saudi Arabia very recently, talked to the King a great deal about the peace process. And we, this time, are going to make certain that we've worked with the Arab states so that they can be supportive if the Palestinians and the Israelis are able to come to an agreement.

GENERAL LORENZ: Let's go to the second mike on this side.

QUESTION: Good morning, Secretary Rice. This morning, I just want to comment that the cooperation and friendship between yourself and --

GENERAL LORENZ: Hang on a second. Remember the rules: Identify yourself and your school, please.

QUESTION: Major Courier from Air Command and Staff College. The cooperation and friendship between yourself and Secretary Gates is refreshing and important to the unity of effort between the Department of State and the Department of Defense in addressing regional conflicts. I was wondering if you could please discuss specifically the new Office of Coordinator of Reconstruction and Stabilization and our nation-building effort.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you very much. Yes, first of all, let me say that Bob Gates and I have a very close friendship that goes back a lot of years. We served together. He was the Deputy National Security Advisor when I was special assistant on that NSC staff of Brent Scowcroft and George H.W. Bush that was fortunate enough to be around at the end of the Cold War. So we had a great friendship and we have a lot of good stories and we enjoy being together.

And we recognize that we have a very strong obligation to have the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the uniformed military, be able to perform well on really what is a continuum between war and peace. We tend to think in our theory of war and then peace, so you win the war and then you go and build the institutions of peace. But of course, that's not how we are fighting and winning any longer. We're fighting on a continuum. Counterinsurgency really means that you have go to into an area, you have to clear it of the enemy, then you have to hold the area with police forces, most appropriately police forces of the home country, which means you have to build adequate police forces, and then you go in and you do reconstruction and development right there where you've cleared so that people don't turn back to the terrorists.

Because the best -- by far, the best weapon that the terrorists have is when they can imbed in a village or in a community and have the local people refuse to turn them over. Very often, the local people don't really support them, but they're terrified of them. And if you can give people security, then they will turn over the terrorists and they will be on your side. And that's what we're seeing in places like Al Anbar province in Iraq, where the Sons of Anbar turned on al-Qaida and have essentially thrown them out. And we've been able then to stabilize Al Anbar.

Now, if you're going to do that, you have to have not just the ability to fight, but also the ability to bring that reconstruction effort. We call it the post -- the stabilization phase. And we have never had in the United States an institution that was really capable and dedicated to doing that, and it needs to be a civilian institution. We've done it in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. Frankly, we tried to do it with the UN structures and that didn't work terribly-- all so well. And then in Afghanistan we tried to do it with the Bonn process, which brought every country in the kind of adopt-a-ministry approach, so the Germans took one ministry, the Italians another ministry. And frankly, while the efforts were sincere and I think many of them good, it left us with some of the incoherence that we have today. In Iraq, we tried to do it by handing it to the Defense Department to do reconstruction and development. Of course, that worked not all that well either. I mean, we were able to do some things, but not as much as we should have done.

So finally, Americans -- if there's one thing we do, we keep going until we get it right. And I think we've now got the right structure, which is a civilian structure that would be akin to the Reserve and the National Guard, where you have different kinds of expertise on call to go out and do reconstruction and development. There's no way in the State Department that I can have city planners and engineers and specialists on building judiciaries and specialists on police. You really, however, might be able to call up Americans -- perhaps, that prosecutor who's in Arizona and wants to spend a year helping the Afghan people to learn how to build a good justice system, or perhaps that city planner who's in Montgomery and would like to go and help the people of Haiti or Liberia know how to do city planning. And so the idea is to have a civilian response corps, probably initially of close to 2,000 or so Americans, who would train the way the Guard and Reserve train, and then be ready when we need to do one of these stabilization efforts.

And not only do I think it would be a wonderful call for Americans who want to contribute in that way; but frankly, this isn't what the military, the Reserve and the Guard should be doing, and we've had to rely heavily on the uniformed military in order to do civilian stabilization and reconstruction because we've just not had the right institution. I think this is the right institution. It's had no stronger supporter than Bob Gates and the uniformed military. And if Congress fully funds it, which we hope that it will, it should be really ready for its initiation phases very shortly.

But thank you for asking.

GENERAL LORENZ: Let's go to the second mike on this side, please.

QUESTION: Good morning, Dr. Rice. I am Group Captain, or Colonel, Iqbal, from Terminal 13 Air War College and Pakistan. Thank you very much for sharing your views about the region, especially Afghanistan and its neighbor, Pakistan. I just want to call your attention towards the recent developments which has happened in Pakistan; that means the country is getting back to the path of democracy. But traditionally, what we have seen, that U.S. is more -- feels comfortable to engage with autocracy there. Because you know, about 30 years, in my country, the country has been ruled by the army. Now, you have a different stage. There is a broad-based government in Pakistan.

So I want to -- I'd like to hear your views about it, because many of the intellectuals here has given their opinion that now the U.S. policy should be engaging both the political as well as the other half, that is, the army. So what are your shares? Thank you very much.

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. And again, on Pakistan, you are absolutely right that the Pakistani people have made a transition. There is a broad-based Pakistani Government which we intend to engage, as the Government of Pakistan, as we would engage any other democratic government. In fact, Deputy Secretary Negroponte has already been to Pakistan to meet the new civilian leaders. I have spoken to a couple of them on the phone prior to the formation of the government. And we think this is a really terrific step for the people of Pakistan. They're to be congratulated for doing it, despite a lot of threats from extremists and efforts to disrupt the elections, starting, of course, first, with the assassination of Mrs. Benazir Bhutto.

Now, we will engage the armed forces in military training and in military cooperation in the way that we do militaries around the world, many of them from democratic countries. It is terrific that you are here. I think one of the most important things that we can do is to have military officers from countries like Pakistan here for international military education. We cut that off for a period of seven -- let's see, four years, which really, I think, was a very, very bad thing to have done, frankly, because we need to engage with all of the institutions of Pakistan. And Pakistan now will need to find a way to have very solid civilian control of the armed forces. I believe that our tradition of that is a good one, in which Pakistani officers can come and be a part of a democratic state in which civilian control is really now taken for granted, but wasn't always taken for granted, so we've built the institutions of it.

So we will engage across a broad front. As I mentioned in my remarks, I believe that the coming of a democratic government in Pakistan is a new strategic opportunity. It is an opportunity for an ally in the war on terror. But remember that our answer to terrorism is not just to fight and defeat the terrorists; it is to deal with the conditions that produce terrorism, and the absence of freedom is one of the conditions that produces terrorism. Perhaps the most important condition is the absence of freedom.

And so when we see an ally in the war on terror makes a transition to democracy, it could not be more affirming of everything that President Bush believes about the power of democracy, the power of those principles, and their power to defeat terrorism long term.

GENERAL LORENZ: Let's go to the last mike on this side.

QUESTION: Good morning, Madame Secretary. My name is Lieutenant Colonel Edwards. I'm from Syndicate 17 at the Air War College. Could you please share with us the foreign assistance framework and how the combatant commanders can inject their theater and regional security concerns in that process, and how might that process be enhanced?

SECRETARY RICE: Thank you. We have gone a long way to reform foreign assistance over the last several years, since I've been Secretary. And one of the reasons that we did it is that we believe that we were not able to bring all elements of our programs together to see whether we had the right elements to move countries along from total dependence on foreign assistance to the place that they were beginning to build the infrastructure and the environment in which perhaps they could begin to get foreign investment. Trade is a part of building that environment.

And so we have changed our foreign assistance process. What we now do is we start by asking the question -- let's take a country like Mozambique. Where is Mozambique on the economic continuum? What two or three things are standing in the way of Mozambique making a transition from totally dependent to eventually perhaps even able to be self-sustaining? Is it the problem with infrastructure? Is it a problem with subsistence farming? How can we make sure that the people of a country are seeing Americans out with them in the field, giving them the opportunity for healthcare, giving them the opportunity for education? Because, in many ways, one of our strongest foreign policy tools is the assistance that we give.

Now, that's where the combatant commanders and the Defense Department have come in. And indeed, when we do now our foreign assistance strategic look at what the budget is going to look like for that year, in my conference room I sit not just with the Assistant Secretary for, say, Africa and the Assistant Administrator for USAID, we also invite the Department of Defense to come and join that meeting, the Department of the Treasury to come and join that meeting, and so we get a full picture of what we're doing for any one country.

The combatant commanders have also been enormously helpful because they are able to use their assets and their resources -- I saw a great example of this in Guatemala, where there is a health clinic that's being run by naval personnel on a kind of rotating basis. They come back every several months and they do healthcare at this clinic. I asked the question: Now, is USAID here alongside you so that when you leave three or four months, before you come back, perhaps we've trained some local healthcare workers to help make sure that eventually Guatemala is going to be able to sustain those clinics on their own?

But I'm a big fan of many of the programs that the combatant commanders run to help people with healthcare, with education. They're fine programs, and we're trying to unite them, link them up with the programs that we have at USAID and State Department programs so that the entire U.S. Government is going -- putting its programs forward for a specific country as a unit -- the entire U.S. Government. And I think we're making some progress.

But I just have to say that one of the real contributions that President Bush has made is to take foreign assistance, which was flat for almost 20 years in the United States, and we have now quadrupled foreign assistance for Africa, tripled foreign direct assistance worldwide, and in Latin America doubled it. We have -- we had the opportunity to see some of these programs in Africa, where the President's Emergency Plan for AIDS is literally saving lives, where children are being saved from malaria, where girls are going to school in places that they've never gone to school, and the compassion of the American people in what we do around the world is coming through, through those programs.

Because America is, and always will be, a powerful country. But what makes America different in the annals of the history of powerful countries is it is also a deeply compassionate country. And compassion, married with principle, married with power, is an extremely effective way to change, literally, the face of the globe. As I said, we've done it before and we're doing it again. And I want to thank each and every you-- every one of you for the role that you're playing in that great historic transformation.

Thank you very much. (Applause.)

GENERAL LORENZ: Madame Secretary, on behalf of the entire Air University community, let me thank you again for sharing with us today your incredible wealth of knowledge in international relations and national security. This has truly been a memorable day for all of us.

Ladies and gentlemen, please remain standing for the singing of the Air Force song and the departure of the official party.

2008/T12-1

Released on April 14, 2008.

Remembering our Heroes

Mon, 04/14/2008 - 6:29pm
Frontier Six, LTG William B. Caldwell, IV, Sends

Remembering our Heroes

Corporal Jason Dunham, United States Marine Corps

Four years ago Corporal Jason Dunham did the unimaginable when an insurgent tossed a grenade into the middle of his unit. In a split second, he placed the welfare of his comrades above his own. Covering the grenade with his Kevlar helmet and his body, he saved the lives of the Marines around him. Tragically, he died of his wounds eight days later. Jason's actions may come as a shock to us, but not to the people who knew him because they reflect the character of the man he was.

Jason was always concerned for others. He had extended his term of enlistment because he wanted to stay with his squad for their entire tour in combat. His good friend, Lance Corporal Mark Dean said "you're crazy, why would you do that?" Jason's response was "I want to make sure everyone makes it home alive. I want to be sure you go home to your wife alive." Shortly before deploying to Iraq, Lance Corporal Dean was a little short on cash and Jason bought him a phone card so he could call his wife.

From his first day in the Marines, Corporal Dunham stood out for his outstanding leadership abilities. One of his leaders, Staff Sergeant John Ferguson, said he showed "the kind of leadership where you're confident in your abilities and don't have to yell about it." A fervent patriot, his father, Dan Dunham said "Jason believed that all men on this earth should be free."

No, Corporal Jason Dunham's actions were no surprise to the people who knew him because Jason was a man of character and integrity, a selfless servant and leader. He embodied all the qualities we want in the men and women serving in our military. Jason also had something extra; the dedication to go above and beyond the call of duty, to care just a little more.

I am always amazed to hear stories like Jason's; amazed, but also thankful. Thankful that people like Deb and Dan Dunham raised a young man with Jason's character, compassion, and concern for others. Thankful that our nation always seems to produce another generation of heroes who are —to step up and serve when their nation calls.

For his actions that day, Corporal Jason Dunham was awarded the Congressional Medal of Honor. At that time, it was only the second Medal of Honor awarded for actions during the Global War on Terrorism. The first was to SFC Paul Smith of the US Army and the other two were awarded to Lieutenant Michael Murphy and Petty Officer Michael Monsoor both of the US Navy. They each made the ultimate sacrifice. Now it is our job to ensure their sacrifice and the lives they lived will never be forgotten.

On April 14th 2008, let's honor the incredible sacrifice of Corporal Jason Dunham and those who loved him so dearly.