The Spring 2008 issue of the US Army War College's Parameters is posted.
Parameters, a refereed journal of ideas and issues, provides a forum for the expression of mature thought on the art and science of land warfare, joint and combined matters, national and international security affairs, military strategy, military leadership and management, military history, ethics, and other topics of significant and current interest to the US Army and Department of Defense.
Here is the line-up:
In This Issue - Parameters Editors
Revolt of the Generals: A Case Study in Professional Ethics by Martin L. Cook
The fact that a joke like that could be told in front of an audience including the President, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Air Force Chief of Staff, and many other Washington dignitaries spoke volumes for the state of relations between senior military leaders and their civilian superiors. For those recently retired general officers who chose to go public with their criticisms of then-Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld (and by implication the Iraq policy), clearly the situation had reached a point where they felt it was part of their obligation to the profession of arms and the American people to dissent. Such intense criticism from military officers who previously held positions of great responsibility in implementing the Administration's policies is something rarely seen in American history. This article will attempt to assess the ethical considerations that bear on officers contemplating such action in any future civil-military crisis.
The Limits of American Generalship: The JCS's Strategic Advice in Early Cold War Crises by Wade Markel
Last spring, Lieutenant Colonel Paul Yingling reignited the perennial debate regarding American generalship with his article, "General Failure." He joined a number of critics in blaming America's senior military leadership, especially Army leaders, for the situation in Iraq. In his view, US generals failed the nation by not anticipating the nature of the war, thus failing to prepare the military for the war in which it is now engaged. Worse, he asserted that they failed to conduct counterinsurgency operations with competence, poorly integrating the political, military, economic, social, and information domains, if at all. In short, Yingling believed that America's generals had waged the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time.
The Mythical Shia Crescent by Pat Proctor
Sometime in late 2006, America awoke to the realization that, by deposing Saddam Hussein and toppling his Ba'athist regime, it had inadvertently removed a major obstacle to Iranian dominance in the Middle East. Assessments of the associated events reached hyperbolic levels. Dire warnings of a growing Iranian hegemony began to surface. Sunni leaders such as Jordan's King Abdullah II began to warn the West of an emerging "Shia Crescent," led by Iran and encompassing Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The idea caught fire in American media and became the dominant narrative in discourse on Middle East policy.
But how realistic is this amalgamation? Is a Shia Crescent really emerging that is capable of challenging more than a millennium of Sunni domination in the Islamic world? Will Iran lead it? On the surface, the idea appears plausible. Yet, a more in-depth examination of the prospective members of this geopolitical realignment raises numerous questions. This intellectual shorthand may be blinding the United States to opportunities that could yield tangible progress on several strategic fronts in the Middle East, while providing a new ally in the global war on terrorism.
Meddling in the Markets: Foreign Manipulation by Felix K. Chang and Jonathan Goldman
No bombs need fall from the sky. Yet damage can be inflicted on the United States through market manipulation that would be as costly to recover from as any conventional attack. The threat of financial and commodity market manipulation is not new. What is new is the ability of a foreign government to use manipulation in a way that would cause a swift and systemic economic crisis in the United States. Such actions could be taken without ever clashing with the American military—offering those without the military capability to penetrate America's defenses an asymmetric tactic for direct attack. That a foreign government could do so should be a major concern for all of America's political and military strategists.
China through Arab Eyes: American Influence in the Middle East by Chris Zambelis and Brandon Gentry
The significance of Beijing's hosting of the second annual China-Arab Cooperation Forum—an event bringing together key envoys from 22 Arab nations under the auspices of the Arab League and their Chinese counterparts—went largely unnoticed in the western media. According to Chinese and Arab news reports, however, the conference, held in May and June 2006, was a success on many levels. As Chinese and Arab dignitaries agreed to greatly strengthen and expand economic, energy, and cultural ties to unprecedented levels over the course of the twenty-first century, Chinese President Hu Jintao, speaking warmly of the blossoming Sino-Arab relationship, stated, "China thanks the Arab states for supporting China in relation to Taiwan and human rights issues and will as always support the just cause of the Arab states and people." For his part, Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa reaffirmed the League's support of the "One China" principle, declaring, "The world has but one China, and we only visit a China with Beijing as its capital."
The Strategic Importance of Central Asia: An American View by Stephen Blank
Undoubtedly Central Asia's strategic importance in international affairs is growing. The rivalries among Russia, China, United States, Iran, India, and Pakistan not to mention the ever-changing pattern of relations among local states (five former Soviet republics and Afghanistan) make the region's importance obviously clear. Central Asia's strategic importance for Washington, Moscow, and Beijing varies with each nation's perception of its strategic interests. Washington focuses primarily on Central Asia as an important theater in the war on terrorism. Additionally, it is viewed as a theater where America might counter a revived Russia or China, or a place to blunt any extension of Iranian influence. Moscow and Beijing view the region as a vital locale for defending critical domestic interests. This asymmetry of interest is a major factor in the competition among states for influence in the region.
Comments
There are problems with the Proctor paper.
From the Iranian perspective, the Iran-Iraq War (known as the Imposed War in Iran) was not a proxy war between the USSR and USA. The US and USSR were allied with Iraq, as was France, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait.
The human wave tactics used by Iran during that war were actually used to effect during parts of the Second World War in the Russo-German conflict.
The Iraqi government is quite open about its warm ties to the Iranian government. Moreover, these ties would be even closer without forced objections being made by the occupying power.
Surprising that this paper provides virtually no role played by Israel in ME politics, including the Shia-Sunni divide. Equally surprising is the fact that no diplomatic scenario/solution for Iran is contemplated, at least in Iraq but also Lebanon, especially given the fact that such was actually offered a few years ago by the previous Iranian administration.