U.S. Army Lieutenant Colonel Daniel M. Swanson on a joint effort between the Coalition Army Advisory Training Team and the Iraqi Defense Ministry completing the Iraqi prime minister's objective for force generation by the end of the year. Transcript. Story.

U.S. Army Brigadier General Gregory J. Zanetti, Deputy Commander, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, on the joint task force focusing on providing "safe, humane care and custody" of detained enemy combatants awaiting trial. Transcript. Story.

2 April 2008

U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Robert H. Holmes, Deputy Director of Operations, U.S. Central Command, on CENTCOM's continuing focus on fighting terrorism in its area of responsibility, with southern Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan as the main priorities. Transcript. Story.

31 March 2008

U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Thomas W. Hartmann, Legal Adviser to the Convening Authority in the Department of Defense Office of Military Commissions, on Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani being charged with murder in violation of the law of war, murder of protected persons, attacking civilians, attacking civilian objects, intentionally causing serious bodily injury, destruction of property in violation of the law of war, and terrorism. Transcript. Story. Video.

The first Emerald Express was conducted in 1995 under the direction of then Lieutenant General Anthony Zinni, Commanding General of I Marine Expeditionary Force. Emerald Express 1995 was the first of several large-scale interagency exercises that addressed operations from a comprehensive military and interagency perspective.

The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory - Wargaming Division (WGD) picked up the Emerald Express program (1999 -- 2007), conducting a continuing series of conferences and workshops designed to quickly garner critical insights and issues from recent operations and directly distribute the results to as wide a range of appropriate organizations and individuals as possible. Participants were typically commanders and senior staff of units from all U.S. services and multi-national partners as well personnel representing relevant interagency and non-governmental organizations.

Some of the more recent WGD Emerald Express events have addressed urban operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II, the interagency dimensions of OIF, humanitarian assistance and stability and support operations in OIF, USMC and Royal Marine operations in Operation Enduring Freedom, and counterinsurgency.

Marine Corps University (MCU) now owns the program, conducting Emerald Express 2008 on 25 -- 26 March at Marine Corps Base, Quantico, Virginia. From the opening remarks by Lieutenant General James Amos, Commanding General, Marine Corps Combat Development Command:

This two day symposium offers a forum to examine the critical issues involved in integration of all elements of national power in the pursuit of national security objectives. Throughout this event, presenters and panelists from both the operational and academic worlds will provide perspectives of interagency efforts in our national capital region, Afghanistan, Iraq, and in the Pacific Theater. Our presenters and panelists were selected based on their expertise, knowledge, reputation, and recent experience.

MCU has posted papers, briefings and maps from the symposium on their Emerald Express 2008 web site.

On a personal note, I had the privilege of running six Emerald Express seminars for WGD and found the experience one of the most rewarding of my 30-year stint as a Marine, Marine civilian and consultant. The insights and observations provided by U.S. and Coalition military and civilian participants, as well as their dedication and professionalism was exceptional in furthering our understanding of complex operations.

An excerpt:

... The aircraft conducting combat missions over Iraq and Afghanistan drop bombs, strafe targets, or perform a low-level show-of-force only 10 percent of the time. The jets and unmanned drones primarily are used for what the military calls armed reconnaissance, meaning their mission is to pass video and other data gathered through sensors and targeting pods back to an operations center where it can analyzed.

But in a world where irregular warfare is the primary focus -- and appears to be for the foreseeable future -- a balance of fighter jets and armed prop-driven aircraft could prove beneficial...

"There really has not been a substantial intellectual investment into what I think I would call air-ground integration looks like in the 21st Century,"... "Everyone's going down this irregular warfare pike, and I think, in some ways, that's a red herring, because, if you create an irregular warfare unit what do you do if you don't have irregular warfare?"

As the Army evolves and changes over the next decade, "ultimately the majority of their airborne-firepower integration and intelligence are going to come from... the Air Force,"... "The real challenge is how do we build a system that is highly flexible and adaptable to meet a full range of requirements for air-ground integration and not just irregular warfare."

Food for thought and kindling for debate...

The classified document provides a more upbeat analysis of conditions in Iraq than the last major assessment by United States spy agencies, last summer. It was completed this week, just days before the top American commander in Iraq, Gen. David H. Petraeus, is due in Washington to give lawmakers a progress report on the military strategy in Iraq.

Among other assessments, the estimate cites slow but steady progress by Iraqi politicians on forging alliances between Shiites and Sunnis in Iraq as well as factors that could reverse this trend. The estimate also warned that security gains could be upended and that militant groups were still capable of deadly attacks in Baghdad, the capital.

Meanwhile, Karen DeYoung of the Washington Post reports that Senators Carl M. Levin (D-Mich.) and Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass.) asked Director of National Intelligence Mike McConnell to release an unclassified summary of the NIE.

Without the NIE, Levin and Kennedy wrote, "Congress and the American people will not have the essential information needed for an informed public debate." The document, an update of two previous assessments publicly released last year, was completed and delivered to Congress on Tuesday.

The United States now has the opportunity to achieve its fundamental objectives in Iraq through the establishment of a peaceful, stable, secular, democratic state and a reliable ally in the struggle against both Sunni and Shiite terrorism. Such an accomplishment would allow the United States to begin to reorient its position in the Middle East from one that relies on antidemocratic states like Egypt and Saudi Arabia to one based on a strong democratic partner whose citizens have explicitly rejected al Qaeda and terrorism in general. The growth of anti-Iranian sentiment in both Sunni and Shiite Arab communities in Iraq holds out the possibility that Iraq can become a bulwark against Iranian aims in the region, and that Iraq can, with American support, return to its role of balancing Iranian power without being the regional threat it had become under Saddam Hussein. Coalition operations in 2007 have already dealt a devastating blow to al Qaeda, and that success--and the reaction of Iraqis to it--has opened the door to achieving positive and important objectives in Iraq and throughout the region...

The way ahead is clear. We must help the Iraqis defeat Sunni and Shia extremists, terrorists, and insurgents. This task is well underway. We must mediate disputes between Iraqi communities at the local, provincial, and national levels, in conjunction with the UN presence in Iraq and with Iraqi mechanisms to resolve disputes. We must support those elements of Iraqi society and government whose interests most closely align with ours, particularly the Iraqi Army and grassroots movements in both Sunni and Shiite communities. We must commit to the defense of Iraq against the interference or attack of its neighbors to encourage the rise of Iraqi nationalism and of anti-Iranian sentiment already growing in Iraq. We must help guide Iraq through the forthcoming elections, which will be a formative period of the nascent Iraqi state. If current trends continue and if the United States plays its proper role, the elections of 2008 and 2009 can capture and capitalize on social, political, and economic attitudes that may drive Iraq toward a close relationship with the U.S. based on common interests, threats, and objectives.

More of the Executive Summary...

... or read the entire report.

... Anthony Cordesman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies writes that the "fighting, which the government portrays as a crackdown on criminality, is better seen as a power grab, an effort by Mr. Maliki and the most powerful Shiite political parties to establish their authority over Basra and the parts of Baghdad."

Vali Nasr of Tufts University says "that [Prime Minister Nouri al-] Maliki is completely irrelevant. The real show is between Hakim and Sadr." That would be Abdul Aziz al-Hakim, head of the Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq and its militia, the Badr Organization, and Moqtada al-Sadr, head of the Sadr Trend and its militia, the Jaish al Mahdi...

Whatever motives may lie behind his action (and what politician does not take politics into account when making any decision?), he has right on his side. Militias have been the bane of Iraq since 2003, and nowhere more so than in Basra, where the failure of British forces to keep the peace ceded control of this vital port to warring groups of thugs. Ordinary Iraqis are thoroughly sick of these desperados and anxious for their elected leaders to get rid of them. That is what Maliki has tried to do in Basra, and he should be applauded for his willingness to take on not just Sunni but also Shiite militias...

Much more.

Over at the American Enterprise Institute Frederick and Kimberly Kagan discuss what we know and what we don't know about recent Iraqi operations against illegal Shia militias.

Coming days and weeks will provide greater insight into whether Maliki or Sadr gained or lost from this undertaking; how well or badly the Iraqi Security Forces performed; and what kind of deal (if any) the Iraqi Government accepted in return for Sadr's order to stand down his forces. The following lists provide a brief summary of what we can say with confidence about recent operations and what we cannot...

Read the summary.

... Based on American experiences in Korea, Vietnam, El Salvador and now in Iraq and Afghanistan, an advisory strategy can help the Iraqi Army and security forces beat Al Qaeda and protect their country. (Obviously, these are my personal views, and do not represent those of the Army.) However, doing so will require America's ground forces to provide at least 20,000 combat advisers for the duration of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan — men and women specially equipped and trained to help foreign forces bear a greater share of the combat load.

Unfortunately, America's military did not have the advisory capacity it should have had after major combat operations ceased. The first attempt to create a new Iraqi Army was farmed out to private contractors. When that effort failed, and it became clear that the assistance needed to help the fledgling Iraqi Army far exceeded the capability of the Army's Special Forces, regular Army troops were called on to fill the gap. Given their lack of training, these soldiers did remarkably well, but it was always a stopgap measure...