The Surge in Iraq: One Year Later by Lieutenant General Ray Odierno, Heritage Foundation - 13 March lecture transcript (pdf).

I returned from Iraq a little over two weeks ago, and trust me, it's great to be in Washington and in your company today. After nearly 15 months in Iraq--most­ly spent focusing on where we are and where we're going--it's a pleasure to step back and reflect a bit about where we've been. I'd like to speak with you about Iraq in 2007, to include the surge, its implemen­tation, and my assessment of its impact...

Talking Points:

- For the government of Iraq, the 2007 surge has provided a window of opportunity. This window will not remain open forever.

- In a very real way and at the local level, the surge allowed Coalition and Iraqi forces to hold the hard-earned ground that was wrested from the enemy, while continuing to pursue terrorists as they struggle to regroup elsewhere.

- By November 2007, there were 30 attacks in al-Anbar province during the last week in October; one year prior, there had been over 300.

- To capitalize on the reduction of violence in 2007, Iraqi leaders must make deliberate choices to secure lasting strategic gains through reconciliation and political progress.

- The improved security conditions resulting in part from the surge of 2007 have given the Iraqis an opportunity to choose a better way.

A conversation with Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV, Commanding General of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Insurgency Research Group Blog - Kings of War

Some Kings of War readers may have noticed the recent launch of the blog of the Insurgency Research Group (IRG) here at King's. The aim of the IRG is to act as a centre of gravity for the community of British COIN researchers/practitioners which, while relatively sizable, is diffuse and unfocused. The IRG blog, which is being run by King's graduate Will Hartley, is meant as a vehicle for this community to publicize events, share ideas and socialize (virtually, so to speak). It's a bit like KOW only more focussed on insurgency...

Counterinsurgency in Iraq - Insurgency Research Group

RAND has released a monograph, entitled Counterinsurgency in Iraq (2003-2006), written by Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell. The paper provides a useful overview of the conflict, and of the various armed actors involved, before assessing the US COIN campaign, and analysing the flaws in US strategy which contributed to the rapid deterioration in the situation in the first years of the campaign...

The gang at Abu Muqawama has put our heads together and updated, once again, our famous Counterinsurgency Reading List. Added to the list are books by Giustozzi and Glubb as well as articles by McMaster, MacFarland, and many others. As usual, everything is hyperlinked. Enjoy!

By Andrew Lubin

The Global Interdependence Center hosted General Robert Magnus, Assistant Commandant, United States Marine Corps, at the University of Pennsylvania Wednesday evening.

Using the current wars in Iraq and Afghanistan as a backdrop, Gen Magnus spoke about using various types of power in order to advance national security and the national interest. "Clausewitz said that you need to understand the war you are in," Magnus explained, "war is an exercise of politics, but by other means."

But having a 'hammer', as he described the Marine Corps and the American military, does not mean that the military should be the primary method of enforcing national strategic interests. There are many ways to utilize the American military, he explained, citing Marine efforts in training Afghan Police, reconstruction efforts in Ramadi, and the Provisional Reconstruction Teams in Iraq who are involved in job creation that ranges from opening shops to vaccinating cows. "If we don't help them find jobs," Magnus commented," then they'll go back to earning money by dropping an IED on our troops."

Part of the utilization of national power, Magnus said, is that it includes making choices. Using the example of arms sales to Pakistan, he explained that while selling arms assists the American economy, and is cheaper than sending troops, it also takes scarce money out of Pakistan, who tends to fund arms purchases by short-changing their education budget and social services "Then the parents send their kids to the madrassa schools, with the obvious consequences."

According to Magnus, there are five elements of national power, with their value depending on the country involved. "Military and Economic Power are the first two, as well as the most obvious", he explained. "On one hand, kinetic power is good when we killed Zarkawi, but bad when we bombed an Afghan wedding. And while Adam Smith's hand is invisible, its effects certainly are not- our GNP is $ 14 trillion annually and we're the world's hyperpower."

Magnus listed Diplomatic Power as the third element, although he noted that this is usually the weakest element of the five. "When Abbas and Hamas and the Israeli's stop negotiating, they fall back to the military option far too quickly."

The remaining two are far more subtle, yet almost as important as the military and economic factors. Culture is vitally important, he explained," Japanese kids playing baseball are now playing in the major leagues. I saw kids wearing Mike Tyson t-shirts when I was in Djibouti; like him or not, Michael Jackson is often seen as a representative of our culture. It's a question of how we as a people are perceived." Moral Power remains the final element, said Magnus. "It's our ability to believe in our righteousness that helps rally the national will, and on the other side it either rallies others to our side -- or forces them away."

The moral element is extremely important, according to Magnus. Citing Clausewitz again, who wrote that moral is to physical as 3:1, he explained that people are more likely to be influenced by moral, instead of physical factors.

This is where the United States is too often lacking, Magnus said. "To change someone's mind is a contest of wills, and the problem is that we don't spend time or money on foreign affairs until there is a problem." Using a domestic problem, Magnus noted that fixing the New Orleans levees before Hurricane Katrina would have saved billions of dollars and numerous other problems.

Gen Magnus said that he expects the war on terror to be a generational struggle, and a 9/11 type terror attack could too easily be repeated "America needs a hammer; some of these bad guys don't want to sit down and talk -- you can't negotiate with Nihilists."

While globalization affects everyone, it affects everyone differently; while 50% of the Iraqi's are literate, with many western-educated and following America on satellite TV; the remaining 50% are illiterate, and too easily influenced by the Islamic extremists teaching in the madrassas. "We need to think of the 26 million people who make up Iraq," Magnus explained, "and how our strategic and tactical actions affect them" The problems are worse in Afghanistan, he continued, a country with a larger population and a larger illiteracy rate. The question, Magnus said, is that as a moral society, we need to decide how we want to influence the neighborhood.

Andrew Lubin is a proud member of the distinguished USMC Combat Correspondents Association, Andrew spent much of 2006 and 2007 in Iraq, and Afghanistan. Embedded with Marine - Army - National Guard units, he's out in the field with the "boots on the ground," and covering the story with the 0311's and 0811's in Ramadi, Mahmudiyah, and the Khyber Pass who are getting the job done.

The presence of drugged fighters is not unknown in the history of warfare. Yet widespread drug use on the battlefield is now part of protracted conflicts largely fought by nonprofessional combatants that take place in an international system characterized by the process of globalization. From marijuana, khat, hallucinogenic mushrooms, cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine to looted pharmaceuticals, irregular fighters have found a ready supply of narcotics to consume for a variety of combat purposes. Such consumption has led to unpredictable fighting, the commission of atrocities, and to the prolongation of internal violence. The presence of intoxicated combatants will continue to be a feature of armed conflict and requires a fuller accounting to adequately prepare policymakers and military planners for future conflicts...

... Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, Americans and their allies have slowly and painfully come to the conclusion that they are in a Long War to create a new political order in the Islamic world that we can better live with--that is, a region with greater inherent stability of the sort that comes from a legitimate government that is at peace with us, with its neighbors, and with its own people. We have found that we cannot comfortably accommodate, in an age of terrorism and the spread of nuclear weapons, what John Quincy Adams called "derelict" states.

And so our policy strongly suggests that our strategy imitate the "clear, hold, and build" tactics that underlie the success of the Iraq surge and the progress made in the U.S. sectors of Afghanistan. Strategically, we are attempting to clear, hold (preferably through allies, rather than ourselves directly), and build on a larger level, in an effort often described as a global counterinsurgency. The policy also suggests that it is the "building" that makes for a decisive victory. That is, victory on the battlefield is not the same as victory in the war; military success is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition. And a corollary is that the military's tasks--for the military's missions are rightly defined by the nation's needs and by political leaders, not by any internal structure of the armed forces--extend beyond the destruction of enemy forces.

Yet the need for "building"--which, at minimum, means state-building--means that there are missions that demand more than military power. And so there has been a lot of effort to mobilize other agencies and other elements of American power, even in cases where these other agencies are poorly suited or highly reluctant to be mobilized. Others with experience of modern counterinsurgencies, such as the Australians, often describe this as a "whole of government" approach. It is an approach that makes great common sense, but one that needs to be correctly translated into an American idiom without inverting the real meaning...

An hour with Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 12 March 2008.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates Press Conference - Transcript

President Bush Remarks on Admiral Fallon's Retirement - Transcript

More from the Times article:

... despite the warm words from Mr. Bush and Mr. Gates, there was no question that the admiral's premature departure stemmed from policy differences with the administration, and with Gen. David H. Petraeus, the American commander in Iraq.

Mr. Gates acknowledged as much when he said that Admiral Fallon, in asking permission on Tuesday morning to retire, had expressed concerns that the controversy over his views were becoming "a distraction." But the secretary labeled as "ridiculous" any speculation that the admiral's retirement portends a more bellicose American approach toward Iran.

Admiral Fallon had rankled senior officials of the Bush administration with outspoken comments on such issues as dealing with Iran and on setting the pace of troop reductions from Iraq — even though his comments were well within the range of views expressed by Mr. Gates...

The Times article quotes "officials" as saying the last straw, however, came in an article in Esquire magazine by Thomas P. M. Barnett, a respected military analyst, that profiled Admiral Fallon under the headline, "The Man Between War and Peace."

Tom Ricks, Washington Post, in an article titled Commander Rejects Article of Praise reported that Fallon called Barnett's Esquire piece poison pen stuff that is really disrespectful and ugly. Ricks had more:

Fallon has previously made it clear he has differences with the Bush administration's foreign policy. Some White House aides were said to be unhappy with his decision to dump "the long war" as a phrase to describe U.S. efforts against terrorism. In addition, some White House officials were irked by the persistent friction between him and Army Gen. David H. Petraeus, the top U.S. commander in Iraq. Fallon and Petraeus are known to have disagreed about plans and troop levels in Iraq, but Petraeus, even though technically subordinate to Fallon, appears to have more influence with Bush.

Asked about his dealings with Petraeus, Fallon said in a December interview, "That stuff is all overblown. . . . We talk daily." He added, "Dave does internal Iraq. I do the region."

Fallon, a career naval aviator and one of the last Vietnam War veterans on active duty, took over as chief of the Central Command in March 2007, becoming the first Navy officer ever to hold that post...

American Forces Press Service is reporting that Fallon's deputy, Army Lieutenant General Martin Dempsey, will take over as acting Central Command commander until a permanent replacement is nominated and confirmed.

On a likely permanent replacement Ricks reports:

A likely successor to Fallon is Petraeus, some defense experts said. The general could be promoted to the Centcom post and replaced in Baghdad by Lt. Gen. Raymond T. Odierno, who until last month was Petraeus's deputy in Iraq. Odierno, who has been nominated to become Army vice chief of staff, developed a strong working relationship with Petraeus.

Another possible successor mentioned yesterday is Lt. Gen. Stanley A. McChrystal, the head of Special Operations in Iraq. McChrystal recently was nominated to be director of the staff of the Joint Chiefs, a key Pentagon position.

More at the Washington Post, Los Angeles Times and Christian Science Monitor. Commentary by Max Boot at the Los Angeles Times, the gang at Abu Muqawama, Galrahn at Information Dissemination, Jules Crittenden at Forward Movement, Westhawk, Jason Sigger at Danger Room, Blackfive, and Zenpundit.

Tom Barnett has no comment.

Updated Links:

"Fox" Fallon Wasn't Hounded Out - Fred Kaplan, Slate

The Fall of Admiral McFallon - Mackubin Thomas Owens, Weekly Standard

A CENTCOM Chief Who Spoke His Mind - David Ignatius, Washington Post

Fallon: Right Man for Wrong Job? - Bronwen Maddox, London Times

Vice President Fallon? - Frank Gaffney Jr., National Review

The Importance of Fallon's Fall - Michael Barone, Real Clear Politics

Resigned to Reality of This War - Oliver North, Human Events

Demagoguing Adm. Fallon's Departure - Washington Times editorial

Fallon vs. Petraeus - Los Angeles Times editorial

Silence in the Ranks on Fallon - San Francisco Chronicle editorial

Fired for Speaking the Truth - Boston Globe editorial

CENTCOM Commander Resigns - David Betz, Kings of War