Who's good at small wars?

The answer is still debated, but the question endures because it goes to the heart of Atlantic relations and British identity...

This is an argument about a lot of things. About history: the British fought many insurgencies. So too did America, as Max Boot shows. American has a whole heritage of small wars, won and lost, it could draw on. But Britain prides itself on a depth of experience and inherited wisdom. One only has to start talking about COIN and the reverent names of Malaya and Templer are summoned.

Its also an argument about Britain's place in the world. More bluntly, about the eclipse of British global power. Its empire lost, its armed forces shrunk, and its strategic role and identity ambiguous, the complex business of patrolling frontiers overseas has become a site through which Britons (and Americans) articulate a relationship between the old hegemon and the new.

There are, in fact, good reasons to doubt whether anyone really has a natural expertise at counter-insurgency. Who is intuitively good at eating soup with a knife?

Read it all.

Roundtable on Osinga's Science, Strategy and War at Chicago Boyz and moderated by Zenpundit.

A blogging roundtable on Science, Strategy and War: The Strategic Theory of John Boyd by Colonel Frans P. Osinga. Slightly over ten years since his death, the influential strategist and iconoclastic USAF Colonel John Boyd remains a subject of controversy despite the fact that (or more likely, because) many of his ideas impacted and informed military "transformation", Network-centric Operations and the theory of 4th Generation Warfare.

Good stuff and several Small Wars Council members are participating.

The Pentagon and Marine Corps authorized the purchase of 84,000 bulletproof vests in 2006 that not only are too heavy but are so impractical that some U.S. Marines are asking for their old vests back so they can remain agile enough to fight.

Marine Commandant Gen. James Conway wants to know who authorized the costly purchase of the nearly 30-pound flak jackets...

Body Armor Wars in the Marine Corps - Herschel Smith, The Captain's Journal

Discuss at Small Wars Council.

Like Mark Twain's "death" in 1897 (he died in 1910), reports of AFRICOM's demise may be exaggerated. Concerns that AFRICOM hasn't been thought out or is unnecessary aren't supported by the actions and statements of those charged with building this entity. However, based on the poor marketing of AFRICOM, these concerns are not surprising.

I attended USC's AFRICOM conference earlier this month and between panel discussions and offline conversations, I came away with a new appreciation (and hope) for the newest, and very different, command.

This is not like the other Combatant Commands (one DOD representative said they dropped "Combatant" from the title, but depending on where you look, all commands have that word or none of the commands include that adjective). Also unlike other commands, this is "focused on prevention and not containment or fighting wars." This is, as one speaker continued, is a "risk-laden experiment" that is like an Ironman with multidisciplinary requirements and always different demands (note: thank you for not saying it's a marathon... once you've done one marathon, they're easy, you can "fake" a marathon... Ironman triathlons are always unpredictable, I know, I've done five.). The goal, he continued, was to "keep combat troops off the continent for 50 years" because the consensus was, once troops landed on Africa, it would be extremely difficult to take them off...

Much more at MountainRunner.

The March -- April 2008 issue of Military Review has been posted to the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center web site. Ton of good stuff, enjoy.

FM 3-0 Operations—The Army's Blueprint by General William S. Wallace, U.S. Army. TRADOC's commander introduces the newest version of FM 3-0, Operations, the Army's guide to operating in the 21st century.

Featured Articles

Restoring Hope: Economic Revitalization in Iraq Moves Forward by Paul A. Brinkley, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Business Transformation. A good news update concerning efforts to modernize Iraq's economy.

Human Terrain Mapping: A Critical First Step to Winning the COIN Fight by Lieutenant Colonel Jack Marr, U.S. Army; Major John Cushing, U.S. Army; Captain Brandon Garner, U.S. Army; Captain Richard Thompson, U.S. Army. Human terrain mapping offers a systematic method to obtain the information Soldiers need to succeed in counterinsurgency.

Combating a Modern Insurgency: Combined Task Force Devil in Afghanistan by Colonel (P) Patrick Donahue, U.S. Army, and Lieutenant Colonel Michael Fenzel, U.S. Army. Two principals describe how Combined Task Force Devil employed a balanced strategy of kinetic, non-kinetic, and political actions to quiet eastern Afghanistan.

Anbar Awakens: The Tipping Point by Major Niel Smith, U.S. Army, and Colonel Sean MacFarland, U.S. Army. The "Anbar Awakening"—what some have called the "Gettysburg of Iraq"—resulted from the careful application of multiple lines of operation, among them the deliberate cultivation of local leaders.

Polish Military Police Specialized Units by Major General Bogusław Pacek, Polish Army. Poland is taking the lead in developing NATO's special police units. The concept's designer rounds out the specifics behind these highly capable modular forces.

A Strategic Failure: American Information Control Policy in Occupied Iraq by Dr. Cora Sol Goldstein. U.S. press policy implemented in Iraq after the fall of Baghdad failed miserably. Decision-makers might have looked to occupied Germany circa 1945 for a better plan.

The Reflective Military Practitioner: How Military Professionals Think in Action by Colonel Christopher R. Paparone, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D. and Colonel George Reed, U.S. Army, Retired, Ph.D. Understanding the social processes at work in the Army's construction of professional knowledge can prevent inertia, ossification, and, ultimately, irrelevance.

Lessons in Leadership: The Battle of Balaklava, 1854 by Dr. Anna Maria Brudenell. Balaklava and its famous charge have become bywords for stubborn heroism, devotion to duty, and steadfastness in the face of overwhelming odds—but also futility, waste, incompetence, and poor communication.

Follow the Money: The Army Finance Corps and Iraqi Financial Independence by Lieutenant Colonel Laura Landes, U.S. Army. Without a sound currency and an interbank market, any appearance of progress in Iraq may be illusory.

Contest Winners

Preparing for Economics in Stability Operations by Lieutenant Colonel David A. Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrew Wallen, U.S. Air Force. During stability operations, economic actions become as important as military actions.

Stabilizing Influence: Micro-Financial Services Capability by James E. Shircliffe Jr. Micro-financial services that offer very small loans and savings accounts to the less affluent should be part of all U.S. stability operations.

Insights

Hybrid Wars by Colonel John J. McCuen, U.S. Army, Retired. To win a hybrid war, the U.S. must succeed on the conventional battlefield and in the "population battlegrounds" at home and abroad.

Listen to the Airman by Lieutenant Colonel Gian P. Gentile, U.S. Army. An Air War University monograph warns that we have become dogmatic in our single-minded pursuit of a proper COIN strategy. It should be required reading for all Army officers.

Get Smart on COIN

The Battle Command Knowledge System (BCKS) has established an Army-level knowledge management system to support Soldiers and leaders in the performance of their respective operational missions. BCKS's primary mission is to support the operational domain (deployed units) with a secondary mission to the institutional domain (schoolhouse). BCKS provides ongoing, near real-time support to the Army's battle command, doctrine development, leader development, and education and training programs. In January 2006 BCKS established the COIN Forum to provide an opportunity for military, government, and civilian personnel, as well as organizations, to come together to collaborate and share their professional knowledge on all aspects of counterinsurgency operations.

The Department of Defense Bloggers Roundtable featured Lieutenant General William B. Caldwell, IV on the Army's new new operations manual (FM 3-0) that elevates the mission of stabilizing war-torn nations to make it as important as defeating adversaries on the battlefield.

LTG Caldwell currently serves as the commander of the Combined Arms Center at Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, the command that oversees the Command and General Staff College and 17 other schools, centers, and training programs located throughout the United States. The Combined Arms Center is also responsible for: development of the Army's doctrinal manuals, training of the Army's commissioned and noncommissioned officers, oversight of major collective training exercises, integration of battle command systems and concepts, and supervision of the Army's Center for the collection and dissemination of lessons learned.

Here are the essential links - Roundtable Audio and Roundtable Transcript.

Reports from Iraq are showing that the war-torn country might finally be on the road to some mix of local and national reconciliation. The recent reduction in violence suggests this might be the case and Iraq's bleeding may have been stopped.

Yet deals cut with our former Sunni-insurgent enemies to stop fighting us and become our allies against al-Qaida, along with the hope of compromise between the different factions in Iraq and the Iraqi government, may be taking our eyes off the fundamental issue that has yet to be resolved: Who will hold absolute power in Iraq, Shiites or Sunnis?

Since taking over in Iraq in February 2007, Petraeus has become the face of the war effort, receiving unusual deference from the White House and using high-profile testimony last September to stave off Democratic efforts to sharply curtail the U.S. presence in Iraq. Widely credited with the success of the "surge" -- the counteroffensive that sharply reduced violence in Iraq last year -- Petraeus has indicated interest in moving sometime this year to the top U.S. military slot in Europe, where he could attempt to revitalize the flagging NATO alliance.

Chiarelli is currently the senior military assistant to Defense Secretary Robert Gates. Prior to that he was the Special Assistant to the Commander of United States Central Command for the Development of Regional Military Capability. From November of 2005 through February 2006, he served as the Commander of the Multi-National Corps - Iraq. Prior to that he was Commanding General, 1st Cavalry Division to include the Division's participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom.

The cover story of yesterday's "New York Times Magazine" is the best reporting I've seen on Afghanistan, ever.

The story is about CPT Dan Kearney's B/2-503 IN. 2-503rd is commanded by my

friend LTC Bill Ostlund and is responsible for the Korengal River valley, the site of the toughest fighting now happening in Iraq or Afghanistan. The people in the Korengal River Valley don't support the coalition or the Afghan government; 2-503 has no one to drink tea with and nowhere near enough troops to provide security to the population.

The story illustrates clearly how many more troops we need in Afghanistan--NATO, Afghan, and US--and how hard counterinsurgency is when you don't have anyone to partner with; Battle Company soldiers are simply strangers in a strange land. If you don't have time to read it, at least look at the photos.

Once you see them--some of the best combat footage of any war, ever--you'll

read the story.

God bless Dan Kearney, Battle Company, 2-503 IN, and the people of the

Korengal River Valley.