



Upcoming Marine Corps deployments to Operation Enduring Freedom have resulted in renewed interest in the Afghanistan resources available in the MCCLL repositories.

Advertisement for USMC MCCLL webpage. Includes text: 'LEARN FROM THOSE WHO HAVE GONE BEFORE', 'USMC', and links for NIPRNET and SIPRNET.

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

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Counter Radio-Controlled Improvised Explosive Device Electronic Warfare (CREW) Lessons and Observations: A report documenting the operational experiences of Marines employing CREW systems to combat the radio-controlled IED threat is now available on the MCCLL classified website.

MCCLL Resources on Afghanistan Operations: The planned deployments of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marines to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) have resulted in renewed interest in MCCLL resources available on Afghanistan operations.

Modular Tactical Vest (MTV): A MCCLL survey of 348 forward-deployed Marines and Sailors provides many candid comments on the strengths and weaknesses of the MTV when worn during combat operations.

Fixed Wing Marine Aerial Refuel and Transport Detachment Operations: A MCCLL collection team visited VMGR-252 to document the lessons and observations of key staff concerning the mission to provide aerial refueling, aerial delivery and battlefield illumination support.

Enhanced Search Results From the Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR): Previously, searching the JLLR only retrieved relevant lessons, but now the JLLR has been upgraded to include the retrieval of after action reports and other documents.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Operation Iraqi Freedom:

MCCLL was pleased to have been a participant in a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) collection team that addressed the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) mission in Iraq.

Counterinsurgency (COIN) Leader's Course at the COIN Center for Excellence:

The MCCLL representative to Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 5 reports on his attendance at the COIN Leader's Course.

Counterinsurgency and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society:

The Marine Corps' expert on tribal culture has written an excellent pamphlet on COIN and irregular warfare operations in a tribal culture.

News

Three news items are highlighted this month on the following topics: (1) a monthly journal is now available from the Combat Terrorism Center at West Point, (2) a military working dog has been awarded the Purple Heart, and (3) Marines are now training with holographic technology.

Reading Lists and Book Review: This month, three books on Marine Corps reading lists are featured: (1) We again highlight First to Fight by LtGen Krulak, the "marquee title" on the Commandant's Reading List, featuring the Conclusion Discussion Guide, (2) Counterinsurgency Warfare by David Galula, also on the Commandant's List, and (3) Culture and Customs of Afghanistan, by Hafizullah Emadi on the MARCENT List for Marines deploying to Afghanistan.

Updated List of MCCLL Representatives: This updated roster provides contact information for individuals assigned at major Marine Corps and Joint commands and organizations as MCCLL representatives.

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter, like other MCCLL products addressing a variety of topics, is an "initial impressions" summary that identifies key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risk or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. Your comments on any topics addressed in this newsletter (or on our website) are welcome. Questions can be directed to: harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil or michael.jones@usmc.mil Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 312-378-1279

## From the Director: "Making Sense" of the Weekly New Lessons' Rollup

As noted in our [October 2007 newsletter](#), the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has begun to push out a weekly report that identifies all of the products that have been added to our repositories during the previous week. This report is generated automatically and distributed to all authorized users of our NIPR and SIPR websites. (You of course have the ability to "opt out" if you do not wish to receive this product.) The objective is to inform you of any newly available information that has been added to our databases.

Unfortunately, for users who are on the Navy Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), the e-mail that is sent out will not support an HTML view of the message, so the e-mail will look like the diagram on the top (which we all agree is virtually incomprehensible). However, you have the capability to view the message as it was intended by simply clicking on "This message was converted to plain text" at the top of the message and then selecting, "Display as HTML" in order to view the message as shown at the bottom.

Users who have previously opted out of the report due to the confusing display can request to be added back (via [Feedback](#)) if you would like to see if this report can provide useful information for your particular needs.

**Click here**

Ref#	Data Type	War Fighting Functions	Title (Linked) Summary	Unit	Campaigns
3624	CDR		<a href="#">CALL News From the Front: Converting Commercial Power for Fixed Signal Assets</a>	CALL	
3625	CDR		<a href="#">Interview with Captain Andrea Gorman - WASSINK</a>	MCCLL	

*Comments on any of the topics in this newsletter can be addressed to the MCCLL Director, Col Monte E. Dunard, USMCR, at [monte.dunard@usmc.mil](mailto:monte.dunard@usmc.mil)*

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## Counter Radio-Controlled IED Electronic Warfare (CREW) Lessons



*Marines from 2d Battalion, 8th Marines confiscated IED making materials from a storage building in Sitcher, Iraq. These two boxes of cell phones would likely have been used to build radio-controlled IEDs.*

As widely reported in the media, the security posture in Iraq has improved greatly within the past year; however, the threat from improvised explosive devices (IEDs) continues to be a significant threat in certain areas of Iraq and is still the greatest threat overall. In order to document lessons and observations from units with recent experience employing the latest counter radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW) systems in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) co-sponsored a collection effort in late 2007 on this subject and has now documented the results in a classified topical paper. The lessons and observations in the report were obtained in conjunction with a doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) study sponsored by the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC). The CREW collection team visited units from September through November 2007 that were returning from deployments to the MNF-W area of operations (AO). A corresponding survey was administered to units still deployed in theater. Among the units interviewed or surveyed were the 1st Light Armored Reconnaissance (LAR) Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, and the 2d Marine Logistics Group. The survey portion of the collection obtained responses from 96 CREW operators, who provided many candid and insightful comments on various aspects of system employment.

The classified report can be viewed on the MCCLL SIPR website at: <http://www.mccll.usmc.smil.mil>. Readers may also be interested in a previous MCCLL report, Ground CREW System Operations (also available on the MCCLL SIPR website) that was prepared in July 2006 in response to questions concerning the training and employment of ground CREW systems.

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## MCCLL Resources on Afghanistan Operations



*Marine with Embedded Training Team (ETT) 7-2 brushes snow from one of the HMWWVS at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Naray in Kunar Province, Afghanistan, to keep water from leaking into the vehicle. The ETT deployed to Afghanistan from Okinawa to work with the Afghan National Army (ANA).*

With the upcoming deployment of the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) and the 2d Battalion, 7th Marine Regiment (2/7) to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), there has been renewed interest in the Afghanistan theater by Marines who are scheduled for deployment. Although there has always been at least a small cadre of Marines deployed in Afghanistan (most recently as part of the Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) working with the Afghan National Army (ANA)), the increased presence of the Corps has caused many Marines to begin researching the unique features of this theater. As a result, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has started to receive many requests for access to information in our repositories on Afghanistan operations.

Although MCCLL has collected substantially more information on the Iraq theater than on Afghanistan, the Center has sponsored several previous collection efforts addressing Marine Afghanistan operations, including collections on OEF infantry battalion counterinsurgency and distributed operations, as well as high-altitude and cold weather operations and Marine Corps participation in Afghanistan ETTs and Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). In addition, MCCLL has acquired many source documents from other organizations (including the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL)) that have significant Afghanistan repositories. In response to the heightened interest in Afghanistan, MCCLL will shortly publish a compilation report that incorporates

many of these separate topical papers to serve as a "one-stop-shop" of available lessons and observations from the Afghanistan theater. **Stay Tuned!**

**Until the compilation report becomes available, there are a number of current resources in the MCCLL repositories that may be of interest to Marines deploying to OEF. A representative sample of documents (some of which will be included in the compilation) are:**



*A vehicle with Embedded Training Team (ETT) 4-2 drives through mountain trails at Hawthorne Army Ammunition Depot, Nevada, as part of the Mountain Viper rough-terrain driving course in preparation for deployment to Afghanistan.*

- [Counterinsurgency Operations in Afghanistan — 2d Battalion, 3d Marines \(2/3\)](#): During the deployment of 2/3 from June 2005 through January 2006 to the Laghman, Nangarhar, and Kunar Provinces of Afghanistan, a MCCLL team attached to the battalion from November 2005 to January 2006 to conduct interviews and collect lessons and observations from key personnel.
- [Distributed Operations in Afghanistan — 1st Battalion, 3d Marines \(1/3\)](#): In July 2006, a MCCLL collection team interviewed commanders and staff of the Distributed Operations Platoon of 1/3 following the battalion's deployment to Afghanistan from December 2005 through July 2006. 1/3 operated in the same provinces as 2/3 in support of Combined Joint Task Force - 76.
- [Operation Enduring Freedom Lessons Learned Briefing](#): This briefing was prepared recently by a working group headed by the 1/3 OEF Battalion Commander, LtCol James Bierman, to document the lessons learned by 1/3 and 2/3 during their Afghanistan deployments in 2005/2006.
- [Medical Support of Operations in a High Altitude, Mountainous](#)

**Environment:** MCCLL, in coordination with the Mountain Warfare Training Center (MWTC), conducted a lessons learned collection in Afghanistan from October to December 2006 to interview both Marine Corps and U.S. Army units to document their lessons and observations concerning medical training, equipment and operations in mountainous terrain.

- [Hypothermia Incidence in Trauma Patients and Prevention/Mitigation Measures](#): Although the MCCLL collection effort that formed the basis for this topical paper focused on the incidence of hypothermia during operations in Iraq, the lessons and observations are also highly relevant to Afghanistan operations.
- [Advising Foreign Forces: A Compilation of Reports](#): This compilation includes a number of MCCLL and CALL reports concerning the training of foreign forces. Of particular relevance are the MCCLL reports on [Embedded Training Teams with the Afghan National Army](#) and [Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan](#), as well as an Australian Army "Desktop Analysis Report on Provincial Reconstruction Teams".
- [Afghanistan Commander AAR Book](#): This report was prepared by the U.S. Military Academy in partnership with the 3rd Brigade, 10th Mountain Division for company commanders who are preparing for combat operations in Afghanistan.
- [Southern Afghanistan COIN Operations](#): This CALL report is based on an information paper prepared by members of the 1st Battalion, 3rd Special Operations Forces Group Alpha (the "Desert Eagles") following their counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan.

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## Modular Tactical Vest



*The Modular Tactical Vest (MTV) (which doubles as body armor and a load-bearing vest) features many improvements over the Outer Tactical Vest. A quick release mechanism allows Marines to get out of the vest rapidly in emergency situations and allows for immediate medical access. The vest provides more protection from shrapnel in the lower back and kidney area and protects the side torso area thanks to the integration of side armor plate carriers.*

Based on their combat experiences in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) in recent years, several Marine Corps units have identified the need for improvements in the Outer Tactical Vest (OTV). As a result, in December 2005, the Marine Corps Systems Command (MCSC) and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) hosted Marines with recent OIF experience in order to identify and prioritize needed enhancements to the OTV. Beginning with the input provided by these Marines, MCSC and MCCDC initiated a series of actions to identify a suitable (interim) design. First, an Industry Day was held in February 2006, during which eighteen vendors presented prototype vests. Then, in April 2006, six of these were selected for a limited user evaluation. Three of the vendors were then asked to submit improved prototypes for a field user evaluation that was conducted in July 2006 at Camp Lejeune. The final selected design was the favorite of over 89% of the participants in the field user evaluation. The result, the Modular Tactical Vest (MTV), was intended to be an interim solution until more advanced protection technologies could be incorporated into a final design.

In order to document the opinions of Marines who have used the MTV during OIF combat operations, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) administered a survey to 348 forward-deployed Marines and Sailors serving in Iraq. The results of this survey have been documented in the topical paper, [Modular Tactical Vest: Results of a Survey of Forward Deployed OIF 06-08 Marines and Sailors](#).

**The survey respondents were asked to address their experiences with the MTV in terms of the categories listed below. A few selected survey results are also highlighted.**

- **Training:** Almost all of the respondents wore an MTV during pre-deployment training, with a slight majority receiving formal instruction on the vest.
- **Thermal Comfort:** The majority of respondents indicated that they experienced some hot spots on the vest, including the hips, sides, chest and back areas.
- **Ballistic Coverage:** The vast majority of respondents rated the ballistic coverage as good or excellent.
- **Assembly and Fit:** A large majority of respondents indicated that the MTV was properly assembled and adjusted to fit their body. However, several mentioned that the MTV then required constant adjustment after donning and removing the vest.
- **Donning and Removing:** By a margin of nearly three to one, Marines prefer to put the MTV on over the head instead of using the side openings. However, more Marines use the side openings to remove the MTV than use this method to don the vest.
- **Weight and Comfort:** Since the MTV is heavier than its predecessor, the majority of Marines and Sailors classified it as either heavy or very heavy.
- **Mobility:** The small arms protective inserts (SAPI) received the most favorable comments in terms of ease of mobility of the vest.
- **Compatibility with Other Equipment:** Radio cable compatibility was rated the highest in the survey, while vehicle hatch compatibility rated the lowest.
- **Comparison with the OTV:** The ballistic coverage of the MTV was the highest rated area of improvement in comparison with the OTV. The lowest rated areas were weight and comfort, movement restrictions, and ease of donning the vest.

Among the groups that expressed overall dissatisfaction with the MTV were scout sniper team members and combat vehicle crewmen. However, as noted by the Infantry Combat Equipment Division at MCSC, "There is an effort already underway to provide a variant of the Full Spectrum Battle Equipment for the Sniper community, and to provide a different armor system to combat vehicle crewmen, as neither community has been happy with the OTV worn with side-SAPI, nor with the MTV."



*Marines with Combat Logistics Battalion (CLB) 4, 3d Marine Logistics Group (MLG), adjust their new MTVs at Camp Foster before vest trainers inspect the configurations. It takes about three hours to train Marines on the configuration, wear, and care of the MTV.*

### Comments on the MTV from a Squad Leader:

*"[There are] good ideas with the MTV. [However], use lighter materials, cut off a lot on it (not so bulky) to increase mobility, and then it's good. I personally would like to see 'SAPI vests with MOLLE' rather than being bundled up in a Kevlar blanket."*

### Comments on the MTV from a Vehicle Commander:

*"The OTV and the MTV both work as needed, but the OTV was more comfortable for me. Although the MTV has an emergency release, it was quite easy to take off the OTV."*

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## Fixed Wing Marine Aerial Refuel and Transport Detachment Operations



Marine Aerial Refuel Transport Squadron 252 (VMGR-252) deployed to Al Asad Air Base, Iraq from March 2007 to September 2007 to provide aerial refueling, aerial delivery and battlefield illumination support for Multi-National Forces - West (MNF-W). VMGR-252 and VMGR-352 each routinely provide three KC-130J aircraft and associated personnel to the ongoing Iraqi detachment of six aircraft. Overall responsibility for the detachment then alternates between the two squadrons.

In August 2007, a team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews at Al Asad with key personnel from the squadron concerning their pre-deployment training and combat experiences. In addition, MCCLL administered an aircrew survey and an enlisted survey, with 37 and 69 respondents, respectively. The squadron personnel indicated that the detachment commitment in Iraq over the past two and a half years has resulted in a very good experience base and an expertise level that can readily satisfy mission requirements. Aircrew that are not in theater have been able to remain abreast of current issues in Iraq through constant liaison with deployed personnel. The result is that aircrew and other personnel can be swapped out quickly and easily.

The results of the interviews and survey have been documented in the topical paper, [Fixed Wing Marine Aerial Refuel and Transport Detachment Operations: Lessons and Observations from VMGR-252 Detachment Alpha Deployed During Operation Iraqi Freedom \(OIF\) 06-08.](#)

### Among the many insightful comments from the VMGR-252 staff were:


- Almost all the aircrew surveyed (97%) indicated that their aviation skills did not deteriorate during deployment.
- Respondents indicated that current programs in place to standardize KC-130J tactics and procedures across the three VMGR squadrons should be reviewed. They indicated that the deactivation of VMGR-253 has resulted in a lack of standardization in VMGR training (for example, between east and west coast VMGRs).



*A VMGR-252 KC-130J performs aerial re-fueling of MV-22s over the Southwest desert*

- Detachment personnel stated that Desert Talon training was very beneficial even though they did not perform aerial refueling during the training.
  - Since the KC-130J electronics are sensitive to heat (especially during the summer months), A/M32C-17 units were employed for one to two hours to cool the electronics prior to engine starts. Interviewees indicated that there were not enough of these units available in theater.
  - Maintenance personnel stated that the supply system worked well and was very responsive.
  - The lack of sufficient lighting in the aircraft hangers was viewed as a safety issue. (Note that as of January 2008, hangar lighting is in the process of being installed.)
- The Director of Safety and Standardization (DOSS) stated that the biggest training shortfall was the lack of school trained aviation safety officers within the deployed detachment.
  - Several aircrew indicated that the feasibility of modifying KC-130 aircraft to carry a Litening targeting pod should be assessed (although others expressed an opposing opinion). As a result, it is recommended that the cost effectiveness of this approach should be compared with increasing the unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capability within the Marine Corps.
  - In some cases, air officers attached to ground units need to be re-educated on the capabilities of the KC-130J. For example, after ground personnel were provided information on the detachment's capabilities, VMGR-252 was tasked with additional battlefield illumination and air delivery missions.

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*A VMGR-252 corrosion control specialist works to close panels underneath the wing of KC-130J Hercules in Al Asad.*

### LtCol Dave Krebs, Commanding Officer, VMGR-252:

*"While I concur that the KC-130J can perform Litening pod missions, I don't think it is in the best interests of the MAGTF. While USAF C-130 squadrons are task organized to support either aerial delivery or air land, the VMGR performs the full spectrum of Hercules missions (i.e., special operations). . . Adding the additional maintenance and aircrew training requirements to support Litening pod operations is perhaps a bridge too far."*

## Enhanced Search Results from the Joint Lessons Learned Repository

As reported in our [December 2007 newsletter](#), the initial capability of the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) can now be accessed from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) website. This provides users with another search capability for finding relevant lessons in their areas of interest. Accessing the link, [SEARCH JOINT LESSONS LEARNED](#), will take you to the Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR) where you will eventually be able to search the databases of many commands, services and agencies simultaneously. Although a number of organizations have come "on line" within the past few months, their repositories will initially be very sparse. Presently, you should only expect to retrieve substantial results from the repositories of the U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) and the Naval Operational Medicine Institute (NOMI).

### Joint Lessons Learned Repository Search

- Use lower case for MAX results
- [click here for search help](#)

Check all

COCOMS	SERVICES	CSAs	INTER-AGENCIES
<input type="checkbox"/> AFRICOM <input type="checkbox"/> CENTCOM (SIPR Only) <input type="checkbox"/> EUCOM (SIPR Only) <input type="checkbox"/> JFCOM <input type="checkbox"/> JS <input type="checkbox"/> NORAD/NORTHCOM <input type="checkbox"/> PACOM <input type="checkbox"/> SOCOM (SIPR Only) <input type="checkbox"/> STRATCOM <input type="checkbox"/> SOUTHCOM <input type="checkbox"/> USTRANSCOM	<input type="checkbox"/> ARMY <input type="checkbox"/> NAVY <input type="checkbox"/> USMC <input type="checkbox"/> USAF <input type="checkbox"/> USCG <input type="checkbox"/> NGB  <input type="checkbox"/> MSC <input type="checkbox"/> NOMI <input type="checkbox"/> NMRPB	<input type="checkbox"/> DCMA <input type="checkbox"/> DIA <input type="checkbox"/> DISA <input type="checkbox"/> DLA <input type="checkbox"/> DTRA <input type="checkbox"/> JPRA <input type="checkbox"/> NGA <input type="checkbox"/> NSA  <input type="checkbox"/> CIFA <input type="checkbox"/> DIOCC	<input type="checkbox"/> USAID <input type="checkbox"/> Dept of State <input type="checkbox"/> DHS  <div style="text-align: center;">NGOs</div> <input type="checkbox"/> ARC <input type="checkbox"/> CAP <input type="checkbox"/> IAFF

**Update!!** Within the past few weeks, the JLLR search capability has been expanded to include not only searches of individual lessons, but also searches of documents contained in the repositories of MCCLL and NOMI (and, of course, other commands and agencies as they come online). The joint lessons learned searches now provide essentially the same functionality as the MCCLL [GOOGLE TYPE SEARCH](#), with the added advantage of searching the repositories of NOMI. In particular, for users interested in performing searches on medical-related issues, the JLLR search capability will serve as a useful tool for identifying available Marine Corps and Navy lessons/documents.

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## Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Operation Iraqi Freedom

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) was pleased to have had the opportunity to provide a Marine Corps representative (Col David Bunn) to the Iraq Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) Collection and Analysis Team (CAAT) that was formed in October 2007 by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL). This team visited key participants in the PRT process in Iraq and Kuwait during a fifteen-day period in October and November 2007. The team interviewed over 140 individuals who represented a cross section of roles in the current PRT mission in Iraq, with varying viewpoints on the reconstruction challenges that must still be faced. The objective was to collect lessons and observations on several specific PRT topics: (1) command and control, (2) training, (3) plans, (4) operations, (5) sustainment and (6) administration. Observations were obtained from both PRTs and embedded PRTs (ePRTs) and included a diverse group of U.S. Army civil affairs specialists, State Department Senior Foreign Service Officers, and company grade officers (both Soldiers and Marines).



*Citizens of Garma, Iraq, joined by Marines from 3d Battalion, 3d Marines, and members of the embedded PRT (ePRT) attend the re-opening of the town's market. This reconstruction project was supported financially by the ePRT.*

Based on the collection effort, CALL has published a report, entitled [Initial Impressions Report: Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Operation Iraqi Freedom \(OIF\)](#). As a result of its visit, the team determined that the focus of the coalition efforts for all PRTs/ePRTs is clearly understood by everyone involved in the process. All participants agreed that the goal of the PRTs is to improve the capacity of the government at the provincial level and to ensure that the Iraqi government improves its sustainability for central services. The goal for the ePRTs is essentially the same, except that the focus is at the municipal level. It was noted that those PRTs that are able to travel freely within their provinces to meet with Iraqi officials and mingle with local citizens have a decided advantage. (This is the case in Al Anbar Province, for example.) In other Iraqi provinces, progress has been slowed by the inability of the teams to travel freely.

Funding sources for projects continue to be the cornerstone of plans to influence the Iraqi leadership from the municipal level up to the national level. Although project activity has improved, the progress of projects is still considered to be slower than what is required (with the exception of the Quick Reaction Fund administered by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and the military's Commander's Emergency Response Program).

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## Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center for Excellence, Taji, Iraq: COIN Leader's Course

**Article by Major Brooks D. Tucker, USMCR, Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) Representative to Regimental Combat Teams 1 and 5**

When Marine unit and detachment commanders and their key staffs arrive in Iraq for the standard Pre-Deployment Site Survey (PDSS), they are first sent to the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNF-I) Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence (COIN CFE), located at Camp Taji, north of Baghdad. The COIN CFE was established in December 2005 by General George Casey, USA, General Petraeus' predecessor. The center's mission is to provide American regiment, battalion, and company commanders, transition team leaders, and key staff with an advanced level of understanding of COIN theory, doctrine, best practices, lessons learned, and friendly TTPs required to execute full spectrum operations in the Iraqi Theater of Operations. The COIN CFE also acts as the focal point for the collection of emerging lessons learned, best practices, and TTPs collected from Coalition Forces and Iraqi Security Forces for further transmittal to the U.S. Army - U.S. Marine Corps COIN Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

The five-day COIN CFE program that I attended in January 2008 was populated by commanders and selected staff members from two Marine infantry battalions slated for duty in Iraq, along with senior representatives from Marine combat arms units deploying to Iraq in the coming months, in addition to Army units that had been operating in and around Baghdad as part of the "surge."

The classified briefings at the center, specific to the AOs of the attending units, are intended to familiarize the students with the current operating environments in their future battle space, inform them of friendly and enemy TTPs, and provide them with direct access to senior U.S. military leaders in Iraq during question and answer periods and interactive discussions.

The first two days of the course included substantive visits from General David Petraeus, Commanding General, Multi-National Force-Iraq, Lieutenant General Raymond Odierno, Commanding General, Multi-National Corps-Iraq, and Major General John Allen, Deputy Commanding General, Multi-National Forces-West Iraq. Each of the General Officers spent the better part of an hour giving the attendees their views and discussed areas of interest with the group.

General Petraeus spent over an hour soliciting questions and providing us with his assessment of the progress to date in Al Anbar and Diyala provinces, and in the city of Baghdad, as well as the ongoing security and stabilization operations along the northern Tigris River and south of Baghdad. He also provided us with his view on force reductions, a "thinning out" as he called it, his prognostication for specific Iraqi political reconciliation legislation and economic revitalization efforts, and commented on the necessity for the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) to be co-located with the regiments and battalions they support.

Major General Allen gave an overview of the MNF-W battle space and the progress he had witnessed since arriving in December 2006, specifically the significant transition from a "Clear and Hold" posture to a "Hold and Build" posture, the integral component of Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) monies as a vital and responsive element of COIN "fire support" to fund essential reconstruction projects in Al Anbar, and the bureaucratic, functional challenges faced by the PRTs. His staff followed with specific briefs from the G-2, G-3, and G-5, and an informative presentation from Major General Allen's Tribal Engagement Advisor, William McCallister, Major, U.S. Army (Ret.) on the subject of reconciliation and tribal patronage, the importance of shame and pride in Iraqi society, the tribal governance factors inherent in Al Anbar, and the overarching cultural and social dynamics present in Iraqi communities throughout Iraq.

One of the best received periods of instruction during the week was a series of one hour seminars on COIN operations in southern Iraq from a purely British perspective, individual case studies of the British conduct of COIN in Aden, Oman, and Malaya, the French COIN experiences in Vietnam and Algeria, and lessons from the U.S. experience in South Vietnam and the specific attributes of the short-lived Marine Combined Action Platoon initiative. These seminars were ably taught by Daniel Marston, an American and Senior Lecturer in the Department of War Studies, Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst. Dr. Marston has spent several months in Iraq, much of it at the operational and tactical levels with British Army units operating in and around Basra. His candid assessments and insights on the British approach to COIN in southern Iraq, much of it shaped by experiences in Northern Ireland, were critical and thought provoking.

(Continued on the [Next page](#))



*Marines from 1st Battalion, 2nd Marines train on the "clear and hold" portion of the "clear, hold and build" mission at Fort Bragg, NC, prior to their upcoming deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 08. The "clear, hold and build" strategy has evolved in order to exploit current OIF successes and begin emphasizing Iraqi reconstruction, governance and economic development.*

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## COIN Leader's Course (continued)

### Article by Major Brooks D. Tucker (continued)

The Marine battalion commanders in attendance provided generally positive feedback on the course content. Lieutenant Colonel James Zientek of Third Battalion, Sixth Marines, stated "Bottom line, I thought the course was good with the exception of some instruction that did not adequately cover issues pertinent to our AO (Anbar) - tribal engagement, Iraqi Government." Other briefings deemed useful to Marine commanders and staffs were the presentations given by the Deputy Staff Judge Advocate, MNF-W, who paid specific attention to the detainee release protocols and the potential operational risks posed by increases in detainee releases across Al Anbar and other provinces, and a panel discussion on the Al Qaim Awakening, moderated by LtCol. P. B. Baumgarten, USMC, Commanding Officer, Task Force 3/2, currently based in Al Qaim. LtCol. Baumgarten was joined by Mr. Farhan, the Mayor of Al Qaim, Sheik Kurdi from the Abu Mahaal tribe, and Brigadier General Ismael, Commanding Officer, 3rd Brigade, Iraqi Army, the senior Iraqi officer based in the Al Qaim area. These Iraqi panelists played pivotal roles in the local resistance against AQI in 2004-2005, when Sheik Kurdi banded together twenty-two tribes in Al Qaim to fight AQI, and all three men were personally involved in the Anbar Awakening that began in Al Qaim during 2005-2006. Each man candidly discussed his role and actions during those dangerous and volatile periods. The Iraqi panelists provided the attendees with invaluable historical perspectives and imparted wisdom to help the Marines understand how to gain the trust of Iraqis and work effectively with Iraqi centers of influence.

The director and staff of the COIN Center of Excellence are constantly striving to improve the course curriculum and tailor it to include fresh operational perspectives and relevant COIN case studies from within the Iraqi theater. The senior instructor at the center is a Marine Lieutenant Colonel on his fourth deployment to Iraq, and he spent considerable time debriefing our group of Marines. Other members of the staff are active duty or retired Army officers, many of whom have served in Iraq and who work at the center as contract employees. Designated members of the staff periodically travel to specific locations in Iraq to interview Coalition Forces and gather information that will comprise new briefings to future classes and reports that are sent to Fort Leavenworth.



*LtCol P. B. Baumgarten (center) was the moderator of a panel discussion at the COIN Leader's Course on the subject of the Al Qaim Awakening. Here, LtCol Baumgarten speaks with a local sheik after assuming command of the Al Qaim area of operations as Commanding Officer, Task Force 3/2.*

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## "Ask Mac" for Advice on COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society

As noted in the article above, MajGen Allen's Tribal Engagement Advisor, William "Mac" McCallister, provided the presentation at the COIN Leader's Course on reconciliation and tribal patronage. In addition to being considered the Marine Corps' resident expert on tribal culture, Mr. McCallister has recently written a pamphlet entitled, [COIN and Irregular Warfare in a Tribal Society](#) that is available from the [Small Wars Journal website](#). As Mr. McCallister notes in this pamphlet:

"COIN and irregular warfare operations in tribal society are a clash of martial, social, religious and political cultures and reflect a number of divergent concepts of victory, defeat and 'rules of play.' Each side's social and political behavior and conventions of war and peace are based on unique historical and social experiences and are expressed in each side's stylized way of fighting and peacemaking. In tribal society, or better stated a society whose behavior is shaped by the tribal ethos, the arts of war and those of peace are the two sides of the coin of statecraft and diplomacy.

The study of the tribal terrain is a challenge. The reason: definitive research materials on tribal diplomacy and the arts of tribal war and those of peace are sparse. Much of the material that speaks to the topic is general and regional in nature and requires 'reading between the lines' to gain an appreciation for the subject matter.

The information contained in this pamphlet is intended to assist the student of the tribal arts of war and those of peace in developing an analytic structure for assessing personal experiences, observations and unit after action reports. The ultimate goal is to assist the warfighter to make sense of the behavior patterns and trends inherent in tribal politics and diplomatic conventions. It hopes to serve as a guide to gauge the effectiveness of COIN or irregular warfare tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) and a cultural baseline to determine why certain approaches succeed or fail."

Readers may also be interested in a news article from the Wall Street Journal that was referenced in the MCCLL [newsletter for October 2007](#) on Mr. McCallister's role in selecting the Mameluke sword as the gift to be presented to tribal sheiks who had teamed up with U.S. forces to fight the insurgency in Iraq.



*MajGen W.E. Gaskin, Commanding General, Multi-National Forces - West (MNF-W) and MajGen John Allen, Deputy Commanding General, MNF-W, present Sheik Duylami with a Mameluke sword as an expression of thanks for his partnership with coalition forces.*

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## News

### A Monthly Journal from the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point

The Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point has issued the first edition of its new monthly online journal, the [CTC Sentinel](#). With access to a large cadre of scholars and practitioners dedicated to the study of terrorism and counter terrorism, the CTC is dedicated to providing a forum for analysis of the most pressing security challenge currently facing the U.S. and its allies.

The first edition of the journal has a excellent series of articles that includes such topics as: (1) the clash between ideological purists and mili-

tary strategists in Al Qa'ida, (2) countering the terrorist use of the worldwide web, (3) the Al Qa'ida resurgence in Pakistan, (4) the significant "loss of ground" by Al Qa'ida in Iraq, (5) the Saudi process of repatriating and reintegrating returnees from Guantanamo, (6) the renouncing of violence by a leading Egyptian Jihadist, (7) securing Yemen's cooperation in the war against Al Qa'ida, and (8) the failure of the southern Thailand insurgency to achieve popular support.

The CTC Sentinel will include scholarly research, as well as articles with a more practical orientation. The latter will be reflected in each issue with an operational

after action report from military personnel returning from combat operations, as well as a monthly chronology of significant terrorist incidents.

Marines who will shortly deploy to Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) may be particularly interested in the article on the resurgence of Al Qa'ida in Pakistan. The article notes that this terrorist organization now has a secure operating base in Pakistan from which to threaten Afghanistan through its Taliban allies.

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### Military Working Dog Receives the Purple Heart

The military working dogs (MWDs) in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) have demonstrated their value on many occasions, as have our canine friends during every major conflict since World War II. The "K-9 Corps" began in 1942 to provide sentry dogs, mine detection dogs, messenger dogs and patrol dogs. Their use has continued unabated to the present. With the emergence of threats such as IEDs in OIF, the number of deployed MWDs has increased significantly. During

OIF, three working dogs and four handlers have been killed in action. Now, for the first time, a Marine MWD has been awarded the Purple Heart, as reported in a story from the AP:

"Lex, the former bomb-sniffing dog of the late Marine Cpl Dustin Lee, will be given a Purple Heart next month at the Working Dog and Fallen K-9 Handler Tribute. Eight-year-old Lex was working with Lee when the Marine was killed during a bombing in Iraq last year. The German shepherd was also injured. He has since

been retired and lives with Lee's family in Clarke County, MS. Lee and Lex had been assigned to the Marine Corps Logistics Base in Albany, Ga. The tribute will be held on 16 February at the Air Armament Museum, Eglin Air Force Base, Fla. Lee's family is scheduled to be on hand for the event. . ."

Read the complete AP story in the [Marine Corps Times](#).

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### Marines Training with Holographic Technology

[Marines Training on the Cutting Edge](#), by Rick Rogers, *San Diego Union-Tribune*, 16 January 2008

"The Marine Corps is embracing breakthrough holographic technology to teach combat tactics and battlefield ethics at Camp Pendleton, as troops there begin another major round of deployments to Iraq. Marine officials yesterday unveiled the Infantry Immersion Trainer, a high-tech prototype simulator that resides in a former - and decidedly low-tech - tomato-packing plant that still bears directions for truck drivers.

The 32,000-square-foot, \$2.5 million training ground became reality after a

request from Gen James Mattis, former Commander of the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force at Camp Pendleton. The program capitalizes on 15 years of Navy and Marine research on everything from body movements to urban warfare, coupled with the latest advancements in simulation from defense companies such as Lockheed Martin.

The new training area is "a pretty big deal ... that's expected to save lives," said Col. Clarke Lethin, Chief of Staff for the 1st Marine Expeditionary Force. He added that it also could help guide Marines through the tough process of making split-second battle decisions involving morality and legality. "As we

go through the war, it's changing out there. There are more no-shoots than shoots," Lethin said. "We want to make sure that we are shooting the right people. . ."

"The new simulation program is designed to reinforce ethical conduct, hone small-unit infantry skills and sharpen Marines' combat instincts. It takes its inspiration from a city block in Iraq that U.S. troops typically would patrol, complete with a warren of shops and houses. . ."

Read the [complete article in the San Diego Union-Tribune Online](#)

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## Reading Lists and Book Review

The reading material identified in the reading lists of the [Commandant](#), the [Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command \(COMUSMARCENT\)](#) and the [Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force \(MEF\) Forward](#) provide Marines with a wealth of resources to support their professional development. This month, MCCLL is pleased to feature books and manuals from the lists of the Commandant and MARCENT:

- **Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice**, by David Galula. This book by a French Army officer who served during World War II is on the Commandant's required reading list for 1st Lieutenants and Chief Warrant Officers 2.
- **Culture and Customs of Afghanistan**, by Hafizullah Emadi is on the MARCENT reading list for Staff NCOs and Field Grade Officers deploying to Afghanistan.
- **First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps**, by LtGen Victor H. Krulak, is the "marquee title" book on the Commandant's list and is required reading for all Marines. Previous newsletters have included discussion guides for Parts I thru VI of this book. This month, we include the Conclusion Discussion Guide (beginning on the [next page](#)).

### **Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice**, by David Galula

**Review by LCDR Joseph D. Haines, USN, Marine Corps Gazette**

"One sign of an expert is the ability to clearly and concisely analyze and explain his subject. LTC David Galula's *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* achieves both goals admirably in just 99 pages. . . [it] should be required reading for every military officer and noncommissioned officer, as well as today's political leaders. Armed with Galula's insightful wisdom, the American military can be armed against the mistakes of Vietnam and Iraq.

LTC Galula served with the French Army during World War II in North Africa, Italy, and France. But his most valuable lessons were learned in counterinsurgency warfare in China, Greece, Indochina, and Algeria. Galula's book was written during a fellowship at the Center for International Affairs at Harvard. He died a few years later, missing the opportunity to see the American military ignore most of his excellent recommendations concerning Vietnam. Had his advice been heeded, a different outcome to the war is certainly conceivable.

The theme of Galula's work can be summed up as how counterinsurgency forces can protect and gain the support of the populace, acquire information on the identity and location of insurgents, and ultimately defeat the insurgents. He draws the crucial distinction between conventional and counterinsurgency warfare. While the primary goal of conventional warfare is to mass firepower at the appropriate time and place to destroy the enemy, counterinsurgency focuses rather on massing intelligence from the local population to destroy the enemy.

Galula states that the "counterinsurgent cannot achieve much if the population is not, and does not feel, protected against the insurgent." Today, Galula would likely state that the United States and the Iraqi Government cannot expect success until the security of the population can be first guaranteed. Only then can the populace be expected to step forward to provide valuable intelligence. He recommends first physically separating civilians from the insurgents via curfews, roadblocks, identity cards, and a census. . ."

Read the remainder of this review in [The Marine Corps Gazette Online](#).

### **Culture and Customs of Afghanistan**, by Hafizullah Emadi

#### **Miscellaneous Reviews**

"This title looks at Afghanistan from ancient times to the present U.S. military involvement and provides useful background information for motivated readers. Emadi has a thorough knowledge of his subject, as he has done fieldwork in various regions of the country and also monitored the 2004 elections. His discussions of the Russian occupation, the subsequent civil war, and the Taliban are detailed and informative, as is his discussion of religion and religious thought. The chapters on social customs and family, women, and gender issues are particularly interesting. This volume includes a simple country map, an extensive and detailed chronology, a short resource guide, and a smattering of pedestrian black-and-white photos. . ." from the [School Library Journal](#)

"This reference is an attempt to remedy the lack of recent literature on the culture, customs and cultural transformation of Afghanistan, a topic that has remained largely overlooked since the outbreak of civil war in 1992. Emadi, a consultant to Focus Humanitarian Assistance and a monitor of the October 2004 elections in Afghanistan, provides a brief history of the region but primarily addresses the religion, literature, arts, housing, social customs and family structures of contemporary Afghanistan. . ." from the [Reference & Research Book News/Art Book News Annual](#)

"[This book] provides a detailed overview of Afghanistan. Chapters include Land, People, and History; Religion and Religious Thought; Literature and the Arts; Architecture, Housing and Settlements; Social Customs, Cuisine, and Traditional Dress; Family, Women and Gender Issues; Lifestyles; Media; and Education. The reader will learn that Afghanistan has been at the crossroads of many cultures and civilizations and occupies a unique place in the cultural geography of Central Asia. Tribes and armies invaded ancient Afghanistan and continue in modern times, and the invasions have left their mark on this country and its people. This volume gives a close-up view of the people of Afghanistan as they struggle to rebuild. . ." from the [MultiCultural Review](#)

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## Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

### First to Fight: Conclusion Discussion Guide

#### 1. Identify LtGen Krulak's mission (task and purpose) in writing this section.

LtGen Krulak's task was to summarize that the Marine Corps' reputation and stature at the end of the 20th century resulted from a deliberate commitment to excellence, combined with the good luck to be noticed for the ability to be at the right place at the right time with the right blend of warriors, equipment, ideas and fighting spirit to get the job done. LtGen Krulak also warns of three challenges facing the Marine Corps: people, bureaucratic processes, and the challenges of crossing oceans to get to the fight. His purpose is to show that the means for addressing these challenges lie within the institution of the Marine Corps so long as the Corps dedicates itself to making Marines who think, innovate, improvise, do more with less, see themselves as part of a family, and are ready to both fight and win.

#### 2. What part of the conclusion was most effective in accomplishing the author's mission? What part of the book was least effective?

The most effective part of the conclusion was the description of the recruiting challenge and the belief that the Marine Corps' capacity to attract people dedicated to being members of an elite held to higher standards of performance and selflessness than the society at large. The least effective part of the conclusion is the third challenge regarding the future of expeditionary warfare from the sea. It is one thing for the Marine Corps to commit to the proposition that its future is inextricably linked to the U.S. Navy, but there exists a huge challenge in convincing the Navy to commit to institutional excellence in amphibious power projection so that Marines are able to employ the full extent of their capabilities. LtGen Krulak's conclusion does not address this parallel set of challenges.

#### 3. What does LtGen Krulak assume in order to accomplish his mission? Does he validate these assumptions in the conclusion?

Again, with regard to the third challenge (the future of expeditionary warfare from the sea), LtGen Krulak assumes that technological advances "serve only to make amphibious assaults more formidable to the enemy" without acknowledging the impact of technology in defending against amphibious operations: coastal defense artillery systems, cruise missile and other precision guided munitions, and mine warfare (particularly very shallow water mines) are all threats that we as a Navy-Marine Corps team have not yet effectively countered.

#### 4. The part of the book that is most relevant to what I/we do:

This answer depends heavily on the individual or organization considering the question. From a general Marine Corps perspective, the answer is threefold. First, we must continue to develop Marines more dedicated to the long term success of the Marine Corps rather than to the prosperity of their own individual careers. Second, the Marine Corps must be able to operate within the Department of Defense bureaucracy without allowing bureaucratic processes to define the Marine Corps. Finally, the Marine Corps' relevance lies in its contributions to naval expeditionary capabilities. The Marine Corps' role is to present unique capabilities in the naval expeditionary (littoral) environment – not to merely duplicate the other services capabilities on a smaller scale.

#### 5. Identify LtGen Krulak's specific and implied conclusions.

Specified conclusions are identified in the responses to questions 1 and 4, but feel free to add other specific conclusions if you are approaching this discussion from a different perspective.

Using the same Marine Corps-wide perspective adopted above, the implied conclusion of LtGen Krulak's first challenge is the gap between societal and Marine Corps values is not static. *Warfighting* expresses this dynamic very well throughout its first chapter (see MCDP-1, "The Human Dimension" pages 13-14 in particular). LtGen Krulak wrote this book in 1984 drawing from the perspective of 34 years of active duty (1934-1968) and over fifty years of observing the transformation of civilians into Marines (including commanding MCRD San Diego from 1959-1962). With respect to values and ethics, the gap between civilian recruits beginning the transformation process and basically trained Marines emerging from the transformation process will vary, sometimes widening and sometimes narrowing. The Marine Corps needs to be its own harshest critic in examining the transformation process and continually strive to improve that process.

Please review the remainder of the discussion guide from the [Marine Corps University](#).

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## Updated List of MCCLL Representatives

The latest roster of Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) representatives to major Marine Corps and joint commands and organizations is provided below. Changes from the December newsletter include: (1) LtCol Larkin has replaced Col Wassink as the MCCLL air combat element (ACE) representative at Al Asad Airbase, Iraqi, and (2) Maj Abramaitys and Sgt Pace have replaced Capt Escher and MGySgt McLane as the MCCLL command element (CE) representatives to Multi-National Forces West (MNF-W) headquarters at Camp Fallujah.

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