After a decade spent in the shadow of the Afghan Taliban, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan claimed ownership over increasingly frequent waves of violence.
Journal
Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.
We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.
What is setting the current influx of migrants apart is the sheer number of unaccompanied children who make up the majority of the tidal wave.
The feedback and analysis system along with metrics used by the US and ISAF to quantify measures of success in Afghanistan has been disproportionately focused on enemy related activity.
The purpose of this paper is to describe social science research methods employed in Afghanistan during 2011-2012 and to report their use to clarify social issues related to conflict.
Community policing is a paradigm within law enforcement suggesting that most issues are best dealt with proactively at the community level through collaborative engagement.
What is important for the Joint force to understand is that social structures are not the stable, highly integrated, and harmonious systems as presented on a map.
Despite the scope of the threat to Mexico’s security, violent drug-trafficking organizations are not well understood, and optimal strategies to combat them have not been identified.
As potentially the ‘first counterinsurgency victory of the twenty-first century’, the Sri Lankan experience turns much of this conventional wisdom on its head.
The emergence of autodefensas (self-defense} or vigilante groups in Mexico has far-reaching international implications that may not be readily visible.
Fighting Fire with Fire: Texas Rangers and Counterinsurgency in the 1847 Mexico City Campaign
Given the exponential growth and popularity of digital fabrication, also known colloquially as 3D printing, it is timely to question the implications that it holds for state security.
Malcolm Gladwell uses high pressure defense as a metaphor for insurgency in his newest book, David and Goliath. The lesson he draws is that the weaker party should always choose asymmetric strategies.
Coordination Failures Among Mexican Security Forces: How the Mexican Government Botched the War on Drugs
Afghan sovereignty and future prosperity requires a more effective security force that is locally trained and fielded, and solely funded by Afghanistan.
A key question going unanswered is whether “The Clash of Civilizations” is still a driving force in current and future operational environments.
How the US Army thinks about strategy, thinking which is unavoidably influenced by how the word strategy is defined, bears on how institutions will imagine, explain, and prepare ‘landpower’.
The new COIN manual retains a section on “Legal Considerations,” upgrading it from an appendix to its own chapter.
Continue on for three loosely related articles meant to inspire novel thought on military operations in the growing urban landscapes of the future.
The seventh anniversary of the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah conflict provides a critical opportunity to evaluate the global effect in a number of dimensions.
Committing months and years at a time to mentoring individuals and organizations takes a specific set of personality and character traits.
In this article, I undertake an analysis of the military-to-military components of the United States’ security assistance program in Morocco.
Echoes of past tensions between the U.S. and Russia are again playing out on the international stage as we are bombarded by an increase in Cold War, anti-American type rhetoric.
U.S. Policymakers have generally accepted as essential and uncontested fact that poverty and terrorism are directly and causally linked.
Thinking About Thinking About the Army’s Future: Paradigms and the Wicked Problem of “Landpower”
The February 2014 take-down of Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán Loera, the notorious over-lord of the Sinaloa Cartel, has had a rippling effect on the drug war in northern Mexico.
Few historical comparisons have proven to be as useful for military officers today as that of the war that the French government fought against the Front de Libération Nationale.
America’s profession of arms is an institution grounded on the nature of ethics and propriety dating back to its inception.
Community Ecosystem Analysis: Using Data to Apply Military Counterinsurgency Principles to Community Policing
In his review of the updated FM 3-24, Bing West has some harsh words about the manual’s academic tint, Charles J. Dunlap is also unimpressed.
Still Shortchanged: Some Observations About the New Army/Marine Corps COIN Doctrine
The Normandy invasion is usually depicted with great crashes, bangs and volcanic energy combined with broad scenes of masses of material and manpower.
If doctrine collapses in practice, do not repeat it. We tried COIN as nation-building twice, and twice it failed.
USSOCOM and USAID came together in 2013 in order to develop a capability that would increase inter- and intra-governmental information sharing and collaboration.
This article examines how the lay-out of Westgate Mall shaped the Westgate Mall attack and the response to it.
The Zero Dark Six Sigma Learning Organization Black Belt: What Should Businesses Learn From McChrystal and The Military Post 9/11?
The new U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps counterinsurgency doctrine, "Insurgency and Countering Insurgencies" has some good things to offer but also has several flaws.
Original and Good: The New US Army and Marine Corps “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies” Field Manual.
The quote alone justifies the publication of the new FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. And the new title is worth noting as well – “Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies.”
A few observations on the new COIN manual "Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies".
Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies: 21st Century Doctrine for an Ancient Way of War - Review of the new COIN manual.
The ability of Americans and partners to coordinate and cooperate will greatly influence how successful we are at addressing the international security threats of the 21st Century.
As long as Syrian President Bashir al-Assad is allowed to stay, Syria’s future is sectarian division between Alawites/Shia and Sunni/Kurds. Christians will have no future.
Effective discourse can have very real and significant influence on military decisions and is a key to better group decision making.
How grievances have become a tool of Islamic extremists intent on righting perceived wrongs as determined by their interpretations of Islam.
This article provides ten tips focused at the tactical level to assist combat leaders on advising host nation security forces on using warrant based targeting.
"... Still coming from William Lind, the “self-professed” inventor, or re-inventor, of the concept of maneuver warfare it cannot be lightly disregarded."
Dueling With Clausewitz: Games of Preemption, Wars of Attrition, and Deconstructing a Classic Analogy for Understanding the Fundamental Nature of the First World War
The IC largely fails to plan and take into consideration sociocultural facets typical to a population within the purview of a unit’s operational environment.
Schizophrenic Doctrine: Why We Need to Separate Democratization Out of Stability and COIN Doctrine
By assessing individual megacities through this framework, the Army can better understand how it might operate as part of a joint, interagency, intergovernmental, and multinational force.