Journal

Extreme Barbarism, a Death Cult, and Holy Warriors in Mexico:

Societal Warfare South of the Border?

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan

Download the Full Article: Societal Warfare South of the Border?

This short essay is about impression—gut feelings combined with a certain amount of analytical skill—about recent trends taking place in Mexico concerning the ongoing criminal insurgencies being waged by the various warring cartels, gangs, and mercenary organizations that have metastasized though out that nation (and in many other regions as well). The authors spent over eight hours sequestered together about a month ago on a five-hundred mile 'there and back again road trip' to attend a training conference as instructors for the Kern County Chiefs of Police. Our talks centered on Mexican Drug Cartels, 3rd Generation Gangs, 3rd Phase Cartels, Criminal Insurgency Theory, and a host of related topics most folks just don't normally discuss in polite company. In the car, and at the conference, we were bombarded by Sullivan's never ending twitter and social networking news feeds—in Spanish and English—linked to the criminal violence in Mexico. If Dante had been our contemporary, we fear, he could just have easily taken a stroll through some of the cities and towns of Mexico using those news feeds and substituting the imagery for the circles of hell he described in his early 14th century work the Divine Comedy.

The hours of conversation about the conflicts in Mexico, bolstered by the news feeds and even the Q&A from the training time provided to the Kern Chiefs, provided us both with much to reflect upon. Additionally, both authors are currently co-writing three essays for a follow-on project to the earlier Narcos Over the Border (Routledge) book, the work that zenpundit.com found as "...one of the more disturbing academic works recently published in the national security field, not excluding even those monographs dealing with Islamist terrorism and Pakistan," concerning Mexico's immense problems. If this were not enough, as part of our ongoing collaboration, the authors have been trying to determine what to make of Hazen's June 2010 International Review of the Red Cross paper "Understanding gangs as armed groups." Her conclusions just don't correlate with the empirical evidence stemming from the cartel and gang related incidents regularly occurring in Mexico. That work suggests to us that American street gang researchers, whose work Hazen utilized as the basis of her analysis, are totally insulated from the reality of the conflicts in Mexico—just as are many members of the American public and their elected officials. For good or for bad, we are not so well insulated, having tracked what has been taking place in that country for some years now. The ongoing review (for the purposes of identifying cartel tattoos, cult icons, and instances of ritual killing) of the images of the tortured and broken bodies—some no longer recognizable as once ever being human beings— continually haunts us both.

Our impression is that what is now taking place in Mexico has for some time gone way beyond secular and criminal (economic) activities as defined by traditional organized crime studies. In fact, the intensity of change may indeed be increasing. Not only have de facto political elements come to the fore—i.e., when a cartel takes over an entire city or town, they have no choice but to take over political functions formerly administered by the local government— but social (narcocultura) and religious/spiritual (narcocultos) characteristics are now making themselves more pronounced. What we are likely witnessing is Mexican society starting to not only unravel but to go to war with itself. The bonds and relationships that hold that society together are fraying, unraveling, and, in some instances, the polarity is reversing itself with trust being replaced by mistrust and suspicion. Traditional Mexican values and competing criminal value systems are engaged in a brutal contest over the 'hearts, minds, and souls' of its citizens in a street-by-street, block-by-block, and city-by-city war over the future social and political organization of Mexico. Environmental modification is taking place in some urban centers and rural outposts as deviant norms replace traditional ones and the younger generation fully accepts a criminal value system as their baseline of behavior because they have known no other. The continuing incidents of ever increasing barbarism—some would call this a manifestation of evil even if secularly motivated—and the growing popularity of a death cult are but two examples of this clash of values. Additionally, the early rise of what appears to be cartel holy warriors may now also be taking place. While extreme barbarism, death cults, and possibly now holy warriors found in the Mexican cartel wars are still somewhat the exception rather than the rule, each of these trends is extremely alarming, and will be touched upon in turn.

Download the Full Article: Societal Warfare South of the Border?

Dr. Robert J. Bunker and John P. Sullivan are frequent contributors to Small Wars Journal.

by Gene Kamena with Roy Houchin

Download the Full Article: Muffled Voices

The Global War On Terror (GWOT), or as we now call it, Overseas Contingency Operations, has cost our nation dearly in terms of loss of life, the number of wounded and the amount of national treasure expended. Operations over the past decade exacted an additional casualty--the ability of military leaders to communicate effectively at the strategic level. Our track record for clear, concise and honest communications is indeed lacking.

Download the Full Article: Muffled Voices

Professor Gene C. Kamena currently teaches Leadership and Ethics at the Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama. He is retired from the Army as a Colonel of Infantry.

Dr. Roy F. Houchin II joined the faculty of the Air War College in 2006 following his retirement from active duty with the Air Force. He has taught previously at the School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air Command and Staff College and in the Department of History at the US Air Force Academy.

by Tony Corn

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

A decade after 9/11, the absurdity of the U.S. grand strategy in the Long War is never better illustrated than by the fact that Washington currently spends $ 100 billion dollars a year in Afghanistan chasing a grand total of 100 Al Qaeda fighters (one billion per terrorist). If there is only one reason to rediscover Liddell Hart today, it is because, as Sir Ernest Rutherford famously said in a different context: "We are running out of money, gentlemen. It's time to start thinking."

Download the Full Article: From Mars to Minerva: Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and the Two Western Ways of War

Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC.

by Heather M. Brown

Download the Full Article: Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam

In the mid-to-late 1960s, Americans became increasingly concerned with the strategic decision-making of U.S. leaders regarding the military's presence in Vietnam. One of the most controversial decisions of the era was ratified on 7 January 1962, when the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army were given authorization under Operation RANCH HAND, to deploy the herbicides 2,4,5-trichlorophenoxyacetate (2,4,5-T) and 2,4-dicholorophenoxyacetate (2,4-D), commonly known by its code name, Agent Orange, on South Vietnam. Operation RANCH HAND directed the herbicide spraying project from U.S. Air Force C-123 twin-engine aircraft, U.S. Army helicopters and infantry hand sprayers.

Download the Full Article: Defense by Defoliation: The Necessity for Agent Orange in Vietnam

Heather Marie Brown received her undergraduate degree from Texas State University-San Marcos in December 2010 as a double-major in History and Political Science.

The Ability to Modify Strategic Doctrine While Still at War

Book review by Reyes Z. Cole

Download the Full Review: Past is Prologue

Martin Samuels, Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and German Armies, 1888-1918, Oregon. Frank Cass Publishers, 2003, 285 pgs, $48.27.

Understanding that in military history "past is often prologue", it would seem odd to return to a book on World War I to compare and contrast U.S. military efforts at adapting doctrine while at war. However, Samuels's book shares some enlightening facts about how German and British forces attempted to modify strategic methods while embroiled in a trench warfare stalemate. This can be a lesson to today's fight as U.S. forces must continually update and modify doctrine, leaving many feeling that the current U.S. Counterinsurgency (COIN) Manual is out of date in regards to operations in Afghanistan.

The Global War on Terror has been underway now for over ten years and at this point I would say the U.S. military strategic goals have not kept pace with enemy strategies, and the military has failed at the task of modifying doctrine while in the midst of fighting a war.

Download the Full Review: Past is Prologue

Reyes Cole is an Infantry Lieutenant Colonel with 25 years experience in the U.S. Army and Army Reserve. He is currently a civilian Branch Head at the U.S. Marine Corps Center for Irregular Warfare. The opinions expressed here are the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense or Marine Corps.

Book Review by Frank G. Hoffman

Download the Full Review: Adapting to the Utterly Unpredictable, the Entirely Unknown

James A. Russell, Innovation, Transformation, and War, Counterinsurgency Operations in Anbar and Ninewa Provinces, Iraq, 2005-2007, Stanford, CA: Stanford Security Studies, 2011, 288 pgs, $24.95.

The most respected military historian of our day, Michael Howard, commented years ago that the one aspect of military affairs he believed needed to be studied above all others was "the capacity to adapt oneself to the utterly unpredictable, the entirely unknown." For a generation we ignored his advice, and instead pursued techno-centric illusions and conceptual dark holes with little payoff.

Reinforcing that advice, now retired Army General Dave Fastabend once encouraged the U.S. Army to seek one operational advantage in the future--to strive to "be superior in the art of learning and adaptation." The last decade of the Long War has borne out both these arguments and also demonstratively shown how far we still need to go despite the development of counterinsurgency (COIN) and stability operations doctrine in the Army and Marine Corps.

Download the Full Review: Adapting to the Utterly Unpredictable, the Entirely Unknown

Mr. Hoffman is a retired Marine Reservist and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal.

by Joe Parker

Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT's

The Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle had a highly publicized entry into the military ranks of vehicles, first with the Marines in 2004, and then eventually filling requirements with the Army to provide a dramatic increase in IED and blast protection than the ill-suited HMMVW for combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Rushed in to production by as many as nine separate contractors, the endstate resulted in an accelerated production of multiple variations of the MRAP, with the types roughly categorized as Category I, II, and III and based on number of occupants and mission specific mine/IED clearance operations. Now, as the combat mission in Iraq has completed and leaders begin to discuss life beyond Afghanistan, the MRAPs usefulness is in question. The Department of Defense is actively pursuing a replacement for the HMMVW with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program, and the MRAP is facing an identity crisis. Is it a troop transporter or a combat system? What capability beyond the blast protection does it bring and how does that translate into future utilization? It would appear that the MRAP does have a future beyond our current conflicts as Defense Secretary Robert Gates instructed the military to incorporate it into the Army Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTMOD) plan. What is yet to be seen is how well the MRAP incorporates itself into the BCTMOD plan, what role and capability it fills in the Brigade Combat Team, and what additional requirements it places on existing force structure.

Download the Full Article: The Impact of Incorporating MRAPs into BCT's

MAJ Joe Parker is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has served three years in Iraq as a platoon leader, brigade maintenance officer, and company commander. He holds a BA in Communications from Wake Forest University, and is a graduate of the Quartermaster Officer Basic Course and the Combined Logistics Captains Career Course. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

by Richard N. Pedersen

Download the Full Article: Mission Command

This paper proposes to describe mission command in a more accurate and practicable way. Effectively integrating the operations process within mission command activities in current and future environments is a complex problem. Enacting changes to time-honored and culturally inculcated institutional concepts is also a complex problem. Complex problems cannot be fully understood until possible solutions are proposed and developed through collaborative discussion and learned about through action. This paper provides a starting point for that process by offering three substantive proposals that may now be discussed and evaluated in order to stimulate further cultural change by transforming institutional concepts.

Download the Full Article: Mission Command

COL Richard N. Pedersen (U.S. Army, Retired) is the lead mission command analyst at the U.S. Army Mission Command Center of Excellence Battle Laboratory at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He commanded a Combined Infantry Brigade Combat Team with duty in combat as Commander, Regional Command-South in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He also commanded the U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program and an airborne infantry battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division.

by Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob

Download the Full Article: Battling Radical Islamist Propaganda in Somalia: The Information Intervention Option

While the international community continues to dither over Somalia, Islamic fundamentalists have taken over control of the country's information space and other key strategic assets. This article discusses the precarious media environment in Somalia and revisits discourses on Information Intervention, conceptualised by Jamie Metzl in 1997. It examines the nature of UN's 'Information Intervention' in Somalia and argues that the international community can do more by drawing on available legal instruments to carry out 'coercive' information intervention.

Download the Full Article: Battling Radical Islamist Propaganda in Somalia: The Information Intervention Option

Dr Jacob Udo-Udo Jacob is a Post-Doctoral Teaching Fellow at the Institute of Communications Studies, University of Leeds, United Kingdom.

by Dave Maxwell

Download the Full Article: A Recommendation for Quiet Professionals

There are two schools of thought in Special Operations regarding writing for publication. On one hand, there are those who suggest SOF operations and experiences should remain in the shadows known only to those within the community. On the other, there are those who argue the SOF story should be told in detail to ensure the proper recognition for, correct employment of, and sufficient resourcing for SOF. I am a believer in a modified version of the second school—with one very important caveat.

Quiet Professionals must put less emphasis on the "quiet" and more on the "professional." As members of SOF, we have a professional responsibility to write and publish and share our experience with each other, the rest of the military and the interagency team as well as to inform, and yes, even influence, policy and decision makers. At the same time we have a responsibility to read and learn from the writings of our joint and interagency partners as the experiences of all must be cross-leveled, understood, and integrated. As the old proverb goes, "intelligent men learn from their mistakes and wise men learn from the mistakes of others."

Download the Full Article: A Recommendation for Quiet Professionals

Colonel David S. Maxwell, US Army Special Forces, is a member of the military faculty at the National War College of the National Defense University. He has nearly 30 years' experience in the Infantry and Special Forces, with more than 25 years of service in Asia. He is a graduate of the National War College, the School of Advanced Military Studies, and the US Army Command and General Staff College. The opinions expressed are the author's and not sanctioned by the National Defense University, the Department of Defense or the US Government.

by Reza Jan

Download the Full Article: After Bin Laden: Confronting the Haqqani Network in Kurram

Information gleaned after the killing of Osama bin Laden seems to indicate that bin Laden was much more centrally involved in running al Qaeda. Even so, his death is not a decisive blow to the network and it would be wrong to hail it as such. In fact, al Qaeda's enduring links to other militant Islamist groups in the region and the expansion of the al Qaeda-linked Haqqani Network's operational territory inside Pakistan serve to broaden the group's room to maneuver and increase its survivability.

Download the Full Article: After Bin Laden: Confronting the Haqqani Network in Kurram

Reza Nasim Jan is the Pakistan Team Lead at the American Enterprise Institute's Critical Threats Project and a co-author of the new report The Haqqani Network in Kurram: The Regional Implications of a Growing Insurgency

by Mike Young

Download the Full Article: The End State

Modernizing the Department of Defense (DOD) organization using known blueprints from the market place will allow the DOD to remove $100B from its annual baseline budget without cutting a single weapon system program. Pretty bold statement; but take it to the bank.

The Department of Defense (DOD) approach to organization was once the organization construct most copied by large corporations in the 1950's. Back when General Motors was the largest employer in the country, the competitive landscape did not change very often, and firms were able to sell everything they made to the domestic market. This management construct was put in place to reduce the chance to make mistakes and preserve the status quo. Most companies produced their overall profit and loss statements for the company as a whole, masking how each business unit fared. To say the competitive landscape has changed significantly since the 1950's would not do it justice.

Download the Full Article: The End State

J. Michael "Mike" Young is a logistician with a major in business software that facilitates business operations (logistics). A twenty-year veteran of the US Air Force, Mike has a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Georgia and knows enough about object oriented programming, user interface, and database design to keep out of trouble.

U.S. Army War College Strategy Research Project

The Nature of War Theory

By Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Olsen, U.S. Army

Dr. Thomas J. Williams, Project Adviser

Download the Full Research Project: The Nature of War Theory

Today's advances in evolutionary biology are unifying competing theories of natural selection and serve as a timely call for a similar unification of competing theories of war. This paper explores the relationship between war and natural selection by first examining war's biological origins, and then placing them within a multidisciplinary framework called the Nature of War Theory.

This theory, as its name implies, reconciles natural selection and war to reveal a shared overarching and paradoxical duality, displaying that war is characterized by the simultaneous violent interplay of evolutionary individual-level and group-level adaptations, manifested by individualist and altruistic wars, respectively, and highlighted by trends and insights recognizable to both students of war and evolutionary biology.

Download the Full Research Project: The Nature of War Theory

LTC(P) Paul Olsen is currently a student at the U.S. Army War College, Advanced Strategic Arts Program. He holds Masters Degrees from Websters and George Mason University. His former assignments include speechwriter to the Commander, Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth and command of the 249th Engineer Battalion (Prime Power).

by Paul Overby

Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?

"In my view" should preface every statement here. It is likely the situation in Afghanistan is understood perfectly by no one, certainly not I. So I present these remarks as a prolegomenon or an extended suggestion to which others may compare their own thoughts. Any figures, for instance, are approximate. I combine references to some of my favorite books with personal experience garnered from a total of about two and a half years on the street as an independent observer in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the first nine months of which are described in my book Holy Blood.

Download the Full Article: Are The Taliban And Al Qaeda Allies?

Paul Overby went to Peshawar independently in 1988 to witness the struggle of the Afghan Freedom Fighters; spent 6 months talking to exile Afghans; finally, for a brief moment, fought alongside the mujahideen in the hills of Kunar. In 1993, Holy Blood was published. That same year he returned to visit the major commander Mullah Naqeeb in Kandahar (and helped push start his Mercedes) and interviewed Ahmad Shah Massoud in Kabul. Since late 2007 he has made four trips to AfPak for a total of 20 months. Talking to hundreds of people on the street, staying as a special guest of his old friend Governor Sayed Fazlolah Wahidi in Kunar, and interviewing a few important figures, his goal was to understand the American position in Afghanistan and to find Osama--whom he tentatively placed in the Yarkhun Valley.

Dr. John Nagl, COL Douglas Macgregor, Dr. Nadia Schadlow, COL Gian Gentile, COL Robert Cassidy, and Celeste Ward Gventer

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: Small Wars Journal Counterinsurgency Inquiry

1. Why should the local providing of governance be a concern for the U.S. military? Why should the U.S. military be in the business of providing local governance? An iconic image of the latest book by Bing West (The Wrong War, Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan) is that of Lt Colonel McCollough who had to assume and perform the role of the governor, police chief, school principal, and banker, in Nawa.

2. Beginning in 2007, "You can't kill your way out to victory" became the hallmark of a military organization that until then was perceived as being too conventionally minded, too kinetic and enemy-centric focused. Has the U.S. Military succeeded in overcoming its Jominian culture of being too enemy-centric and becoming more comfortable with the drinking-tea and doing windows side of the spectrum? Able to successfully manage both the governance building and war-fighting skills? Or is it in the danger of going too much to the other side of the spectrum, of becoming too focused on drinking-tea and doing windows (projects, shuras, economic development), and so neglecting its war fighting core duties? Is this after all an impossible balancing act? And too confusing for a soldier trained as warrior?

Download the Full Article: Small Wars Journal Counterinsurgency Inquiry

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy.

by Jon Mikolashek and Sean N. Kalic

Download the Full Article: Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency

There is a current trend in the United States Army, advocated by some officers, that population-centric counterinsurgency (COIN) theory should be the sole focus of their intellectual pursuits. Nicknamed COINistas by friend and foe alike, COINistas concern themselves with how and why insurgencies emerge. While this trend is understandable considering their numerous deployments in counterinsurgency environments, from an academic perspective they are narrowly focused and tend toward formulaic solutions. This means that they use their battlefield experience combined with recent and shallow knowledge gleamed from several popular counterinsurgency studies to produce a simplified "strategy" for the current fight. The problem with this "solution" is that it overlooks the true complexity of the counterinsurgency fight by fixating on finding a simple solution. Our proposal is that there is a better way to understand counterinsurgency that will benefit the United States Army and the nation. The Army as an institution and these experienced and valiant, noble officers must incorporate more history into their critical thinking and study of insurgencies.

Download the Full Article: Deciphering Shades of Gray: Understanding Counterinsurgency

Jon Mikolashek is currently an Assistant Professor of History at the United States Army Command and General Staff College in Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas.

Sean N. Kalic is currently an Associate Professor in the Department of Military History at the U.S. Army's Command and General Staff College in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

by Bob Cassilly

Download the Full Article: Computer Aided Democracy (CAD)

The important roles computers and the internet played in stirring passions among activists in the Middle East come as no surprise to veterans of U.S. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in Iraq. Since the U.S. involvement in Iraq in 2003, computers have steadily emerged as indispensable tools of unlimited potential in development of effective, transparent, and democratic government.

Download the Full Article: Computer Aided Democracy (CAD)

Bob Cassilly was the lead Governance Advisor on the PRT in Salah ad Din Province from April 2006 to April 2007 while serving as an Army JAG. From December 2007 to December 2008 he served as the U.S. Department of State Senior Governance Advisor on the PRT in Karbala Province and from July 2009 to August 2010 as the Senior Strategic Planner for the Office of Provincial Affairs, Embassy Baghdad. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the U.S. Department of State or the U.S. Government.

To Design or Not to Design: In Conclusion

by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: To Design or Not to Design: In Conclusion

Is Design a necessary methodology for the U.S. Army? By codifying into service doctrine an entire chapter on design in FM 5-0, the Army appears to acknowledge the need for ontological approaches to complex systems. FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency also featured a new Design chapter when updated in 2006. Although the presence of design in doctrinal form validates a substantial requirement for alternative methodologies to JOPP and MDMP, Army design in current form suffers from an identity crisis as well as extensive tacticization via institutional bias. To take higher guidance without critical thinking and launch into MDMP prioritizes analysis and description over synthesis and explanation. Today's increasingly complex conflict environments cannot function without Design consideration prior to any detailed planning processes initiating. Yet Design by its logic is a cumbersome and problematic methodology when applied to traditional military planning processes.

Download the Full Article: To Design or Not to Design: In Conclusion

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: The essay is the final of six in a series on design.

Civilians in the Build Phase

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Civilians in the Build Phase

"You Americans should not leave. Iraqis are incapable of governing ourselves. Within a year after you are gone, there will be chaos or another dictatorship. You are capable of ruling us; Iraqis are not"

-- Farmer Jamail, February, 2010

I was coming to the end of my tour. My conversation with Jamail that day was the last I would have with him. Nearly a year earlier our Governance Team had found the market area of Zaidon in a state of near chaos with a lethargic population, filthy and unpaved streets strewn with rubbish, and a pile of ruins where the milk collection plant had been. Without the collection plant, the dairy industry was depressed. That last day, the streets were clean and lighted, the potholes were gone, and solar lighting made night shopping possible. Business in the shops was booming and the once hostile populace was eager to talk and gossip with us. The foundation for the new milk collection facility had been laid, and it was scheduled to reopen within a year; indeed, it did open in early 2011.

None-the less, my conversation with Jamail depressed me. My job was not just to rebuild. It was to build up the local and national government in the eyes of the population. Jamail's words echoed those that I had heard too often that week in my farewell tour of the Abu Ghraib Qada'a which I had become fond of despite its challenges. We'd tried hard. When we sent out our Mobile Rural Support Teams (MRSTs) all carried the logo of the Abu Ghraib government. We had tried our utmost to give the Deputy Governor (Qaimaqam) and the Qada'a council credit, but the people saw through the ruse. They knew who was paying the bills and supervising the real work. Leadership by example can only go so far.

Download the Full Article: Civilians in the Build Phase

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10 and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

An Interview with Bing West, A Sequel

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Interview: Interview with Bing West: A Sequel

What is wrong with the war strategy employed by ISAF forces?

The strategy's goal is "to serve and secure the people" (namely, the 11 million Pashtuns living in 7,000 villages.) This goal is too idealistic and too ambitious. We have 1,000 outposts; so what is happening in the other 6,000 villages? We do not patrol at night. We do not arrest. We do not speak Pashto or understand their Islamic tribal culture. How can we serve them? We can secure some of them as long as we are physically near at hand. But the people are the prize for winning the war, not the means of winning it. They are waiting to see whether the Taliban or the Afghan army wins. We are treading water with this strategy.

Download the Full Interview: Interview with Bing West: A Sequel

Octavian Manea is Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy

by Philip K. Abbott

Download the Full Article: Achieving a Peace Settlement between Abkhazia and Georgia: Lessons from Swiss Federalism

Since the end of the Georgian-Abkhazian War of 1992-93, negotiations failed to come up with a viable solution considered satisfactory to either side. To a great extent, any meaningful settlement must first rule out the subordination or exclusion of ethnic minorities by the majority. Thus bringing us to the unique political culture of Swiss federal democracy, where leaders generally avoid speaking in terms of "majority and minority". Instead, "Swiss political structures strive to be volksnah [in touch with the people] and to every extent possible, respond to the wishes of all citizens." While such an approach is not often observed in most democratic societies, this is one of many subtle features of the Swiss model that may offer a fresh look at addressing separatist movements. It is within this context, that the paper aims to highlight distinguishing features of Swiss federalism and how this unique form of government may add value and possibly transferable lessons for a peaceful solution to the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict.

Download the Full Article: Achieving a Peace Settlement between Abkhazia and Georgia: Lessons from Swiss Federalism

Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is currently the Chief, Americas Division on the Joint Staff, J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate. He received a B.A. from Norwich University, an M.A. from Kansas University, and an M.S. from the National Defense University. He served in various Command & Staff positions in the United States and Europe and worked extensively throughout Latin America as a Foreign Area Officer.

by Braden Civins

Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique

The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, published in 2006, quickly became doctrine for the U.S. armed forces. While the manual has its share of detractors, even its fiercest critics acknowledge that it is regarded as "transcendent" and has "become the defining characteristic of the...new way of war." This critique (1) explores the validity of a key assumption underlying the manual; (2) analyzes specific guidance offered as a result of that assumption; and (3) argues that the manual makes a significant omission of no small consequence.

Download the Full Article: FM 3-24 COIN Manual Critique

Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs.

by Scott Dempsey

Download the Full Article: Is Spending the Strategy?

American foreign assistance has long been misunderstood if not ridiculed by detractors as a frivolous expense that does not serve American interests. In an attempt to reassert the relevance of aid on the battlefield, Congress and the Obama administration have allocated unprecedented resources -- via USAID and the Commanders Emergency Reconstruction Program (CERP) -- with the thought that money, when paired with military force, can stabilize even the most violent hotspots around the globe. This belief is so widely held that during President Obama's 2009 West Point speech announcing a troop surge in Afghanistan, he called for a corresponding "civilian surge that reinforces positive action."

Download the Full Article: Is Spending the Strategy?

Until February 2011, Scott Dempsey was a USAID Foreign Service Officer, most recently with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs in Washington. From July 2009 - August 2010, he served as a development officer in Helmand Province. He also previously deployed as a Marine on a civil affairs team in Fallujah in 2005.

Small Wars Journal

Vol. 7, No. 4 is now available. 

Click here for the

full issue, or directly on these titles for single articles. In this issue:

by Joseph Collins

Download the Full Article: The April "Revolution" and the Soviet-Afghan War

The relative stability of 1933 to 1978 gave way to insurrection first against Afghan communists, and later, the invading Soviet Union. The communist coup (April 1978) and the Soviet invasion (December 1979) touched off a period of 33 years of war that continues up to the present. If we review the basics, however, the Soviet experience is not a good analog for U.S. and NATO operations.

Download the Full Article: The April "Revolution" and the Soviet-Afghan War

Joseph Collins, a retired Army Colonel, teaches strategy at the National War College. From 2001-2004, he was the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Stability Operations. He is a 30 year Afghanistan watcher. This article is the author's own and does not represent the analysis or policy of any government agency. It is drawn from his NDU Press book, Understanding War in Afghanistan, forthcoming Summer, 2011.

Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East

by Peter J. Munson

Download the Full Article: Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East

Eight years after the American-led invasion of Iraq, the Middle East sits at a crossroads. The pressure, building for nearly a century in the contrived states drawn up after western models after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire in the First World War, has finally begun to burst the dam. The oppression and inhumanity were so intolerable that Mohamed Bouazizi, a roadside fruit seller unable to cough up a bribe to keep his roadside turf, immolated himself after Tunisian authorities beat him. This tipping point led to weeks of rage, felling the Tunisian and Egyptian dictators, setting Libya, Yemen, Bahrain, and Syria on razor's edge, and forcing at least token reforms in Oman, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia. The depths of the frustration felt across the region, however, indicate not the promise of rapid transitions to democratic rule, but rather the extent of the damage to society, economy, and politics that will have to be overcome. While it is a unique case, the Iraqi experience holds hard-won lessons for what lies ahead. Rather than prescriptions on how to "do it better next time," the lessons should be that transition is an unpredictable and protracted process that cannot be predictably managed. This process can only find legitimacy in solutions that stem from the host society.

Download the Full Article: Iraq's Hard-Won Lessons for Future Transitions in the Middle East

Peter J. Munson is a Marine officer, aviator, and Middle East Foreign Area Officer. His first book, Iraq in Transition: The Legacy of Dictatorship and the Prospects for Democracy (Potomac, 2009), details the social, political, and economic legacies of the Saddam era and their intersection with the American-led invasion and its aftermath. He is currently working on a new project, tentatively titled War, Welfare, and Democracy: Rethinking America's Quest for the End of Democracy. The views expressed here are his own and do not reflect the position of the United States Marine Corps or the Department of Defense.

A Primer for Generating Force Integrated Strategy to Campaign Plan Development

by Rob Thornton

Download the Full Article: A Primer for Generating Force Integrated Strategy to Campaign Plan Development

This paper is designed to assist organizations responsible for strategic planning in understanding how a process can be used to develop a business strategy and how it can be used to operationalize that strategy into FY (Fiscal Year) campaign plans within the Generating Force. The paper does not seek to distinguish who has authority to make a strategy with respect to establishing an overarching course that guides actions, rather it seeks to assist those charged with strategic planning in distinguishing why the Generating Force may require specific processes based on the nature of its roles, responsibilities and the constraints, limitations and conditions that affect it.

Download the Full Article: A Primer for Generating Force Integrated Strategy to Campaign Plan Development

Rob Thornton, USA Retired, served in both Operating Force and Generating Force units and completed his service as a Functional Area 59.

Looking Beyond the Conventional Wisdom Surrounding the IDF Campaigns against Hizbullah and Hamas

by Lazar Berman

Download the Full Article: Beyond the Basics

The United States military devotes great resources and attention to understanding the Israeli campaigns against Hizbullah (2006) and Hamas (2008-9). The Pentagon has sent at least twelve teams to interview Israeli officers who fought in the 2006 Second Lebanon War. "I've organized five major games in the last two years," notes Frank Hoffman of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory in Quantico, "and all of them have focused on Hizbullah." Only months after the end of Operation Cast Lead in January 2009, the US Army Combined Arms Center's Combat Studies Institute (CSI) at Fort Leavenworth published "Back to Basics: A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation CAST LEAD", an attempt to document the changes in the IDF over the two conflicts.

The conventional wisdom, especially in the US military, is that the IDF erred in several key areas during the Second Lebanon War. The IDF ceased training for high-intensity warfare. Perhaps more damagingly, the wisdom holds, the IDF adopted a new doctrine based on Effects-Based Operations (EBO), a doctrine that led IDF generals to abandon ground maneuver, and to believe they could defeat Hizbullah from the air. After the war, according to this approach, the IDF simply returned to previous understandings and doctrine, as shown in Operation Cast Lead in 2008/9.

Unfortunately, the conventional wisdom that has coalesced in America around the recent IDF operations, based largely on "Back to Basics" and other CSI studies, comes from a superficial understanding of the IDF and of its performance during the two conflicts. These accounts inaccurately portray the IDF in 2006, and miss the nuanced but profound change it went through after the war in Lebanon. The IDF that went to war in 2006 was heavily influenced by societal pressure against accepting casualties and by a prevalent low-intensity conflict (LIC) mindset. Caught without a fully developed doctrine, its performance, while not uniformly bad, was often muddled and indecisive. The experience of the war in Lebanon led to new IDF concepts of maneuver and victory, on display in Cast Lead. The dominant narrative in America attributes the products of the societal and LIC pressures to a doctrine never adopted by the IDF, and fails to recognize the new IDF concepts. Left uncorrected, this narrative puts the United States defense community at risk of learning the wrong lessons from Israel's recent campaigns.

Download the Full Article: Beyond the Basics

Lazar Berman is the Program Manager for Foreign and Defense Policy Studies at the American Enterprise Institute. He received an MA in Security Studies from Georgetown University's Walsh School of Foreign Service, with a concentration in Military Operations. Lazar served in the Israel Defense Force as an infantry officer in the Gaza area. He also commanded a platoon in the Bedouin Scout Battalion. His work has appeared in Small Wars Journal, Huffington Post, and the reading list for the US Army COIN course in Taji, Iraq.

The author would like to thank Gen. Itai Brun, Dr. Eitan Shamir, and the staff at the Dado Center for Interdisciplinary Military Studies for their support and insight while researching this issue.

by Jason Whiteley

Download the Full Article: War by Any Other Name Is War

In Starship Troopers, Robert Heinlein wrote that, "War is controlled violence, for a purpose." After the recent military intervention in Libya there has been a rush in some circles to distinguish the purpose of this most recent episode of 'controlled violence' from those military offensives launched by the United States against Iraq and Afghanistan in 2003 and 2001, respectively. Analysts aplenty have published observations on the normative use of military force and even provided frameworks for analyzing the latter half of Heinlein's quotation. However, to better inform ourselves on the context of the question of whether or not to initiate 'controlled violence,' we, as citizens, must also be certain that we have a common understanding of what is meant by war.

Download the Full Article: War by Any Other Name Is War

Jason Whiteley is a West Point graduate and an Iraq veteran. He has been widely quoted on building governance capacity in post-war countries. He is author of the forthcoming book Father of Money: Buying Peace in Baghdad (Potomac Books, 2011)

Book Review: It Happened on the Way to War: A Marine's Path to Peace

by Rye Barcott

Published by Bloomsbury USA, New York. 2011, 340 pages. $26.

Reviewed by Michael Few

Download the Full Book Review: It Happened on the Way to War: A Marine's Path to Peace

Rye Barcott's memoir, It Happened on the Way to War: A Marine's Path to Peace, is a study in opposites. There is the man he was, a combat veteran torn by the legacy of war, and the man he is striving to be, the humanitarian on a quest to end poverty at the local level in one distant slum. Following allegations that key moments in Greg Mortenson's Three Cups of Tea were fabricated, I delved cautiously into Barcott's book, fearing that I was buying a fourth cup of snake oil. But after reading the book, hearing Barcott speak, and talking to others associated with his charity, Carolina for Kibera (CFK), I doubt that this nonprofit was erected to brand Rye Barcott. The book can be enjoyed on its own terms as an emotionally, inspiring coming of age story. The core idea is that of the longstanding theory of participatory development, an alternative, indirect approach to empowering the poor. Rye Barcott merely serves as the vessel showing the evolution of CFK from theory into practice through his travels in North Carolina, Kenya, Bosnia, Djibouti, Iraq, and Massachusetts. CFK seeks to develop local leaders, catalyze positive change and alleviate poverty in the Kibera slum of Nairobi. The lingering question remains: will CFK succeed?

Download the Full Book Review: Book Review: It Happened on the Way to War: A Marine's Path to Peace

Michael Few is the Editor of Small Wars Journal.

Book Review by F. G. Hoffman

Download the Full Book Review: Effective Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century

Mackubin Thomas Owens, US Civil-Military Relations After 9/11: Renegotiating the Civil-Military Bargain, New York: Continuum Books, 2011, 211 pgs, $22.95.

Protracted and indecisive conflict often generates serious fissures between policy makers and military leaders. It can also lead to profound cracks between societies and the military institutions they raise up and sustain to defend themselves. The United States has been at war for about a decade against enemies whose fighting style and tactics confound us, challenge our view of warfare and thwart our traditional sources of power. Victory has been elusive, but the costs are tangible and growing.

Against such a backdrop, one would have expected the oft conflicted elements inherent to American civil-military relations to have produced some crisis or dysfunctional undertow by now. In fact, even before the war, distinguished historians concluded that relations between our uniformed leaders and senior elected officials were "extraordinarily poor" and that the national fabric had been rent. There have been alleged crises; the purported Revolt of the Generals during the Bush Administration, Admiral "Fox" Fallon's apparent public policy disagreement with the White House over Iran, and the fallout from the Rolling Stones article where General Stan McChrystal's staff torched his career with what can only be charitably described as diarrhea of the mouth.

Despite the elongated situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the extraordinary pressures that have been placed upon the Armed Services by its constant deployment cycle and the personal costs of the war, the supposedly rent fabric is holding up. Flawed operations and strategic missteps there have been, but the sort of crisis predicted even before 9/11 has not emerged. But war is both an arbiter of and influence upon societies and military institutions, and long wars, conclusive or not, generate pressures to national institutions. Thus, Dr. "Mac" Owens' refreshingly lucid book is well timed to explain the foundation and evolution of U.S. civil-military interactions over the past decade.

Download the Full Book Review: Effective Civil-Military Relations in the 21st Century

Frank Hoffman is a retired Marine Reserve officer and works for the Department of the Navy.

North Africa Maritime Security Operations

by Lieutenant Commander Benjamin Armstrong

Download the Full Article: A Ketch Named Mastico

In May of 1801 the United States of America became involved in the nation's first overseas conflict when the administration of Thomas Jefferson formally refused tribute demanded by the Pasha of Tripoli to halt piracy on the Barbary Coast of Africa. Tripoli immediately declared war. For decades prior to the conflict American merchants struggled with the dangerous waters of the Mediterranean. The challenge posed by the Barbary pirates to American national and economic security was the very reason for the founding of the United States Navy and Marine Corps. The First Barbary War was a naval war, based on maritime causes and fought by America's young sea services. However, it wasn't a traditional naval conflict made up of fleet or squadron engagements and decisive battles at sea. America's first maritime conflict was made of maritime interception, counter-piracy, and maritime security operations as well as the organization and leadership of an insurgent force. It was a conflict that 21st century sailors would recognize and identify with, both in terms of geography and missions assigned. It can be described as the 19th century predecessor of today's naval irregular warfare campaigns.

Download the Full Article: A Ketch Named Mastico

LCDR Benjamin "BJ" Armstrong is an active duty Naval Aviator currently serving as Officer-In-Charge of an MH-60S Armed Helicopter Detachment. His unit is currently assigned to 6th Fleet providing search and rescue, special operations, and gunship support for contingency and maritime security operations off the coast of Libya. A frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal, he holds a Master's degree in military history from Norwich University and has published on naval irregular operations in a number of journals including USNI's Proceedings, Defense and Security Analysis, and American Diplomacy.

This article is a standalone expansion of his article "The Most Daring Act of the Age: Principles for Naval Irregular Warfare," published in the Autumn, 2010 issue of The Naval War College Review. The historical narrative serves as "prequel" to the NWCR article, describing the details of how the United States Navy's Mediterranean Squadron captured the Tripolitan ketch Mastico following the grounding and surrender of USS Philadelphia. The squadron's Maritime Security Operations reinforce the principles developed in the original article. Specifically, it illustrates the importance of having the right people, platforms, and partnerships for success in Naval Irregular Warfare.

by MG Michael T. Flynn

Download The Full Article: Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams: Warfare in the 21st Century

Warfare used to be a bi-polar structure, state on state. Our defense establishment was more concerned with templating our enemies in a force-on-force engagement that was grounded in understood "rules of war." The battlefield was linear and structured, with clearly defined battle lines. We could isolate, contain, outflank, and attack our enemies well into the depths of the rear of their formations. Our enemies had tangible and recognizable infrastructures that, when attacked, could shut down their telecommunications networks and transportation systems. We were able to counter their numbers. There were parallel technologies, and in most cases numerical capabilities that we could quantitatively overcome. There were observable indications and warnings that enabled our high-tech intelligence system the advantage to provide the necessary early warning to detect movement of our enemy's formations. Those were the days.

Download The Full Article: Sandals and Robes to Business Suits and Gulf Streams: Warfare in the 21st Century

Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, is an active duty intelligence officer with various command and staff positions in multiple tours to Iraq, Afghanistan, Grenada, and Haiti. Previously, Flynn served as the director of intelligence at Division, Corps, Joint Special Operations Command, Central Command and the Joint Staff. Flynn also holds three graduate degrees: a Master's of Business Administration in Telecommunications from Golden Gate University, San Francisco, a Masters in the Military Arts and Sciences from Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and a Masters in National Security and Strategic Studies from the United States Naval War College. Previously published reports include the co-authored CNAS report Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan.

by Warren K. Vaneman

U.S. military history, during the 50 years prior to the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, is filled with examples of operational problems, often caused by different doctrine of the services, lack of compatibility of communications and weapons systems, and in some cases inter-service rivalries. To address these deficiencies, Senator Barry Goldwater (D-AZ) and Rep. William Flynt Nichols (D-AL) proposed wide sweeping reforms to the Department of Defense (DoD). These changes were designed to: centralize the military advice to the President of the United State through the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs; defined new roles of the services, and enhanced the roles of the combatant commanders; specified the sharing of new technologies among the services to gain efficiencies through shared procurements; and changed the personnel management of military officers.

Download the Full Article: The Case for Joint Professional Security Education for the Afghan National Security Forces

CAPT Warren Vaneman, USN, is currently assigned to the NATO Training Mission Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (NTM-A/CSTC-A), as a Senior Military Analysts for the Deputy to the Commanding General. The views expressed in this article are his alone and do not reflect those of NTM-A/CSTC-A.

by Robert Tollast

Three former diplomats who served in Iraq during three phases of the conflict share their thoughts on the security, economic and political issues of their time in country.

Download The Full Article: Iraq: The Whole Thing Was Much Harder Than It Needed To Be

Even more important, during and following the savage civil war, the U.S. did two extraordinary things: we negotiated as opposed to dictated the terms for our withdrawal from the country we had invaded and occupied and then led a Herculean effort to get all the Iraqi sides to come to agreement on a constitution that allows them to govern themselves civilly and democratically. These are unprecedented achievements in Iraq's history, or indeed the history of any Middle Eastern country wracked with such deep sectarian and ethnic divisions. While Iraq faces many tests in the months and years ahead, especially following the departure of U.S. forces at the end of this year, it now stands as the Arab world's first experiment in liberal democracy with a genuine chance of success.

Download The Full Article: Iraq: The Whole Thing Was Much Harder Than It Needed To Be

Keith Mines served as the CPA Governance Coordinator for Al Anbar in 2003. Currently, he is the director of the U.S Embassy Narcotics Affairs Section in Mexico City.

Gary Grappo served as Minister Counselor for Political Affairs at the U.S Embassy in Baghdad from 2009 to 2010. Currently, he is the Head of Mission for the Office of the Quartet Representative. The Middle East Quartet is a diplomatic mission spanning the U.N, E.U, U.S and Russia looking to mediate the Israeli -Palestinian peace process.

Matthew Lodge served as the Deputy Chief of Mission at the British Embassy in Baghdad in 2007. Currently, he is Britain's Ambassador to Finland.

Robert Tollast is an English Literature Graduate from Royal Holloway University of London and has published articles for the finance publication AccountingWEB. He became interested in events in Iraq through his late father, who was a Military Intelligence Officer in Iraq with General Sir Maitland Willson's Persia/ Iraq force (Paiforce) in 1942. He is currently learning Arabic and would be interested one day to visit Iraq, although he concedes this is currently quite an eccentric ambition.

All opinions in this article are those of private citizens and do not necessarily reflect the policies of either the British or American Governments either now or during the times in question.

by Colonel John M. Collins

Download the Full Article: Warlord's Writing Tips

This short writing guide appeared as part of a larger article, Sharp pens sharpen swords: writing for professional publications, in the May-June 2006 issue of Military Review. It is republished here with the author's kind permission.

Download the Full Article: Warlord's Writing Tips

John M. Collins began to amass military experience when he enlisted in the Army as a private in 1942. Thirty years and three wars later, in 1972, he retired as a colonel. He spent the next quarter century as the leading analyst on military and defense issues at the Congressional Research Service. Ten years ago, he established the Warlord Loop, a by-invitation-only e-mail forum that fosters voluminous, freewheeling exchanges seven days a week.

To Design or Not to Design (Part Five):

Doctrine and Design: How Analogies and Design Theory Resist the Military Ritual of Codification

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not Design (Part Five)

The invention of writing made standardization and conceptual control of information both possible and necessary as human civilizations passed experiences and values from one generation to the next. "Writing makes possible the codification and systemization of assertion, and hence the birth of doctrine." Doctrine originally fused religious ritual with the exclusivity and power of literacy. The educated minority subsequently created effective models for controlling human action, and through both access and knowledge of codified information, limit how the majority could deviate from them. "Ritual...does not succumb to rational argument, erected in favor of political or economic expedients. Religious ritual blunts rational objections in exactly this way." Ontological synthesis of doctrine for this article aims towards the scientific and historical aspects of the doctrinal process instead of ideological values.

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not Design (Part Five)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

by Paulo Shakarian

Download The Full Article: Stuxnet: Cyberwar Revolution in Military Affairs

On June 17th, 2010, security researchers at a small Belarusian firm known as VirusBlockAda identified malicious software (malware) that infected USB memory sticks. In the months that followed, there was a flurry of activity in the computer security community -- revealing that this discovery identified only one component of a new computer worm known as Stuxnet. This software was designed to specifically target industrial equipment. Once it was revealed that the majority of infections were discovered in Iran, along with an unexplained decommissioning of centrifuges at the Iranian fuel enrichment plant (FEP) at Natanz, many in the media speculated that the ultimate goal of Stuxnet was to target Iranian nuclear facilities. In November of 2010, some of these suspicions were validated when Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad publically acknowledged that a computer worm created problems for a "limited number of our [nuclear] centrifuges." Reputable experts in the computer security community have already labeled Stuxnet as "unprecedented," an "evolutionary leap," and "the type of threat we hope to never see again."

In this paper, I argue that this malicious software represents a revolution in military affairs (RMA) in the virtual realm -- that is Stuxnet fundamentally changes the nature of cyber warfare. There are four reasons to this claim: (1) Stuxnet represents the first case in which industrial equipment was targeted with a cyber-weapon, (2) there is evidence that the worm was successful in its targeting of such equipment, (3) it represents a significant advance in the development of malicious software, and (4) Stuxnet has shown that several common assumptions about cyber-security are not always valid. In this paper I examine these four points as well as explore the future implications of the Stuxnet RMA.

Download The Full Article: Stuxnet: Cyberwar Revolution in Military Affairs

Paulo Shakarian is a Captain in the U.S. Army and a Ph.D. candidate in computer science at the University of Maryland (College Park) and will soon take up a position teaching computer science at the U.S. Military Academy. He holds a BS from the U.S. Military Academy and an MS from the University of Maryland (College Park), both in computer science.

The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of the United States Military Academy, United States Cyber Command, the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the United States Government.

by Octavian Manea

Octavian Manea, Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy, continues his SWJ interview series. In this exclusive, Octavian asks Professor Theo Farrell and MG Nick Carter to describe their thoughts on the Battle for Helmand Province in Southern Afghanistan.

Download The Full Article: The Battle for Helmand

Geospatial Editor: Joyce Hogan

Download The Full Article: The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data:

Maneuver warfare at its core is a mechanistic endeavor and fits with a corresponding necessity of top-down hierarchies. Conversely, counterinsurgency is a more ambiguous environment that varies in its complexity and context; it is the chess match of war. It is different in every locale and can cover the entire spectrum of war simultaneously. Consequently, counterinsurgency is difficult to put on a bumper sticker, to trademark as a catch phrase, or sell to a population and their representatives. In 2006 the United States (U.S.) public's perception of success or failure of the Iraqi counterinsurgency strategy was concentrated around the concept of massing combat power in time and space, often called the "The Surge." The term, "The Surge," condensed a new counterinsurgency strategy into a simple and quantifiable slogan for the sound bite culture surrounding current affairs in the modern world. Unfortunately, counterinsurgency is more complex than "add more and then you win."

Download The Full Article: The Statistical Irrelevance of American SIGACT Data:

Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and a recent graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. He is currently serving in 1st Special Forces Group (Airborne).

by Phil W. Reynolds

Download The Full Article: Civil Affairs as a General Purpose Force: An Opportunity

CA doctrine has not kept pace with the execution of CMO by maneuver forces and this is creating a dangerous seam. CA is supposed to provide the commander with expertise in the execution of tasks that deal with the civil component of the battlefield. Stability Operations, Security Assistance and Non-Lethal Targeting all are areas which need to be addressed because of their strong civil component. With publications like FM 3-07 and FM 3-0 outstripping CA doctrine, the framework of operational themes and missions to CA missions is broken. But with the creation of the 85th CA Brigade, there is an opportunity for the branch to simplify and clarify its own doctrine. As the Army's General Purpose Force (GPF) Civil Affairs brigade takes shape there will be a greater emphasis on integration, particularly in regards to planning, conventional training, and deployments as part of a combined arms team. Nothing new needs to be created- Rather, bring CA doctrine more line with the rest of the Army and the Joint force.

Download The Full Article: Civil Affairs as a General Purpose Force: An Opportunity

Major Phil Reynolds, U.S. Army, Civil Affairs, is currently assigned as the CMO Planner for Army Central. He holds a B.A. from Saint Bonaventure University and an M.A. from the University of Oklahoma. MAJ Reynolds served with 1st Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment and the 96th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne). He has worked in Africa, Iraq, and extensively in Central Asia. He will be attending the U.S. Naval Post Graduate School this summer, pursuing a degree in Defense Analysis.

Attacks on Journalists and "New Media" in Mexico's Drug War:

A Power and Counter Power Assessment

by John P. Sullivan

Download the Full Article: Attacks on Journalists and "New Media" in Mexico's Drug War

This paper examines the impact of attacks on journalists on media reportage within Mexico's drug wars, known as "la Inseguridad" in Mexico. It examines two concepts in communication theory (agenda-setting theory and "mind framing" for power and counter-power) to frame the impact of drug cartel information operations (info ops). Specifically, It examines cartel attacks on media outlets, and kidnappings and assassinations of journalists by narco-cartels to gauge the potential impact of the attacks in terms of censorship, cartel co-option of reportage, and the use of new media (horizontal means of mass self-communication).

Download the Full Article: Attacks on Journalists and "New Media" in Mexico's Drug War

John P. Sullivan is a career police officer. He currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010). His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty in Mexico and elsewhere.

Practical Application of Complexity Theory to Military Operations

by Grant Martin

Download The Full Article: Tell Me How to Do This Thing Called Design!

Since first being introduced to "Design" I, like many others, have felt that there was an awful lot of theory and not enough practical application. Naturally, therefore, I feel sympathetic towards those who clamor for less background theory and more operational "how to" instructions. We are an Army of action, and there is little room, patience, or cultural tradition for too much time thinking about things. And, honestly, too much time hesitating, thinking, or theorizing many times will cede the initiative to those who act boldly. '"Okay", you say: "I'll trust your theory (or I'm just not interested in all that mumbo-jumbo), just give me what to do!!" If that quote is something that resonates with you, then this article was written with you in mind.

Download The Full Article: Tell Me How to Do This Thing Called Design!

Grant Martin is a U.S. Army Special Forces Major assigned to the U.S. Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School (Airborne).

by James Michael Few

Download The Full Article: The Pacification of Zaganiyah (Part One)

The attacks of 9/11 and subsequent Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) thrust the United States military General Purpose Forces (GPF) into a host of small wars. As we relearned the timeless art of counterinsurgency, much debate surrounds perfecting the proper mixture of gentle influence and violent coercion required as an external intervention force. In the beginning, this mixture is irrelevant. Instead, the most difficult problem facing the commander is one of information. How does one discover and define the current situation on the ground? This understanding is the critical foundation of all other planning and actions.

This essay describes how one Army reconnaissance unit answered this question in a small village perched in a rural, hostile valley. It is the first part in a larger work describing company-level counterinsurgency efforts in the Diyala River Valley during the Iraq Surge. The intent is to describe our initial reconnaissance efforts to define the operational environment and develop a plan to intervene. The purpose is two-fold: 1. inform policy makers on the costs, requirements, and time needed for such GPF interventions, and 2. provide young leaders with an example of applying theory to practice.

While this individual case is unique in study, the methodology is universal. Basic military tactics and techniques appropriately applied for the given environment provide the highest probability for a successful outcome. This valley would serve as watershed moment for the junior combat leaders involved, and they would eventually apply these lessons learned in the streets of Baghdad at the tail end of the Iraq Surge, the ravaged airfield and slums of Port-au-Prince, Haiti after the 2010 earthquake, and the seemingly unconquerable valleys of Kunar Province along the Af-Pak border during the Afghanistan Surge.

Download The Full Article: The Pacification of Zaganiyah (Part One)

Major James Michael Few, USA, is an active duty armor officer and the Editor of Small Wars Journal. He served multiple tours to Iraq in various command and staff positions. The views expressed herein are his own.

by Neoptolemus

Download the Full Article: Defense in an Age of Austerity: 2022

My fellow Americans, it is with a grave heart and serious reservations that I come to you today to announce the implementation of the results of the Preserving America's Economic Security Commission. This congressionally-authorized panel was established to provide our nation's elected leaders with recommendations to better balance the abyss between our national treasury and our collective ability to pay for our own government and security. Decades of delay and delusion have brought us well past the crisis point. We have preserved global stability for others for many decades, but at great expense. The long war against extremism has cost us well over $2T in direct costs alone and the interest compounds daily. Meanwhile the country's demographic aging, rising health care costs, and insatiable appetite for entitlements has placed our great Nation's balance sheet deep in the red. A culture of entitlement over sacrifice and shared obligation has eroded our stature as a great power and our moral standing. A decade of continued economic pressure, unemployment above 12%, coupled with a determined resistance on the part of the nation's elected officials to come to any serious resolution of the country's fiscal crisis has brought us to the point of peril.

The international bond market has spoken. We presently owe $23T in publicly held debt and at least another $10T in unfunded social security liabilities. Just the interest on that debt alone costs us more than $1T a year, double our annual defense expenditures. We continue to run trillion dollar deficits as we have for the entire last decade. Our debt to revenue ratio is now well over 120%. People are beginning to avoid U.S. backed bonds and dollar based investments. Now interest rates are climbing several points from 3 to 5 to 7% on our bonds, as global markets have found better places and safer currencies in which to invest. The dollar is no longer the world's reserve currency or first choice. We once criticized small countries like Greece or Ireland for failing to meet their debts, and now we are in far worse shape.

Download the Full Article: Defense in an Age of Austerity: 2022

Neoptolemus, a retired infantry officer, is currently imprisoned as a senior defense official in the Pentagon. Neoptolemus was the son of the warrior Achilles and the princess Deidamia in Greek mythology.

An Interview with General Jack Keane

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Interview: An Interview with General Jack Keane

How would you describe the US Army's mind-set in approaching the war in Vietnam?

I think we took an army whose primary focus was conventional operations against the Warsaw Pact in Europe and took it to war in South Vietnam. In the first three years of the war we were trying to use conventional tactics against an unconventional enemy. That strategy failed miserably. And it was not until General Abrams came in and took over from General Westmoreland who changed the strategy to a counterinsurgency strategy which was designed to protect the population. We saw significant progress against the insurgency and then, by 1971, three years later, it was essentially defeated.

Should we understand that World War II, the Korean War, and preparation for Fulda Gap campaigns - all this operational heritage - had an impact in shaping the mind-set of the US Military vis-í -vis executing war?

Yes.

What should have been the lessons learned from the Vietnam experience?

I think we learned all the right lessons in how to defeat an insurgency because we succeeded. We lost the war for other reasons, but in terms of defeating the insurgency, I think we learned the right lessons in terms of the preeminence of and the importance of protecting the population, winning the population to your side, using minimum amount of force, dealing with a government that is not effective and dealing with a population that has legitimate grievances against that government. Most insurgencies obviously have some legitimate grievances against the government -- otherwise - it wouldn't be an insurgency to begin with. I think we codified the major tenets of the counterinsurgency we learned and it was in our memory up until 1975. When the war ended we purged it from our lexicon and put the doctrine we had developed on the shelf and embraced war against the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union. I think it has much to do with how the war ended in Vietnam. The fact that it did not come out favorably to us - I think the military leaders of the time just wanted to get rid of it like a cancer.

Download the Full Interview: An Interview with General Jack Keane

Interview with General Jack Keane conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

Small Wars Journal

Vol. 7, No. 3 is now available.  It presents a few new (as of 31 Mar) articles

and provides select reprints and an index of all articles from March. 

Click here for the

full issue, or directly on these titles for single articles.

Countering Extremism in Yemen: Beyond Interagency Cooperation

Kaz Kotlow

Shaping Coalition Forces' Strategic Narrative in Support of Village Stability

Operations by  Scott Mann

The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration by Scott Dempsey

Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

by Eric von Tersh

Libya's Rebel Leaders and Western Assistance by Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol

E. B. Choksy

Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict by Timothy

Richardson

The index of all articles published in March begins on

page 22 of the

issue.  Please review that listing or our

monthly or

title archives

for any you may have missed as they fired past during the month.

This entry is closed for comment. Please make any comments directly on the individual

articles via the links above.

To Design or Not to Design (Part Four):

Taking Lines out of Non-Linear; How Design Must Escape 'Tacticization' Bias of Military Culture

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Four)

The fifteen pages of design doctrine in FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design introduces non-linear open system concepts while paradoxically recommending traditional linear methodology for transforming these dynamic open systems into the desired state. While the first eleven pages on design discuss open systems and their inherent tendencies to learn, adapt, and resist mechanistic action, section 3-58, The Operational Approach, resorts back to linear causality by recommending lines of effort as a method to depict transforming the system. Once again, Army design doctrine suffers an identity crisis in which holistic approaches to complex systems struggles with an institutional preference for tacticizing all levels of war.

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Four)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: This essay is part four of a six part series on design.

by Michael E. Reheuser

Download The Full Article: Shaping a Culture of Privacy in the DoD

I read with interest your December 6th article entitled The Military's Cultural Disregard for Personal Information. The authors have done well to bring to light a continuing challenge not only for the Department of Defense, but for all government agencies. They rightly point out the overreliance on Social Security Numbers as a common identifier and the risks which its pervasiveness present to military personnel both at home and deployed across the globe.

For more than 30 years the Defense Privacy Office -- now Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office (DPCLO) -- has worked across the DoD Components to address a myriad of risks to personal information. Over that time the Department has instituted numerous policies to protect the privacy and secure the records of its personnel and their dependents, sometimes revolutionizing entire business practices in the process. Today the Department faces just such a watershed moment.

Download The Full Article: Shaping a Culture of Privacy in the DoD

Michael Reheuser is the Director of the Defense Privacy and Civil Liberties Office (DPCLO) and DoD's Deputy Civil Liberties Officer.

Seeing Everything from the Prism of Islamic Extremism in Afghanistan

by Metin Turcan

Download The Full Article: Simply a Nirvana Fallacy

Abstract. There has emerged a vast literature at the strategic level on the COIN efforts of the CF in Afghanistan, which is generally considered as an integral part of the struggle against global extremism. Nonetheless, to see Afghanistan as a "front" in the struggle against global extremism severely distracts our focus and falsely lead us to cover all other related phenomena under the blanket of "Islamic extremism.' The utmost aim of this article is to challenge traditional COIN wisdom available in the literature which takes "Islamic Extremism" as the single factor that explains everything in rural Afghanistan. This article suggests that the tribal and rural characteristics of Afghanistan precede the Islamic identity of Afghanistan, and therefore, the current debacle of international community in rural Afghanistan does not conform to established frames or assumptions in the literature.

Download The Full Article: Simply a Nirvana Fallacy

Metin Turcan holds an MA degree in Security Studies from Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. He served in northern Iraq (1999, 2004), Kazakhstan (2003), Kyrgyzstan (2004) and Afghanistan (2005) in both fulfilled liaison and training missions. Currently, he is working as a security advisor in the Interior Ministry of Turkey and a Ph.D candidate studying Afghanistan and the changing nature of warfare in the 21st century.

All opinions expressed are those of the author alone and do not necessarily represent the views of any institution or organization the author has been associated with.