Journal

Limiting the definition of insurgency, can limit the military response

Self-organized civilians' activities against the military in war are neither a theoretical assumption nor NEW in history. Today and tomorrow, armies will have to contend with the phenomena.

How do you ensure you have the right amount of junior leaders (rank of sergeant to major) where you need them, when you need them? 

As the withdrawal of US and allied forces continues, the post-2014 allied manning and assistance levels in Afghanistan have yet to be defined.  The absence of a plan, inadequate media coverage, and our upcoming presidential election have created ambiguity, confusion, and drift, harming the war effort and giving comfort to our adversaries.

A Case Study of the American Experience in Iraq in the Pillar of Justice

Policy analysts question conceptual failure (ends), intellectuals want to know why, and the analysis of organizational and operational lessons learned (ways and means), will shape outcomes for years.

Kaplan builds a case for the growing importance of the Indian Ocean and its perimeter states as the new geopolitical center of the developing world

Uribe COIN model: Interview with Dr. Thomas A. Marks

Leading thinking about counterinsurgency misses the relevance of religious freedom.

Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan – What is Being Done Wrong and What Could be Done Better

Non-Commissioned Officer's masters thesis

I place the Libyan Civil War of Liberation within the ambit of 2011 Arab Spring; broadly as a refurbished sprig of Arab people’s movement against their respective autocratic state regimes.

Leveraging technology, the US could create networks allowing for unprecedented intelligence collection as well as widespread and immediate distribution of information

Fallujah and The Silk Road

The civil war is in full swing and Iran is driving it—it all goes back to the “Green Cresent” and the old “Silk Road”

The Gentile-Nagl Debate is nothing new in military history

The Troops Need Napalm and Flamethrowers

A response to Shane Bilsborough's Counterlawfare in Counterinsurgency

In times of austerity, the military's best investment is in its people: education, selection, and promotion of talent.

Regardless of what the current US administration and Senior Military Officers claim, we lost the peace in Iraq.

Many areas of interest to the United States today were former Ottoman dominions like Egypt, Iraq, Syria, even Libya.  Understanding the mechanics of this former empire is crucial to comprehending the nuances of the region.

A counterinsurgency strategy based on the now-famous Field Manual 3-24, written under the auspices of then-LTGs David Petraeus and James Mattis in 2006, is inappropriate for Mexico. 

Opinion polls in Afghanistan cover issues as diverse as the legitimacy of the Karzai regime, the use of suicide attacks, the appropriateness of female education, and the adequacy of the health systems.

The lack of guidance regarding how to identify which form of legitimacy a population recognizes and what steps need to be taken to alter a population’s perceptions is a glaring problem

Recent budget debates have featured emotional discussions about reforming the military retirement system. This is not a new phenomenon; there have been more than a dozen official studies on reforming military retirement since 1948.

Drones and special forces get the headlines, but pundits have missed a more fundamental shift in the nature and direction of American national security policy.

Bing West, John Nagl, Mark Moyar, Thomas Mockaitis, Christopher Paul, Douglas Ollivant, Gian Gentile, and David Anderson share their views

For Whom will the American Military Fight if our Governmental System is Challenged?

Dust off the plans from 2009, Here is a "Way" to Organize for the Transition Mission

Is there really anything new under the sun?

International legal institutions, media outlets, human rights NGO’s should be leveraged to the US advantage as part of a focused and coherent counterlawfare strategy.

The book is not doctrine.  It invites those interested in influencing the outcome of ‘internal’ armed conflicts to weave together ideology, politics, methodology, intelligence practices, operations, and strategy as seamlessly as possible

Should we continue to embrace the status quo, we will jeopardize our ability to achieve the aims of our current National Security Strategy

Retired Indian General and Small Wars Council extraordinaire Ray visits to talk all things India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

Targeting Maoist-affected areas with increased funding and attention is probably good policy, but it is likely not an overstatement to say anti-Maoist success will correlate significantly with India’s progress in caring for its poorest peoples.

The government of India has proclaimed this Naxalite – Maoist movement to be the greatest threat to national security. This may become a self-fulfilling prophesy.

Spanish translation of Urban Land Use by Illegal Armed Groups in Medellin

We collect lessons learned, but do we learn from the lessons collected?

Can Soft Power Take The Lead In Iraq?

A review of Sylvia Longmire's work on Cartels

We are woefully under-trained.  The troops can absorb and do far more than we tend to credit them.  Our training is mostly designed to be easy on the trainers and to produce metrics

Perspective from the Tactical Level of Operations

Truth to Power with Information Operations in Khost Province

Examing small wars in Indonesia, East Timor, Sudan, and Kenya to see what lessons apply to Afghanistan

The Realpolitik behind the European Financial Crisis

Have FST and CSTs teams pushed the limits of the female exclusion in combat policy?  Is it time to adjust the policy?

Has there ever been an American way of war or simply a tactical way of battle?

Author compares and contrasts On Guerilla Warfare and The Accidental Guerilla

This essay proposes integrating elements of design thinking into the Mission Analysis and COA Development steps of the JOPP to develop the variety of options that the POTUS and SECDEF require in a complex and dynamic environment

From Classic Conventional Deterrence to a “Lloyd’s of London” Posture