Small Wars Journal

Journal

Journal Articles are typically longer works with more more analysis than the news and short commentary in the SWJ Blog.

We accept contributed content from serious voices across the small wars community, then publish it here as quickly as we can, per our Editorial Policy, to help fuel timely, thoughtful, and unvarnished discussion of the diverse and complex issues inherent in small wars.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/23/2011 - 8:35pm | 0 comments
'Holding' for Companies and Platoons in Counterinsurgency

by George R. Dimitriu

Download The Full Article: 'Holding' for Companies and Platoons in Counterinsurgency

In August 2010, the Dutch redeployed their forces after being active in Afghanistan for four years, aiding and abetting ISAF with around 2000 troops each rotation. Initially, the contribution after August had been discussed fiercely, but the collapse of the Netherlands' coalition government in February 2010 meant also the end of the discussion about prolongation of the mission of Task Force Uruzgan; the withdrawal of troops is definite and more or less completed by the time of writing.

In a recently published article about the performance of the Dutch forces in Uruzgan, which I wrote together with Dr. B.A. de Graaf, we considered the efforts, the operations and the lessons learned by analyzing three operations in Uruzgan: operation 'Perth' in July 2006; 'Spin Ghar' (White Mountain) in October 2007; and 'Tura Ghar' (Sabre Mountain) in January 2009, all three of which were conducted in the Baluchi valley in Uruzgan. One of our most important conclusions is that clearing operations had very limited positive effects and mainly negative effects, if carried out on their own. This comes as no surprise as troops throughout Afghanistan were confronted with the same effects when the cleared areas were not hold thereafter. Therefore, I thought it would be worthwhile to look once again, and more deeply, at the complexity of 'holding' areas after 'clearing'. In my view -- and views of many others - this is the most crucial phase, but also the one which is the most difficult to execute. Based on the Dutch experiences in Uruzgan I introduce a model for executing the hold-phase. I focus on the tactical level, but otherwise none of the principles I introduce is really new; it is simply a question of interpreting and applying the existing COIN principles.

Download The Full Article: 'Holding' for Companies and Platoons in Counterinsurgency

George R. Dimitriu is a research fellow at the Netherlands Defence Academy. The views in this article are his alone and do not reflect those of the Royal Netherlands Armed Forces.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/23/2011 - 8:10pm | 0 comments

Panama: Is Restructuring the Razor to Cut Out Corruption?

 

by Anthony Scheidel

Download The Full Article: Panama: Is Restructuring the Razor to Cut Out Corruption?

This work is an empirical article detailing the recent restructuring of Panamanian Service Groups and Governmental Ministries. It provides valuable analysis not only on how the organizations were physically reorganized, but also insight into the reasons why changes were made, including corruption and rising crime levels throughout the country. Although the two reorganizations are separate and independent of each other, it also touches on how they are intertwined from a national security aspect. The essay concludes with evidence revealing how Panama is now better prepared to counter these rising levels of insecurity by means of a stronger security plan, as well as possible future approaches, including more comprehensive and applied regional security cooperation initiatives.

Download The Full Article: Panama: Is Restructuring the Razor to Cut Out Corruption?

Anthony Scheidel is a research analyst on Latin America related issues at the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO), an open source research organization that focuses on the foreign perspective of understudied aspects of the Operational Environment.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/22/2011 - 10:39am | 3 comments
A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part Two):

Type-I Dark Network: Opportunistic-Mechanical

by Ian S. Davis, Carrie L. Worth, and Douglas W. Zimmerman

Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part Two)

The purpose of this essay is to illustrate an example of a dark network whose design state is defined by moderate environmental hostility and a moderate requirement for secure coordination of work that yields what we call Type-I Opportunistic-Mechanical configuration. Based on our theory of dark network design, the example shows how an Opportunistic-Mechanical dark network is configured to achieve its purpose and how it is vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.

Major Ian Davis is a United States Army Special Forces officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis.

Major Carrie Worth is United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviator and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters in Defense Analysis.

Major Douglas Zimmerman is a United States Army Intelligence officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis.

Editor's Note: This essay is the second in a six-part series on a theory of dark network design. This series was originally submitted as a thesis graduation requirement for a MS in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Nancy Roberts served as the thesis advisor, and Dr. John Arquilla served as the second reader. An electronic version of the complete thesis is available here.

by Ben Zweibelson | Fri, 03/18/2011 - 9:00am | 55 comments

To Design or Not to Design (Part Three):

Metacognition: How Problematizing Transforms a Complex System towards a Desired State

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Three)

FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design describes design's purpose as a methodology used to "make sense of complex, ill-structured problems." The term 'make sense' deals with explanation of the open system. The previous article of 'To Design or Not to Design' demonstrated how military institutions have a strong propensity for describing an open system instead of explaining it. To make sense of a complex system, humans instinctively attempt to categorize information through descriptive monikers and reductive classifications. Knowledge is usually "pursued in depth in isolation...Rather than getting a continuous and coherent picture, we are getting fragments- remarkably detailed but isolated patterns." FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design follows military institutional preference for reconstructive and mechanical methodology prevalent at the tactical level of war by misapplying it to the operational level with design. Army design doctrine does not articulate why and how to transform a complex system into a desired one.

Download The Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Three)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: This is part two of a six part series on design. Parts one and two can be found here and here.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/15/2011 - 8:08am | 0 comments
Hawaii and Guam: Strategic Convergence Zones for the United States Forward Defense Strategy in the Pacific Rim

by James A. Kent and Eric Casino

Download the Full Article: Hawaii and Guam: Strategic Convergence Zones for the United States Forward Defense Strategy in the Pacific Rim

Robert Kaplan had an article in the May/June 2010 issue of Foreign Affairs titled "The Geography of Chinese Power: How Far Can Beijing Reach on Land and at Sea?" His discussion of what the Chinese Navy calls the "first island chain" and the "second island chain" in the Pacific Ocean drew our attention. These two maritime constructs are not simply linear descriptions of the layout of islands but ones with value-added undertones for both Chinese and American geostrategists over the Pacific Rim. Among these undertones, three are discussed below. First is the general observation that geography trumps politics in dealing with the emergent Chinese power. Second is that Guam and Hawaii because of their critically important position in the second island chain are historically poised to benefit the nations of the Pacific Rim by becoming new convergence zones. Third the emerging trends and the actions needed to capture, benefit from and give leadership to these trends for the Pacific century are discussed.

Download the Full Article: Hawaii and Guam: Strategic Convergence Zones for the United States Forward Defense Strategy in the Pacific Rim

James A. Kent is a global community analyst with extensive experience with geographic focused social and economic development policy in Pacific Rim countries.

Dr. Eric Casino is a social anthropologist and policy consultant with a long-term interest in international business and development programs in Southeast Asia and the Pacific.

by Huba Wass de Czege | Mon, 03/14/2011 - 11:02pm | 4 comments
Thinking and Acting Like an Early Explorer:

Operational Art is Not a Level of War

by Brigadier General Huba Wass de Czege (US Army Ret.)

Download the Full Article: Operational Art is Not a Level of War

Operational art is not a "level of war" as our current western military doctrines assert. It is, rather, thinking and acting like an explorer before the days of Google Earth, The Weather Channel, and Global Positioning Systems. While tactical and strategic thinking are fundamentally different, both kinds of thinking must take place in the explorer's brain, but in separate compartments.

To appreciate this, think of the metaphor of an early American explorer trying to cross a large expanse of unknown terrain long before the days of the modern conveniences mentioned in the previous paragraph. The explorer knows that somewhere to the west lies an ocean he wants to reach. He has only a sketch-map of a narrow corridor drawn by a previously unsuccessful explorer. He also knows that highly variable weather and frequent geologic activity can block mountain passes, flood rivers, and dry up desert water sources. He also knows that some native tribes are hostile to all strangers, some are friendly and others are fickle, but that warring and peace-making among them makes estimating their whereabouts and attitudes difficult. He also knows that the snows are less likely to be deep in the south, and that some fur trappers have reported an extensive mountain range running north to south. They have also provided vague descriptions of several ways to cross them. Finally, the expedition must head west because turning back can only lead to shame and penury; even perishing in the attempt to cross the wilderness will bring honor; and reaching the ocean will mean certain fame and probable wealth.

Download the Full Article: Operational Art is Not a Level of War

Huba Wass de Czege is a retired U.S. Army brigadier general. During his career as an infantry officer, he served two tours in Vietnam and gained staff experience at all levels up to assistant division commander. General Wass De Czege was a principal designer of the operational concept known as AirLand Battle. He also was the founder and first director of the Army's School for Advanced Military Studies where he also taught applied military strategy. After retiring in 1993, General Wass De Czege became heavily involved in the Army After Next Project and served on several Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency v advisory panels. He is a 1964 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy and holds an MPA from Harvard University.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/14/2011 - 9:01pm | 0 comments
A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)

by Ian S. Davis, Carrie L. Worth, and Douglas W. Zimmerman

Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)

Abstract

This study presents a theory of dark network design and answers two fundamental questions about illuminating and interdicting dark networks: how are they configured and how are they vulnerable? We define dark networks as interdependent entities that use formal and informal ties to conduct licit or illicit activities and employ operational security measures and/or clandestine tradecraft techniques through varying degrees of overt, or more likely covert, activity to achieve their purpose. A dark network must design itself to buffer environmental hostility and produce output to achieve its purpose according to its design state. The level of hostility in the environment and the requirement for secure coordination of work determine the dark network's design state. These factors yield four typological dark network configurations: Opportunistic-Mechanical; Restrictive-Organic; Selective-Technical; and Surgical-Ad hoc. Each configuration must allow the secure coordination of work between the dark network's directional, operational, and supportive components and should adhere to the six principles of dark network design we identify: security, agility, resilience, direction setting, control, and capacity. If a dark network's configuration does not fit its design state or violates the principles of dark network design, the network will be vulnerable to illumination and interdiction.

Download The Full Article: A Theory of Dark Network Design (Part One)

Major Ian Davis is a United States Army Special Forces officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Davis has over 23 years of active duty service with the majority of his career assigned to 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) in key enlisted and officer operational billets. He is currently conducting an internship with CJSOTF-A en route to his next assignment at 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

Major Carrie Worth is United States Air Force Special Operations Command (AFSOC) aviator and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters in Defense Analysis. After graduating from the United States Air Force Academy in 1997, Major Worth has accumulated over 4,800 flight hours in assignments throughout AFSOC community. She is currently en route to her next assignment at Special Operations Command Europe.

Major Douglas Zimmerman is a United States Army Intelligence officer and recently graduated from the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis. Major Zimmerman has over 14 years of active duty service and spent the majority of his career supporting Special Operations forces with assignments in the 4th PSYOP Group (Airborne), 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne), 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne) and USASOC Headquarters. He is currently conducting an internship in the Common Operational Research Environment (CORE) Laboratory and the Naval Postgraduate School.

Editor's Note: This essay is the first in a six-part series on a theory of dark network design. This series was originally submitted as a thesis graduation requirement for a MS in Defense Analysis at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, CA. Dr. Nancy Roberts served as the thesis advisor, and Dr. John Arquilla served as the second reader. An electronic version of the complete thesis is available at here.

by Frank Hoffman | Mon, 03/14/2011 - 6:50pm | 12 comments
Wrong War, Wrong Policy, or Wrong Tactics?

Book Review by F. G. Hoffman

Download the Full Article: Wrong War, Wrong Policy,or Wrong Tactics?

Bing West, The Wrong War, Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan, New York: Random House, 2011, 307 pg, $27.95. (maps and photographs)

The Long War against extremism has spawned an explosion in books on global terrorism and America's interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan. While Operation Enduring Freedom was the first counter-blow, following quickly on the heels of 9/11, it has not garnered as much attention as the larger Iraqi conflict. In contrast, the protracted contest in Mesopotamia generated George Packer's Assassin's Gate, Tom Ricks' superlative Fiasco and The Gamble, and Linda Robinson's Tell Me How This Ends among others.

Afghanistan has produced some notable exceptions. Sean Naylor's Not a Good Day to Die topped the field until Sebastian Junger's War was issued last year. The former was an operational history of the ferocious fight against Al Qaeda in the Shahikot Valley during Operation Anaconda in March 2002. Junger's micro-epic focused more narrowly on a small unit over a longer period of time in 2008 in the Korengal Valley.

The imbalance in our bookshelves is starting to become rectified, and Bing West's latest book tops the list. Mr. West, a former Marine, Pentagon policy official and noted author, brings much insight and no small amount of prior experience to this particular subject. During the Vietnam War, he had the opportunity to closely examine creative approaches and political complications of modern conflict. His first book, the renowned The Village, captured the complexity of American efforts to provide local security assistance to a foreign population beleaguered by a fierce conflict.

Download the Full Article: Wrong War, Wrong Policy,or Wrong Tactics?

Mr. Hoffman is a retired Marine Reservist and frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/14/2011 - 12:28pm | 7 comments
Moral Intuition and the Professional Military Ethic

by Michael C. Sevcik

Download The Full Article: Moral Intuition and the Professional Military Ethic

As our Army faces the professional ethics challenges of ten years at war, we would do well to realize how central emotion is to morality. We should shift our training, education and Army learning programs to focus mainly on developing men and women of character and integrity. Our Army should place less emphasis on the moral reasoning and ethical decision making processes when it comes to training in both the institutional school house and operational units. This quandary ethics approach not only falls short in providing a process that does not work when the bullets are flying but this thin slicing is a formula for postmodern relativism. When it comes to morality and ethics, the "how to" decision-making process is never as important as what our Soldier's think morally, demonstrate in character and live by the example of uncompromising integrity. Three thousand years ago, Aristotle focused on the 'character" of the individual. His focus regarding Stoic moral philosophy and approach to ethics was to build character in men based on courage, justice, temperance and wisdom. Only after we develop men and women of character, can we hope to get our Soldier's to the proper "intuitive" moral response to the tough ethical challenges they face in both combat and garrison operations. With the understanding of how central the role of emotions is to morality, our commanders and leaders will able to better train their Soldiers and importantly, establish a command climate based on character, values and honor.

When it comes to morality and character, the human species has changed little during the past three millennia. Our approach as a professional organization ought to turn back from the quandaries of case studies and ethical decision making processes which lead moral relativism. Aristotle had it right -- let's get after the inculcation of morality, character and values in our Soldiers.

Download The Full Article: Moral Intuition and the Professional Military Ethic

COL. (Ret.) Michael C. Sevcik is an instructor at the School for Command Preparation, US Army Command & General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He served for 32 years as a Soldier, retiring in 2007.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 03/14/2011 - 9:16am | 0 comments
Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan

by David N. Santos

Download The Full Article: Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks on the United States the terms of terrorism and insurgency have become part of the everyday American lexicon and for that matter much of the international community's as well. So common has the usage of these terms become that it would appear they are almost interchangeable if not the same. There is, however, a distinction between a terrorist and an insurgent. It is this distinction which lies at the heart of the difficulty in combating an enemy who does not look like or operate in the manner of a traditional conventional armed threat. If an enemy is identified as being irregular and not keeping with traditional enemy threat models what are the most effect methods for addressing this type of threat? Add to this complexity of combating an unclear and irregular threat the use of terrorism which adds a new dynamic to the situation. Does the presence of terrorist acts indicate those acts were committed by terrorists or some other type of group such as a revolutionary, an insurgent or a guerrilla?

Download The Full Article: Counterterrorism v. Counterinsurgency: Lessons from Algeria and Afghanistan

Major David N. Santos is an active duty Military Intelligence officer currently attending the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/13/2011 - 11:27am | 3 comments
Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

by Eric von Tersch

Download the Full Article: Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

It is well understood that to be successful in counterinsurgency, the real goal must be to influence the local population, not just destroy the enemy combatants. It is also clear that non-military elements of power can be as or more efficacious than guns and planes. The difficulty is how to apply those two maxims. More times than not, the application of these two maxims intersect in the position of the apparent host-nation leader, be it at the village, regional, or national level.

The following vignette explains how a U.S. team of advisors managed their relationship with a Provisional Director of Police (PDOP), MG Khalid, in a northern province of Iraq in order to convince the general to move decisively against terrorists and develop his 27,000-man police force so that it had credibility with the Iraqi population.

Download the Full Article: Building Relationships and Influence in Counterinsurgency: One Officer's Perspective

Eric von Tersch is a retired U.S. Army colonel with service in Army Special Forces and as a Foreign Area officer.

Editor's Note: The names of most of the Iraqi officers mentioned in the narrative, as well as place names, have been changed since all of the Iraqi officials alluded to are still in positions of authority. Masking the names and locations does not take away from the essential arguments put forward.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/13/2011 - 10:32am | 0 comments
Download the Full Article: Breaking the Camel's Back
by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/12/2011 - 8:23am | 0 comments
The EU's Afghan Police Mission: Failing to Meet Commitments

by Matthew Ince

Download The Full Article: The EU's Afghan Police Mission: Failing to Meet Commitments

The publication of a report by the House of Lords' European Union Committee released on 16 February 2011 has served as yet another illustration of civilian under commitment within the international community's counterinsurgency efforts in Afghanistan. If this trend is left unaddressed and civilian missions such as the EUPOL continue to fall short of meeting their commitments within the region, the international community may well find it increasingly difficult to address key grievances within Afghanistan and ensure that legitimate governance is maintained. Furthermore, this could fundamentally disrupt their ability to successfully train Afghan security forces and enable the Afghan Government to provide security to its citizens; a prerequisite for overcoming the excessive levels of corruption that must be addressed if stability is ever to be sustainable within the region.

Download The Full Article: The EU's Afghan Police Mission: Failing to Meet Commitments

Matthew Ince currently works as a Project Manager at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies. He has an MA in Geopolitics and Grand Strategy and a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Sussex.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/11/2011 - 11:50am | 32 comments
The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration

by Scott Dempsey

Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration

General Petraeus will be in Washington next week where he will inevitably continue to extol the progress of counterinsurgency (COIN) in southern Afghanistan, the Taliban's heartland -- and where our war to achieve sufficient stability to enable us to leave will be either won or lost. COIN doctrine argues that with the right combination of security, governance, and development, there will be transformational impact that can marginalize insurgents' control over local populations. Combined with multiple external factors mostly beyond our ability to influence, COIN was indeed part of the transformational improvement in Iraq -- and provided sufficient stability for American troops to withdraw in favor of Iraqi government forces. The Afghanistan surge seeks to create similar results-- which would ultimately create conditions for transfer of authority and responsibility to the Afghan government and security forces. A key component to GEN Petraeus's COIN talking points cites the Nawa District of restive Helmand Province as a "proof of concept" for counterinsurgency dogma, and that the "Nawa model" is durable. However, during my year in Helmand Province, including nine months as the U.S. development lead in Nawa District, I saw a variety of factors that led to Nawa's success -- none of which pass this test. Furthermore, to secure even the most basic degree of Afghan government-led stability will require a seemingly endless commitment to continue to fight and finance this effort.

Download The Full Article: The Fallacy of COIN: One Officer's Frustration

Until February 2011, Scott Dempsey was a USAID Foreign Service Officer, most recently with the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs in Washington. From July 2009 - August 2010, he served as a development officer in Helmand Province. He also previously deployed as a Marine on a civil affairs team in Fallujah in 2005.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 03/11/2011 - 11:23am | 5 comments
Seeing the Other Side of the COIN:

A Critique of the Current Counterinsurgency (COIN) Strategies in Afghanistan

by Metin Turcan

Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN

Though the international visibility of Tribalized Rural and Muslim Environments (TRMEs) such as rural Afghanistan has dramatically increased for almost nine years with the efforts of Coalition Forces (CF) in Afghanistan, TRMEs have rarely been studied from Counterinsurgency (COIN) perspective. Although there has emerged a vast literature at the strategic level on the COIN efforts of the CF in Afghanistan and the prospective policies of the international community to resolve the current insurgency, unfortunately, we are still unable to see the other side of the COIN at the tactical level, or view on the ground.

The utmost aim of this article is to attack many "dogmas" currently exist in the COIN literature, and challenges traditional COIN wisdom available in the literature. It also aims to lay out a different perspective regarding the COIN efforts in rural areas at the tactical level, a rarely studied level from COIN perspective. This is, therefore, not an article of problem solver. It may be regarded, instead, as an article of problem setting at the tactical level and concerning Afghanistan in general. It claims that the current situation in rural Afghanistan do not conform to established frames or assumptions in the literature, and the current literature is, thus, far behind from figuring out what the real problem is.

Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and soul.

If one member is afflicted with pain, other members uneasy will remain.

If you have no sympathy for human pain, the name of human you cannot retain.

-Sa'adi Shirazi (13th century Islamic poet)

Download the Full Article: Seeing the Other Side of the COIN

Metin Turcan, who holds a MA Degree on Security Studies from Naval Postgraduate School, is currently working as a security advisor in the Interior Ministry of Turkey. He served in southeastern Turkey (1999,2004,2006,2008), Iraq (1999,2003,2005) and fulfilled liaison and training missions in Kazakhstan(2004), Kyrgyzstan(2004), and Afghanistan(2005).

by Ben Zweibelson | Fri, 03/11/2011 - 10:14am | 72 comments

To Design or Not to Design (Part Two):

The There Is a Problem with the Word 'Problem;' How Unique Vocabulary Is Essential to Conceptual Planning

by Ben Zweibelson

Download the Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Two)

Costello: "Well then who's on first?"

Abbott: "Yes."

Costello: "I mean the fellow's name."

Abbott: "Who."

Costello: "The guy on first."

Abbott: "Who."

Costello: "The first baseman."

Abbott: "Who."

Costello: "The guy playing..."

Abbott: "Who is on first!"

Costello: "I'm asking YOU who's on first."

Abbott: "That's the man's name."

FM5-0 Chapter 3 Design discusses a critical component to conceptual planning and phrases it with "solving the right problem." However, military doctrine and institutional culture already employ the word problem for an entirely different and valid reason. Should one ask any tactical-level member of a military unit what their understanding of the word problem is in a military setting, the majority will explain to you that a problem is 'something one solves.' The existing word meaning uses a short-term or tactical perspective that is divorced from the larger context in which design theory provides understanding on metaphysical processes. These processes exceed the artificial boundaries imposed by the military institution's valid definition of a tactical problem; the perspectives do not match.

Download the Full Article: To Design or Not to Design (Part Two)

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

Editor's Note: This is part two of a six part series on design. Part one can be found here.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/10/2011 - 8:46am | 4 comments
Download The Full Article: The Unnecessary Front: Reconsidering The Corps's East Asian Bases
by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/10/2011 - 8:21am | 0 comments
The Post-Afghanistan Threat Environment:

A Case Study on the Maldives

by Jason Thomas

Download The Full Article: The Post-Afghanistan Threat Environment

The conflict in Afghanistan is one of the longest military engagements in modern warfare for Western governments and their partners. At the same time there is continued agitation and provocation from non-state actors, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba (Army of the Righteous), based along the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan. There is an unparalleled amount of human and technological surveillance focused on monitoring the flow of funds and fighters to Afghanistan. Yet, the next seed of radicalization to have regional and global consequences has been planted in small Islamic nation states or those who previously have not registered as potential breeding grounds. This paper argues that this is an asymmetric response by non-state Islamic actors to our superiority in surveillance and concentration of overwhelming force being applied in Afghanistan and the border regions of Pakistan. By their very nature, non-state actors such as al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Taiba are borderless movements. They do not rely on a one-dimensional front line and use impressionable segments of society or fragile nations with porous borders as hosts. One such nation is the Maldives. There is also a growth in al Qaeda networks within Mauritiania, Nepal, Bangladesh and Somalia.

Download The Full Article: The Post-Afghanistan Threat Environment

Jason Thomas is a former Regional Manager for a USAID Implementing Partner in Afghanistan. He has also worked extensively in the Civil War area in Sri Lanka, negotiating with the Tamil Tigers as well as being a senior political advisor in the British House of Commons. He is a PhD candidate at Curtin University, Perth W.A Australia -- in his spare time he takes disadvantaged kids up the Kokoda Track battlefield in PNG.

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 03/09/2011 - 6:00pm | 12 comments
"Mr. Gates Doth Protest Too Much"

by Neoptolemus

Download the Full Article: "Mr. Gates Doth Protest Too Much"

Mr. Gates continued his farewell tour with a strong speech at the Air Force Academy last week. Unlike his talk at the US Military Academy he did not talk over the student's heads or treat them as tethered goats. Nor did he suggest that they'd wasted four years at the wrong Service academy or that their future profession was in doubt—as he unintentionally did at West Point. Instead he talked to them as the future Air Force leaders, the ones that will ultimately be "tackling the challenges of the 21st century head on." He spoke plainly but passionately about what the Air Force of the 21st century must look like -- as well as the challenges and moral issues they would face as leaders.

As at West Point, the Secretary candidly discussed the conservative culture of the Pentagon, noting that when he arrived he still found all the Services -- including the Air Force -- looking at the world "through the prism of the 20th century," preparing to win conventional and large scale fights against comparably armed competitors. His efforts, he noted, ran into a stone wall of cultural resistance and bureaucratic sacred cows, especially from the Air Force.

Download the Full Article: "Mr. Gates Doth Protest Too Much"

Neoptolemus, a retired infantry officer, is currently imprisoned as a senior defense official in the Pentagon. Neoptolemus was the son of the warrior Achilles and the princess Deidamia in Greek mythology.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/06/2011 - 10:16am | 7 comments
The Koepenick Syndrome: Is the United States the new Prussia?

by Franz-Stefan Gady

Download The Full Article: The Koepenick Syndrome: Is the United States the new Prussia?

January 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of Dwight D. Eisenhower's farewell address. In it, he warned the American people of the growing influence of the "military industrial complex" . An outgrowth of this "total influence", as Eisenhower put it, is the United States' reverence for its armed services and the men commanding it. While it is unlikely that the United States will ever take the path of Prussia, the dangers of the Koepenick syndrome are real—a disproportionate admiration for leadership and innovation in men and women wearing uniforms and minimizing civilian influence over tough policy decisions.

Download The Full Article: The Koepenick Syndrome: Is the United States the new Prussia?

Franz-Stefan Gady is a foreign policy analyst at the EastWest Institute. He served in the Austrian Army.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/06/2011 - 9:46am | 0 comments

Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

 

by Braden Civins

Download The Full Article: Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

The drug war in Mexico threatens the stability of the Mexican federal government, catalyzes widespread border crossing by undocumented aliens (UDAs), and imperils U.S. citizens on both sides of the border. This note examines one proposal to address these concerns—additional deployment of the military along the southwest (SW) border—and the legal issues potentially raised by this response. Part I of this note provides background information on the nature of the problem. Part II traces the law governing military support to civilian law enforcement agencies (MSCLEA) with respect to counternarcotics (CN) operations along the southwest (SW) border. Part III examines how the law will either constrain or facilitate MSCLEA with respect to surveillance and detention operations. Part IV offers recommendations to improve the utility of military deployment to the border to combat drug trafficking organizations (DTOs).

Download The Full Article: Optimizing Use of the Armed Forces in Combating Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations

Braden Civins, a native Texan, is in his fourth and final year of study at The University of Texas, pursuing a J.D. from The School of Law and a Master of Global Policy Studies, with a specialization in Security Studies, from the L.B.J. School of Public Affairs.

 

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 03/06/2011 - 9:20am | 0 comments
The World Hears Us:

George Bush's Rhetoric in the Global War on Terrorism

by Scott Cullinane

Download The Full Article: The World Hears Us

Nearly a decade after the September 11th attacks and the declaration of a War on Terrorism America is still struggling to more accurately define the nature and scope of this war. Debate continues because fundamental questions still remain: with who is the US at war, is it a war, and if so, how should it prosecute such a war? This ambiguity has many contributing factors, but one that is significant and has yet to be examined closely enough is the role and influence of rhetoric. The rhetoric of President George W. Bush shaped the perception of the American public and influenced US military actions and foreign policy. Likewise, events such as the sectarian and insurgent violence in Iraq influenced the words President Bush used. As the War on Terrorism developed the President's rhetoric changed in some ways, but it never sufficiently address al-Qaeda's motivations nor counter its narrative.

Words and phrases often carry multiple meanings and can have connotations that change with their context. Words people do not use or avoid using can equally carry weight by their absence. In an environment as complex as the War on Terror, words are no simple matter. During a conventional interstate war, rhetoric does matter, but it is ancillary to the use of force and the exercise of will. In conventional warfare the central and indispensible factor is the imposition of one nation-state's will on another by force. The words a leader speaks only matter so far as they affect force. Yet, in America's current situation, rhetoric matters a good deal more because the US is not in a conventional war, but something else entirely.

Download The Full Article: The World Hears Us

Scott Cullinane is currently a Staff Associate for the Oversight & Investigations Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. He is also a student of national security affairs at the Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/05/2011 - 11:21am | 19 comments
Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

by Timothy Richardson

Ivan, Arreguin-Toft. How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict. Cambridge studies in International Relations, 99. New York: Cambridge University Press, 250 pages, 2005. ISBN: 0521548691 Paperback $41.00

Download The Full Article: Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

The military prowess of the United States would seem to be unrivalled in the 21st century. Yet a decade into the new century, the United States is still engaged in the longest war of its history in Afghanistan against a weaker, non-state actor, with no end in sight. Why? In his 2005 book, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Ivan Arreguin-Toft offers insight into the reasons why strong actors, such as the United States, often lose to weak actors in an asymmetric conflict. He not only provides sound logic detailing his Strategic Interaction (STRATINT) theory to explain why weak actors defeat strong actors, but he also outlines the growing post-World War II trend marking the increased winning percentage of weak actors in asymmetric conflicts. Given the United States' efforts in Afghanistan and Iraq this past decade, few would argue against the prediction that the United States will continue to be engaged in small, asymmetric wars against militarily inferior adversaries for the foreseeable future. More importantly, one could perceive that because the United States has such an overwhelming military superiority that it did not plan for, or was not prepared for, the strategy of its adversary. As such, Arreguin-Toft's STRATINT theory is relevant, compelling, and well-supported. Moreover, it is a great follow-on to other prominent asymmetric conflict theories proposed by Andrew Mack and Gil Merom, and is an essential read for defense planners, as well as IR scholars and students.

Download The Full Article: Book Review: How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict

Major Timothy Richardson is a career Air Force intelligence officer currently studying Irregular Warfare at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He has a B.A. in History from Mary Washington University and M.S. in International Relations from Troy University. He has deployed to four contingency locations since 9/11.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/05/2011 - 10:57am | 6 comments

COIN in Mexico? A Response to Robert Culp's Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

 

by Patrick Corcoran

Download The Full Article: COIN in Mexico?

It has grown fashionable in recent years to argue that the solution to Mexico's public security difficulties lies in treating organized crime within the context of counterinsurgency theory. Many have made this argument, one of the most recent being Robert Culp here at Small Wars Journal. This is an unfortunate misreading of the security problems that are plaguing Mexico. While COIN theory offers a handful of sensible ideas, as an overarching philosophical guide, it is an imperfect fit for Mexico.

Download The Full Article: COIN in Mexico?

Patrick Corcoran is a student of international relations at Johns Hopkins' School of Advanced International Studies. He lived in northern Mexico from 2005 to 2010 and blogs daily about Mexican security and politics at Gancho.

by SWJ Editors | Sat, 03/05/2011 - 10:37am | 4 comments
The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia

by Boris Kogan

Download the Full Article: The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia

Abstract. This paper delivers a short overview of the Basmachi insurgency in Soviet Central Asia, a conflict which spanned a quarter of a century (1918-approximately 1943) and the territory of a half-dozen of today's countries, foreshadowing many future Islamic insurgencies including those in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Western China, Iraq and Chechnya. The "Basmachestvo" involved prolonged full-spectrum warfare fought by a fragmented insurgency with multiple centers of gravity against a multiethnic empire, whose ideology the insurgents perceived as a threat to their identity and way of life. The subject has been largely opaque to Western historians due to several reasons, including the remote and inaccessible theater of warfare (Soviet Central Asia having been denied to Western journalists and diplomats in the timeframe discussed,) the suppression of accounts failing to adhere to the official narrative by the Soviet Union and purges of those who participated on both sides of the insurgency and remained in the Soviet Union after the conflict's conclusion. Thus, a conflict with a high degree of relevance to the present-day international situation has been forgotten or ignored. This paper attempts to begin to remedy this situation.

Download the Full Article: The Basmachi: Factors Behind the Rise and Fall of an Islamic Insurgency in Central Asia

SSG Boris Kogan is currently serving in the Washington Army National Guard while completing his Bachelor of Arts degree at the University of Washington, Seattle. He previously served on active duty as a Special Operations Team Alpha leader. He was awarded the Jim & Anna Hyonjoo Lint Scholarship by the Lint Center for National Security Studies in August 2010.

by Ben Zweibelson | Fri, 03/04/2011 - 11:11am | 10 comments

To Design, or not to Design:

An Introduction to a Six Article Series

by Ben Zweibelson

Download The Full Article: To Design, or not to Design

Are the Joint Operational Planning Process (JOPP) and the Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) unable to address the growing complexities of modern, ill-structured conflict? Does the U.S. Army's design methodology provide the military institution a more effective structure, format, vocabulary, and process that are understandable to the force and applicable? Many military professionals charge that design is 'just MDMP's mission analysis on steroids,' while others claim design is merely 'Effects Based Operations (EBO) by another name.'

Download The Full Article: To Design, or not to Design

Major Ben Zweibelson is an active duty Infantry Officer in the US Army. A veteran of OIF 1 and OIF 6, Ben is currently attending the School for Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He has a Masters in Liberal Arts from Louisiana State University and a Masters in Military Arts and Sciences from the United States Air Force (Air Command and Staff College program). Ben deploys this June to support Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as a planner.

by Chris Paparone | Fri, 03/04/2011 - 9:40am | 12 comments

Design and the Prospects of a Design Ethic

by Christopher R. Paparone

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects of a Design Ethic

Interestingly, if one examines how the issue of ethical reasoning is approached in the US military institution, the focus of attention seems to be more on the individual rather than the reflexivity of the institution as the frame of reference. The Vann story exposes that the institutional propensity is to orient on ethics of progressivism, compliance, and equality. Progressivism is revealed in the institutional portrayal of convergent and assimilative knowledge artifacts to include published doctrine and regulations and a vast array of organizations devoted to "lessons learned." The institutional ethic on compliance seems strongly favor that, under normal circumstances, an officer shall not question the decided stratagems of the hierarchy (perhaps the assumptive underpinnings are that the higher you go, the more you know and the more accountable you are). At the same time, there are institutional cross-pressures to accommodate equality -- (at least apparently) treating those of the same position and rank equally; albeit, the talents and wisdom are diverse. We will address these sequentially.

Download The Full Article: Design and the Prospects of a Design Ethic

Christopher R. Paparone, Colonel, U.S. Army, Retired, is an associate professor in the Army Command and General Staff College's Department of Joint, Interagency and Multinational Operations at Fort Lee, Virginia.

Editor's Note: This essay is the last in Paparone's series on design.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 03/03/2011 - 5:22pm | 0 comments
The Second Battle of Hastings

by Cliff W. Gilmore

This article is cross-posted to Small Wars Journal with the kind permission of Matt Armstrong at MountainRunner

Download the Full Article: The Second Battle of Hastings

Michael Hastings' most recent attempt to unseat a U.S. general alleges members of the military illegally used Information Operations (IO) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) activities to shape the perceptions of elected U.S. officials and senior military leaders. Many respondents quickly addressed a need to clarify lines between various communication activities including Information Operations, Psychological Operations (recently re-named Military Information Support Operations or MISO), Public Affairs (PA) and Strategic Communication (SC). Amidst the resulting smoke and fury both Hastings and his detractors are overlooking a greater underlying problem: Many in the military continue to cling with parochial vigor to self-imposed labels - and the anachronistic paradigms they represent - that defy the very nature of a rapidly evolving communication environment.

The allegations highlight two false assumptions that guide the U.S. military's approach to communication in an environment defined not by the volume and control of information but by the speed and ease with which people today communicate with one another. This article identifies these assumptions and recommends several actions to avoid yet another Battle of Hastings by eliminating existing stovepipes rather than strengthening them. The analysis presented here is grounded in two key established Truths.

Download the Full Article: The Second Battle of Hastings

Cliff W. Gilmore is an active duty Marine Corps Major assigned as Special Assistant for Public Communication to the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Cliff is a 2010-2011 Fellow with MIT's Seminar XXI. He holds an MS in Organization and Management with a Leadership specialization from Capella University and is a PhD Learner in the same field. The focus of his ongoing dissertation research is principle-based communication as a leadership practice and he is the author of "Principles, Credibility, and Trust", Appendix P ofthe U.S. Joint Forces Command Handbook for Strategic Communication (Version 3) (Appendix P begins on page 197). This opinions in this paper are Cliff's personal thoughts and do not reflect those of his commander or organization.

by Octavian Manea | Thu, 03/03/2011 - 7:59am | 2 comments
Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion:

An Interview with Etienne de Durand

by Octavian Manea

Download The Full Article: Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

How important were Charles Lacheroy and Roger Trinquier in shaping the French School of COIN compared to David Galula?

There was much debate and opposition within the French Army regarding the proper answers to guerre révolutionnaire, and no single school of thought ever prevailed. If there is such a thing as the French School of Counterinsurgency, its founding father undoubtedly is Charles Lacheroy, and with him the proponents of DGR (doctrine de guerre révolutionnaire or French Counterinsurgency Doctrine) to include Jacques Hogard. During the French Indochina and Algeria wars, they were extremely influential towards French policy and strategy leading conferences and lectures, contributing to doctrinal manuals, and advising on day-to-day operations. Lacheroy, for instance, had high-level contacts within the government and was able to implement his views in 1957, with the creation of 5e bureaux all over Algeria and the generalization of guerre psychologique (psychwar or psychological operations).

Roger Trinquier is at first more of a practitioner. He wrote on COIN at the end of the period and should therefore only in retrospect be included as a central, yet not foundational, figure of French COIN.

Contrastingly, David Galula was an intelligence officer and most of what he wrote was marginal in France. Nobody knew of him.

Download The Full Article: Reflections on the French School of Counter-Rebellion

Etienne de Durand is director of the Security Studies Center at the Institut Franí§ais des Relations Internationales (IFRI) in Paris. He is also professor at the Institut d'études politiques de Paris and at the Ecole de guerre. He is the author of the chapter dedicated to France in "Understanding Counterinsurgency-Doctrine, operations and challenges" (Routledge, 2010) edited by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney. He is contributor to the Ultima Ratio (http://ultimaratio-blog.org/) a blog focused on debating contemporary security and defense issues.

by Gary Anderson | Thu, 03/03/2011 - 4:39am | 0 comments
The Closers (Part III):

Civilians in the Hold Phase

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download the Full Article: Civilians in the Hold Phase

The second or "Hold" phase of a counterinsurgency will likely not be clear cut. It is generally the point at which the insurgents no longer can operate openly in any given area, and have to revert to the covert first stage of guerilla operations. The line is not easily recognized and may vary from locality to locality even within a single brigade or regimental operating area. The military will develop metrics to try to determine where they stand relative to the insurgency.

The civilian members of any Reconstruction Team (RT) will likely also develop their own measures, even if the process is less formal. I had a tendency to gauge progress in any given area by the quality of the Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and of their manner of emplacement. As IED networks are rolled up in the clear phase and further degraded in the hold phase, the quality and quantity of the IEDs decreases with the replacement of skilled bomb makers and emplacers with less competent recruits.

Download the Full Article: Civilians in the Hold Phase

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10 and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/01/2011 - 7:09pm | 8 comments
Will the Real Robert Gates Please Stand Up?

by Neoptolemus

Download the Full Article: Will the Real Robert Gates Please Stand Up?

It's hard not to like the provocative nature of the SecDef's speeches—which often have serious messages and outright swipes at sclerotic bureaucratic habits. For example in his West Point speech, he talked over the heads of the cadets in the room and railed about the future as an "opportunity to attack the institutional and bureaucratic constipation of Big Army, and re-think the way it deals with the outstanding young leaders in its lower- and middle-ranks."

Likewise, his advocacy for greater diversity and flexibility in careers and educational opportunities. "For example, instead of being assigned to new positions every two or three years," Mr. Gates opined that officers could "apply for job openings in a competitive system more akin to what happens in large organizations in the private sector." I really liked his public endorsement of Lieutenant General David Barno's proposals for Army reform and the need for tomorrow's smaller professional force to compete and retain the best talent as a "must do" for the incoming Army Chief of Staff.

But Mr. Gates has also a deliberate taste for rhetorical overstretch when he makes irritating if not dangerous comments on "likely" and implausible scenarios about the future use of military force.

Download the Full Article: Will the Real Robert Gates Please Stand Up?

Neoptolemus, a retired infantry officer, is currently imprisoned as a senior defense official in the Pentagon. Neoptolemus was the son of the warrior Achilles and the princess Deidamia in Greek mythology.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/01/2011 - 12:59am | 0 comments

The February 2011

issue of Small Wars Journal (Vol. 7 No. 2) is now available.

Click here for the

full issue, or directly on these titles for single articles.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/01/2011 - 12:59am | 2 comments
"Napoleonic Know-How" in an Age of Persistent Engagement

by Douglas Batson, Al Di Leonardo, Christopher K. Tucker

Download the Full Article: "Napoleonic Know-How" in an Age of Persistent Engagement

A bevy of prominent national security thinkers have suggested that the US has entered an era of persistent engagement with troubled regions of the world. From this perspective, failing or failed states are likely to lure the US into counter-insurgency (COIN) operations, foreign internal defense, and other modes of irregular warfare for decades to come. The sources of these difficult situations will inevitably vary greatly, from ethnic conflicts to natural resource grabs; predatory kleptocracies to narco-terrorist regimes; proxy wars to religious extremism; and more. Yet all of these situations owe their origins in large part to the absence of the same governance infrastructures that have enabled successful modern states since the days of Napoleon.

Douglas Batson joined the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) in 2004.

Lieutenant Colonel Di Leonardo is a decorated combat veteran of US Special Operations.

Dr. Christopher K. Tucker thinks and works at the intersection of technology, strategy, geography, and national securi-ty. Dr. Tucker manages, Yale House Ventures, a portfolio of technology companies and social ventures across the domains of international affairs, defense/intelligence, and academe.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 03/01/2011 - 12:51am | 0 comments
Developing Better Relations with Russia

by John D. Johnson

Download the Full Article: Developing Better Relations with Russia

The Obama Administration has made improving relations with Russia one of its main foreign policy goals and its efforts to date have borne fruit and put U.S.-Russia relations on a positive footing looking toward the future. For its part, NATO also has re-engaged in a concentrated effort to improve relations with Russia since NATO-Russia Council meetings were suspended in 2008 following Russia's military action in Georgia.

As a result of these efforts, since the post-Soviet low in relations with Russia following the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, relations between the U.S., NATO and Russia have steadily improved over the past two and half years. And in spite of lingering mistrust and marked differences on some issues, the U.S., NATO and Russia have created a positive political environment where real dialogue and engagement on a number of shared interests makes possible a "true strategic partnership between NATO and Russia" for the 21st century as expressed in NATO's new Strategic Concept. Moreover, as important strategic issues such as counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, Iran and North Korea continue to challenge all sides, and other external powers continue to evolve, cooperation seems as important now as at any other time since the 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union.

This paper aims to examine recent U.S. and NATO efforts to develop better relations with Russia, identify areas of common interest and disagreement, and provide recommendations for the way forward. This article will, at times, attempt to take into account the Russian perspective, a side that is sometimes overlooked in Western media, in order to highlight where U.S./NATO and Russian views diverge on key issues.

Download the Full Article: Developing Better Relations with Russia

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson is a U.S. Army Fellow assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany. He has served in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Department of the Army Staff, U.S. Army Europe, Multi-National Forces-Iraq (Baghdad), III Corps, U.S. Division South-Iraq (Basra), the 1st Infantry Division, the 1st Cavalry Division, and the 501st Military Intelligence Brigade.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 02/24/2011 - 9:46am | 0 comments
Making a Sandwich in Afghanistan:

How to Assess a Strategic Withdrawal from a Protracted Irregular War

by Paul Rexton Kan

Download The Full Article: Making a Sandwich in Afghanistan

The dinner offerings at the dining facility at ISAF headquarters were not the best when I took a break one night from working with CJIATF-Shafafiyat. The general's military aid, a lieutenant, sat down at the table with a few slices of bread, some meat and cheese. I said, "That actually looks better than what I got". He replied, "Sir, if it's one thing the Army taught me, it's how to make a sandwich." This is an appropriate metaphor for NATO and US efforts in Afghanistan and perhaps an important corollary to John Nagl's "eating soup with a knife." Simply put, it means doing the best with what you have in the face of worse options. When it comes to the war in Afghanistan, most of the focus has been on the counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy and what it will mean for 2014 when International Security Assistance Force's (ISAF) mission will fall to the Afghan Security Forces. To be sure, civilian decision makers will take into account the metrics used by the military as it undertook its assessment of success. But whether 2014 will be a "period" or a "comma" marking the international community's military involvement in the country will largely depend on strategic level considerations of politicians, and not purely the military metrics of an operational strategy like COIN.

Download The Full Article: Making a Sandwich in Afghanistan

Paul Rexton Kan is currently an Associate Professor of National Security Studies and the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at the US Army War College. He is also the author of the book Drugs and Contemporary Warfare (Potomac Books 2009) and was recently the Visiting Senior Counternarcotics Advisor for CJIATF-Shafafiyat (Transparency) at ISAF Headquarters in Kabul, Afghanistan. His forthcoming book is Cartels at War: Mexico's Drug Fueled Violence and the Threat to US National Security (Potomac Books).

by SWJ Editors | Wed, 02/23/2011 - 10:11pm | 5 comments
Exit Strategies: Iraq and the Republic of South Vietnam

by Robert Tollast

Download The Full Article: Exit Strategies: Iraq and the Republic of South Vietnam

Editor's Note. This essay is an interview with James H. Willbanks with initial commentary added by Robert Tollast. In 1972 James H. Willbanks was one of a handful of American advisers to the South Vietnamese Army at the battle of An Loc, one of the most desperate and fearsome battles of the entire war. A detailed account of this battle, as well as the political and military problems of Vietnamization can be found in his book Abandoning Vietnam: How America left and South Vietnam lost its war.

Download The Full Article: Exit Strategies: Iraq and the Republic of South Vietnam

Robert Tollast is an English Literature Graduate from Royal Holloway University of London and has published articles for the finance publication AccountingWEB.

by Gary K. Busch | Wed, 02/23/2011 - 7:50am | 0 comments

Revolution And The Egyptian Labour Movement

by Gary K. Busch

Download The Full Article: Revolution And The Egyptian Labour Movement

Mubarak has gone and the spirit of revolution is in the air in Egypt, despite the fact that the military remain in control. The Army has pledged to meet the democratic demands of the protestors and have promised elections in the near future. Despite this, there is still unrest in the country and tens of thousands of workers are staying away from their workplaces. They say they are on strike. Striking may seem to be a normal reaction for dissatisfied workers anywhere, but these strikes are structured and conducted in way not immediately familiar to analysts in the West and pose serious challenges to the revolution.

Download The Full Article: Revolution And The Egyptian Labour Movement

Dr. Gary K. Busch has had a varied career-as an international trades unionist, an academic, a businessman and a political intelligence consultant.

by Mike Few | Mon, 02/21/2011 - 2:31pm | 33 comments
The Wrong War: An Interview with Bing West

by Michael Few

Download the Full Article: The Wrong War: An Interview with Bing West

Bing West's The Wrong War: Grit, Strategy, and the Way Out of Afghanistan will be out on the bookshelf tomorrow. We asked Bing, a longtime supporter of Small Wars Journal, for an exclusive interview prior to publication. We wanted an honest, open discussion on the current war in Afghanistan and modern warfare. He more than delivered, and hopefully, this interview will be followed in several weeks with another by Octavian Manea. Enjoy the interview, and make sure that you go out and get his book!

- Mike

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 02/18/2011 - 9:20am | 4 comments
Negotiation: By, With, and Through the Afghan People

by Tim Mathews

Download The Full Article: Negotiation: By, With, and Through the Afghan People

This submission is offered at this time to coincide with the upcoming panel discussion at the United States Institute of Peace, titled, Making Peace in Afghanistan: the Missing Political Strategy. The goal is to spur discussion and raise issues that have been absent in recent debates surrounding the prospects of a negotiated solution in Afghanistan. It does not offer definitive answers or advocate for a specific policy. Rather, the intent is to influence the debate by causing people to rethink assumptions about the appropriate actors to be involved in negotiations and consider how best to engage those actors.

Download The Full Article: Negotiation: By, With, and Through the Afghan People

Tim Mathews is a former US Army Infantry Officer, commissioned in 1999 at Marion Military Institute. He served on multiple deployments to Bosnia-Herzegovina and Iraq. Since separating from the Active Army in 2008, he has earned a Master of Business Administration from George Washington University and he is a Juris Doctor candidate in the class of 2011 at the University of Maine School of Law.

by SWJ Editors | Tue, 02/15/2011 - 7:40pm | 24 comments
The Future of MISO: A Critique

by Alfred H. Paddock, Jr.

Download the Full Article: The Future of MISO: A Critique

In his article for the January-February 2011 issue of Special Warfare, "The Future of MISO," Colonel Curt Boyd, Chief of Staff for the US Army JFK Special Warfare Center and School, seeks to demonstrate the rationale for changing the PSYOP name to Military Information Support Operations (MISO), and argues for a consolidation of MISO, Information Operations (IO), and Public Affairs (PA). His piece suffers from historical inaccuracies, unfounded assertions, and questionable logic.

Download the Full Article: The Future of MISO: A Critique

Alfred Paddock, Jr., was on active duty in the U.S. Army, 1957--1988, and served three combat tours in Laos and Vietnam with Special Forces. He also was the Director for Psychological Operations, Office of the Secretary of Defense. In June 2009 he received the inaugural Gold Award of the MG Robert A. McClure Medal for Exemplary Service in Psychological Operations, recognizing his lifetime of achievements and outstanding service to the Psychological Operations Regiment.

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 02/14/2011 - 5:23pm | 1 comment
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy

by Jeffrey Dressler and David Witter

Download the Full Article: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy

Although Uzbek militants have been active in Afghanistan and Pakistan since the late 1990s, little attention has been paid to these fighters. Principally, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan—formed in 1998 by Toher Yuldashev and Juma Namangani—is the main organization which organizes and directs these militants. The group's main focus has always been ousting Uzbek President Islam Karimov in favor of installing an Islamist regime. Over the past several years however, the IMU has strengthened its ties with the likes of al-Qaeda and the Taliban, focusing not just on northern Afghanistan but internationally as well—a particularly troubling development that has managed to fly under the radar.

The IMU has maintained close ties with the Taliban and al-Qaeda since the late 1990s, meeting with Taliban officials and Osama bin Laden in 1997 and later, agreeing to set up a base of operations in northern Afghanistan while Yuldashev resided in Kandahar with Taliban senior leadership in 1998. In exchange for using northern Afghanistan as a launching pad into the central Asian states, the IMU provided militants to the Taliban to battle the Northern Alliance, led by Ahmed Shah Massoud. In 2000, the group was designated as a terrorist organization by the United States, who noted the group's close association with al-Qaeda. After fighting losing battles with invading U.S. forces in the north and east in 2001, the IMU relocated to South Waziristan in Pakistan where it reconstituted, partially shifting its focus to assist a clan of Waziri tribal militants in fighting against the Pakistani government.

Download the Full Article: Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and the Changing Face of Uzbek Militancy

Jeffrey Dressler is a analyst focusing on Afghanistan and Pakistan security dynamics at the Institute for the Study of War in Washington, DC. David Witter assists with research at ISW and is the author of the ISW Backgrounder, "Uzbek Militancy in Pakistan's Tribal Region."

by SWJ Editors | Mon, 02/14/2011 - 7:16am | 0 comments
The Day Embassy Kabul Forever Changed:

Remembering the 1979 Assassination of Adolph "Spike" Dubs and

The Dismantling of the American Civilian Mission in Afghanistan

by Katherine Brown

Download The Full Article: The Day Embassy Kabul Forever Changed

At 8:40 a.m. on February 14, 1979, the United States Ambassador to Afghanistan, Adolph "Spike" Dubs, walked out of his residence in the Shahr-e-Naw neighborhood of Kabul and took a backseat in the black Cadillac waiting for him. His driver, Gul Mohammad, then took off for the U.S. Embassy, the American flags waving.

Moments later, Mohammad stopped the Cadillac at an intersection. A man dressed in a police uniform approached the car and ordered Mohammad to roll down the window. Dubs encouraged Mohammad to cooperate.

Five minutes later, Ambassador Dubs would be held hostage in Room 117 of the Kabul Hotel. Four hours and 20 minutes later, he would be dead.

The assassination of Ambassador Dubs 32 years ago today has rarely been referenced since we re-engaged with Afghanistan in late 2001. However, it was a catalyst for the suspension of the on-the-ground development and, ultimately, diplomatic missions inside Afghanistan before September 11th. Details about the tragic event and its aftermath illuminate Embassy Kabul's struggle to maintain a policy that both recognized Afghanistan's significance to U.S. national security interests and supported the Afghan people, despite their increasingly despotic and Soviet-leaning government. It is a vital piece of diplomatic history to remember as we prepare for a decreasingly militarized U.S. mission beyond 2014.

Download The Full Article: The Day Embassy Kabul Forever Changed

Katherine Brown is a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University and an Adjunct Fellow at the American Security Project. She served as an official at Embassy Kabul from 2003-2004 and was a research fellow at the Counter-Insurgency Training Center at Camp Julien from May-June 2010. Katherine is also a Fellow with the Truman National Security Project.

by Robert Bunker | Fri, 02/11/2011 - 9:25pm | 24 comments

The Mexican Cartel Debate:

 

As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of Security Studies

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download the Full Article: The Mexican Cartel Debate

The Mexican cartel debate is becoming increasingly more important to U.S. national security, however, it is also becoming ever more confused, heated, and at times downright nasty, with little agreement about what is taking place in Mexico or in other regions of the Americas, such as Guatemala, Honduras, and even this side of the U.S. border. To shed some light on this critical debate—a debate we need to have now and not later— it is the contention of this author that, since the Mexican cartel phenomena is being looked at by scholars from divergent fields of security studies and since each field of study brings with it its own key assumptions and concerns, preferred responses, terminology, works, and authors, those analyzing the problem are often talking at cross-purposes which is unproductive. Additionally, dissention among those within each individual field of study about the threat the cartels represent—the divergences among those who study insurgencies as but one important example— adds another layer of confusion to this debate.

It can be argued that an ordinal threat continuum exists, differentiated by field of security study, of the danger that cartels represent to the Mexican state and, in turn, those states bordering it. Taken together, these threat assessments are helping to actively influence U.S. public and governmental perceptions of the conflict now taking place in Mexico and, ultimately, help shape U.S. policy. While it is accepted that other major factors and biases are in play—U.S. federal and state governments and administrations, political parties and action committees, citizens groups, and the ideological leanings of the individual media outlets all attempt to influence this debate—academics and professionals aligned within recognized fields of security studies have a disproportionate impact due to their propensity to actively publish as well as get their messages out via other media. The debate benefits from each field's unique insights, unfortunately, these come with the baggage of having its own biases and their own interests at heart. Accordingly, some attempt will be made to mitigate the deleterious effects of this fact while seeking potential areas for cooperation between the fields.

Download the Full Article: The Mexican Cartel Debate

Dr. Robert J. Bunker has had the privilege of being involved in projects related to all five of these fields of security studies over the last two decades. This has provided him with a rather unique perspective on each of these fields, their assumptions, concerns, and the major authors influencing them. He holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history.

by Octavian Manea | Fri, 02/11/2011 - 9:56am | 10 comments
Setting the Record Straight on Malayan Counterinsurgency Strategy:

Interview with Karl Hack

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: Setting the Record Straight on Malayan Counterinsurgency Strategy

You are a long time researcher and observer of the Malayan Emergency. What were the core key ingredients that broke the back of the communist insurgents in the Malayan Emergency? The primary cause for putting the campaign on a firmly winning path? The game changer that helped at the end of the day to regain the initiative?

That is a bit like asking, 'In making a cup of tea, which action is the game-changer: the heating of the water, the addition of the tea bag, or the correct amount of steeping? If you don't heat the water, or don't add the teabag, or under or over-steep, you don't get a drinkable cup of tea. In addition, if you do things in the wrong order, it may turn out disgusting. You can't just skip a stage and go to the one and single 'really important' bit of tea-making.

The same goes for counterinsurgency. You cannot, for instance, go straight to a comprehensive approach for 'winning hearts and minds' and expect it to work, if you have not first broken up the larger insurgent groups, disrupted their main bases, and achieved a modicum of spatial dominance and of security for the population in the area concerned. Local fence-sitters are, quite rightly in terms of family survival needs, likely to regard personal safety and avoiding 'collaboration' with you as overriding concerns, especially after contractors and officials who help you are assassinated or tortured.

Yet for counterinsurgency, people do sometimes ask 'what is the one key ingredient'? The answer is, menus do not work like that, and neither did the Malayan Emergency. There were distinct phases or stages. I would argue that many other insurgencies are also likely to have distinct stages, and indeed that within a single insurgency different provinces or regions may be at different stages at any one time. It is quite possible that Helmand and Herat, Kandahar and Nangarhar, could simultaneously be at very different stages, requiring very different policies.

The question above, therefore, encompasses what I would like to dub the 'temporal fallacy' (that policies abstracted from one defining moment might be equally valid in qualitatively different phases), and the spatial fallacy (that different geographic regions will be in the same phase, so allowing a single strategy for a country no matter how fractured and diverse).

Download the Full Article: Setting the Record Straight on Malayan Counterinsurgency Strategy

Interview with Karl Hack conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 02/11/2011 - 8:00am | 19 comments
MRAP Future Discussion Paper

by Ryan T. Kranc

Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle (MRAP) is a broad term encompassing three main vehicle categories with 28 specific types of vehicle. The vehicle family was procured and acquired in mass as a result of a growing improvised explosive device (IED) threat encountered in Iraq in 2004. Though there is no doubt that the MRAP family of vehicles has saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives since it was first fielded and placed into operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the MRAP should not be incorporated into the US Army operational structure for a number of reasons. It offers protection against a specific threat type and does not lend well to the higher intensity realm of full spectrum operations. The MRAP incorporation into current brigade combat team structures is as infeasible as it is impractical. Finally, further evaluation and analysis is needed in terms of DOTMLPF in order to more fully understand the long term impacts of MRAP inclusion and fusion into the force. Until those issues are resolved it would be irresponsible, costly, and infeasible to incorporate the MRAP into the operational structure of the US Army.

Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper

MAJ Ryan T. Kranc is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

by SWJ Editors | Fri, 02/11/2011 - 7:12am | 10 comments
The War of Ideas, Revisited

by Gabriel C. Lajeunesse

Download The Full Article: The War of Ideas, Revisited

Three years ago, in this forum, I argued for an increasingly robust U.S. effort in what had been described by many as the "War of Ideas"—the battle for hearts and minds among Muslim populations. This struggle is between the worldview of radical Islamic extremists on one hand and the liberal values of liberty, human rights and freedom of conscience on the other. This is the foundational struggle in the global war on terrorism. I argued for a renewed effort, akin to that undertaken during the Cold War, to support reformers and moderate voices within their societies. Further, I described the woeful gap in U.S. strategic communications efforts as compared to the nimble use of new media by violent extremists and called for redoubling of U.S. efforts, both by the government and by key influencers in civil society. While the Bush administration's Middle East Partnership Initiative made some attempts in that direction, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hurricane Katrina and economic troubles pushed these aspirational goals to the back-burner. President Obama seemed to take up the banner of the War of Ideas in his inaugural address:

Download The Full Article: The War of Ideas, Revisited

Lt Col Gabriel C. Lajeunesse writes and researches on topics related to international criminal law, the Middle East and national security policy.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 02/10/2011 - 10:57pm | 0 comments
The Rule of Law at Dawn:

A Judge Advocate's Perspective on Rule of Law Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2008 to 2010

by Geoff Guska

Download The Full Article: The Rule of Law at Dawn

Through the observations of a Judge Advocate assigned to the Rule of Law mission within Iraq between 2008 and 2010, the critical aspects of successful Rule of Law operations are: Unity of Effort; Interagency and Host Nation Relationships; synchronization of efforts with the host nation Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy; Prioritization of effort based on need and resource availability; and thorough but fluid planning. Each of these must be considered during the planning, execution and assessment of Rule of Law operations to ensure the success of those operations. Unity of Effort within a Rule of Law mission refers to the need to synchronize information and efforts of Rule of Law actors in order to effectively marshal resources towards achieving the desired Rule of Law objectives and end states. Deployed Rule of Law operations are, by their nature, a joint interagency effort that relies on effective and constructive relationships to connect those agencies with the appropriate host nation partners in order to accomplish their assigned tasks. This synchronization and relationships building is done with the primary focus of working "by, with and through" host nation partners in the furtherance of the Rule of Law components of the host nation IDAD strategy. Once the Rule of Law components of the host nation IDAD strategy is identified, the Rule of Law practitioner needs to prioritize the available resources against the host nation IDAD objectives in order to ensure effective application of limited resources towards achieving those objectives. The above process is made possible through a continuous planning cycle that considers the host nation IDAD strategy in light of available resources, the tactical situation and the ground commander's desired end states. The consideration of these factors will assist the Rule of Law practitioner in developing and implementing Rule of Law projects to assist the Host Nation in the advancement of its IDAD strategy.

Download The Full Article: The Rule of Law at Dawn

CPT Geoff Guska is a US Army Judge Advocate currently assigned as a Battalion Judge Advocate to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He is a graduate of John Carroll University and The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law and wrote this article while serving as the Special Operations Task Force-Central Legal Adviser.

by SWJ Editors | Thu, 02/10/2011 - 7:44am | 1 comment
U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement

by Christopher Holshek

Download The Full Article: U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement

Since the turn of the century, U.S. policies have emphasized greater integrated power to engage a full range of threats, challenges, and opportunities largely concerned with the fragility of civil society and the seams within and between nation-states in a globalized world. This is not only due to well-known transforming strategic and operational environments, but more as of late because of increasing resource constraints for statesman and commanders, nationally and internationally. Moreover, the context for such engagements for the U.S. military, beyond being more joint and interagency, is increasingly multinational, with greater balance and synergy between "soft" and "hard" power, smaller military footprints, as much to prevent future conflicts as to respond to them, and involving greater cooperation with civilian interagency and non-governmental partners.

Download The Full Article: U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement

Christopher Holshek, a retired U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Officer, served as Senior U.S. Military Observer and Chief, Civil-Military Coordination at UNMIL from January 2008 to July 2009. He has also served with United Nations field missions as a civilian -- with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia from 1996 to 1998 as a logistics officer and the UN Mission in Kosovo from 2000 to 2001 as a political reporting officer.

by Gary Anderson | Tue, 02/08/2011 - 5:15pm | 3 comments
The Closers (Part 2):

Civilians in the Clear Phase of a Counterinsurgency

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download The Full Article: Civilians in the Clear Phase of a Counterinsurgency

The transition from a primarily military effort to one of host nation civilian leadership in any insurgent conflict that Americans become involved in is a delicate process in which American civilians should play a central role. If a counterinsurgency is done properly, the seeds of the end should be sewn at the beginning. This was the case in El Salvador, but not in Iraq or Afghanistan. In Asia, we had to learn the hard way.

Clear, hold, and build is the mantra of counterinsurgency operations as American doctrine defines them. FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) is now officially considered interagency, not just military doctrine; it is an accepted interagency approach, and I believe in it. I've seen it work first hand in two distinctly different parts of Iraq and in recent months we seem to be finally making it work in Afghanistan if the research I have done for this study is correct; but it is not a slam dunk.

If improperly applied, it won't work at all. As with politics, all insurgencies are local. If the local population is hard core anti-American or anti-government for whatever reason, it will be difficult to wean them to the government side. This usually happens when the government is made up of an ethnic or religious group that has traditional animosity to the local population; these situations are relatively rare, but they happen. In such cases, the second method of ending an insurgency (ruthless local suppression) may be the host nation government's final recourse. That should be their decision, not ours. Fortunately, these situations are generally the exception in insurgencies. The normal case is one in which the population is on the fence. The general population base is usually open to persuasion, but it is also open to intimidation if the population is not protected from the insurgents.

Download The Full Article: Civilians in the Clear Phase of a Counterinsurgency

The Closers (Part 1): How Insurgencies End can be found here.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10, and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

by SWJ Editors | Sun, 02/06/2011 - 5:18pm | 3 comments
Supporting Sustainable Transition in Afghanistan

A Provincial Perspective

by Jonathan Moss

Download The Full Article: Supporting Sustainable Transition in Afghanistan

As we enter 2011 it is a good time to consider what more needs to be done to promote sustainable transition in Afghanistan. Critical to a successful transition will be getting international support right at the provincial level.

If money really is a weapon system then it is time for the International Community (IC) to start accounting for the ammunition -- at the very minimum to ensure we are doing no harm. Rather than contributing to international objectives, excessive spend focused too narrowly on selected districts may become a driver of instability and put at risk the transition process. The future lies in the government of Afghanistan running a national management cycle of planning, budgeting, execution, auditing and reporting that is responsive to local needs and touches people in their daily lives. The capacity deficit is great and time is short. Now is the last chance to focus on what is needed to sustain the state post transition.

Download The Full Article: Supporting Sustainable Transition in Afghanistan

Jon Moss is a Senior Manager with Coffey International Development specialising in fragile states, stabilisation and sub-national governance. Since October 2008 Jon has been contracted by the UK Stabilisation Unit to lead a small multi-disciplinary team to build the capacity of the provincial administration in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.