Journal

The Mexican Cartel Debate:

As Viewed Through Five Divergent Fields of Security Studies

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download the Full Article: The Mexican Cartel Debate

The Mexican cartel debate is becoming increasingly more important to U.S. national security, however, it is also becoming ever more confused, heated, and at times downright nasty, with little agreement about what is taking place in Mexico or in other regions of the Americas, such as Guatemala, Honduras, and even this side of the U.S. border. To shed some light on this critical debate—a debate we need to have now and not later— it is the contention of this author that, since the Mexican cartel phenomena is being looked at by scholars from divergent fields of security studies and since each field of study brings with it its own key assumptions and concerns, preferred responses, terminology, works, and authors, those analyzing the problem are often talking at cross-purposes which is unproductive. Additionally, dissention among those within each individual field of study about the threat the cartels represent—the divergences among those who study insurgencies as but one important example— adds another layer of confusion to this debate.

It can be argued that an ordinal threat continuum exists, differentiated by field of security study, of the danger that cartels represent to the Mexican state and, in turn, those states bordering it. Taken together, these threat assessments are helping to actively influence U.S. public and governmental perceptions of the conflict now taking place in Mexico and, ultimately, help shape U.S. policy. While it is accepted that other major factors and biases are in play—U.S. federal and state governments and administrations, political parties and action committees, citizens groups, and the ideological leanings of the individual media outlets all attempt to influence this debate—academics and professionals aligned within recognized fields of security studies have a disproportionate impact due to their propensity to actively publish as well as get their messages out via other media. The debate benefits from each field's unique insights, unfortunately, these come with the baggage of having its own biases and their own interests at heart. Accordingly, some attempt will be made to mitigate the deleterious effects of this fact while seeking potential areas for cooperation between the fields.

Download the Full Article: The Mexican Cartel Debate

Dr. Robert J. Bunker has had the privilege of being involved in projects related to all five of these fields of security studies over the last two decades. This has provided him with a rather unique perspective on each of these fields, their assumptions, concerns, and the major authors influencing them. He holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history.

Interview with Karl Hack

by Octavian Manea

Download the Full Article: Setting the Record Straight on Malayan Counterinsurgency Strategy

You are a long time researcher and observer of the Malayan Emergency. What were the core key ingredients that broke the back of the communist insurgents in the Malayan Emergency? The primary cause for putting the campaign on a firmly winning path? The game changer that helped at the end of the day to regain the initiative?

That is a bit like asking, 'In making a cup of tea, which action is the game-changer: the heating of the water, the addition of the tea bag, or the correct amount of steeping? If you don't heat the water, or don't add the teabag, or under or over-steep, you don't get a drinkable cup of tea. In addition, if you do things in the wrong order, it may turn out disgusting. You can't just skip a stage and go to the one and single 'really important' bit of tea-making.

The same goes for counterinsurgency. You cannot, for instance, go straight to a comprehensive approach for 'winning hearts and minds' and expect it to work, if you have not first broken up the larger insurgent groups, disrupted their main bases, and achieved a modicum of spatial dominance and of security for the population in the area concerned. Local fence-sitters are, quite rightly in terms of family survival needs, likely to regard personal safety and avoiding 'collaboration' with you as overriding concerns, especially after contractors and officials who help you are assassinated or tortured.

Yet for counterinsurgency, people do sometimes ask 'what is the one key ingredient'? The answer is, menus do not work like that, and neither did the Malayan Emergency. There were distinct phases or stages. I would argue that many other insurgencies are also likely to have distinct stages, and indeed that within a single insurgency different provinces or regions may be at different stages at any one time. It is quite possible that Helmand and Herat, Kandahar and Nangarhar, could simultaneously be at very different stages, requiring very different policies.

The question above, therefore, encompasses what I would like to dub the 'temporal fallacy' (that policies abstracted from one defining moment might be equally valid in qualitatively different phases), and the spatial fallacy (that different geographic regions will be in the same phase, so allowing a single strategy for a country no matter how fractured and diverse).

Download the Full Article: Setting the Record Straight on Malayan Counterinsurgency Strategy

Interview with Karl Hack conducted by Octavian Manea (Editor of FP Romania, the Romanian edition of Foreign Policy).

by Ryan T. Kranc

Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper

Mine-Resistant, Ambush-Protected Vehicle (MRAP) is a broad term encompassing three main vehicle categories with 28 specific types of vehicle. The vehicle family was procured and acquired in mass as a result of a growing improvised explosive device (IED) threat encountered in Iraq in 2004. Though there is no doubt that the MRAP family of vehicles has saved hundreds, if not thousands, of lives since it was first fielded and placed into operation in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the MRAP should not be incorporated into the US Army operational structure for a number of reasons. It offers protection against a specific threat type and does not lend well to the higher intensity realm of full spectrum operations. The MRAP incorporation into current brigade combat team structures is as infeasible as it is impractical. Finally, further evaluation and analysis is needed in terms of DOTMLPF in order to more fully understand the long term impacts of MRAP inclusion and fusion into the force. Until those issues are resolved it would be irresponsible, costly, and infeasible to incorporate the MRAP into the operational structure of the US Army.

Download The Full Article: MRAP Future Discussion Paper

MAJ Ryan T. Kranc is currently a student at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

by Gabriel C. Lajeunesse

Download The Full Article: The War of Ideas, Revisited

Three years ago, in this forum, I argued for an increasingly robust U.S. effort in what had been described by many as the "War of Ideas"—the battle for hearts and minds among Muslim populations. This struggle is between the worldview of radical Islamic extremists on one hand and the liberal values of liberty, human rights and freedom of conscience on the other. This is the foundational struggle in the global war on terrorism. I argued for a renewed effort, akin to that undertaken during the Cold War, to support reformers and moderate voices within their societies. Further, I described the woeful gap in U.S. strategic communications efforts as compared to the nimble use of new media by violent extremists and called for redoubling of U.S. efforts, both by the government and by key influencers in civil society. While the Bush administration's Middle East Partnership Initiative made some attempts in that direction, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, Hurricane Katrina and economic troubles pushed these aspirational goals to the back-burner. President Obama seemed to take up the banner of the War of Ideas in his inaugural address:

Download The Full Article: The War of Ideas, Revisited

Lt Col Gabriel C. Lajeunesse writes and researches on topics related to international criminal law, the Middle East and national security policy.

A Judge Advocate's Perspective on Rule of Law Operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2008 to 2010

by Geoff Guska

Download The Full Article: The Rule of Law at Dawn

Through the observations of a Judge Advocate assigned to the Rule of Law mission within Iraq between 2008 and 2010, the critical aspects of successful Rule of Law operations are: Unity of Effort; Interagency and Host Nation Relationships; synchronization of efforts with the host nation Internal Defense and Development (IDAD) Strategy; Prioritization of effort based on need and resource availability; and thorough but fluid planning. Each of these must be considered during the planning, execution and assessment of Rule of Law operations to ensure the success of those operations. Unity of Effort within a Rule of Law mission refers to the need to synchronize information and efforts of Rule of Law actors in order to effectively marshal resources towards achieving the desired Rule of Law objectives and end states. Deployed Rule of Law operations are, by their nature, a joint interagency effort that relies on effective and constructive relationships to connect those agencies with the appropriate host nation partners in order to accomplish their assigned tasks. This synchronization and relationships building is done with the primary focus of working "by, with and through" host nation partners in the furtherance of the Rule of Law components of the host nation IDAD strategy. Once the Rule of Law components of the host nation IDAD strategy is identified, the Rule of Law practitioner needs to prioritize the available resources against the host nation IDAD objectives in order to ensure effective application of limited resources towards achieving those objectives. The above process is made possible through a continuous planning cycle that considers the host nation IDAD strategy in light of available resources, the tactical situation and the ground commander's desired end states. The consideration of these factors will assist the Rule of Law practitioner in developing and implementing Rule of Law projects to assist the Host Nation in the advancement of its IDAD strategy.

Download The Full Article: The Rule of Law at Dawn

CPT Geoff Guska is a US Army Judge Advocate currently assigned as a Battalion Judge Advocate to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne). He is a graduate of John Carroll University and The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law and wrote this article while serving as the Special Operations Task Force-Central Legal Adviser.

by Christopher Holshek

Download The Full Article: U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement

Since the turn of the century, U.S. policies have emphasized greater integrated power to engage a full range of threats, challenges, and opportunities largely concerned with the fragility of civil society and the seams within and between nation-states in a globalized world. This is not only due to well-known transforming strategic and operational environments, but more as of late because of increasing resource constraints for statesman and commanders, nationally and internationally. Moreover, the context for such engagements for the U.S. military, beyond being more joint and interagency, is increasingly multinational, with greater balance and synergy between "soft" and "hard" power, smaller military footprints, as much to prevent future conflicts as to respond to them, and involving greater cooperation with civilian interagency and non-governmental partners.

Download The Full Article: U.S. Military Observers and Comprehensive Engagement

Christopher Holshek, a retired U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Officer, served as Senior U.S. Military Observer and Chief, Civil-Military Coordination at UNMIL from January 2008 to July 2009. He has also served with United Nations field missions as a civilian -- with the UN Transitional Administration in Eastern Slavonia from 1996 to 1998 as a logistics officer and the UN Mission in Kosovo from 2000 to 2001 as a political reporting officer.

Civilians in the Clear Phase of a Counterinsurgency

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download The Full Article: Civilians in the Clear Phase of a Counterinsurgency

The transition from a primarily military effort to one of host nation civilian leadership in any insurgent conflict that Americans become involved in is a delicate process in which American civilians should play a central role. If a counterinsurgency is done properly, the seeds of the end should be sewn at the beginning. This was the case in El Salvador, but not in Iraq or Afghanistan. In Asia, we had to learn the hard way.

Clear, hold, and build is the mantra of counterinsurgency operations as American doctrine defines them. FM 3-24 (Counterinsurgency) is now officially considered interagency, not just military doctrine; it is an accepted interagency approach, and I believe in it. I've seen it work first hand in two distinctly different parts of Iraq and in recent months we seem to be finally making it work in Afghanistan if the research I have done for this study is correct; but it is not a slam dunk.

If improperly applied, it won't work at all. As with politics, all insurgencies are local. If the local population is hard core anti-American or anti-government for whatever reason, it will be difficult to wean them to the government side. This usually happens when the government is made up of an ethnic or religious group that has traditional animosity to the local population; these situations are relatively rare, but they happen. In such cases, the second method of ending an insurgency (ruthless local suppression) may be the host nation government's final recourse. That should be their decision, not ours. Fortunately, these situations are generally the exception in insurgencies. The normal case is one in which the population is on the fence. The general population base is usually open to persuasion, but it is also open to intimidation if the population is not protected from the insurgents.

Download The Full Article: Civilians in the Clear Phase of a Counterinsurgency

The Closers (Part 1): How Insurgencies End can be found here.

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10, and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

A Provincial Perspective

by Jonathan Moss

Download The Full Article: Supporting Sustainable Transition in Afghanistan

As we enter 2011 it is a good time to consider what more needs to be done to promote sustainable transition in Afghanistan. Critical to a successful transition will be getting international support right at the provincial level.

If money really is a weapon system then it is time for the International Community (IC) to start accounting for the ammunition -- at the very minimum to ensure we are doing no harm. Rather than contributing to international objectives, excessive spend focused too narrowly on selected districts may become a driver of instability and put at risk the transition process. The future lies in the government of Afghanistan running a national management cycle of planning, budgeting, execution, auditing and reporting that is responsive to local needs and touches people in their daily lives. The capacity deficit is great and time is short. Now is the last chance to focus on what is needed to sustain the state post transition.

Download The Full Article: Supporting Sustainable Transition in Afghanistan

Jon Moss is a Senior Manager with Coffey International Development specialising in fragile states, stabilisation and sub-national governance. Since October 2008 Jon has been contracted by the UK Stabilisation Unit to lead a small multi-disciplinary team to build the capacity of the provincial administration in Helmand Province, Afghanistan.

Lessons for State Building

by Mark Massey Jr.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building In Africa (IV)

This series has argued for a reconceptualization of state building. It started by offering a new way of understanding state collapse that recognizes processes of transformation and emerging orders that are often mistaken for anarchy. Building on this, it criticized the standard state building model for being over-centralized and encouraged meaningful decentralization. It sought to make a new contribution to this discipline by highlighting the potentials that non-state systems hold for building more stable, democratic states in Africa, looking at Somaliland as a case study.

This final article addresses the lessons and implications for state building. It argues not only why, but how to implement these lessons by positing methods and mechanisms for incorporating these systems into the government and fusing local, bottom-up efforts with international, top-down efforts.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building In Africa (IV)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

Editor's Note: This essay is the final of four in the series. See also Part I, Part II, and Part III.

El Imperativo Estratégico de Estados Unidos Debe Cambiar de Irak/Afganistán a México/Las Américas y la Estabilización de Europa

por Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Transfiera el artí­culo completo: El Imperativo Estratégico de Estados Unidos Debe Cambiar de Irak/Afganistán a México/Las Américas y la Estabilización de Europa

Los Estados Unidos al momento se enfrenta con dos niveles de amenazas no estatal (red), pero solo uno de ellos es abiertamente reconocido. Al Qaeda y otros elementos del Islam radical, han sido reconocidos como la amenaza níºmero 1 desde el 11 de Septiembre del 2001 que mato a casi 3,000 Americanos y causo más de 100 millones de dólares en daí±os a la infraestructura, la respuesta de emergencia, y los trastornos económicos. Esta amenaza que acumula atención de los medios, sin embargo, en muchos frentes palidece en comparación representada por los carteles de la droga y bandillas de narco, que durante décadas han ido evolucionando, mutando y creciendo en capacidad y poder en las Américas. Mientras por lo pronto esto es visto como "un asunto crimen y aplicación a la ley", como Al Qaeda fue pre -- 9-11, esta amenaza estratégica más sutil y envolvente ha dado como resultado la muerte de más de 100.000 ciudadanos de las Américas (unos 30.000 solo en México en los íºltimos 4 anos) y ha causado la desestabilización de un numero de paí­ses incluyendo México, Guatemala y Honduras, y fue testigo del aumento de la influencia narco dentro de las regiones del territorio de los Estados Unidos a lo largo de su frontera sur. Económicamente, los daí±os sufridos y los trastornos ocasionados por el cartel de droga y las actividades de pandillas narcotraficantes a los particulares, las economí­as locales, y organismos gubernamentales es más allá de la marca de un trillón de dólares y sigue aumentando. Ambos de estas amenazas no-estatal (red) reta a las instituciones de las muchas naciones afectadas, la lealtad de las poblaciones indí­genas para el propio Estado, y son indicativos de la 'guerra sobre la organización social y polí­tica' que ahora se libra en varias regiones del mundo.

Transfiera el artí­culo completo: El Imperativo Estratégico de Estados Unidos Debe Cambiar de Irak/Afganistán a México/Las Américas y la Estabilización de Europa

El Dr. Robert J. Bunker tiene tí­tulos en la ciencia polí­tica, gobierno, ciencia del comportamiento, ciencias sociales, geografí­a-antropologí­a, e historia. Entrenamiento tomado incluye la proporcionada por DHS, FLETC, DIA, Cal DOJ, Cal POST, LA JRIC, NTOA, y entidades privadas de seguridad en la lucha contra el terrorismo, contra-vigilancia, respuesta a incidentes, protección de la fuerza, y la inteligencia. Dr. Bunker ha participado en trabajo en equipo rojo y ejercicios de lucha contra el terrorismo y ha proporcionad apoyo a las operaciones dentro del Condado de los Ángeles.

Keeping China Out, Bringing India In, Calming Turkey Down

by Tony Corn

Download The Full Article: The Real Plan B in AfPak

In response to a charge of inconsistency, British economist John Maynard Keynes once famously replied: "When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, sir?"

Keynes's remark comes to mind when trying to assess the change of heart of the Obama Administration regarding Afghanistan in the past twelve months. At the risk of caricaturing: in December 2009, the Plan was to start withdrawing by July 2011; by December 2010, the Plan seemed to have become, stay "well beyond 2014." While critics were quick to accuse the Administration of inconsistency, a more judicious approach is to ask: What facts may have changed, that led the White House to change its mind?

Download The Full Article: The Real Plan B in AfPak

Dr. Tony Corn taught European Studies at the U.S. Foreign Service Institute in Washington DC. This is a follow-up to two articles: Peaceful Rise through Unrestricted Warfare: Grand Strategy with Chinese Characteristics and COIN in Absurdistan: Saving the COIN Baby from the Afghan Bathwater (and Vice-Versa). The opinions expressed here are the author's own and do not necessarily reflect the view of the U.S. Department of State.

by Tristan Abbey and Scott Palter

Download The Full Article: Turmoil in North Africa: Lessons for European Defense

That the second decade of the 21st-century will end with neither Ben Ali in charge of Tunisia nor Hosni Mubarak ruling in Egypt should come as no surprise. After all, the former was born in 1936, the latter in 1928. The ancient Roman poet Horace reminds us: "Pale death, impartial, he walks his round; he knocks at cottage-gate and palace-portal." Whether by revolution, orderly succession, or a knock at the door, both men were bound to pass from the scene in the near future.

Amid all the analysis and projections--about the Muslim Brotherhood, the potential domino effect throughout the Muslim world, prospects for Israel and the United States, and so forth--recent events should also provide a warning to European defense planners. The scenes on the streets of Cairo could be repeated across the Maghreb in the coming years. Given global economic turbulence and volatile commodity prices, buying off the huddled masses in Morocco, Algeria, and Libya may prove beyond the power of those regimes. Political collapse in those countries--or in Tunisia and Egypt, down the road--could spark an exodus of refugees heading north, far worse than the present situation in places like Malta, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Imagine hundreds of thousands of desperate people setting sail in anything that floats and heading for the nearest European shore.

Download The Full Article: Turmoil in North Africa: Lessons for European Defense

Tristan Abbey, a graduate of Georgetown's Security Studies Program, and Scott Palter, president of Final Sword Productions, are senior editors at Bellum: A Project of The Stanford Review.

Why Democratic Realpolitik is Essential

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download the full article: Realism, Idealism, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Islamic World

Enough comment and critical debate has been generated by the essay Why We Should Support Democratic Revolution in the Islamic World to warrant further elaboration on the themes it contains and why support of the despotic status quo in the Islamic World is not only morally unacceptable but, more importantly for many of the Small Wars Journal readership, no longer rational from the perspective of realpolitik and purely selfish U.S. interests at home and abroad. The latter concern shall be addressed first since those who are presently students of insurgency and foreign policy tend to focus on realism— how things really are— over idealism—how things can or should be. The elements of national power and morality should be complimentary to one another in U.S. foreign policy but for many reasons, including our increasing loss of political and economic dominance, the balance has overwhelmingly shifted to the primacy of retaining power, ultimately coercive military capability, coupled with that of promoting corporate profit and the American standard of living.

The prevailing foreign policy lesson learned over the last half-century is that a friendly despot in control is worth far more than a potential democratic leader (representative of a free and open society) waiting to arise because of the high political risks involved. The potentials for a belligerent Ayatollah (representative of a hostile theocracy) replacing an allied Shah are simply too great to accept. This is representative of the basic cost-benefit foreign policy calculation that now dominates. We have been conditioned to participate in a long running zero-sum game. In this game, the U.S. people and its government benefit as do our autocratic client states, including the foreign despots, and elites and cronies who surround them. The fact that we damn the peoples who live under these friendly despotic regimes to a form of governance devoid of our basic freedoms and political rights is viewed as an acceptable form of collateral damage. Many would say these peoples—such as the Egyptians— are better off under such 'fatherly and benign rulers' as Hosni Mubarak. Far better him and his cronies than the monster hiding in the closet—the Muslim Brotherhood— who would not only make life worse for the common Egyptian but would immediately renounce peace with Israel and would also put the U.S. in its gunsights. From a status quo U.S. foreign policy perspective, things have pretty much been figured out—U.S. interests are best served by this method of cost-benefit analysis.

Download the full article: Realism, Idealism, and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Islamic World

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal. He has over 200 publications including Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); and Narcos Over the Border (editor). He can be reached at bunker@usc.edu.

by Michael Horowitz

Download the full article: Maintaining American Military Power In an Age of Uncertainty

2011 is a critical year for the American military. With President Obama's original July 2011 deadline for assessing American progress in Afghanistan rapidly approaching, it makes sense to take a step back and think about the next steps for the American military. Sharp disagreements exist between those who believe that the United States should optimize its military for future counterinsurgency (COIN) campaigns like Afghanistan and Iran, and those who believe the United States should focus instead on its conventional capabilities. The decisions the United States makes now will influence its defense posture and military capabilities for the next generation.

This dialogue is taking place under the shadow of growing national debt and a lagging American economy, which will make the decisions taken over the next few years all the more important. Yet at the same time, the future is extremely difficult to predict. Predictions about the future of warfare are much more likely to end up in the dustbin of history than to accurately inform policy makers and planners.

One way to think about how the United States can position itself in future security environments and maintain operational flexibility involves understanding the financial and organizational requirements for adopting new military innovations, an approach called adoption capacity theory. In combination with the security environment, the adoption capacity constraints associated with potential changes in the character of warfare shape the costs and benefits of different response strategies for both state and non-state actors. We can predict the choices states make in response to a new innovation and the likely implications for the international security environment by focusing on the capacity of states to successfully meet the resource mobilization challenges and the organizational changes required to adopt a new innovation.

Download the full article: Maintaining American Military Power In an Age of Uncertainty

Michael Horowitz is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. This article is drawn from his book, The Diffusion of Military Power: Causes and Consequences for International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010). Thanks to Frank Hoffman, Michael Noonan, 1st Lt Frank Furman (USMC) and 2nd Lt Nicholas Francona (USMC) for their excellent suggestions.

Interview with Jeffrey Dressler

An Interim Assessment on the Campaign

for Regaining the Momentum in Helmand Province

by Octavian Manea

Download the full article: 

Interview

with Jeffrey Dressler

Jeffrey Dressler is a Research Analyst at the

Institute for the Study of War

(ISW) where he studies security dynamics in southeastern and southern Afghanistan.

He has previously published the ISW report,

Counterinsurgency in Helmand: Progress and Remaining Challenges (January

2011). Dressler was invited to Afghanistan in July 2010 to join a team conducting

research for General David Petraeus following his assumption of command.

How would you diagnose the COIN efforts and the on the ground developments

before summer 2009?

Primarily, I would say that the effort was under-resourced from the beginning

of 2006 up until 2009. I would also point to a lack of strategic clarity in terms

of the objectives that were being pursued. The forces, lacking the resources and

the mandate to really operate in an aggressive manner, were unable to address the

enemy situation and instead were focusing on reconstruction and development as the

means to win over the population.

Download the full article: 

Interview

with Jeffrey Dressler

Improving Combat Advising to Strengthen Partnering with Afghan National Security Forces

by James Cowan, Nengyalai Amalyar and Mohammad Mustafa

Download The Full Article: Motivational Interviewing

Standing up a professional Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) is central to establishing a secure and more stable Afghan nation, and combat advising, as provided by US and coalition forces, is foundational to establishing a strong partnership with our ANSF brethren. Effective partnering, in turn, is critical to developing a capable and enduring ANSF. Given historical and evolving challenges and the contemporary importance of combat advising across US military operations, continuing efforts are necessary for further strengthening and preparing combat advisors to advise, coach, mentor, teach and partner with host nation security forces most recently in Afghanistan.

It is well understood that a strong partnership between combat advisors and their host nation security forces advisee is indispensable to supporting the ANSF's readiness, willingness and ability to ac-complish their security mission. During the U.S. Army Foreign Security Forces (FSF) Combat Advisor Course and through the literature, advisors assigned to Afghanistan are told anecdotally that establishing an effective partnership depends on a number of essential elements such as developing rapport and respect, building trust, sharpening skills of persuasion, exercising patience, effecting empowerment, learning some Dari or Pashtu, and employing cultural awareness and competency while advising, training and conducting operations.

Download The Full Article: Motivational Interviewing

Lt Col James Cowan, United States Air Force, is assigned to the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan/Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan as a Medical and Preventive Medicine Combat Advisor to the Afghan National Police 606th Zone Headquarters and Afghan National Army (ANA) Herat Regional Military Hospital, respectively. In 2005, he served as the Preventive Medicine Advisor to the ANA Office of the Surgeon General, Preventive Medicine Directorate. Lt Col Cowan is a graduate of The University of Tennessee-Knoxville College of Veterinary Medicine with a Doctorate of Veterinary Medicine and an Air Force Institute of Technology Scholarship graduate of The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill UNC Gillings School of Global Public Health with a Masters of Science in Public Health in Health Behavior and Health Education.

CPT Nengyalai Amalyar, Afghan National Army, is assigned to the Herat Regional Military Hospital and has served for the past two years as Chief, Preventive Medicine Department and as an internal medicine physician. He graduated from Nangarhar Medical School with a Doctor of Medicine (MD) degree.

1LT Mohammad Mustafa, Afghan National Army, is assigned to the Herat Regional Military Hospital where he has served as Deputy Chief, Preventive Medicine Department for five years. He is a graduate of the Medical Intermediate Institute, Ministry of National Defense, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

A Threat to ISAF COIN Implementation

by James Sisco

Download The Full Article: Karzai's Governing Strategy

Karzai's initial governing strategy, focused at centralizing power within the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA), has failed. He perceives that US and international com-munity support for his regime is eroding. Therefore, Karzai is systematically build-ing a coalition of regional powerbrokers in preparation for a post-American Afghanistan. By strategically reshuffling provincial, district, and ministerial positions, Karzai is gradually reproducing the powerbrokers' political and economic patronage structures he tried for seven years to displace with his own. He is doing so to create the political space required to maintain his family's influence beyond the 2014 elections or to exit the presidency intact.

Implementing this strategy allows President Karzai to achieve his objectives due to three effects. First, and most importantly, he begins to break his dependence on the international community for his administration's survival. Second, he is able to leverage remaining international assistance to secure continued powerbroker interest in the short-term viability of GIRoA. Finally, Karzai can choose to reconcile with the Taliban to reinforce his bargaining position. This new Karzai governing strategy mitigates the conse-quences of the impending decline in international support, though at the expense of the Afghan population and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) counterinsurgency (COIN) implementation.

An effective counter to Karzai's power sharing strategy is a bottom-up, grass roots COIN implementation that directs international resources toward village-level and civil society capacity. GIRoA, the Taliban, and local powerbrokers have very little legitimacy with the population. Building legitimate, accountable governance capacity at the village level buys ISAF valuable time for reform efforts to take hold. Rebalancing Afghan society, so that the local areas exert more influence and checks on powerbrokers and GIRoA, stands to make the entire political structure more accountable.

Download The Full Article: Karzai's Governing Strategy

LCDR James Sisco is an Afghan Hand currently serving in Afghanistan at ISAF HQ within the Force Reintegration Directorate. He previously serviced in Afghanistan in 2005-2006 as the military liaison for President Karzai. The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of ISAF, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.

The Necessary Exclusion of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

by Adam E. MacAllister

Download The Full Article: Unnecssary Evil

The policy of reconciliation and reintegration in Afghanistan is not a new concept, but in 2010 it has received renewed emphasis. This, in large part, is due to NATO's acceptance of President Hamid Karzai's withdrawal timeline -- a timeline that advocates 2014 as the final year of Coalition occupation. Focusing on Afghanistan's future takes the casual observer in many directions that includes an analysis of economic matters, geo-political alliances, and the daunting potential of a reinvigorated extremist presence inside of the country. Additionally, given the importance of cultural geography, it can be argued that another significant factor is being purposefully overlooked. The critical factor in question is the close examina-tion of the key players associated with the current Afghan reconciliation and reintegration program. And yet, it is believed that "absent a viable, broad-based reintegration and reconciliation plan, the Afghan conflict will not end within a politically acceptable timeframe."

Well articulated by Dr. Amin Tarzi, director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University, the current reconciliation and reintegration program, originally articulated in the Bonn Agreement of 2001, has suffered continuous ambiguity, an absence of clear objectives, and competing, if not contradictory, efforts by ISAF and Afghan Government officials. This point is made even more salient by the recent imposter who posed as the number two Taliban leader, Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, who received an audience with the Afghan President and intelligence officials. Consequences of events such as these could precipitate the undesired movement towards personali-ties for which we are historically familiar. Specifically, a reliance on the personality of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar could be a par-ticularly fateful decision by Afghan and ISAF leaders.

The reintegration and reconciliation process is a critical element in the long-term success of Afghanistan. The process relies upon prudent decision making, which potentially runs counter to a socio-political environment that is seeking immediate successes to bolster its strength and legitimacy. The purpose of this paper is to inform the reader of the historical role that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar has played in the history of Afghanistan and demonstrate why his exclusion from the current reconciliation and reintegration efforts is absolutely critical to the long-term objectives of Afghanistan and the region. This is a matter of pragmatism and not one of social relativism or mirror imaging.

There are many who believe that as a foreigner it is our obligation to appreciate and accept the cultural norms in Afghanistan that cater to survival and the attainment of power. In 1857, Joseph Ferrier described this pension for reinvention best when he said, "they will change their protectors as often as it suits them; for fear and the greed of gain are the only motives which influence their conduct, but they rarely pay their tribute to whichever suzerain they attach themselves for the time." He then continued, saying that this trait "has existed from the earliest times, and will certainly be the same a thousand years hence."

Download The Full Article: Unnecssary Evil

CPT Adam MacAllister is an Active Duty Infantry Officer currently assigned to the Institute of World Politics and has served in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

Small Wars Journal's

January 2011 issue (Vol. 7 No. 1) is

now available. Click

here for the full issue, or directly on the titles below for single

articles.

by Colonel Gary Anderson

Download The Full Article: The Closers (Part 1): How Insurgencies End

In my last experience in Iraq, I was one of the civilian closers who participated in the turnover of primary responsibility for counterinsurgency operations to the Iraqis. This series is based on my observations, and experience as well as research and comparison of notes with other veterans of the transition.

Download The Full Article: The Closers (Part 1): How Insurgencies End

Gary Anderson is a retired Marine Corps Colonel who served as a Special Advisor to the Deputy Secretary of Defense on Counterinsurgency from 2003-05. He served on an embedded Provincial Reconstruction Team in Iraq in 2009-10, and is currently an Adjunct Professor at the George Washington University Elliott School of International Relations.

Below and Beyond the State: Incorporating Non-State Systems to Build Stronger States

by Mark Massey

Download the Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (III)

This series urges a fundamental reconsideration of traditional state building approaches. As the second article argued, these traditional approaches perpetrate two fundamental mistakes: 1) they reproduce centralized, top-heavy states when they should cultivate decentralized, local governance; and 2) they ignore the very systems that millions of Africans choose over the state. This third article expands upon this by exploring the implications of "non-state systems," i.e. non-state structures, networks and complexes that provide economic, social and/or political services in cases of state collapse/failure. The emergence of such systems is an overlooked and under-researched trend. Analysts typically dismiss them as temporary, criminal offshoots of anarchy. But this is premature and erroneous. These systems are often emerging orders that challenge fundamental assumptions about state-society relations. The article identifies a number of non-state complexes across Africa, with a focus on Somaliland in Northern Somalia. Though Somalia is assumed to be a vacuum of violent anarchy, Somaliland's extra-state "governance without government" is organically evolving from the bottom-up and is surprisingly peaceful and democratic—especially when compared to conflict-torn Southern Somalia. This article hopes to highlight both the dangers and potentials such systems hold. Thus far we have ignored these non-state complexes to our own detriment. However, they could greatly facilitate effective, bottom-up, decentralized state building.

Download the Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (III)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker

Download The Full Article: Why We Should Support Democratic Revolution in the Islamic World

Recent events in Tunisia, Egypt, and Yemen have caught senior U.S. policymakers off guard like a herd of deer frozen in the headlights of a big rig barreling down the highway. The State Department contingency plan now appears to be to pretend to play the middle in the media—between the democratic yearnings of the mob and the longing looks of friendly despots— while privately clinging to principals of realpolitik. Calls for democratic freedoms and reforms to be implemented in Egypt, the true center of gravity for the Arab region, are being made but they are no more than hallow exaltations.

The U.S. has the bad habit of backing corrupt despots and the ruling families and elites that support them. Who can forget the Ngo family in South Vietnam, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran, and General Manuel Noreiga in Panama? As long as this general or that ruler is —to back our foreign policies in the region of concern, we turn a blind eye to inequality, authoritarianism, torture, rigged voting, and other abuses. If they should dare to cross us, however, then all bets are off and they may just find themselves dead or rotting in a jail cell for the rest of their lives. International relations is much like a knife fight— outside help is always welcome, little thought is given to the baggage that may come with offers of support, and you had always better watch your back. Ultimately, these friendly despots and their cronies are 'not our friends' and definitely not 'legitimately elected leaders'. We also tend to get morally tainted by our relations with these types; not that our silver-tongued diplomats would give this a second thought. Realpolitik requires sacrifices and morality quickly becomes relative and squishy to the policy being implemented or crisis now at hand.

Download The Full Article: Why We Should Support Democratic Revolution in the Islamic World

Dr. Robert J. Bunker is a frequent contributor to Small Wars Journal. He has over 200 publications including Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); and Narcos Over the Border (editor). He can be reached at bunker@usc.edu.

The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

By Dr. Russell W. Glenn, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.

This study, sponsored by the U.S. Joint Forces Command Joint Irregular Warfare Center, has been approved for public release. To the best of our knowledge, Small Wars Journal is the first organization to publish this study on the Internet. This material is based on work supported by USJFCOM and the JIWC under Contract No. N00140-06-D-0060/065. Any opinions, findings and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of USJFCOM or the JIWC.

From the preface:

Glory Restored?: The Implications of the 2008-2009 Gaza War in Times of Extended Conflict

During his 22-year career with the U.S. Army, Dr. Russell W. Glenn served in Korea, Germany, the United Kingdom, and locations throughout the United States in addition to a combat tour with the 3rd Armored Division during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm in Iraq. Dr. Glenn was a senior defense analyst with RAND from 1997 to early 2009 after which he joined his current organization, A-T (Anti-Terrorism) Solutions.

An Interview with Colonel Alexander Alderson

by Octavian Manea

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach

Can you point out the purpose of the military and of the use of military force in countering an insurgency? After all, the classic counterinsurgency (COIN) arithmetic suggested by David Galula is now the conventional wisdom: 80% political action and only 20% military.

The principal role of the military is to provide security but it is often from ideal to use soldiers to provide civil security. In many countries, this is the role of the police force. Unfortunately, in many cases when an insurgency emerges, it often does so at a point beyond which the police force can contain the situation. If it could, presumably the problem would not have developed in the way it did. But let's say that the government has not been able to stop the insurgency from developing and the insurgency goes on to challenge law and order and governance. Let's say that the insurgents have got to the stage where they control an area where they actively challenge the rule of law if not overturn it. In such a case the government needs to act. At this point extraordinary measures are needed and this includes using soldiers to support the police to re-establish the rule of law, to protect the population, and to confront the insurgent.

Of course, this is not ideal. A soldiers' principal role is to defend the state from external threats so their equipment, training and skills tend to be optimized for general war. That said, good professional armies should be able to rise to the complex challenges of a 'war among the people' by a process of adaptation and adjustment. Specialist training and some adjustment to organizations, equipment and tactics are generally required. The faster an army can do this, the more effective it can be. The initial advantage the insurgent has is that armies tend to be large and often conservative organizations. They can take too long to respond the general environmental challenges of COIN and the specifics of insurgent tactics and equipment. So unless the institutional mindset is attuned to adaptation, the insurgent will have the advantage. It is not for nothing that both US and British COIN doctrine emphasizes the need for adaptation, in fact 'Learn and Adapt' was made one of the British principles to highlight the importance of not getting stuck in one's ways.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency as a Whole of Government Approach

Colonel Alexander Alderson set up the British Army Land Forces Stability Operations and Counterinsurgency Center in 2009 and is now its director. He was the lead author for the British Army's Counterinsurgency Doctrine (November 2009) and his operational experience includes Iraq, Bosnia, Northern Ireland and the 1991 Gulf War. He holds a Ph.D. in Modern History and is a senior visiting research fellow with the University of Oxford and at King's College London.

Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

by Robert Culp

Download The Full Article: Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

The Mexican Army's counter-drug (CD) operations are making a limited impact on narco-trafficking in Mexico. If they continue their current CD tactics, they will not be effective in the long run because SEDENA is not approaching CD operations like a counter-insurgency (COIN) mission, nor are they effectively attacking the Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) Center of Gravity (COG). SEDENA operations are currently centered along two principal lines of operation - source control (drug eradication/seizure) and HVI interdiction (arrest). By weighting these two lines of effort, SEDENA operations are not focused on what is the key terrain in any counter-insurgency environment - the population. Additionally, SEDENA targeting efforts are not focused on attacking the critical vulnerabilities that directly affect the DTOs strategic COG -- the revenues derived from drug sales.

Download The Full Article: Strategy for Military Counter Drug Operations

LTC Robert Culp is a career Officer in the US Army with extensive experience in special operations and low intensity conflict. He is currently in battalion command at Camp Zama Japan.

The Unbearable Lightness of Governing: Over-Centralized and Decentralized Governance

by Mark Massey, Jr.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (II)

The first article in this series, "Begin by Rethinking State Collapse," argued that traditional theories of state collapse perpetuate errors that hinder our state building missions. Their state-centric dogmas and great power bias distort our understanding of state collapse, over-simplifying it as merely a technical/administrative problem and narrowly locating blame within the country at issue. One should not equate governmental collapse with societal collapse, lest one overlook the "non-state systems" that often emerge to replace the state. But what does this reconsideration of state collapse imply for state building?

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (II)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

by Carl Anthony Wege

Download The Full Article: The Hizballah-North Korean Nexus

A significant relationship between Hizballah and North Korea, facilitated by Iran, has developed over the last two decades. This relationship has changed the configuration of Hizballah and shaped it into a more formidable military entity. The famed Hizballah Model now includes a North Korean flavor.

In the early twentieth century Paris sought to create a Christian-Arab state in the environs of Mt. Lebanon to further French political objectives. Lebanon was established with a confessional system dominated by a Maronite-Sunni axis to the disadvantage of the Shi'a.

This confessional system stratified Lebanese political institutions and society in a way that became increasingly untenable precipitating a civil war in 1975. The Lebanese fratricide included Palestinians, Israelis, and Syrians. Clan, tribe, and confessional association became more important than any intermediating Lebanese political institutions. The outbreak of the war in the spring of 1975 was followed by a Syrian intervention in 1976 and Israeli invasions in 1978 and 1982.

Among the Shi'a the 1982 Israeli-Lebanon war catalyzed the emergence of Islamic Amal (Amal Al-Islamiyah), led by Hussein Musawi when he and hundreds of followers from Musa Sadr's original AMAL organization streamed east to Baalbek in Lebanon's Bekka valley joining Sheikh Subhi Tufayli's cadre from Lebanon's al-Dawah (the Islamic Call). A coalition developed between the Musawi organization, the followers of Sheikh Subhi al-Tufayli, and other Shi'a factions. The Sepahe al-Quds (Jerusalem) elements of Iran's Pasdaran (Padan-e Inqilal-e Islami or Revolutionary Guards) in coordination with the Iranian Embassy's in Beirut and Damascus, deployed in the eastern Bekka in July of 1982, built on this and Hizballah was born.

Download The Full Article: The Hizballah-North Korean Nexus

Carl Anthony Wege is a Professor of Political Science at the College of Coastal Georgia and has previously published a variety of materials on Hizballah.

by Matthew Ince

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Falling Short of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

As we enter into a new year of conflict within Afghanistan, NATO must seek to work alongside its partners to overcome failures in the adoption of the Comprehensive Approach to COIN operations. At present the political and economic pillars of such an approach continue to be overshadowed by their own shortfalls and a disproportionate emphasis on the military dimension of the campaign. If left unaddressed this will critically impact upon the ability of the international community to address key grievances within Afghanistan and will further perpetuate a situation whereby political objectives will become increasingly unattainable.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Falling Short of the Comprehensive Approach in Afghanistan

Matthew Ince has an MA in Geopolitics and Grand Strategy, and a BA (Hons) in International Relations from the University of Sussex. In February 2011 he will begin an internship at the Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI).

Discussions on the Complexity of

Diverse Sunni Islamic Interpretations:

History and Islamic Argumentation

al-Qaida Chooses to Neglect

by CDR Youssef Aboul-Enein,

MSC, USN

Download the Full Article: 

Discussions on the Complexity of Diverse Sunni Islamic Interpretations:

Islam has within it an emphasis to moderation, which must be contrasted

against militant Islamist interpretations regarding violence, extremism,

defeats, and a plea for patience to await a notion of victory.  It is a

narrative that can be rendered unacceptable to most Muslims and non-Muslims.  To

accomplish this we must synthesize militant Islamist narratives and deduce which

fragments of Islam they emphasize while discarding whole swaths of Islamic

theology.

Download the Full Article: 

Discussions on the Complexity of Diverse Sunni Islamic Interpretations:

Commander Aboul-Enein is author of "Militant

Islamist Ideology: Understanding the Global Threat," published by Naval

Institute Press, Annapolis, Maryland.  He teaches part-time and is Adjunct

Islamic Studies Chair at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces in

Washington DC.

by Mike Fowler

Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now

Shortly after the end of the Spanish-American War in 1898, an insurgency campaign began against the US occupational force in the Philippines. In less than four years, the counterinsurgents were able to claim victory as the last of the major insurgent leaders surrendered. As of 2010, an entirely different insurgency campaign in the Philippines dragged into its fifth decade. This analysis provides fresh insights into effective counterinsurgency strategy while offering a heavy dose of caution to the transferability of lessons learned from one counterinsurgency to the next. While this study confirms many key factors of a successful counterinsurgency strategy, the findings of this study also indicate that lessons cannot be universally applied in all counterinsurgencies due to wide variations in insurgent strategy.

Download The Full Article: Philippine Counterinsurgency Strategy: Then and Now

Lt Col Mike Fowler is a 17-year Air Force intelligence officer. He received his Master's Degree in International Relations from Troy State University and his PhD in Security Studies from the Naval Postgraduate School. He is currently researching the effects of violence on state political development.

Evidence of Effective Approaches to Counterinsurgency, 1978-2008

by Christopher Paul, Colin P. Clarke, and Beth Grill

Download The Full Article: Victory Has a Thousand Fathers

Contemporary discourse on counterinsurgency is voluminous and often contentious, but to date there has been a dearth of systematic evidence supporting the various counterinsurgency (COIN) approaches advocated by various discussants. This analysis is based on all insurgencies worldwide begun and concluded between 1978 and 2008; 30 insurgencies in total. Among other things, the analysis offers strong support for 13 commonly offered approaches to COIN, and strong evidence against three. Further, the data show that good COIN practices tend to "run in packs" and that the balance of selected good and bad practices perfectly predicts insurgency outcomes. Data confirm the importance of popular support, but show that the ability to interdict tangible support (such as new personnel, materiel, and financing) is the single best predictor of COIN force success.

Download The Full Article: Victory Has a Thousand Fathers

Dr. Christopher Paul is a Social Scientist at the RAND Corporation. Colin P. Clarke is a doctoral candidate at the University of Pittsburgh's Graduate School of Public and International Affairs, and is a Project Associate at RAND. Beth Grill is also a Project Associate at RAND.

The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

by A. Lawrence Chickering

Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

In a series of short reflections, Tom Ricks neatly summarizes major themes in current thinking on how to strengthen COIN. Sharing a trait that is evident in most current theoreticians, he omits serious discussion about how to recruit the populace of countries threatened by insurgencies to play an active role in COIN. This failure has several dimensions. I want, in this short essay, to address one of the most interesting of them, which relates to the importance of basic principles in physics to counterinsurgency warfare. I will focus, especially, on the difference between the "old" (Newtonian) physics and the "new" physics of quantum mechanics and relativity theory.

Download The Full Article: The New Physics: Key to Strengthening COIN

A. Lawrence Chickering is a social entrepreneur and writer who designs and implements civil society strategies in public policy.

by Jeffrey Reeves

Download The Full Article: US Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges and Opportunities

The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) stands alone as an organization positioned to address the aforementioned challenges. It is indigenous in conception and construction and contains both China and Russia as member states. As opposed to NATO, the UN, or the EU, the SCO does possess the necessary cultural understanding to implement a successful regional solution to the United States' Central Asia challenges. The United States would benefit from closer cooperation with the SCO in its struggle to bring security to Afghanistan, to maintain its political and economic influence in Central Asia, and to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear program.

Download The Full Article: US Cooperation with the Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Challenges and Opportunities

Dr. Jeffrey Reeves is currently Director for Culture and Conflict Studies and Chinese Studies Center at the Center for Advanced Defense Studies in Washington, DC.

by Joshua Thiel

Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

"Conventional wisdom holds that a government must expend ten times as much as insurgents in their efforts to contain insurgency" (Mataxis, 1994, p.7). Authors, experts, and military historians establish a variety of ratios for military engagements as a way of forecasting requirements and predicting outcomes. The U.S. Army teaches Second Lieutenants that three to one numerical superiority is the planning factor for a successful attack. However, in order to account for shifting demographics and various operating environments, the U.S. Army established five to one as the tactical number for an urban attack. Similarly in the Department of the Army's Handbook on Counter Insurgency, produced in 2007 under the direction of General David Petraeus, references the mythical ten to one force ratio prescribed for counterinsurgency (Department of Defense [DoD], 2007, p. 1-13).

Download The Full Article: COIN Manpower Ratios: Debunking the 10 to 1 Ratio and Surges

Major Joshua Thiel is a United States Army Special Forces Officer and graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School with a Masters of Science in Defense Analysis and a graduate of American Military University with a Masters of Arts in Low Intensity Conflict.

Non-State Systems, Decentralization and Refounding African Statehood

by Mark Massey Jr.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (I)

State building is asserted as the remedy to state collapse. It is heralded as both an immediate solution to contemporary collapse and the preventive medicine against future collapse. It has ascended to a new level of importance in the post-9/11 era. Analysts deem failed states more of a threat to international security than powerful, hegemonic ones, reflecting one prominent scholar's observation that "chaos has replaced tyranny as the new challenge" of the 21st century. Yet, state building is exceedingly difficult and complex; its track record is mixed at best. This series of four articles, under the heading of "Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa," aims to provide a reconceptualization of state building. This introduction lays out the arguments to follow in the proceeding articles, in order to provide a roadmap connecting the arch of the overall series.

Download The Full Article: Reconceptualizing State Building in Africa (I)

Mark Massey, Jr. works for The Louis Berger Group, Inc., an engineering and economic development firm focusing on stabilization and reconstruction programs in conflict countries. He holds an MA in International Conflict Studies from the University of London's King's College and a BA in Political Science and History from McGill University.

El significado espiritual de ¿Plata O Plomo?

por Pamela L. Bunker y Robert J. Bunker

Transfiera el artí­culo completo: El significado espiritual de ¿Plata O Plomo?

La sabidurí­a convencional sostiene que la violencia de narco pandillas y los carteles de drogas son primordialmente seculares en su naturaleza. Este punto de vista asido recientemente retado debido a las actividades de La Familia Cartel y algunos de los zetas, al igual que algunos otros carteles allegados al culto de la santa muerte. Por medio de principios religiosos de "justicia divina'' en instancias donde ví­ctimas de tortura y ritual de sacrificio humano ofrecido a una deidad obscura, respectivamente ocasiones donde manos mutiladas han sido lanzadas en los pisos de discotecas en Michoacán en el 2005, también huellas de un cráneo quemado fueron encontradas en una parcela de un rancho en la pení­nsula de Yucatán, solo sirven como algunos ejemplos sobresalientes de dichos hechos ya ocurridos. Considerando que el infame incidente de el "cuadron negro'' ocurrido en Matamoros en 1989, donde el cerebro de Mark Kilroy un estudiante universitario Norteamericano fue encontrado en un lugar perteneciente a una Padilla local, fue considerado una rara excepción, dichas actividades espirituales, y similares a estas ya son muy frecuentes.

Este tipo de actividades sirven para corroborar lo que los eruditos, incluyendo a Sullivan, Elkus, Brands, Manwaring y los autores sobre la Guerra social moviéndose a través de las Americas. Este tipo de Guerra social se manifiesta sobre asimismo en "insurgencias criminales'' las cuales se derivan de grupos criminales tales como. Pandillas, carteles, y redes de mercenarios. Los cuales promueven una nueva forma de organización criminal. Basados en normas y comportamientos polí­ticos y sociales. Estos incluyen un sistema de valor derivado del uso ilegal de narcóticos, donde se mata (comete homicidio) por deporte o placer, al igual que tráfico humano y esclavitud, perspectivas disfuncionales en las mujeres y vida familiar, una orientación así­a la violencia y una completa falta de respeto las libertades democráticas de estos tiempos modernos socio-civiles. Esto se remota a los pensamientos de Pedro sobre 'una nueva clase de guerreros emergentes', anteriormente a esto las proyecciones de Van Creveld's de la guerra 'no trinitaria'.

Transfiera el artí­culo completo: El significado espiritual de ¿Plata O Plomo?

Pamela L. Bunker es un oficial de alto rango de la corporación Counter-OPFOR. Intereses de investigación incluyen las armas menos letales (LLW) y CONUS OPFORs (los grupos radicales del medio ambiente y la franja y los cultos religiosos). Su trabajo ha sido presentado en conferencias policiales y académicas en Alaska, Australia, y Alemania. Fue colaboradora de la Enciclopedia de la Primera Guerra Mundial (ABC-CLIO, 2005), ha escrito sobre armas menos letales para un proyecto NLECTC-West, y ha disparado LLW en el Rango de la Policí­a de Australia del Sur (SAPOL). Se gradíºo de la Universidad Pomona de el Estado de California Polytechnic con una licenciatura en antropologí­a y geografí­a y también un una licenciatura en ciencias sociales y de la universidad Claremont Graduate, con una maestrí­a en polí­tica píºblica con trabajo adicional de postgrado completado en polí­tica comparativa y gobierno. Experiencia profesional del pasado incluye investigación y coordinación de programa en la Universidad, Organización No Gubernamentales (NGO), y lugares de Gobierno de la Ciudad.

Dr. Robert J. Bunker asistió a la Universidad de California State Polytechnic, Pomona y la Universidad de Claremont Graduate. Tiene un doctorado en ciencias polí­ticas y una maestrí­a en gobierno y bachilleratos en antropologí­a y geografí­a, ciencias sociales, ciencias de la conducta, y la ciencia histórica. Dr. Bunker es Profesor Adjunto, Programa de Estudios de Seguridad Nacional, Universidad del estado de California, San Bernardino, y Profesor, Guerra no Convencional, Universidad Militar Americana Manassas Park, Virginia. Se ha desempeí±ado como consultor de las comunidades militares y policiales. Su investigación se centra en la influencia de la tecnologí­a de la Guerra y la organización polí­tica y sobre las implicaciones de seguridad nacional de las nuevas formas de guerra. Las obras del Dr. Bunker's han aparecido en Parameters, Special Warfare, Army RDA, Military Intelligence, Red Thrust Star, Airpower Journal, Marine Corps Gazette, Institute of Land Warfare Papers, Institute For National Security Studies Occasional Papers, y en varias publicaciones de aplicación de la ley, enciclopedias militares, y en libros de capí­tulos.

The original SWJ article, "The Spiritual Significance of ¿Plata O Plomo?", in English, can be found here.

Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico:

Web and Social Media Resources

by Dr. Robert J. Bunker and Lt. John P. Sullivan

Download The Full Article: Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico: Web and Social Media Resources

The authors of this piece, individually, collectively, and in cooperation with other scholars and analysts, have written about the criminal insurgencies in Mexico and various themes related to them in Small Wars Journal and in many other publications for some years now. The Small Wars publications alone include "State of Siege: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency," "Plazas for Profit: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency," "Cartel v. Cartel: Mexico's Criminal Insurgency," "The Spiritual Significance of ¿Plata O Plomo?," "Explosive Escalation?: Reflections on the Car Bombing in Ciudad Juarez," and "The U.S. Strategic Imperative Must Shift From Iraq/Afghanistan to Mexico/The Americas and the Stabilization of Europe." Certain truths have become evident from such writings and the raging conflicts that they describe and analyze.

First, the criminal insurgencies in Mexico have been increasing in intensity since the formal declaration of war—penned with the initial deployment of Army units into Michoacán and Ciudad Juárez against the insurgent gangs and cartels—by the Calderón administration in December 2006. Over 30,000 deaths in Mexico, just over ten-times the death toll from the 9-11 attacks, have now resulted from these conflicts with 2010 surpassing the earlier end of year tallies with almost 13,000 total killings. While most of these deaths have been attributed to cartel on cartel violence, an increasing proportion of them include law enforcement officers (albeit many of them on cartel payroll), military and governmental personnel, journalists, and innocent civilians. While some successes have been made against the Mexican cartels, via the capture and targeted killings of some of the capos and ensuing organizational fragmentation, the conflicts between these criminal groups and the Mexican state, and even for neighboring countries such as Guatemala, is overall not currently going well for these besieged sovereign nations. Recent headlines like those stating "Mexico army no match for drug cartels" and "Drug gang suspects threaten 'war' in Guatemala" are becoming all too common. Further, it is currently estimated that in Mexico about 98% of all crimes are never solved—providing an air of impunity to cartel and gang hit men and foot soldiers, many of whom take great delight in engaging in the torture and beheading of their victims.

Second, Small Wars Journal readers, especially those in the United States, need to appreciate the strategic significance of what is taking place in Mexico, Central America and in other Latin American countries, and increasingly over the border into the United States itself. War and insurgency in Iraq, Afghanistan, Western Pakistan, and in other distant OCONUS locales ultimately represent much lower stakes than the high levels of strife, establishment of criminal enclaves and depopulated cartel security zones, and rise of narco-cities—such as Nuevo Laredo under the Cártel del Golfo (CDG)—now taking place on our Southern border and extending down through Central America. A chilling example of the criminal insurgencies being waged is the fate of the contested city of Ciudad Juárez—over 230,000 people have fled, primarily the business elite and skilled workers; 6,000 businesses have closed, and tens-of-thousands of homes now stand vacant or have been abandoned. While Ciudad Juárez may represent an extreme form of urban implosion, this pattern is being repeated in numerous towns throughout Mexico with many such towns and small villages in Northern Mexico now partially or fully abandoned and, even in some instances, burned to the ground. To add insult to injury, some of the cartel conflict now taking place in the urban plazas and rural transit routes is being described in an almost post-apocalyptic manner with make shift armored pickups and even a ten-wheeled armored dump truck able to carry ten enforcers and with the combatants engaging in firefights with high caliber and anti-tank weapons. It must now be accepted that the cartels and gangs of Mexico, Central America, and increasingly South America have morphed from being solely narcotics based trafficking entities to being complex, diversified criminal organizations. These criminal enterprises are increasingly politicized and armed with military grade weaponry, backed up with the training and esprit de corps necessary for them to make war on sovereign states. This asymmetric war now being waged is derived from their unique and evolving criminal insurgency tenets using not only the bribe and the gun but also, information operations, and increasingly, deviant forms of spirituality in order to further dark and morally bankrupt agendas.

Download The Full Article: Criminal Insurgencies in Mexico: Web and Social Media Resources

Dr. Robert J. Bunker holds degrees in political science, government, behavioral science, social science, anthropology-geography, and history. Past associations have included Futurist in Residence, FBI Academy, Quantico, VA; Counter-OPFOR Program Consultant (Staff Member), National Law Enforcement and Corrections Technology Center—West, El Segundo, CA; Fellow, Institute of Law Warfare, Association of the US Army, Arlington, VA; Lecturer-Adjunct Professor, National Security Studies Program, California State University San Bernardino, San Bernardino, CA; instructor, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA; and founding member, Los Angeles County Terrorism Early Warning Group. Dr. Bunker has over 200 publications including short essays, articles, chapters, papers and book length documents. These include Non-State Threats and Future Wars (editor); Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency (editor); Criminal-States and Criminal-Soldiers (editor); Narcos Over the Border (editor). He can be reached at bunker@usc.edu.

John P. Sullivan is a regular contributor to Small Wars Journal. He is a career police officer and currently serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism (CAST). He is co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter-Terrorism Network (Routledge, 2006) and Global Biosecurity: Threats and Responses (Routledge, 2010). His current research focus is the impact of transnational organized crime on sovereignty, intelligence, terrorism, and criminal insurgencies.

by John D. Johnson

Download The Full Article: Root Causes of Islamist Extremism: Nine Years Later

The 9/11 attacks showed to the world that Islamist extremism presents a significant threat to international peace and security. Following the attacks, the 9/11 Commission issued a thorough report that considered all aspects of attacks, tried to answer the question of why the terrorists conducted the attacks, and made many important recommendations on ways to improve U.S. security against terrorism.

Nine years later, the U.S. is probably safer due to the implementation of many of the recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Report (e.g., the establishment of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the creation of a National Counterterrorism Center, and the improvement in interagency and international intelligence sharing), but it is not clear that our collective understanding of the grievances or root causes of Islamist extremism or that our counter-terrorism strategies have resulted in an environment where Islamist extremists are any less likely to attack the U.S., and the West more broadly.

This article considers the grievances of Islamist extremists involved in several recent terrorist attacks, presents an overview of the root causes of Islamist extremism and draws several analytical conclusions looking to the future.

Download The Full Article: Root Causes of Islamist Extremism: Nine Years Later

Lieutenant Colonel John D. Johnson is a U.S. Army Fellow assigned to the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany.

by John Cochran

Download The Full Article: The Need to Create an Unconventional Warfare Advanced Studies and Training Center

Unconventional Warfare or UW is the most difficult and complex of any form of combat. UW's complexity lends itself to the salient fact that it is not a straight on fight; instead it is a method of warfare that employs psychological warfare, subversion, sabotage, guerrilla warfare, and intelligence operations. Its very nature is to attack from the inside of the enemy and through the use of a disenfranchised section of society force the enemy to acquiesce and capitulate. It requires its soldiers to meld into the sociological and physical environment, apparently a farmer or banker one moment and conducting a direct action or kinetic strike the next. UW is not just a slugger's war or a thinking man's war; it requires a mental and physical decathlete whose sole devotion is mastering its complexity. Assurance that the specified soldiers can conduct this successfully requires both continual exercises and a devoted education system which focuses solely on this multifaceted form of warfare. These facts necessitate the creation of an Unconventional Warfare Advanced Studies and Training Center whose sole responsibility is the advanced training and continual education of UW to facilitate the tactical, operational and strategic needs of the US military's only force with UW as its fundamental mission: US Army Special Forces.

Download The Full Article: The Need to Create an Unconventional Warfare Advanced Studies and Training Center

CW2 John D. Cochran is a US Army Special Forces Warrant Officer currently assigned at Naval Postgraduate School pursuing a graduate degree in Defense Analysis. CW2 Cochran has had Command and Staff assignments in Iraq, Europe, Afghanistan and Africa. He holds a BA in Intelligence Studies/SOLIC and a MA in Military Studies/UW from the American Military University. The opinions he expresses in this paper are his own and represent no U.S. Government or Department of Defense positions.

by Shaun A. Reynolds

Download The Full Article: SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq

"All the air conditioners are gone," said the interpreter. The Special Forces Operation Detachment-Alpha (ODA) team leader forgoes the niceties that usually accompany the first few minutes of most meetings with Iraqi citizens. "Ask him where the air conditioners went," he tells the interpreter, maintaining a no-nonsense look at the boy's elementary school principal. The principal, through the interpreter, explains that due to the threat of theft the air conditioning units were removed and locked in storage for the summer months. Despite the locked security gate and posted security guard, the possibility of losing them when school is out of session is too great a risk for the principal. After a few minutes the ODA is led to a locked class room where the units are stored. A quick count by the team leader ensures that all the units are in fact present, two months after he and his team supervised completion of this major school renovation project.

Download The Full Article: SOF Detachment Civil Military Operations in Iraq

Captain Shaun Reynolds is a U.S. Army Civil Affairs officer previously assigned to Special Operations Task Force Central, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Arabian Peninsula as Civil Affairs planner. He is currently assigned to 5th Special Forces Group (Airborne).

The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?

by Philip K. Abbott

Download The Full Article: The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?

Economic integration and dependency under the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) successfully paved the way for improved cooperation between the United States and Mexico on a wide range of issues. However, in the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the focus of this relationship suddenly shifted from social-economic prosperity to border security issues as U.S. politics became increasingly more polarized concerning homeland security. As U.S. national security, NAFTA and immigration became more and more intertwined, there was growing concern in Mexico.

Download The Full Article: The Merida Initiative: A Flawed Counterdrug Policy?

Colonel Philip K. Abbott, U.S. Army, is currently the Chief, Americas Division on the Joint Staff, J5 Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate.

Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

by David Hollis

Download The Full Article: Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

The Russian-Georgian War in August of 2008 represented a long history of geostrategic conflict between the two nations and was based on many complex factors: ¬geopolitical, legal, cultural, and economic. The 1992 South Ossetia War and the 1993 Abkhazian War resulted in the loss of the regions from Georgia to internationally unrecognized, pro-Russian local governments. Tensions had been building in the region for several years prior-to the initiation of conflict in August 2008. The war officially started on 7 August 2008 after several weeks of growing arguments over the future of the South Ossetian territory. Georgian troops initiated a military attack against South Ossetia and began a massive shelling of the town of Tskhinvali in response to alleged Russian provocation. Russia deployed additional combat troops to South Ossetia and retaliated with bombing raids into Georgian territory. Russia deployed naval forces to formally blockade Georgia and landed naval infantry (marines) on Abkhaz coast (near Georgia). The decisive ground combat operation of the campaign resulted in mechanized Russian military and Ossetian militia forces defeating the more lightly armed Georgian military forces in the only large-scale major ground combat of the war (battle for the town of Tskhinvali). Georgian tactical military defeat at the battle of Tskhinvali, operational defeat via Russian uncontested invasion of the western part of Georgia, unchallenged naval blockade of Georgia, and Georgian difficulty getting their media message out to the world, led to Georgia's strategic defeat in the war. The conflict forced approximately 25,000 Georgian residents to flee from ground combat as refugees into internal displacement. The two countries signed a ceasefire agreement a week later but tensions remain high to this day. Russia has failed to implement some of the terms of the ceasefire agreement, resulting in further loss of Georgian territory to Russian occupation.

Download The Full Article: Cyberwar Case Study: Georgia 2008

David M. Hollis is a Senior Policy Analyst with the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence (OUSD(I)).

The Case for Decentralized Thinking

by Benjamin Summers

Download The Full Article: Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking

The "fog of war" has thickened over the past decade. Dynamic operating environments and information overload are two unique challenges that strategists face as we approach our tenth year of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. In our operating environment, blurred lines of distinction and sensitive battles of perception have shrunk the gap between tactics and strategy, increasing the risk of "tactical victories" turning into "strategic defeats." We face these tactical and strategic challenges in an era where information is so readily available that finding relevance is becoming increasingly difficult. While these two layers of fog hinder visibility for strategists, the Army turns towards our junior leaders to provide new viewpoints and effectively process information. By incorporating more young minds into our problem framing and solving processes, the Army has moved towards decentralizing the way that we think as an organization. Decentralized thinking works because it widens our perspective and flattens the way that we process information.

Download The Full Article: Widening and Flattening: The Case for Decentralized Thinking

Ben Summers is currently serving as an assistant operations officer in the 159th Combat Aviation Brigade.

by Anton Kuruc

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Domestic Politics by Other Means

Clausewitz describes war in a foreign policy context that needs to be adapted to insurgencies. This paper discusses insurgency in the context of domestic rather than foreign policy. It discusses the aspects of domestic politics that help define the role of violent coercion in domestic political discourse. This paper discusses the role of a political campaign to win domestic political competitions. It identifies key assumptions that underpin demographic planning and applies some typical political campaign planning methods to better analyze the human terrain. It also explores how the military campaign should support the overarching political campaign and to better incorporate domestic policy expertise into the whole of government counterinsurgency effort.

Clausewitz's general theory remains very useful, but it needs a different context - that of domestic politics.

Download The Full Article: Counterinsurgency: Domestic Politics by Other Means

Lieutenant Colonel Anton Kuruc is an infantry officer in the Australian Army who graduated from the Royal Military College Duntroon in 1986 with a Bachelor of Arts degree with a double major in Politics and History.

Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

by Michael A. Clauser

Download The Full Article: Not Just a Job, an Adventure: Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

It's become trite to state that the solution for U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is "political," and not solely "military," in nature. Both Presidents Bush and Obama made the case that the purpose of U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq and Afghanistan was to provide a security space allowing for national and local governance to take hold and grow. But while President Bush found five brigades to surge into Iraq and President Obama committed 30,000 additional forces to Afghanistan, neither President could find adequate numbers of —foreign and civil servants to accompany our men and women in uniform. U.S. non-military civilian numbers in both countries remain low. One senior official estimated that U.S. civilian personnel in Afghanistan total around 1,000 strong, just one percent of the military footprint in that country. Even now, most of these are found in the crowded embassy in the capital. If the U.S. is serious about winning the war in Afghanistan through a political solution, Congress should change current law and begin to draft civil servants with the right skill sets and training for national objectives abroad.

Download The Full Article: Not Just a Job, an Adventure: Drafting the U.S. Civil Service for Counterinsurgencies

Michael A. Clauser served as the National Security Legislative Assistant to a senior Republican member of the House Armed Services Committee and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. He previously served in the Bush Administration in the Pentagon. The views expressed in this commentary are his own and do not reflect that of the United States Government.

Small Wars Journal

Vol 6, No. 12 is

now available. Click

here for the full issue, or directly on the titles below for single articles.

by Thomas Kirk

Download The Full Article: Afghanistan: Reconciliation plans, tribal leaders and civil society

A reading of the Afghanistan's troubled history against recent explorations of the contemporary conflict question the wisdom and trajectory of the current peace talks for creating a lasting end to the violence. Current efforts at reconciliation should carefully pinpoint the country's powerbrokers and uncover Afghanistan's voiceless civil society.

Download The Full Article: Afghanistan: Reconciliation plans, tribal leaders and civil society

Thomas Kirk is a researcher with Global Governance and PHD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Thomas' work investigates the role of civil society in creating the conditions for peace in contemporary conflict with particular reference to Afghanistan and Pakistan.

by Michael J. Faughnan

Download The Full Article: Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program

As the December review of our strategy in Afghanistan nears, one program that shows significant progress and will have a far reaching impact on this war torn nation is the Afghan National Security Force Literacy Program. This program's objective, overseen by NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan (NTM-A), is to provide every member of the Afghan National Security Force (ANSF), composed of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP), a third grade level of literacy. To accomplish this, we employ more than 1,000 Afghans to teach Dari and Pashto the two dominant languages in this nation.

Download The Full Article: Afghan National Security Forces Literacy Program

Dr. Mike Faughnan is the Chief of the NTM-A / CSTC-A Education Division.

What Happens When We Lose the COG

by Jeremy Kotkin

Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety

GEN Petraeus' COIN Guidance is published and on the bulletin boards in hundreds of staff offices in Kabul. As the vanguard of this new policy, Afghan Hands have a charter to operate under the COIN Guidance in concert with the mission statement developed for the program: "to build long-lasting, positive partnerships with GIRoA, Afghan entities, and civilians, in order to demonstrate the long-term commitment of ISAF to build capacity and capability within Afghanistan and deny support among the Afghan people to insurgents." These two concepts, the COIN Guidance and the Afghan Hands Program intent before it, should operate in perfect harmony, each reinforcing the other. Afghan Hands, through eyes unencumbered of 9 years of standard operating tactics and procedures, should be allowed the professional scope to "get the job done" in ways which no other individual augmentee can.

Download the Full Article: The Strategic Risk versus Tactical Safety

Major Jeremy Kotkin is a Functional Area-59, Strategist, and assigned to ISAF through USFOR-A.

by Colonel Lawrence Sellin

Download the Full Article: Is Our Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Approach Irrelevant?

"You know you never defeated us on the battlefield", said the American colonel.

His adversary pondered this remark a moment. "That may be so," he replied, "but it is also irrelevant."

That conversation occurred on 25 April 1975 in Hanoi between Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., then Chief, Negotiations Division, U.S. Delegation, Four Party Joint Military Team and Colonel Tu, Chief of the North Vietnamese Delegation.

Colonel Summers is now best known as the author of a powerful critique of the Vietnam War titled, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War. It analyzed the reasons behind the US tactical victory, but strategic defeat in that conflict.

Download the Full Article: Is Our Afghanistan Counterinsurgency Approach Irrelevant?

Lawrence Sellin, Ph.D. is a recently retired colonel with 29 years of service in the US Army Reserve. He is a veteran of Afghanistan and Iraq.