by Richard N. Pedersen
Download the Full Article: Mission Command
This paper proposes to describe mission command in a more accurate and practicable way. Effectively integrating the operations process within mission command activities in current and future environments is a complex problem. Enacting changes to time-honored and culturally inculcated institutional concepts is also a complex problem. Complex problems cannot be fully understood until possible solutions are proposed and developed through collaborative discussion and learned about through action. This paper provides a starting point for that process by offering three substantive proposals that may now be discussed and evaluated in order to stimulate further cultural change by transforming institutional concepts. Specifically, the paper proposes that we:
1) Describe Army mission command in a way more practicable to unified action. Mission command is a construct that integrates the functions and techniques of the art and science employed during the exercise of command authority over missions applying military and other instruments of national power.
2) Adapt how Army commanders conduct the operations process. New mission command ideas include: elevating framing as a major operations process activity; describing design as an operations process subcomponent alongside MDMP, rehearsals, and RDSP; describing the operations process subcomponents in the context of how the staff manages the operations process; adding learning through action as a key commander task; and integrating the framework by describing the operations process as an integral subset of mission command.
3) Develop practicable unified action functions. Mission command is the overarching unified action function (UAF) bond that integrates all unified action functions across all command echelons. The warfighting functions (WFFs) are retained and described as military mission power UAFs. Fifteen new UAFs collectively governing diplomatic, informational, and economic mission powers were developed.
These proposed concept refinements may enable the military to more effectively meet the challenges of unified actions in complex and uncertain environments. Although the discussion in this paper is from the perspective of Army commanders, the ideas put forth have great relevance to potential JIIM partners. These three broad conceptual refinements offer a framework within which both "soft" and "hard" power can be transformed into "smart" power. These ideas should now be collaboratively discussed, studied, experimented with, and further developed in order to better learn the true nature of the problem and ultimately to solve the complex problems that require unified action.
Download the Full Article: Mission Command
COL Richard N. Pedersen (U.S. Army, Retired) is the lead mission command analyst at the U.S. Army Mission Command Center of Excellence Battle Laboratory at Fort Leavenworth, KS. He commanded a Combined Infantry Brigade Combat Team with duty in combat as Commander, Regional Command-South in Kandahar, Afghanistan. He also commanded the U.S. Army Battle Command Training Program and an airborne infantry battalion in the 82nd Airborne Division.
About the Author(s)
Comments
Chris Paparone-
I, too, once thought that unity of effort/command was the way to go. The infighting between services/agencies/branches seemed inefficient to me. Your points about competition and disunity are very compelling to me after having seen the everyone-on-the-same "3-24 lines of effort"-sheet in Afghanistan. Everyone being on the same sheet in a complex environment probably means everyone on the same sheet towards failure...
The Army could do with some disunity and competition in the realm of COIN IMO. Of course, the trick would be to capture the best ways of doing business and reward those ways- all in an ever-changing environment...
John,
I think the direction we [the Army] will ultimately head is for the G3/S3 to be the staff officer overseeing the Mission Command WFF. The '3' will keep oversight of the'movment and maneuver' WFF as well.
If you really think about it, the '3' always had the old C2 WFF/BOS anyway, but was supported by the SIGO. (where are the CPs, where is the Cdr, where are the relays/retrans, call signs, frequencies, challenges and passwords, crypto fills, etc).
The emerging contemporary Mission Command WFF will undoubtedly be inherently more complex then the old C2 notions because it must now address IIA, cyber-ew, and perhaps even the functions governing the other instruments of power, all in addition to the old C2 that are still pertinent.
Perhaps it was never specifically stated in our doctrine, but it was at least implied that the C2 WFF [MC WFF today] was the overarching function that integrated all other WFFs. This is the 'command' piece of 'command and control' and/or mission 'command'. As we move forward we just need to insure we don't make the commander a staff officer.
Although I don't believe there are any conclusive consensus/decisions made yet, I think that, in the absence of a definitive doctrine on the matter, commanders in the field will charge their '3's with staff oversight of the mission command WFF. Yes this probably will mean the '3' shop will grow again to house all of the staff officers who have the requisite skills/expertise.
These are my own thoughts on the matter, but I have heard it discussed along the lines outlined above.
Dick
Mike,
Your 'working off the same sheet of music' metaphore resonates with me. Intestringly, I'm reading a [yet draft and unpublished] textbook entitled 'Orchestrating the Instruments of Power.' Its by Dr. Robert Worley whom I have worked with in the past. I think he even has some posts on SWJ.
He basically sets a national strategic context for the instruments of power and very well brings out some of the challenges our democratic form of government has, as Chris elludes to.
What I like about it is that he also recognizes that it is the 'practiioners' in the field who ultimately must figure out what to do and how to do it, because we can't seem to get it going at the national level.
The pertinent issue is that the practioners in the field can't wait for [and in many cases don't trust] the theorists to figure it out, because no theory posited seems to work in the field, certainly not as concieved of.
While it is accurate that our system of government is intentionally made up of various checks and balanaces, those in the field [getting shot at] are in need of theories that can effectively orchestrate the various instruments required. Whether it's jazz, classical, or rock n roll, its somehow got to be combined together [integrated? orchestrated? choose the metaphore that works for you] to achieve the desired effects. I suppose this makes the theorist the music writer, but you still need musicians and a conductor to make music.
Dick
Mike--
Your comment "Its tough government work to get USAID, DOS, allies, host nation and million other cats and dogs all working off the same 'sheet of music.'"
This may expose the fallacy of the desire for integration with less respect to competition and with less regard to other ways of "framing."
We think success comes from "unity of effort" when the nature of our democracy should clue us in that democratic effectiveness comes from disunity (discursive processes and very "messy" political change). Our democratic system (with some exceptions such as 1861-1865) has shown the paradox of unity through a norm of nonviolent disunity (political discourse).
We need to have some sort of view of tradeoffs among values. Integration is not always a "good" thing -- can also mean groupthink and too much power vested in a single channel in the the USG Executive Branch. Our system of government is, by-design, not unified! It is paradoxically based both in unity and disunity. This is the brilliance therein.
In that regard how can you have innovation and
new ideas if everyone is reading off the same sheet of music (the orchestration metaphor)? How can we also have improvisational jazz? One could argue you should have both and everything in between.
All of your comments have been most interesting to read. As an instructor of the MDMP, I often get asked hard questions from some of the Army's brightest young leaders; however, none have been as difficult to answer as those questions about mission command. For example, a Signal Officer (S6) in one of the finest infantry battalions in the US Army was told, during an LTP, that he would be the Mission Command War Fighter Function Manager. His query to me was how does this look in my running estimate or the quad charts I am preparing for mission analysis. Needless to say, I did not have a good answer for him.
Hi Dick, I thought it was a great article and helpful in the mission command approach to UA, which I have not seen others attempt. Good on ya. Two thoughts:
1. Your third facet "art and science" -- just like all of our doctrine is overly focused on a process type function. I don't think it works this way. Perhaps a better approach is art (creativity and intuition), craft (the accumulation of years of professional experience and personal life skills) and the use of science. I think doctrine should throw out the term "science of command." There is no "science of command" as there is a science of mathematics, medicine, botany, etc. Commanders and staff officers use science in reports, analysis, data, computations IOT better understand and visualize. Science helps lift the 'fog of war. See Mintzberg for a brilliant perspective.
2. Your forth facet talks about critical thinking and creativity. I'm with you on critical thinking but creativity is problematic. Most social psychologists simplify creativity down to: variation & selection with value. Value of course, lies in the eye of the beholder. No one in SWJ, or MILREV or any Army "doctrinal" publication has really got after creativity - and it is a great source of frustration. Doctrine & especially TRADOCs last five years of learning concepts, studies, etc. almost always have some pithy or sweeping "critical and creative" thinking comment. There is little or no thought, no analysis and no help regarding what creativity is, where it comes from, how to encourage it, how to use it, develop it, etc.
Finally, I really liked how your article formalizes and really put structure to what our mission command doctrine realizes: "inform and influence" are much more appropriate methods to approach the type of stability fight we find ourselves in during GWOT. Of course mission command is all about getting after unity of effort -- and a tough challenge for commanders to "Realize the Unified Action" challenge. Its tough government work to get USAID, DOS, allies, host nation and million other cats and dogs all working off the same "sheet of music." That music comment from when I was assigned as a trumpet player in the fighting 62d Army Band out of Fort Bliss, TX.
Thanks for publishing a meaningful article and Regards, MCS
Sir...excellent comments. I disagree with a lot of the changes I see. But, that's not something I want to continue recycling.
The biggest takeaway at this point - putting on my positive hat - is that people are talking. If the dialog stops and something is forced from the top, then we have problems. Hopefully that does not happen in spite of the dialog. Overall I'd say some good solutions will be found, so long as those with the authority to implement listen to a multitude of perspectives and not merely cling to one school of thought or remain within one paradigm of analysis.
Charles,
Thanks for the comeback.
I think you are absolutely on target with your comments that we need to: to be accurate; learn from history; get back to basics; and develop Soliers and leaders.
Someone recently said that 'simple is brilliant.'
The basic nature of our problem(s) is that we [collectively] have yet to be brilliant enough to make our problems/solutions simple; the dilimia is to 'over-complicate' a complex problem or to 'over-simplify' it; neither lends itself to being accurate or effective; so we've got to somehow find the right balance.
There are two fundamental ideas addressed in the article that the Army is still wrestling with that it hasn't been able to simplify enough to garner the concensus necessary to be accepted by the collective:
1) Design/framing;
2) unified action, et al (DIME, PMESII, etc).
Both of these are somewhat addressed in our doctrine, our training, and our schools, so, we've 'checked the blocks.' Discarding them is an option, but most agree there is something of value in them. As you point out, the illustratioins are all throughout our formations and throughout websites such as this one, thus complicating both individual and collective understanding.
Perhaps the unified action functions could provide a 'starting point' for educating Soldiers and leaders about the other instruments of power, which you have probably wielded in some form down range. An alternative is to not address what they are and allow Soldiers/leaders to use their intuition to solve complex problems requiring the other instruments of power.
Times, they are a-changing; at least we live in interesting times. Modern collaborative communications capabilities has, among other things, forever changed how we coordinate, cooperate, collaborate, and express institutional ideas. Frankly, I don't think we're near coming to grips with that yet either.
Thanks again for your initial comments and your comeback comments; If you desire a more private discourse, my email is dpandallc@aol.com.
Dick
COL Pedersen,
Sir...great to see your feedback. I won't speak for the others that have commented, but, from my position things are getting too complicated. By that I mean we are trying to make them complicated - we're doing it to ourselves.
If it's education and leader development we aim to create, foster, and sustain, then let's do just that.
I don't mean to be cryptic, but time forces me to do so...I'll just say the following: we need to be accurate. The illustrations are all througout our formations and throughout websites such as this one. The lessons are out there but we need to attend to history and get some accurate perceptions about our current wars and wars of the past. I think we'll see we don't need unified action functions and other new things. We don't need pop-doctrine. We need to get back to the basics and develop our Soldiers and leaders from there.
Apologize if this was too vague. Thanks again for your comments, sir.
Phil, Chris, and Charles,
Thank you all for taking the time to read the article and to post your comments. The article represents my own thoughts and ideas and have not been vetted through any Army institution, so the criticism us for me, not the Army.
The ideas expressed in the article are not intended to be the 'new doctrine.' They are intended to stimulate thought in areas we seem to be short of answers, both doctrinally and in the field. Professional discourse in forums like this is essential to vet new ideas.
Changing the institutional thinking of any large organization is difficult; sweeping changes are very difficult, if not impossible. It is not likely the Army will simpley throw out all of its concepts and adopt totally new ones. It is in this light that the ideas in the article are very much a 'shift from a known point.'
Lots of folks these days are very critical of doctrine (including myself). Not very many folks who offer critism ever follow through and offer any realistic solutions that may actually have a chance of being accepted.
Education is absoltely a key to how we get to where we need to be. But education on 'what' and 'where' within a military career? How should the Professional Military Education System change? Or should we totally do away with the Professional Military Education System and just send folks to civilian universities?
Generals are supposed to sign off on doctrine, et al; this will not change, nor should it for that matter. What the generals need is help with creative new alternatives that have a realistic chance of passing the critical review required to be adopted.
Critical and creative thinking are essential in changing an institution. Often, these days, there is ample 'critical' thinking, but not nearly as much 'creative' thinking. Perhaps this is because it is much easier to be critical then to be creative. I believe we must take care in our professional discourse that we do not unintentionally limit creative thinking with critical thinking. This can easily occur by what one says and how one says it.
Again, I thank you all for taking the time to read the article and post your thoughts. Your reactions to the ideas are valuable to me.
All the way!
Dick
Chris Paparone and Phil Ridderhof replied to this with more sophistication than I could. But, I'd like to provide my ground floor assessment, from a pragmatic approach...
Quote:
Adapt how Army commanders conduct the operations process. New mission command ideas include: elevating framing as a major operations process activity; describing design as an operations process subcomponent alongside MDMP, rehearsals, and RDSP; describing the operations process subcomponents in the context of how the staff manages the operations process; adding learning through action as a key commander task; and integrating the framework by describing the operations process as an integral subset of mission command.
End quote.
So, now design is a subcomponent of operations and is alongside (parallel?) to MDMP? Design will be alongside rehearsals? Doesn't that mean we enter a never ending cycle? Learning through action for commanders...what does this even mean? Integrating framework by describing ops as part of mission command...isn't that the way things work alredy or have I clung to one of the incorrect definitions of mission command, there's only like 50 of them out there now.
Quote:
Develop practicable unified action functions. Mission command is the overarching unified action function (UAF) bond that integrates all unified action functions across all command echelons. The warfighting functions (WFFs) are retained and described as military mission power UAFs. Fifteen new UAFs collectively governing diplomatic, informational, and economic mission powers were developed.
End quote.
This is why we're short of Majors. BOSs, WFFs, UAFs, 15! new UAFs...what the...practicable, how can the creation of 15 new things, with this ambiguous name, be practicable? I'm genuinely lost on this one. There aren't enough Majors and Captains and even LTCs to produce the PowerPoint slides needed to breif this hierarchy, or whatever it is.
I like the reference to "pop-doctrine" as it certainly seems to fit.
Too many buzz words - RGR, +1
From Mr. Ridderhof: "Does doctrine have to be so comprehensive that it covers all possibilities and accounts for all permutations of conflict? In my mind, education is what prepares military leaders for uncertainty and new situations, not necessarily writing it into doctrine."
Great comment and it dovetails into what others have talked about regarding leadership. I think Ken White has made several comments about intuitive leaders. This "doctrine for all" approach is the opposite. However, it sure makes things easier because you always have the comfort of knowing you followed the doctrine.
Why is the Army taking Jospeh Nye's pop-poli-sci "concepts" (the soft, hard, smart metaphors) and trying to institutionalize them?
Has anyone in the concept development arena sought criticisms for Nye's ideas? Does the international relations/foreign affairs field accept his propositions?
For me, Nye's work consists of metaphors that we are trying to operationalize into some sort of functionalist (task-engineering) doctrine (for example, how does one manipulta e"soft power" when it emerges from Hollywood, etc.?). Nye's theory lacks substance beyaond rhetorical seductiveness (the IR poli-sci disciplines have hardly accepted it). Second, why are we accepting this smart power "narrative" as a viable concept (because someone "powerful" subscribes to it)?
In short, we have the same social phenomenon of "fads" in management studies. Some "silver-tongued expert" convinces others that this is the "silver bullet" (lean and six sigma, balanced scorecard, "reinventing government -- sound familiar?). This "concept" is no different from these other social fads in the business/public management field.
In my view, there can be no unifying theory of action. The "way of doctrine" has become a mythology...and we keep chasing our tail. Doctrine is good for things like maneuver drills, flying, shooting. communicating etc. but one cannot expect to doctrinalize the social sciences -- absurd.
p.s. I note the self-referencing footnotes -- mostly insular to the doctrinaire of concepts-already-written, self-referencing community.
This represents a possible problem with compliance (must comply with "already approved" AOC and so on...). The AOC and other such concepts were also "approved knowledge" and deemed so by the stroke of a GO. This is not professional debate...it is oligarchic control of a sort of PowerPoint-deep sort of knowledge.
Too many buzz words.
These are extended concepts from old concepts that were bound up in other like-concepts.
We are getting lost in metaphors for metaphors...and (perhaps?) do not realize it.
Sorry, for me these concepts seem more like marketing than esoteric professional knowledge. Repackaged same-old...functionalism still reigns...
Unfortunately, these ideas are not being debated in "blind-peer reviewed journals" as would other professional bodies of knowledge in law or medicine.
Instead they will be "settled" by a general officer's signature on a doctrinal manual and played with until we extend into another set of functionalist concepts (metaphor is "rearranging of deck chairs").
In reading Col. Pedersens article, as well as tracking parallel discussions on design, Im wondering if the Army is expecting something from doctrine that it cant deliver. Does doctrine have to be so comprehensive that it covers all possibilities and accounts for all permutations of conflict? In my mind, education is what prepares military leaders for uncertainty and new situations, not necessarily writing it into doctrine. I think one of the whole points of design is that you cant necessarily write it into a "how to" booklet. The same with mission command. While the previous definition, which focused on a commander leading through intent and allowing subordinates initiative, is very simple, in its simplicity is a whole philosophy towards how to command (and how to follow). To extend and "nuance" the definition, as the new doctrine has done ("exercise of command authority using mission orders," and that it "blends the art of command and the science of control to organize the warfighting functions;" "Design is added as a cognitive tool." And so on.) just gives rise to confusion. The simplicity of the previous "mission command" allowed for its comprehensiveness in applying broadly to military, inter-agency, and coalition operations. The attempt at comprehensiveness in the new construct leaves the impression that if something isnt explicitly stated, the definition doesnt necessarily apply. With this line of thinking about the role of doctrine, and the forces expectation of what it should do for them, I believe the Army will be in a constant loop of writing and re-writing doctrine for each new thought and operation. In will be inward-looking, rather than focusing on its tasks at hand, and in the future.
Separate, but I suppose related to the doctrine issue, this statement floored me:
"The Army is contemplating moving from an organizational culture that has previously focused on the application of military power as part of the nation's foreign policy, to an organizational culture that embraces joint operations with other elements of national power as well as international partners."
So the previous understanding of "military power" excluded joint operations? And being part of the nations foreign policy excluded working with other elements of national power? The new identification of organizational culture seems to bring nothing of value, other than to soften the idea that the Army is a military service, whose core competency is the application of force (violence).
Semper Fi,
Phil Ridderhof