Journal

The Russian claim is that their counterinsurgency operations in Chechnya were successes: but at what cost?

In the final part of this series, Iraq expert Kirk Sowell shines a light on the country's murky foreign policy.

It sounds crazy, but catching the most notorious and wanted drug trafficker in the world might be a bad thing.

The Russian Federal forces enjoyed overwhelming superiority, yet were forced into a premature cease-fire in 1996 and suffered immense casualties.

An interview with Janine Davidson.

The linkages between democracy, natural resources, and peacemaking as Burma seeks a way to wind down a half-century long complex of ethnic, political, and religious strife.  

Risk management and wicked messes like Afghanistan.

Two great minds on drugs... and strategy.

Change doesn’t come easy to military culture; it is often resisted.

Regional proxy wars between Iran and the Arab Gulf are using Lebanon as their figurative prostitute.

Throughout its existence beginning in the early 1990s, ASG has waffled back and forth between criminality and terrorism. 

Protests in the Middle East are about a power struggle in the Muslim world triggered by the democratic uprisings of the Arab Spring.

People and culture are important – but they are not the only important things. Their importance is relative to the mission and the operational environment.

Fit the operation to the narrative, not the narrative to the operation.

The US Army is finding itself in the difficult position of attempting to redefine itself in a climate of reduced resources. It shouldn't pin its future to peer-to-peer battle.

Simply put, interagency reformists have failed to understand the environment within which they are proposing change.

Time now for a return to the basics if the organization is to endure well into the current century.

A warning and call to action from the French criminologist.

Understanding the great paradox of the U.S. military: the better our conventional capabilities, the more likely we are to face increasingly irregular and asymmetric threats.

Policy implications from Stathis Kalyvas’ concepts of attitudinal and behavioural support.

Beware the experts, expats, urbanites, and a host of other easy routes.

The “Red” element can enhance analytical products, challenge critical planning outcomes, scrutinize the viability of source reporting, and assess potential attacks or responses. 

The subject of Israel’s relations with Iraq does not make for headline news. If Israel attacks Iran, that could quickly change...

As some try to connect the dots of recent events, is there an Iranian role in what appears to be Stage 2 of the Arab Spring?

One of the reasons, if not THE reason, that we struggled to accomplish our objectives in Afghanistan is that we applied an industrial-era approach to the way we conceptualize planning and operations.

In assessing our “lessons learned” it is vital that the service look forward and not just retrospectively so it does not learn the wrong lessons. 

Multi-national corporations--particularly from the extractive sector with long project life cycles, access to capital, and attractive return on investment--could act as a new phase in civil-military operations.

The Syrian regime’s use of shelling and aircraft are now being complimented with wholesale executions in rebel-controlled neighborhoods.

Water scarcity is an increasingly dangerous problem in the USCENTCOM AOR.

The prevalence of PTSD and mental disorders in weak and failed states is exacerbated by insurgencies, defying efforts break the cycle.

Pershing's leadership attributes and willingness to understand and work through the Moro culture achieved success in a complex operational environment.

Without international intervention, Syria will continue to slip into deeper sectarianism, which is the worst case scenario for Iraq.

“Afghan Led” is a critical aspect of our counterinsurgency operations that we must grasp to enable ultimate mission success.

The uniformed analytic community largely lacks institutional expertise and struggles to provide commanders with meaningful intelligence products.

A scathing and scholarly critique of the impact of De-Ba’athification on the America’s efforts to stabilize Iraq. 

Further thought is required if this concept is going to succeed in the future.

Historians often turn wars and battles into linear sequences outlining casual chains for which the mind has a natural bias.

Transition can’t simply be, “We are leaving...good luck.”

The barbarians have come and the rules of war and peace stand transformed.

Cyber warfare isn’t hype; it’s real.  

 “We’ve won the war,” General Dan Halutz boasted.

What began as an Israeli air campaign rapidly evolved into an extensive ground war of bloody house-to-house battles that the Israelis were ill prepared to wage. 

Iranian inroads in Africa present a potential new front in the Iranian-US cold war.

An autocratic Iraq will probably be happier doing more business with China and Russia. But the idea of a Sino-Russian strategy in the Middle East is far from simple.

Using security cooperation to prevent, shape ... and win.

Implementing a provocative idea.

The conventional approach taken by most aid programs has been a counterproductive disaster.

Looking to Plan Colombia to create a Plan Yemen.

Or how to shatter organizational stagnation and identify critical tensions preventing creative thinking and improvisation.

The authors lay out the “courses of action” available to Iran at sea, air, ground, in other countries and by conducting terrorism around the globe.