The U.S. Army Combined Arms Center has posted the September - October 2007 issue of Military Review. Always a 'must read', links to individual articles follow, enjoy.

Featured Articles

Learning From Our Modern Wars: The Imperatives of Preparing for a Dangerous Future by Lieutenant General Peter W. Chiarelli, U.S. Army, with Major Stephen M. Smith, U.S. Army. Looking beyond the current wars, a former commander of the 1st Cavalry Division and Multi-National Corps-Iraq calls for significant changes to the way we train and fight.

Iraq: Tribal Engagement Lessons Learned by Lieutenant Colonel Michael Eisenstadt, U.S. Army Reserve. As the "Anbar Awakening" suggests, tribal engagement could be a key to success in Iraq. MR presents a useful primer on the subject.

Fighting "The Other War": Counterinsurgency Strategy in Afghanistan, 2003-2005 by Lieutenant General David W. Barno, U.S. Army, Retired. The former commander of Combined Forces Command-Afghanistan offers his assessment of operations in Afghanistan since the fall of the Taliban.

Linking Doctrine to Action: A New COIN Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Peter R. Mansoor, U.S. Army, and Major Mark S. Ulrich, U.S. Army. A new tool from the Army/Marine Counterinsurgency (COIN) Center can help bridge the gap between COIN doctrine and real results on the ground.

The Man Who Bent Events: "King John" in Indochina by Lieutenant Colonel Michel Goya and Lieutenant Colonel Philippe Franí§ois, French Marines. Rushed to Hanoi when the French were on the brink of defeat, General Jean de Lattre de Tassigny almost single-handedly turned the tables on Giap and Ho.

A Logical Method for Center-of-Gravity Analysis by Colonel Dale C. Eikmeier, U.S. Army. An Army War College professor prescribes a heuristic to demystify the center-of-gravity determination process.

Medical Diplomacy in Full-Spectrum Operations by Major Jay B. Baker, U.S. Army. Using medical civil assistance programs to win hearts and minds only undermines our efforts to build the Iraqi Government's legitimacy.

The Economic Instrument of National Power and Military Operations: A Focus on Iraq by LTC David Anderson. U.S. Marine Corps, Retired. The economic arm of U.S. national power has been ineffectively and even counterproductively deployed in recent conflicts.

Lessons Learned from the Recent War in Lebanon by Brigadier General Elias Hanna, Lebanese Army, Retired. According to one much-cited commentator, Hezbollah's stunning performance against Israel last July could be a preview of wars to come.

After Fidel: What Future for U.S.-Cuban Relations? by Waltraud Queiser Morales, Ph.D. How should the U.S. react to Fidel Castro's pending demise? Dr. Morales argues that it's time to overcome ideological qualms and special-interest objections.

Battling Terrorism under the Law of War by Colonel David A. Wallace, U.S. Army. A USMA law professor explains the legal issues at stake in the War on Terrorism and argues for adherence to the laws of war.

Chile and Argentina: From Measures of Trust to Military Integration by Lieutenant Colonel Felipe Arancibia-Clavel, Chilean Army. Cooperation and integration in the areas of security and defense are helping Chile and Argentina overcome centuries of mistrust and hostility.

Contest Winners

1st Place, Information Operations

Muddy Boots IO: The Rise of Soldier Blogs by Major Elizabeth L. Robbins, U.S. Army. Far from being threats to operational security, Soldier blogs, or milblogs, are strategic communications assets.

1st Place, MacArthur Award

Leadership in Counterinsurgency: A Tale of Two Leaders by Major Michael D. Sullivan, U.S. Army. T.E. Lawrence and Sir Gerald Templer were in many ways complete opposites, except that both leaders knew how to win at counterinsurgency.

Insights

The Droning of Strategic Communication and Public Diplomacy by Robert D. Deutsch, Ph.D. People decode the world symbolically and metaphorically, using emotionally based reasoning. Our strategic communication and public diplomacy leaders have yet to realize this.

Understanding Airmen: A Primer for Soldiers by Major General Charles J. Dunlap Jr., U.S. Air Force. If you think Airmen are prima donnas "obsessed with 'things that go fast, make noise, and look shiny,'" think again. We're all on the same side.

Paper and COIN: Exploiting the Enemy's Documents by Major Vernie Liebl, U.S. Marine Corps, Retired. We are ignoring a valuable source of intelligence by failing to search documents, hard drives, and other exploitable detritus found in the course of operations.

Words Are Weapons . . . So Use Them Wisely by Major Michael D. Jason, U.S. Army. The Army's failure to define partner and partnership, two terms widely used in Iraq, has led to unnecessary operational and tactical confusion.

MR Revisited: The Surrender Program by Garry D. Brewer. In this reprint from October 1967, the author describes the amnesty program used in Vietnam to co-opt and repatriate Viet Cong insurgents. Its lessons may be pertinent to Iraq.

Book Reviews and Letters

Earlier this week, America's top two officials in Iraq testified before Congress about the war in Iraq. Ambassador Crocker described slow but sure progress; General Petraeus spoke more strongly, citing goals met and "substantial" progress.

I was surprised. After a steady public debate of stalemate and withdrawal, the pair put forward recommendations to remain. The disconnect between how America sees Iraq and how our two most knowledgeable professionals view it is great.

Why?

I believe that the answer lies in measures. Media reports and independent assessments like the Brookings Institution's "Iraq Index" have opened the floodgates on statistics. Analyses abound. But, as a recent Salon piece demonstrates, not all have been disciplined. Indeed, the public discourse has abandoned methodology entirely.

In an unusual move, however, Gen. Petraeus took time away from his testimony to assure Congress that he hasn't. The military, he said, uses "a methodology that has been in place for well over a year" to ensure "rigor and consistency" in its analyses. Then he called in a second opinion: "Two U.S. intelligence agencies recently reviewed our methodology and they concluded that the data we produce is the most accurate and authoritative in Iraq."

What is this methodology? Or, more broadly, how do we measure insurgencies?

To answer that question, I began to rummage around, uncovering a number of studies outlining insightful conceptual approaches. They hardly agree. But, taken together, they highlight five important principles.

First is the firm assertion that there are no magic numbers—not troops deployed, not dollars spent, not total number of insurgent attacks. As one of West Point's "Irregular Warfare Messages of the Month" notes bluntly, "trying to reduce success or failure to one or two criteria is risky if not irresponsible." Instead, suggests Craig Cohen of the U.S. Institute of Peace, it is better "to devise an aggregate index of indicators." With measures, more may not always be better, but a handful will always be too few.

Second, analysts need a framework that attaches meaning to each metric. As James Clancy and Chuck Crossett explain in one of the Army's leading journals, different officials too often find different meaning in the same numbers because they have no common reference. To one, falling casualties may be good news. But, to another, it is a sign of decreasing patrols—a possible indicator of heightened instability. The Army's Douglas Jones phrases it simply: "it is only through agreement of definitions and a common framework of insurgency that applying measures of effectiveness to counterinsurgency operations becomes useful." Without a framework, a pile of statistics can be made to fit almost any position.

Third, measures must be important, not just convenient. Counting heads at a graduation parade is far easier than measuring public opinion in a war zone or tracking insurgent financing. But it is a poorer measure of effectiveness. As Frederick W. Kagan notes in the Armed Forces Journal, such tallies of casualties, attacks, and trained locals "are measures of convenience, reflecting the ease with which data can be collected and presented rather than its inherent importance." Honest assessment begins with honest data, even if it is difficult or dangerous to collect.

Fourth, outputs are more important than inputs. Measuring inputs like total dollars spent or the number of bases constructed gauges effort, not effectiveness. As Craig Cohen notes, progress should not be "judged in large part on the basis of international resources expended or programs implemented rather than on the basis of actual results produced." In some ways, this is related to the problem of convenience; analysts can track coalition actions much more readily than their effects. But it is the effects—not efforts—that ultimately matter most.

Fifth—and perhaps most important—is the recognition that the strategy must determine the metrics. The two must be tied. If one campaign goal is to disrupt insurgent operations, for instance, a count of local cell phones would be little more than a statistical distraction. In their approaches, researchers from USIP, the Rand Corporation, the Johns Hopkins University, the Brookings Institution, and the Army's Command and General Staff College all follow this principle. They start high and move down the ladder—from strategy to goals, from goals to measures, and from measures to specific metrics. As in a chain of command, each metric reports to a goal, and that goal back up to the strategy. This approach both highlights needed metrics and removes unneeded metrics—the cell phone counts of some government fact sheets.

So, before the testimony, how did the measures in America's public discourse hold up next to these principles? In a word, poorly.

Media reports were misleading. Major newspapers continue to announce casualties and troop levels daily, encouraging a "magic number" mindset. The Washington Post's series "Weighing the Surge" cites inputs like dollars of oil revenue spent or the number of Baghdad security outposts, and convenient counts like the number of market stalls opened, Iraqis trained, or barrels of oil produced. A graphic published the day before report is the perfect example. And a recent overview in the New York Times presents an array of measures without any mention of the author's insightful framework.

But the media follows the lead of others. As an intern with a government agency working to rebuild Iraq, I saw firsthand the random—and always positive—fact sheets that once circled Washington. Today's Congressional benchmarks are only slightly better. The legislative requirements, for instance, are measures of convenience; in such a corrupt place, laws are cheap markers of government effectiveness and social change. Further, at least five of the eighteen benchmarks measure inputs and not outputs. And nor are they tied to strategy. As last Wednesday's GAO report notes, they were derived not from methodical assessment, but from public statements made by severely pressured politicians.

Notably, such an application to Iraq should be taken with a degree of due reflection. These principles apply to insurgencies; the war in Iraq is more than an insurgency. Among others, tribal warlords, political opportunists, criminal networks, foreign intelligence services, and terrorist organizations complicate the picture considerably. Further, these troubles with measures do not necessarily discredit the broad conclusions of public discourse. Plainly, Iraq remains stubbornly unstable and violent.

But the guidelines outlined above can help—and not just with Iraq. The United States faces an international environment simmering with active and possible insurgencies. It is a challenge that will not go away. Bringing America's public measures nearer its professional ones may help us develop clearer consensus—ensuring that our conflicts abroad do not also become our conflicts at home.

J. Eli Margolis is a MA Candidate at Georgetown University, School of Foreign Service's Security Studies Program.

Discuss at Small Wars Council

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A rumor we have been hearing since May was reported on yesterday in the North County Times -- Lieutenant General James Mattis (USMC) has been nominated for his fourth star and slated to take over US Joint Forces Command in Norfolk, Virginia.

Camp Pendleton's Lt. Gen. James Mattis will be nominated for the rank of general and appointed commander of a high-level military planning and strategy unit based in Virginia, the North County Times has learned.

Mattis, whose present job is commander of Marine Corps Forces Central Command and head of Camp Pendleton's I Marine Expeditionary Force, will become head of the Joint Forces Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Transformation.

Multiple sources within the military and in Washington, D.C., confirmed that Mattis, who has overseen Marine Corps forces in the Middle East for the last 15 months and is regarded as a "warrior monk" for his intellectual acumen and war-fighting skills, will be nominated for a fourth star by President Bush.

An announcement of the nomination is expected to come from the Defense Department within days. The move is subject to Senate confirmation.

While this nomination will remove one of our most capable generals from command of operationally deployed units it does hold good tidings for the future of Joint operations capabilities, concepts, and doctrine and training development.

USJFCOM was the command that, in 2002, served up the experiment, war game, computer simulation, live field exercise (one-size fits all) Millennium Challenge (MC02). Setup by JFCOM to showcase Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020), Effects Based Operations (EBO), Rapid Decisive Operations (RDO) and Operational Net Assessment (ONA) -- and there were other ornaments on that Christmas tree -- MC02 came to a grinding halt when the 'Red Team' (enemy) commander, Lieutenant General Paul Van Riper (USMC Ret.), conducted his own rapid, decisive operation to achieve desired effects based on information superiority and soundly defeated the Joint Force of the future - using asymmetric tactics and commercial-off-the-shelf technologies.

The Mattis nomination is one small step for sound Joint capabilities, one giant leap for a future firmly grounded in reality.

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Tom Barnett on this post:

A good sign for the evolution of the force. The ultimate "monk of war" takes over the primary "force generating" command, whose Area Of Responsibility is "the future"!

Abu Muqawama - First blog catch honors:

You can all file this story in among those Abu Muqawama very much hopes are true.

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) were established as a result of the need to develop the infrastructure necessary for the Afghan and Iraqi people to succeed in a post-conflict environment. The efforts of PRTs take place every day during a time when major conflict is commonplace in both countries. PRTs have become an integral part of the long-term strategy to transition the lines of security, governance, and economics to the indigenous people. Integrated appropriately, PRTs serve as combat multipliers for maneuver commanders engaged in governance and economics, as well as other critical lines of operation. In addition, PRTs serve as force multipliers for U.S. Government (USG) development agencies engaged across the stability and reconstruction sectors.

This playbook focuses on PRTs in general, with additional information specific to Iraq and Afghanistan. The information contained in this playbook comes from multiple sources inside and outside the USG with the understanding that the manner in which PRTs operate is likely to change over time.

The intent of this publication is to share knowledge, support discussion, and impart lessons and information in an expeditious manner. This Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) publication is not a doctrinal product. The information provided in this publication is written by USG employees for those individuals who will serve in a stability and reconstruction environment.

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned September 07 Newsletter

- The results of recent collection team visits with two aviation units, Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 167 and Marine Fixed Wing Fighter Attack Squadron (VMFA (AW)) 242.

- A report documenting the results of a questionnaire distributed to selected reserve officers soliciting their comments on aspects of their professional military education (PME) experiences.

- The results of a collection effort with 3d Battalion 2d Marines on its experiences performing counterinsurgency operations in Operation Iraqi Freedom 05-07.

- Highlights of several resources that have been added recently to the MCCLL repositories concerning Marine Corps and U.S. Army military transition team experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan.

- The latest status of the ongoing program to develop a Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) and a Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR).

- The results of a collection effort by the Command and Control Training and Education Center of Excellence (C2 TECOE) with three battalions deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom 06-08 to document their command and control training lessons and observations.

- Reserve PME.

- More...

Grunts and Jarheads: Rethinking the Army-Marine Division of Labor - US Army Strategic Studies Institute Op-Ed by Dr. Steven Metz

Debate rages today about the future of America's ground forces. Gone are the days when serious strategists could suggest that that utility of landpower was receding. Now no one questions its importance. But there is disagreement on the type and number of ground forces that the nation needs.

Among the most contentious points are the size of the force (by how much should the Army and Marines be enlarged?), specialized formations for irregular warfare and stabilization operations, and the role of the reserve components. All of these are vitally important. There is, though, another issue which receives less attention: the relationship between the Army and the Marine Corps—the two primary components of America's ground forces. Does the United States need two ground forces with virtually similar capabilities? I once heard a perplexed foreign officer say, "I'll never understand your military—not only does your navy have an army, but your navy's army has an air force!" Is there a strategic reason for this beyond simple tradition? If not, what should the division of labor within the ground forces be? These are not new questions but are ones that should be asked anew, given the evolving national security environment.

To answer these questions, we must first be clear on what we want ground forces to do. While nearly all strategists agree that irregular warfare and stabilization operations will be the most common tasks for the U.S. military in coming decades, there is also a broad consensus that it must retain the capability for conventional warfighting. This means the ground forces must be capable of multidivision stabilization or combat operations of relatively short duration, and smaller scale counterinsurgency support or stabilization operations lasting many years. In most cases, major operations would take place within the context of a multinational coalition, but the United States must also be able to undertake unilateral or near-unilateral action...

Negotiation in the New Strategic Environment: Lessons from Iraq - US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph by Mr. David M Tressler

In stability, security, transition, and reconstruction (SSTR) operations like the U.S. mission in Iraq, negotiation is a common activity. The success or failure of the thousands of negotiations taking place daily between U.S. military officers and local civilian and military leaders in Iraq affects tactical and operational results and the U.S. military's ability to achieve American strategic objectives. By training its leaders, especially junior ones, to negotiate effectively, the U.S. military will be better prepared to succeed in the increasingly complex operations it is conducting—in Iraq as well as the ones it will face in the new strategic environment of the 21st century.

This monograph analyzes the U.S. Army's current pre-deployment negotiation training and compares it with the negotiating experience of U.S. Army and Marine Corps officers deployed to Iraq. The author argues that successfully adapting to the nature of the contemporary operating environment requires changes that include increased training in negotiation. Based on interviews with U.S. officers, the author identifies three key elements of negotiation in SSTR operations and offers recommendations for U.S. soldiers to consider when negotiating with local Iraqi leaders; for U.S. military trainers to consider when reviewing their pre-deployment negotiation training curriculum; and for the Army and Marine Corps training and doctrine commands to consider when planning and structuring pre-deployment training.

To Understand Sheiks in Iraq, Marines Ask 'Mac' -- Greg Jaffe, Wall Street Journal

Earlier this summer, William "Mac" McCallister's Marine Corps bosses asked him for help selecting gifts for tribal sheiks who had teamed up with U.S. forces to fight radical Islamists.

Mr. McCallister, the Marines' resident expert on tribal culture, settled on the perfect gift: a Mameluke sword. The swords, which all Marine officers carry, date back to 1804 when a Marine lieutenant led a group of Arabs in a successful attack on pirates and was awarded a sword by an Ottoman pasha.

There was only one problem: The swords were banned as gifts because their value exceeds the government limit of $305.

So Mr. McCallister launched an impassioned campaign to obtain a waiver. Sheiks, who see themselves as products of a warrior culture, would love the swords, he insisted in an email to his bosses. Every time the sheik carried one, it would remind his constituents of their special "warrior bond" with the Corps, he wrote.

Expertise in 1,000-year-old tribal customs has given Mr. McCallister a position of some importance in the U.S. effort to pacify Iraq. The 46-year-old retired Army major has spent the past four years in Iraq studying the tribes' myths, histories and ancient legal system. Although he's completely self-taught, his ideas have helped shape the Marine Corps' strategy in western Iraq, which calls for forging alliances with tribal sheiks to drive out radical Islamist fighters. The success here in Anbar Province contrasts with more mixed results countrywide and is likely to be a big part of a much anticipated status report by Gen. David Petraeus, the top commander in Iraq, due out today.

"Mac has been worth his weight in gold to us," says Marine Brig. Gen. John Allen, deputy commander of U.S. forces in western Iraq. "Most of us are no better than observers of tribal society. Mac is one of the few experts." ...

After Words Video Interview: LTC John Nagl

Lieutenant Colonel John Nagl helped write "The U.S. Army/Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual," which was prepared under the guidance of Gen. David Petraeus (currently leading the "surge" in Iraq). LTC Nagl, a veteran of both Opertation Desert Storm and the current war in Iraq, talks about the manual with Sean Naylor, senior writer for Army Times and the author of "Not a Good Day to Die: The Untold Story of Operation Anaconda."

Latin America's New Security Reality: Irregular Asymmetric Conflict and Hugo Chavez - US Army Strategic Studies Institute monograph by Dr. Max G. Manwaring

In 2005, Dr. Manwaring wrote a monograph entitled Venezuela's Hugo Chavez, Bolivarian Socialism, and Asymmetric Warfare. It came at a time when the United States and Venezuela were accelerating a verbal sparing match regarding which country was destabilizing Latin America more. President Chavez shows no sign of standing down; he slowly and deliberately centralizes his power in Venezuela, and carefully and adroitly articulates his Bolivarian dream (the idea of a Latin American Liberation Movement against U.S. economic and political imperialism). Yet, most North Americans dismiss Chavez as a "nut case," or—even if he is a threat to the security and stability of the Hemisphere—the possibilities of that threat coming to fruition are too far into the future to worry about.

Dr. Manwaring's intent is to explain in greater depth what President Chavez is doing and how he is doing it. First, he explains that Hugo Chavez's threat is straightforward, and that it is being translated into a consistent, subtle, ambiguous, and ambitious struggle for power that is beginning to insinuate itself into political life in much of the Western Hemisphere. Second, he shows how President Chavez is encouraging his Venezuelan and other followers to pursue a confrontational, populist, and nationalistic agenda that will be achieved only by (1) radically changing the traditional politics of the Venezuelan state—and other Latin American states—to that of "direct" (totalitarian) democracy; (2) destroying North American hegemony throughout all of Latin America by conducting an irregular Fourth-Generation War "Super Insurgency"; and, (3) country-by-country, building a great new Bolivarian state out of a phased Program for the Liberation of Latin America.

Johns Hopkins University Unrestricted Warfare Symposium

The proceedings from the 2007 Unrestricted Warfare Symposium hosted by Johns Hopkins University are available on the JHU website (link above). Web page includes the entire proceedings book, individual papers as well as presentations.

Right Sizing the People's Liberation Army: Exploring the Contours of China's Military - US Army Strategic Studies Institute book by Mr. Roy Kamphausen and Dr. Andrew Scobell

This volume addresses how the leadership of China and the PLA view what size of PLA best meets China's requirements. Among other things, this analytical process makes important new contributions on the question of PLA transparency, long an issue among PLA watchers. A great deal of emphasis has been put on understanding not only how, but also why a military modernizes itself. Some of the determining factors are national policies and strategy, doctrine, organizational structure, missions, and service cultures. While this list is not exhaustive, it does begin to paint a picture of just how broad and deep military interests run. It is important when we look at the structure and strategy for growth within the Chinese military that we see the world as China sees it. We need to see a world in which the "Taiwan issue" as well as that of North Korea and others are not viewed as short-term concerns, but fit into how China sees itself in a long-term leadership role in the region and in the world.

Mr. Chairmen, Ranking Members, Members of the Committees, thank you for the opportunity to provide my assessment of the security situation in Iraq and to discuss the recommendations I recently provided to my chain of command for the way forward.

At the outset, I would like to note that this is my testimony. Although I have briefed my assessment and recommendations to my chain of command, I wrote this testimony myself. It has not been cleared by, nor shared with, anyone in the Pentagon, the White House, or Congress.

As a bottom line up front, the military objectives of the surge are, in large measure, being met. In recent months, in the face of tough enemies and the brutal summer heat of Iraq, Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces have achieved progress in the security arena. Though the improvements have been uneven across Iraq, the overall number of security incidents in Iraq has declined in 8 of the past 12 weeks, with the numbers of incidents in the last two weeks at the lowest levels seen since June 2006.

One reason for the decline in incidents is that Coalition and Iraqi forces have dealt significant blows to Al Qaeda-Iraq. Though Al Qaeda and its affiliates in Iraq remain dangerous, we have taken away a number of their sanctuaries and gained the initiative in many areas.

We have also disrupted Shia militia extremists, capturing the head and numerous other leaders of the Iranian-supported Special Groups, along with a senior Lebanese Hezbollah operative supporting Iran's activities in Iraq.

Coalition and Iraqi operations have helped reduce ethno-sectarian violence, as well, bringing down the number of ethno-sectarian deaths substantially in Baghdad and across Iraq since the height of the sectarian violence last December. The number of overall civilian deaths has also declined during this period, although the numbers in each area are still at troubling levels.

Iraqi Security Forces have also continued to grow and to shoulder more of the load, albeit slowly and amid continuing concerns about the sectarian tendencies of some elements in their ranks. In general, however, Iraqi elements have been standing and fighting and sustaining tough losses, and they have taken the lead in operations in many areas.

Additionally, in what may be the most significant development of the past 8 months, the tribal rejection of Al Qaeda that started in Anbar Province and helped produce such significant change there has now spread to a number of other locations as well.

Based on all this and on the further progress we believe we can achieve over the next few months, I believe that we will be able to reduce our forces to the pre-surge level of brigade combat teams by next summer without jeopardizing the security gains that we have fought so hard to achieve.

Beyond that, while noting that the situation in Iraq remains complex, difficult, and sometimes downright frustrating, I also believe that it is possible to achieve our objectives in Iraq over time, though doing so will be neither quick nor easy.

Having provided that summary, I would like to review the nature of the conflict in Iraq, recall the situation before the surge, describe the current situation, and explain the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command for the way ahead in Iraq...

Full Transcript (PDF)

Briefing Slides (PDF)

Ambassador Ryan Crocker

Mr. Chairman, ranking members, members of the committees, thank you for the opportunity to address you today.

I consider it a privilege and an honor to serve in Iraq at a time when so much is at stake for our country and the people of the region, and when so many Americans of the highest caliber in our military and civilian services are doing the same.

I know that a heavy responsibility weighs on my shoulders to provide the country with my best, most honest assessment of the situation in Iraq in its political, economic and diplomatic dimensions and the implications for the United States.

In doing so, I will not minimize the enormity of the challenges faced by Iraqis, nor the complexity of the situation. At the same time, I intend to demonstrate that it is possible for the United States to see its goals realized in Iraq and that Iraqis are capable of tackling and addressing the problems confronting them today.

A secure, stable, Democratic Iraq at peace with its neighbors is, in my view, attainable. The cumulative trajectory of political, economic, and diplomatic developments in Iraq is upwards, although the slope of that line is not steep. This process will not be quick. It will be uneven and punctuated by setbacks, as well as achievements, and it will require substantial U.S. resolve and commitment.

There will be no single moment at which we can claim victory. Any turning point will likely only be recognized in retrospect. This is a sober assessment, but it should not be a disheartening one. I have found it helpful during my time in Iraq to reflect on our own history. At many points in our early years, our survival as a nation was questionable...

Full Transcript (PDF)

What are the insurgents thinking as General David H. Petraeus prepares to testify about the state of the war in Iraq? If they are historically-minded, they are thinking about the 1968 Tet Offensive.

As those of a certain age recall, Tet involved scores of near-simultaneous surprise attacks across South Vietnam by thousands of Viet Cong guerrillas and North Vietnamese troops. As was played out on television screens across America, some of the fighters even penetrated to the U.S. Embassy grounds for a few hours leading to desperate fighting by American troops.

Even more vicious and extended was the fighting that occurred at Hue, the majestic Vietnamese city that suffered enormous damage before the insurgents finally were expelled. Of particular note are the thousands of South Vietnamese officials and anti Communists who were massacred by the Viet Cong during the weeks it took to bring the city back under control.

Ironically, Tet today is understood a victory for U.S. and South Vietnamese forces. Not only did the mass uprising North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap hoped to catalyze never occur, but the losses among the attackers were enormous - as many as 45,000 killed as opposed to the 4,300 casualties the U.S. and South Vietnamese militaries suffered. Never again would the Viet Cong field forces of similar strength. When South Vietnam finally collapsed in 1975, it was under the weight of North Vietnamese armored divisions, not the black pajama-clad South Vietnamese Viet Cong.

Yet to the entire world, and especially to the U.S. public, Tet was a symbol of American failure. The very idea that so many strikes could be launched was perceived as the equivalent of actual military success. Never mind that in the end counterinsurgency forces virtually annihilated the attackers.

Tet became a turning point in the war. Perceptions about it negated all the positive reports of progress in South Vietnam, and set the course for the U.S.'s withdrawal and the establishment of the Communist regime that still clings to power. Tet may have been a technical military defeat for the Communists, but psychologically it was their most important triumph of the war.

What does all this mean for Iraq? Iraqi insurgents do not have the capability or support to launch attacks of the same intensity or scope of those of Tet. However, they do have a cadre of suicide bombers, advanced IED technology, and plenty of mortars and missiles to create a series of very deadly incidents. What is more is that they have a sophisticated public relations operation that can hype an event of any dimension into something of vast strategic import.

In other words, we must be prepared for the enemy to make a maximum effort to conduct a series of savage attacks and to cause as many casualties as they can during General Petraeus' testimony. We should expect that U.S. troops, in particular, will be the target. Obviously, U.S. losses have the greatest potential to overshadow whatever Petraeus may have to say.

In short, it is virtually certain that the enemy will attempt to manipulate America public opinion at this crucial juncture. This is not a particularly new phenomenon, but the timing has never been more critical.

Regardless of what one may think the right answer for Iraq may be, it is vitally important that such decisions be made in an objective manner. They should be the product of a rational analysis of the merits of the military situation, as well as long-term American interests. What they should not be based upon is overheated perceptions orchestrated by enemy brutality.

Charles Dunlap is an active duty Air Force Major General. These are his personal views.

Multi-National Force - Iraq (MNF-I) has been subject to more than their fair-share of Monday-morning quarterbacking by retired generals and colonels; active duty officers, non-commissioned officers and enlisted; Representatives, Senators, reporters, pundits, bloggers and think-tankers without throwing yet another so-called "expert" opinion into the hopper.

Moreover, the release of the recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq and General Accounting Office report combined with the partisan bickering in Congress only add to the fog of war as these documents, as well as other reports, have been interpreted by both sides of the aisle as either an encouraging sign of progress or confirmation of a bad war heading south.

The need for restraint in second-guessing and adding to the noise level is especially true leading into General David Petraeus' and Ambassador Ryan Crocker's much awaited progress report to Congress.

What I offer here are "the basics" - background on the "new" counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine and a quick-look guide on what to look for in reports and commentary concerning the dynamic and complex operating environment in Iraq -- all against assumptions that "we don't know what we don't know" and everything we hold as ground-truth is nothing more than a snapshot in time of a long campaign that is subject to rapid and dramatic change for good or for bad on a recurring basis.

Background

Nothing new here -- Its all been documented before is a common criticism concerning Counterinsurgency -- US Army Field Manual 3-24 / Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 33.3.5 published in December of 2006. To a certain extent this is true and (prior to the publication of FM 3-24) if one was so inclined to gather up the combined works (books, studies, articles, speeches, and interviews) of T.E. Lawrence, Galula, Thompson, Fall, Trinquier, Kitson, Liddell-Hart, Kilcullen, Hammes, Manwaring, Cordesman, F. Hoffman, B. Hoffman, Metz, Millen, Robb, Boot, Nagl, Petraeus, Mattis, Chiarelli, McMaster, Yingling, Strickland, Record, Cassidy, Murray, Sepp, Tomes, Krepinevich, Grau, Thomas, Mao, Guevara, Giap along with many others and then read, sort and analyze -- I think you see where I am going with this...

The authors (experienced operators and COIN scholars - oftentimes both) of FM 3-24 did the research, analysis, and writing for us -- whittling down that vast database into an easily digestible and, more importantly, a relevant and useable guide. What was to serve as the "new doctrine" in Iraq took the historical principles, molded those into contemporary imperatives and then offered up the unique paradoxes inherent to COIN in comparison to conventional force-on-force operations.

If wishes were horses, then beggars would ride -- Yes, from the offset, if we had a real Phase IV Plan (post-"major" combat operations) and had implemented that plan with full participation of interagency assets things could very well be different now. Had we efficiently occupied the vacuum that existed immediately following regime change one could credibly argue that the counterinsurgency that developed and face today would have never matured.

Well, we didn't have a coherent Phase IV plan, we didn't have all instruments of national power (interagency minus the military) available and we fueled the development of an insurgency by alienating large segments of the Iraqi population. Water under the bridge and best left to the historians to sort out -- it is time to move on. What is important is that we now have a "theater-wide" doctrine (best and brightest tactical commanders implemented sound COIN practices on a local level from the offset -- but their efforts were fleeting as units moved on and there existed a denial in many quarters that we were even facing an insurgency) and short of calling it quits, that doctrine is our best, and possibly last, chance on getting this thing right.

But we need a strategy; doctrine is all about tactics -- Right, history is chock-full of examples of COIN military forces winning every tactical battle only to lose the war. That said, strategic goals are many times (if not most) vaguely defined and tend to shift with the prevailing political wind over time. Sound and stable tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) (COIN best practices) provide a common and time-tested baseline for military and other agency organizations to operate from in the absence of a well-defined strategic end-state. While the advantages of a "bottom-up" approach to COIN is arguable; solid tactics, executed correctly and uniformly, provide a solid base while the "top" (host nation or otherwise) sorts itself out.

Our National Strategy for Iraq:

- Short term, Iraq is making steady progress in fighting terrorists, meeting political milestones, building democratic institutions, and standing up security forces.

- Medium term, Iraq is in the lead defeating terrorists and providing its own security, with a fully constitutional government in place, and on its way to achieving its economic potential.

- Longer term, Iraq is peaceful, united, stable, and secure, well integrated into the international community, and a full partner in the global war on terrorism.

When one only has a hammer every problem looks like a nail - To meet these goals we require the right tools in the toolbox -- FM 3-24 provides tactical tools that, given time, are the best practices to meet the strategic goals listed above. Are those tools foolproof and a guarantee for success? Absolutely not, but again -- they are our last best chance.

Been there, done it -- This addresses the proliferation of first-person accounts of OIF operations -- because they can, at times, be confusing and even contradicting. The insights of vets with one or more tours in Iraq are most valuable in identifying the lessons -- hopefully learned -- that contribute to future success and updates of FM 3-24. There is one caution however and LTC Bob Bateman summed it up nicely in a recent post on the Small Wars Journal concerning a New York Times Op-Ed piece penned by members of the 82nd Airborne Division:

When I was writing from Iraq, I myself took care to speak only about what I personally saw, what I personally did, and (within the limits of operational security) things that happened around me. I was not in a position, even as a major with a top-secret security clearance working directly for one of the higher level headquarters in Iraq, to make as sweeping statements as their essay did.

That is not to say that many of their grander statements on topics such as political reconciliation within Iraq, or American strategy, are wrong. I leave that for all of you to evaluate on your own. It is only to say that their opinions on strategic issues are no more, or less, than any civilian living in, say, San Francisco or the Bowery. The fact that they, like me, wear uniforms should not convey some sort of magic pixie-dust validity to their opinions on events way beyond their personal experience, just as it does not for mine.

In a way, it is a shame that they wrote their essay in the way that they did. They could have been much more powerful, while conveying the same opinion, had they "stayed in their lane."

What follows are historical principles of COIN operations as outlined in the opening pages of FM 3-24. I've provided some abbreviated commentary on the things to look for and potential roadblocks in regards to recent and ongoing operations in Iraq. Again, not to judge, but to provide an insight on how FM 3-24 is playing out in Iraq.

Historical Principles for Counterinsurgency

1. Legitimacy is the Main Objective

This is a big, and elusive, COIN principle (with Principle 8 -- Long-term Commitment) in Iraq -- fostering development of effective governance by a legitimate government.

Things to look for: Increased (or decreased) ability of the central government to provide security; selection of national leaders in a manner considered just and fair by a majority of citizens; high level of popular participation and support for political processes; culturally acceptable level of government corruption; culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development; and a high level of acceptance by major social institutions. (1) In the near-term, movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform. (2)

Roadblocks: Shia insecurity about retaining political dominance, widespread Sunni unwillingness to accept a diminished political status, factional rivalries within the sectarian communities resulting in armed conflict, and the actions of extremists such as al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and elements of the Sadrist Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. (3)

2. Unity of Effort Is Essential

Essential at every echelon and by every organization -- military and civilian -- U.S., other Coalition and Iraqi. Well-intentioned but uncoordinated actions can cancel each other out and / or provide vulnerabilities suited to be exploited by adversaries. (4)

Things to look for: Continued close cooperation and coordination between Amb. Crocker and Gen. Petraeus and their staffs, same with Coalition partners. Close coordination, cooperation and combined operations between Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) and military units. Expansion of the PRT program to include access to previously denied areas in Iraq. Close coordination, cooperation and combined operations between U.S. military and PRTs and Iraqi security forces (local and national).

Roadblocks: If and when non-military capabilities significantly increase (PRTs -- non governmental organizations, international and regional organizations) the challenge of conducting coordinated and complementary operations by diverse organizations with inherently parochial objectives. The Iraqi national government's ability to meet the basic needs of the general population and its perceived legitimacy by a majority are the primary obstacles. Without the Iraqi government there can be no 'political' unity of effort.

3. Political Factors Are Primary

One "rule of thumb" is COIN is 80% political action and 20% military action. All military and non-military actions should contribute to strengthen the national government's legitimacy.

Things to look for: Any and all indicators of a true national government capable (or becoming capable) and —to take on those tasks associated with governance of a country. Solid steps towards national reconciliation is key. Again, movement on legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform.

Roadblocks: The precarious state of the Iraqi Government due to criticism by other members of the major Shia coalition (the United Iraqi Alliance, UIA), Grand Ayatollah Sistani, and other Sunni and Kurdish parties. Increase in divisions between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Sadrists and possible alternate coalitions between Shia factions aimed at constraining Maliki. (5)

4. Counterinsurgents Must Understand the Environment

This is much more than traditional enemy order of battle information. COIN requires a thorough understanding of Iraqi society and culture. Unfortunately, the insurgents hold a home-field advantage in regards to local knowledge. Therefore, to be effective, Coalition forces and other agencies require expertise in such skills as language and cultural understanding. (6)

Things to look for: Increasing and institutionalizing recent and ongoing efforts across the board in cultural understanding in formal military and non-military doctrine, education, and training. Increasing deployment and integrating with Coalition forces of subject matter experts to include Human Terrain Teams.

Roadblocks: Time, time and more time to train, educate and deploy. Bureaucracy hurdles in formalizing cultural awareness education, training and doctrine. Availability of subject matter expert advisors in Iraq at the tactical level where the vast majority of diverse cultural interaction occur.

5. Intelligence Drives Operations

Without good intelligence counterinsurgents are blind, wasting energy and oftentimes causing unintentional harm while conducting COIN operations. With good intelligence they are like surgeons cutting out cancerous tissue while keeping other vital organs intact. (7)

Things to look for: A concerted effort to push intelligence capabilities down to the lowest tactical level. This includes the capability to conduct intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination. Human Intelligence capabilities are key. Formalized and properly resourced company-level intelligence cells are key. Increase in Iraqi civilian's willingness to provide intelligence / information to Coalition and Iraqi Security forces.

Roadblocks: Time and resources (trained personnel and intelligence-related equipment) necessary to provide tactical-level commanders more than the current ad-hoc capabilities. Standardized TTP to facilitate seamless sharing of intelligence between tactical commands and during hand-over to follow-on units / organizations. Policy issues that place barriers on intelligence sharing with non-U.S. Coalition partners and non-military organizations.

6. Insurgents Must be Isolated from Their Cause and Support

It is easier to separate an insurgency from its resources and let it die than to kill every insurgent. While killing or capturing insurgents is often necessary, especially when based in religious or ideological extremism, killing or capturing every insurgent is impossible and can be counterproductive. Insurgents must be cut off from their sources of power -- and the key source is the civilian population. (8)

Things to look for: Continued local reconciliation building towards national reconciliation. As in Anbar, an increase in local Iraqi leaders coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. Government of Iraq support in integrating local volunteers into legitimate institutions to help improve local security. (9)

Roadblocks: Continued sectarian violence and the distrust it produces amongst the Iraqi civilian population. Continued attacks by Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists. Continued external support to insurgents - especially by Iran. (10)

7. Security Under the Rule of Law is Essential

The COIN cornerstone is security for the civilian population. Without that security no permanent reforms can be implemented and disorder spreads. Transitioning security duties from COIN combat forces to law enforcement is key. Insurgents must be seen as criminals by the local population. In OIF Iraqi law enforcement organizations must be seen as legitimate and operating under the Rule of Law. (11)

Things to look for: Increased Iraqi security operations with minimal U.S. support. Increased Iraqi government capabilities to provide essential services. Increased presence of regional and international Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).

Roadblocks: Again, the ability of the national government to provide security under the Rule of Law and continued sectarian violence, continued attacks by Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists and continued external support to insurgents.

8. Counterinsurgents Should Prepare for a Long-Term Commitment

Insurgencies are protracted by nature... Constant reaffirmations of commitment, backed by deeds, can overcome a common perception that U.S. COIN forces lack staying power. The perception that the national government has similar will and stamina is critical. At the strategic level, gaining and maintaining U.S. public support for a protracted effort is also critical. (12)

Things to look for: This is huge, and a very dynamic and complex issue - Congressional actions that extend U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq or sets conditions and timelines for withdrawal. U.S. public opinion polls as Congress and candidates often utilize these polls to formulate legislation and platforms. Iraqi public opinion polls that reflect perception on U.S. commitment (staying power) and confidence in the Iraqi national government's future.

Roadblocks: The Washington Clock vs. the Baghdad Clock -- time allocated by the National Command Authority vs. the time needed to successfully conduct COIN operations in Iraq. Operational Tempo -- the ability for U.S. military forces to sustain security operations on a level necessary to allow for Iraqi national reconciliation. The ability of the Iraqi national government to achieve reconciliation.

Endnotes:

1. Counterinsurgency -- FM 3-24, MCWP 3-33.5, December 2006.

2. MNF-I Commanding General letter dated 7 September 2007.

3. Update to NIE, Prospects for Iraq's Stability: A Challenging Road Ahead, August 2007.

4. FM 3-24.

5. Update to NIE.

6. FM 3-24.

7. FM 3-24.

8. FM 3-24.

9. MNF-I Commanding General letter.

10. MNF-I Commanding General letter.

11. FM 3-24.

12. FM 3-24.

Links:

Seeing the Counterinsurgency Forest from the Trees - Christian Lowe, Defense Tech

What to Make of the Petraeus Strategy - Dave Dilegge, Military.com

Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Coast Guardsmen, and Civilians of Multi-National Force-Iraq

We are now over two-and-a-half months into the surge of offensive operations made possible by the surge of forces, and I want to share with you my view of how I think we're doing. This letter is a bit longer than previous ones, since I feel you deserve a detailed description of what I believe we have -- and have not -- accomplished, as Ambassador Crocker and I finalize the assessment we will provide shortly to Congress.

Up front, my sense is that we have achieved tactical momentum and wrested the initiative from our enemies in a number of areas of Iraq. The result has been progress in the security arena, although it has, as you know, been uneven. Additionally, as you all appreciate very well, innumerable tasks remain and much hard work lies ahead. We are, in short, a long way from the goal line, but we do have the ball and we are driving down the field.

We face a situation that is exceedingly complex. Al Qaeda, associated insurgent groups, and militia extremists, some supported by Iran, continue to carry out attacks on us, our Iraqi partners, and the Iraqi civilians we seek to secure. We have to contend with the relentless pace of operations, the crushing heat, and the emotions that we all experience during long deployments and tough combat. And we operate against a backdrop of limited Iraqi government capacity, institutions trying to rebuild, and various forms of corruption. All of this takes place in a climate of distrust and fear that stems from the sectarian violence that did so much damage to the fabric of Iraqi society in 2006 and into 2007, not to mention the decades of repression under Saddam's brutal regime. Tragically, sectarian violence continues to cause death and displacement in Baghdad and elsewhere, albeit at considerably reduced levels from 8 months ago, due, in large part, to your hard work and sacrifice together with our Iraqi counterparts.

In spite of these challenges, our operations -- particularly the offensive operations we have conducted since mid-June -- have helped produce progress in many areas on the ground. In fact, the number of attacks across the country has declined in 8 of the past 11 weeks, reaching during the last week in August a level not seen since June 2006. This trend is not just a result of greater numbers of Coalition and Iraqi Security Forces; it also reflects your determination, courage, and skill in conducting counterinsurgency operations. By taking the fight to the enemy, you have killed or captured dozens of leaders and thousands of members of Al Qaeda-Iraq and extremist militia elements, you have taken many of Al Qaeda's former sanctuaries away from them, and you have dismantled a number of their car bomb and improvised explosive device networks. By living among the population with our Iraqi partners, you have been holding the areas you have cleared. By helping Iraqis reestablish basic services and local governance, you have helped exploit the security gains. And by partnering closely with Iraqi Security Forces, you have been strengthening Iraqi elements that will one day have sole responsibility for protecting their population. Indeed, while Iraqi forces clearly remain a work in progress, Iraqi soldiers and police are very much in the fight, and they continue to sustain losses that are two to three times our losses.

We are also building momentum in an emerging area of considerable importance -- local reconciliation. Local Iraqi leaders are coming forward, opposing extremists, and establishing provisional units of neighborhood security volunteers. With growing Government of Iraq support, these volunteers are being integrated into legitimate institutions to help improve local security. While this concept is playing out differently in various areas across Iraq, it is grounded in a desire shared by increasing numbers of Iraqis -- to oppose extremist elements and their ideologies. This is very significant, as many of you know first-hand, extremists cannot survive without the support of the population. The popular rejection of Al Qaeda and its ideology has, for example, helped transform Anbar Province this year from one of the most dangerous areas of Iraq to one of the safest. The popular rejection has helped Coalition and Iraqi Forces take away other areas from Al Qaeda as well, and we are seeing a spread of this sentiment in an ever-increasing number of Sunni areas. Now, in fact, we are also seeing a desire to reject extremists emerge in many Shi'a areas.

The progress has not, to be sure, been uniform across Baghdad or across Iraq. Accomplishments in some areas -- for example, in Ramadi and in Anbar Province -- have been greater than any of us might have predicted six months ago. The achievements in some other areas -- for example, in some particularly challenging Baghdad neighborhoods and in reducing overall civilian casualties, especially those caused by periodic, barbaric Al Qaeda bombings -- have not been as dramatic. However, the overall trajectory has been encouraging, especially when compared to the situation at the height of the sectarian violence in late 2006 and early 2007.

Many of us hoped this summer would be a time of tangible political progress at the national level as well. One of the justifications for the surge, after all, was that it would help create the space for Iraqi leaders to tackle the tough questions and agree on key pieces of "national reconciliation" legislation. It has not worked out as we had hoped. All participants, Iraqi and coalition alike, are dissatisfied by the halting progress on major legislative initiatives such as the oil framework law, revenue sharing, and de-ba'athification reform. At the same time, however, our appreciation of what this legislation represents for Iraqi leaders has grown. These laws are truly fundamental in nature and will help determine how Iraqis will share power and resources in the new Iraq. While much work remains to be done before these critical issues are resolved, the seriousness with which Iraqi leaders came together at their summit in late August has given hope that they are up to the task before them, even if it is clearly taking more time than we initially expected.

In the coming months, our coalition's countries and all Iraqis will continue to depend on each of you and on our Iraqi counterparts to keep the pressure on the extremists, to help security and strengthen the rule of law for all Iraqis, to work with the Government of Iraq to integrate volunteers into local security and national institutions, to assist with the restoration and improvement of basic services, and to continue the development of conditions that foster reconciliation. For our part, Ambassador Crocker and I will continue to do everything in our power to help the Prime Minister and the Government of Iraq achieve the meaningful results that will ensure that your sacrifices and those of your comrades help produce sustainable security for Iraq over the long term. A stable and secure Iraq that denies extremists a safe haven and has a government that is representative of and responsive to all Iraqis helps protect the vital interests of our coalition countries. A stable and secure Iraq will also benefit Iraq's citizens and Iraq's neighbors alike, bringing calm to a region full of challenges and employing iraq's human capital and natural resource blessings for the benefit of all.

As I noted at the outset of this letter, over the next few days, Ambassador Crocker and I will share with the U.S. Congress and the American people our assessment of the situation in Iraq. I will also describe the recommendations I have provided to my chain of command. I will go before Congress conscious of the strain on our forces, the sacrifices that you and your families are making, the gains we have made in Iraq, the challenges that remain, and the importance of building on what we and our Iraqi counterparts have fought so hard to achieve.

Thanks once again for what each of you continue to do. Our Nations have asked much of you and your families. It remains the greatest of honors to serve with you.

Sincerely,

s/

David H. Petraeus

General, United States Army

Commanding

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Signed PDF Version

Multi-National Force - Iraq

U.S. Embassy Baghdad, Iraq

General David Petraeus - Biography

Ambassador Ryan Crocker - Biography