From COL John Collins (USA Ret. via the Warlord Loop)

Lieutenant General Sam Wilson just telephoned me, and notifies that General Wayne Downing's funeral service and interment will be at West Point at times and dates to be announced.

From the US Military Academy at West Point

General Wayne A. Downing, a member of the Class of 1962, has brought extraordinary credit to the United States Military Academy through his lifetime of uniquely distinguished service to the Nation. As a combat leader, educator, global strategist, and national security expert, Wayne Downing's critical contributions to national defense and security have immeasurably raised the prominence of West Point as an institution vital to the American way of life.

Wayne Downing served the Nation in critical roles during three decades of our Nation's wars. Upon commissioning into the Infantry, he embarked on a thirty-four-year military career, rising to the rank of four-star general and the position of commander of all United States Special Operations forces. His reputation was that of a smart, decisive, forceful, and caring leader, known in particular for his unwavering determination to accomplish any mission assigned and provide his soldiers the best possible support. Since retiring from the Army in 1996, General Downing has repeatedly answered the call of public service. He is one of our Nation's foremost advisors and experts on fighting the war on global terrorism. General Downing's career has epitomized the phrase "lifetime of service to the Nation" and exemplified ideals inherent in Duty, Honor, Country.

Granted a competitive appointment to the United States Military Academy as the Son of a Deceased War Veteran (WW II) from the State of Illinois, Wayne Downing's early military career included assignments on Okinawa and in the Republic of Vietnam with the 173d Airborne Brigade, followed by instructor duties at the Infantry School and company-level command in the 1st Training Brigade at the United States Army Infantry Training Center, Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1968. He then returned to Vietnam to command Company A, 2d Battalion, 14th Infantry Regiment, 25th Infantry Division, followed by duties as the Battalion and then the 2d Brigade Operations Officer.

Following graduate school at Tulane University, Wayne Downing served as a senior operations research/systems analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Then a major, he served successively as operations officer and then executive officer of the 1st Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry, Fort Stewart, Georgia, in 1975 and 1976. A series of commands followed: he commanded Task Force (Alaska), 24th Infantry Division from 1976 to 1977 and the 2d Battalion (Ranger), 75th Infantry Division from 1977 to 1979.

Following completion of the Air War College and a tour as secretary to the Joint Staff, United States European Command, Vaihingen, Germany, he commanded the 3d Brigade, 1st Armored Division in Germany. His culminating field grade command was activation and command of the 75th Infantry Regiment from 1984 to 1985. There, he also oversaw the activation of a third Ranger Battalion and guided its integration into the newly formed regiment, which also included the 1st and 2d Ranger battalions, previously independently

operating units.

Promoted to brigadier general in 1985, Wayne Downing advanced to the forefront in the special operations community. In November 1989 he was appointed commanding general of Joint Special Operations Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, based at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. In December of that year he commanded the joint special operations forces that were so successful during the swift liberation of Panama during Operation Just Cause. One year later, during Operation Desert Storm, General Downing commanded a joint task force of 1200 American special operations forces who conducted highly effective attacks on the Iraqi SCUD missile infrastructure.

Deep behind enemy lines, the direct action of special operations forces led to the end of the SCUD attacks on Israel and dramatically reduced the overall ballistic missile threat in the theater of operations. These operations directed by General Downing were largely responsible for thwarting the Iraqi regime's attempt to use attacks on Israel to break up the allied coalition. In August 1991, he was appointed commanding general of the United States Army Special Operations Command. In 1993, he was appointed Commander-in Chief of the United States Special Operations Command. In this capacity he trained, equipped, and deployed 47,000 special operators from the Army, Navy, and Air Force in worldwide deployments in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives and the Global Combatant Commanders.

He retired from active duty in 1996, highly decorated by his Nation and many of its allies. His retirement from public service was short lived, however, as global terrorism became increasingly active. Following the deadly attack on Khobar Towers in June, Wayne Downing led a 40-person presidential task force that investigated the attack and made recommendations on how to better protect Americans abroad. Three years later, he was appointed by the U.S. Congress to the National Commission on Terrorism, which advocated implementing an aggressive global strategy to combat the rising, undeclared war of terrorism against the United States. The national emergency that began on September 11, 2001, drew him from retirement yet again; he accepted appointment by the President as the National Director and Deputy National Security Advisor for Combating Terrorism. In this position his responsibilities involved coordinating the diplomatic, law enforcement, intelligence, financial, and military facets of the global war on terrorism.

In recent years, General Downing has often returned to West Point, where he has served since 2003 as the Distinguished Chair of the Combating Terrorism Center. At West Point, he has helped to develop the next generation of the Long Gray Line, providing an extraordinary mentor and role model for the Corps of Cadets. He also serves as a visiting faculty member at the University of Michigan Ross Business School, where he conducts seminars on leadership and transformation management.

Accordingly, the Association of Graduates of the United States Military Academy takes great pride in presenting the 2006 Distinguished Graduate Award to Wayne A. Downing.

COL John Collins on General Downing

Second Lieutenant Wayne Downing, fresh out of West Point, was lucky beyond belief when he acquired my friend Colonel Chester B. McCoid as his mentor before he entered combat in Vietnam. Wayne often told me he learned more about war-fighting from hard bitten Chet in four months than he learned in four years at West Point.

General Downing not only looked like a recruiting poster, but maintained an open mind all the time he climbed the Army's promotion ladder from gold bars to four stars.

Correspondence from me to him in August 1993, for example, said, "A picture on the wall of my office shows David standing over Goliath. The caption reads 'Who Thinks Wins.' U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) needs all the help it can get to thrive during these trying times.

We discussed a clearinghouse for new ideas when you were a brand new brigadier general. Now that you are CINCSOC, I offer to show your staff how to put concepts into practice. You have a lot to gain and nothing to lose." Almost immediately he told his deputy, Rear Admiral Chuck Le Moyne, "Let's do it," but USSOCOM's clearinghouse never amounted to much for administrative and procedural reasons -- partly because USSOCOM, unlike the Warlord Loop, couldn't use email to attract and sustain contributions. The entire project dropped dead the day General Downing retired in February 1996. I already miss him immensely.

The jihadist narrative is well developed. In an analysis entitled "Iraqi Insurgent Media: The War Of Images And Ideas", Daniel Kimmage and Kathleen Ridolfo of Radio Free Europe examined 966 statements posted on websites by insurgent groups. They concluded that the statements "used religion-based, pejorative code words for the targets of the attacks." The insurgent groups coalesced around a narrative that depicted US forces as Christian crusaders, the Iraqi Army as traitors to Islam and the Shiites as heretics - all deserving death in the name of religion. Mattis called this narrative, "tyranny in a false religious garb".

Mattis is correct in pointing to the lack of a united American response. Americans are as divided about the narrative of Iraq as we were about Vietnam. Some believe Saigon fell because the South Vietnamese government and military were hopelessly incompetent; others believe we lost our will and, by reducing our aid, enabled North Vietnam, amply armed by China and the Soviet Union, to win by force of arms.

In the Iraq case, On June 10, former Secretary of State Colin Powell addressed the issue: " As the national intelligence estimate characterizes al-Qaeda, it says they are the accelerant. They have the most effective bombs, the more vicious soldiers.... But it is not just an al-Qaeda problem. It's much bigger than that. It is a sectarian conflict that I choose to call a civil war."

Therein lies the rub. Mr. Powell presented two narratives side by side: defeating al Qaeda by military force, and interjecting in a civil war that cannot be won by American military force. Mr. Powell endorsed elements of both narratives, while tilting in favor of depicting Iraq as a civil war driven by religious hatreds that transcend terrorist provocations.

The term "civil war" conjures up an image of fighting on a scale far larger than currently exists. Secretary Powell, presumably well-briefed by US Army generals who are his colleagues, suggested the civil war will increase in intensity, posing the question, " Are we delaying the inevitable conclusion of this civil war that ultimately will be fought out between Sunnis and Shias, Shias and Shias, Sunnis and al-Qaeda?"

There was no such ambiguity in General Mattis's interview. He said, "If this is important, we can win this. We know we can win it. There's nobody more convinced of that than the young troops who have spent the most time over there."

How could two generals reach such differing conclusions? Mattis's turf is Anbar Province, where conditions have improved remarkably, proving wrong the military's own predictions of a year ago. Excepting al Qaeda, most guerrillas do not roam from province to province. Because the insurgency is locally based, it's possible for conditions to improve inside Anbar and not improve elsewhere.

General Mattis was correct that the press issues a "moral bye" each time a story reads: 'a bomb killed 40 civilians' rather than 'a suicide bomber murdered 40 civilians'. The problem is that America is divided into two camps about how to write the narrative of Iraq.

The Anti-Terror camp identifies the jihadists as the main enemy. General Petraeus insists that "Iraq is the central front of al Qaeda's global campaign." In his judgment, AQI is "public enemy number one" because it slaughters thousands of innocent Shiites in order to provoke a civil war. The Washington Post reported that last November CIA Director Gen. Michael Hayden told the Iraqi Study Group that al Qaeda was in fifth place among the main causes of the violence. Whatever the truth of that report, Hayden also believes that a US failure in Iraq will result "in a safe haven (for al Qaeda) from which then to plan and conduct attacks against the West".

Al Qaeda in Iraq has a different goal than the insurgent groups that call themselves "the honorable resistance" rebelled against American occupation and rejected democracy with a Shiite majority. It is the belief of the Anti-Terror camp that after four years of fighting, many of these Sunni rejectionists have reluctantly concluded they cannot wrest central power from the upstart Shiites. Knowing the Americans do not intend to stay, they now fear that Qaeda extremists will become their rulers. The Anti-Terror camp believes many of these fighters can be reconciled. The same belief is applied to the Shiite militias; namely, that while the death squads must be destroyed, most militias can be disarmed or neutralized. So with perseverance, the terrorist movement based around AQI can be destroyed while other insurgent and militia groups reach local understandings about power-sharing, allowing Iraq to emerge as a pluralistic, democratic-based society, albeit plagued like Columbia with violence.

Anbar illustrates this point of view. Even as insurgent Web sites persist in endorsing jihad, attacks against American forces have substantially declined. How to account for this gap between rhetoric and reality? In the judgment of Marine Brigadier General John R. Allen, who leads the effort to support the tribes in Anbar, "jihad rhetoric probably comes from a fairly finite collection of tech savvy jihadis both here in Iraq as well as across the Web.... The tribes know what they have done (by attacking al Qaeda) and the risks they will face for years to come. "

It's conventional wisdom now to say that Anbar improved because the Sunni tribes aligned against al Qaeda. True enough, but an incomplete explanation. With inadequate manpower, the Marines and Army National Guard and active duty soldiers persisted year after year with gritty, relentless patrolling that convinced the tribes the American military was, as one tribal leader said to me, "the strongest tribe". Hence the tribes could turn against al Qaeda, knowing they had the strongest tribe standing behind them.

But why join "the strongest tribe" if it is migrating back to the States? In Anbar, the Marines are trying to cement relations between the tribes, the police chiefs and the local Iraqi Army battalion commanders so that, with American advisers, they will support one another - and be supported by the Shiite-dominated central government. "They (the tribes in Anbar)," Allen wrote me recently, "expect their government to assist in rebuilding their cities and giving their children a better life. They expect security and expect to have their own young men and women incorporated into this security. "

The Anbar narrative points toward strong provincial self-rule in a Sunni province. This is a simpler model of government than in the mixed areas in and around Baghdad. It is a bottom-up approach toward reconciliation, at least as important as the compromise legislations inching through the National Assembly sheltered in the Green Zone. Bottom-up or top-down, though, the onus falls on the central government to deliver a modicum of resources.

Sunni and Shiite extremists do not attack each other; both attack the defenseless. Unfortunately, the Iraqi police and soldiers kill or capture relatively few of these cowards. Most of the violence against the population is perpetrated by Sunni extremists. Their numbers aren't large, and number of firefights in Iraq is astonishingly low. This is a police war, not a battle between squads, platoons or battalions. American troops in large numbers are needed to prevent the Sunni insurgents from tearing the country apart by forcing the Iraqi soldiers to flee from city after city, to include ceding large parts of Baghdad. Any precipitate withdrawal on our part would demoralize the Iraqi forces. It's not enough, then, for US soldiers to protect the population; our soldiers must also either cripple the Sunni extremist movement or inculcate in the Iraqi forces a sense that they will emerge as the winners.

In Baghdad, American forces must restore security to every district; then they must solidify relations among neighborhood watch groups, the local police and the Iraqi Army units. Both tasks can proceed simultaneously. In the summer heat, though, that is a daunting mission. Realistically, continuing with the surge into early 2008 would be prudent.

However, February of '08 is the key Presidential primary month. Most Republican candidates will not run on continuing the status quo; the surge is expected to recede and to be replaced by Plan B - the gradual withdrawal of US combat forces. But discussing withdrawal undercuts the momentum the surge is gathering. Thus General Petraeus must score a hat trick with his report in late September. He must: 1) persuade a skeptical public that terrorism, not sectarian hatred, is the root cause of the simmering civil war; 2) affirm that Iraqi forces can gradually defeat those terrorists; and 3) assure, without divulging any timetables, that most US combat forces will be quietly withdrawn over the next few years.

The Sectarian Camp, on the other hand, believes an intransigent hostility between the Shiites and Sunnis will lead inevitably to a full-blown civil war and ethnic cleansings -regardless of the current surge. Iraq is being torn apart by religion, not terrorism. Senator Barack Obama argues that "Iraq was a diversion from the fight against the terrorists". Senator Clinton advocates withdrawing US troops from Baghdad and other areas of sectarian strife.

In this view, the cancer of hate has already metastasized and spread throughout the body politic. Removing the terrorists - Petraeus's Public Enemy Number One - will not remove the root cause of the violence. Senator Clinton has been quite direct about this: "Thousands of people are dying every month in Iraq. Our presence there is not stopping it. This is an Iraqi problem — we cannot save the Iraqis from themselves.... I think I have a lot of support among general officers and military experts that it's (the surge) not going to work."

Indeed, there are distinguished generals, experienced policymakers and disquieting incidents that support that view. For instance, in February when I visited Salman Pak, a staunch Sunni enclave on the southern outskirt of Baghdad, the sectarian hostility was palpable. When I went back in April, the American advisers proudly showed me the progress made under a new, non-sectarian Iraqi National Police battalion. However, the nearby presence of Iraqi forces and the well-meaning efforts of their leaders had not altered the bloodletting between the local sectarian communities.

Among the Shiites, there are powerful interests dedicated to sectarian supremacy. The American toleration of Moqtada Sadr in 2003 and 2004, when there were numerous opportunities to remove him from power, was a crucial mistake. Iran's influence among the Shiite militias is malign.

It's clear, though, that the Sunni extremists are the number one enemy. With their murderous car bombs and hate-filled suicide bombers, they are the provocateurs of the low-grade civil war. In late April, I visited with Iraqi and American units in various neighborhoods throughout Baghdad. Everywhere the residents were eager to talk to the American soldiers. (Venting to Americans about the lack of Iraqi government services was as normal as booing at a baseball game.) In almost every conversation, sooner or later anxiety about the unknown cropped up - who might walk by and incinerate us in an instant.

By slaughtering Shiites for the "crime" of heresy, the terrorists erected a wall of distrust that separated neighborhoods, causing the Shiites to band together out of fear. Every neighborhood then had punks and toughs who grabbed power by claiming to be the guardians. Ethnic cleansing followed as the Sunni middle class elected or were forced to flee, with Shiite poor occupying the abandoned houses. Petraeus stopped that by putting US rifle companies in every district.

On balance, no one knows, as Secretary Powell put it, how much "bigger the problem is"; that is, how deep the roots of sectarian hatred have pushed. Incidents, no matter how horrifying in themselves, do not constitute a trend. Hence two narratives are competing to frame the story of Iraq: whether the root cause of the violence is terrorism that can be contained, or sectarian hatred that cannot be contained.

We know where General Mattis stands. He wants Americans to come together and support one narrative. No hesitation in Mattis: show him the fight and his instinct is to win it. His experience was Anbar, where the ferocity of the fighting was characterized by the two battles for Fallujah. For years, Anbar was the toughest fight, where the core enemy is al Qaeda in Iraq, Yet Anbar swung faster than anyone had projected.

No one yet knows whether a similar change is germinating in Baghdad neighborhoods, where American and Iraqi forces are now patrolling from every one of the 67 police precincts. This is the key question General Petraeus will address in September.

The Senate overwhelmingly confirmed General Petraeus as our military commander in a messy, vicious war. He would not be leading our troops in battle if he did not believe in his mission. Judgments about the surge being rendered in advance, no matter how well-meaning, lack the professional expertise and depth of analysis that Petraeus and his experienced staff possess. So let's wait and listen to him before reaching conclusions. He is our military leader.

A former Marine and former assistant secretary of defense, Mr. West visits Iraq on a regular basis. He is working on his third book about the war.

For those tired of the mainstream media's twisted presentation of facts and generally warped reasoning, pick up Ralph Peters' latest book. Anytime you are frustrated by the banal posturing of government officials and want straight-forward thinking, take a close look at Wars of Blood and Faith. It is a coherent assessment of today's most pressing threats and opportunities from Africa to India to the Middle East. So if you're a student of strategic affairs, a policy official enshrouded with the official view and want to break out of the blinkered pap you get from the party line, or simply an American citizen who wants to find insightful and at times brutally frank perspectives on current challenges, you don't need not to look any further. Ralph Peters and Wars of Blood and Faith provide the most penetrating assessment of what could be called the age of identity-based conflict.

I know I don't need to puff up the author's reputation, which was well established by his two decades of service to the Nation as an Army intelligence officer. His longstanding credentials as a fearless, perceptive, and accurate analyst are hard to beat. With more than 20 books to his credit, he somehow keeps up a prolific volume of quality material. In this anthology, Ralph extends his reputation even further as a writer. The opening section on the 21st century military begins with a biting essay titled "The Shape of Wars to Come." It's a searing intro to this era's religious-based violence, an era that will generate an "an unprecedented expansion in the varieties of organized violence."

Peters has lots to say about the new counterinsurgency manual. Some of this we have already hashed out on the journal's pages, but I think the discussion on the influence of religion on modern irregular warfare remains in play. I know some people have impressions from their exposure to current operations, and my own research is inconclusive, but there is something to this issue that bears detailed scrutiny. To Peters, we have exited a brief aberration of conflict and reentered a much longer era of fundamental struggles over God and blood. Now that the brief age of ideology is over, he thinks we are returning to the recurring tides of human history existence in which wars were fought over blood and belief, not over political systems or resource distribution. This is a profound distinction, and one that many politicians, officers and civilian experts cannot seem to fathom. "No matter how vociferously we deny it," Ralph notes, "our wars will be fought over religion and ethnic identity." The author leaves the reader with little doubt that those wars will be brutally savage and protracted.

For Peters, conflict over primitive faith and blood loyalties should induce alternations to the Maoist era counterinsurgency doctrine. The prescriptions in FM 3-24 claimed to have understood that today's era was different and clearly attempted to come to grips with the complexities of insurgents fueled by religious hatred and primal loyalties. Peters argues, persuasively to this reviewer, that violence stemming from the confessional or ethnic identity is profoundly different and not easily rectified or solved by our historically grounded counterinsurgency theory of the past half century. In the midst of violent struggles between intolerant religious factions and age-old ethnic rivals, Peters finds the new manual replete with outdated remedies. LtCol Peters emphasizes, "A Maoist in Malaya could be converted. But Islamist terrorists who regard death as a promotion are not going to reject their faith any more than an ethnic warrior can—or would wish to-- change his blood identity."

With regard to new insights on COIN theory, the influence of religion and conflict, I would also encourage readers to closely review Dr. Steve Metz's superlative new monograph, titled Rethinking Counterinsurgency, which is available on line at the Army's Strategic Studies Institute. I would also encourage readers to review the longitudinal data compiled and analyzed by Harvard's Dr. Monica Duffy Toft in the recent issue of International Security. Her essay, titled "Getting Religion?: The Puzzling Case of Islam and Civil War" (International Security, Spring 2007, pp. 97-131) amplifies on research I had cited in my earlier postings on this topic, and her conclusions (based off of 42 civil wars over a 60 year period) are that religious conflicts are more destructive, harder to stem, are four times as deadly, and last twice as long. Her analysis suggests that there are numerous contextual explanations, aside from pure spiritually motivated zeal and savagery.

Ongoing operations in Iraq may provide another data point on this issue. When we can step back and view the data critically and objectively, I hope we can produce some clearer conclusions. For now, I will abide with Wars of Blood and Faith. It is a stunning collection of provocative writing on current and future national security challenges and cuts to the chase on so many complicated issues.

LtCol Hoffman is a Research Fellow employed by the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, and is also a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute of Philadelphia, PA.

Happy Blogiversary

The Wall Street Journal takes a look at 10 years of blogging:

It's been 10 years since the blog was born. Love them or hate them, they've roiled presidential campaigns and given everyman a global soapbox. Twelve commentators -- including Tom Wolfe, Newt Gingrich, the SEC's Christopher Cox and actress-turned-blogger Mia Farrow -- on what blogs mean to them...

Brigadier General Kevin Bergner, spokesman for Multi-National Force -- Iraq, comments: "Around here, folks like to read Small Wars Journal, Blackfive and The Mudville Gazette."

On Al Qaeda in Iraq - Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?

SWJ Post - Al Qaeda in Iraq -- Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets? by Malcolm Nance - two strong responses (so far):

Bill Roggio at The Fourth Rail -- Al Qaeda and its Role in the Iraq Insurgency

The attempts to minimize the role played by al Qaeda in Iraq in the larger Sunni insurgency took a significant step over the past week. Clark Hoyt, the public editor of the New York Times, claimed that the media had become complicit in the government's attempts to paint the entire Sunni insurgency with an al Qaeda brush. Also this week, Malcolm Nance published an article at the Small Wars Journal claiming al Qaeda is being given too much credit for the violence in Iraq. In the article, titled "Al Qaeda in Iraq--Heroes, Boogeymen or Puppets?," Nance claims al Qaeda is but a bit player in the Iraqi insurgency and is largely controlled by the Baathist remnants of Saddam Hussein's regime. To Nance, al Qaeda is both a U.S. Boogeyman and Baathist Puppet...

Michael Goldfarb at The Weekly Standard's WorldWideWeekly.com - Al Qaeda in Iraq: Not Just a Boogeyman

Roggio just posted what I think is the definitive takedown of the argument put forward earlier in the week by Small Wars Journal contributor Malcolm Nance. Nance's theory is that al Qaeda is basically a bit player in the insurgency--small, but lethal--and that the administration is trying to hype the threat the group poses in order to convince the American people that withdrawing from Iraq would be the equivalent of surrendering in the war on terror. Suffice to say, Roggio isn't buying it...

Nance's essay strikes me as part of a larger, renewed push by the antiwar crowd to discredit the idea that the war in Iraq has any real connection to the war on terror--as Roggio points out, the New York Times put in its two cents last Sunday with a piece by the public editor declaring that "President Bush and the United States military in Baghdad are increasingly pointing to a single villain on the battlefield: Al Qaeda...

LTG Odierno Update

A month ago we posted Lieutenant General Ray Odierno's (Commanding General Multi-National Corps -- Iraq) Counterinsurgency Guidance. Since then we have received several e-mails in praise of the general's leadership, understanding of the situation on the ground in Iraq and providing the guidance to get the job done. Here is one from a reliable and knowledgeable source:

LTG Odierno impresses me with his grasp of "the art of the possible" in Iraq, and his command style-- which I like very much (little theatrics, all business, works in small groups).

I also am very much impressed with the professionalism & experience of this Corps' staff-and I would assess that it very much reflects their commander. I think I have to guard against being too impressed with the staff to maintain some objectivity. But after having read the V Corps AAR [After Action Reviews] & OPORDs [Operation Orders] and LTG Metz's earlier 2005 III Corps AAR, I would assess that the current team appears to be a cut above the others.

This may (and actually I think this the case) reflect the accumulated experience gained on the ground over the past 4 plus years. GEN Petraeus's influence on the Corps is undoubtedly felt, but I think it too early to assess how much. Odierno & Petraeus are a very good command team--- a hard-nosed operational commander and a very good strategic thinker. Odierno has a thorough, nuanced, and thoughtful appreciation of the situation, much better than popularly portrayed in the media (as in Fiasco).

Petraeus is positive, upbeat, and brings a fresh look to often intractable Iraqi problems. This stands in contrast to his predecessor who appeared worn down after nearly three years on the job & ready to throw in the towel. Although the Corps conducted extensive "shaping" operations from Feb-June, the key "Surge" operations began on 19 June when the 5th "surge" [Battalion Combat Team] BCT became operational. All of these operations are conducted in the Baghdad "belts," or in areas hitherto not occupied or patrolled. The Corps has dubbed the umbrella operation "Phantom Thunder," of which Arrowhead Ripper is a part.

See Dave Kilcullen's SWJ post Understanding Current Operations in Iraq for a detailed and ground-truth discussion of Phantom Thunder.

I Marine Expeditionary Force

I MEF sponsored a Tactical Capabilities for Irregular Warfare conference 20 -- 24 June at Camp Pendleton, CA. The purpose was to identify, refine and integrate IW capabilities required by the tactical warfighter.

The going-out summary of identified requirements and initiatives included:

• Actionable Intelligence at the Company Level

• Biometric Data

• Combat Hunter Skills

• Cop-Like Skills

• Increased Language/Cultural Information

• Information Operations Capability

• Standardized Training (MTT)

• Enhanced Patrolling Skills

• Precision Engagement

• Squad Fires (Employ Supporting Arms)

• Battalion Level Subject Matter Expert Advisor Cell

I MEF 5-3-5 Philosophy:

Recent Small Wars Council Odds and Ends

On New Paradigms for 21st Century Conflict

On John Robb's Brave New War (members only)

On Combat Tracker Teams

On COIN Aircraft

On Combat Optics

On U.S. Policy, Interest and Endgame in Iraq

On Iraqi Security Forces

Could Someone Please Explain the "Surge" Strategy to Me?

On The Illogic of American Military Strategy in Iraq

On Thomas P.M. Barnett - Army America Needs vs. The Wars Americans Prefer to Wage

On Carlton Meyer on Airborne Operations

On Wargaming

Council Members Like Randall Knives, Ka-Bars Too...

Much more at the Council - join the discussion - membership is easy and the price is right...

This report to Congress is submitted consistent with Section 1314 of the U.S. Troop Readiness, Veterans' Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 110-28) (the "Act"). It includes an assessment of how the sovereign Government of Iraq is performing in its efforts to achieve a series of specific benchmarks contained in the Act, as well as any adjustments to strategy that may be warranted in light of that performance. This is the first of two reports to be submitted consistent with the Act and has been prepared in consultation with the Secretaries of State and Defense; Commander, Multi-National Forces-Iraq; the United States Ambassador to Iraq; and the Commander of United States Central Command, consistent with Section 1314(b)(2)(B) of the Act. This assessment complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to the Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition Partners, or Iraq.

Here are the "bottom-line" findings (excerpted from the report) on achievements and shortfalls (bolded emphasis SWJ):

This report provides, consistent with the Act, an assessment of how the Iraqi Government is performing on 18 specified benchmarks, rather than the effects being generated. Some of the benchmarks may be leading indicators, giving some sense of future trends; but many are more accurately characterized as lagging indicators, and will only be achieved after the strategy is fully underway and generates improved conditions on the ground.

The security situation in Iraq remains complex and extremely challenging. Iraqi and Coalition Forces continue to emphasize population security operations in Baghdad, its environs, and Anbar province to combat extremist networks, and create the space for political reconciliation and economic growth. As a result of increased offensive operations, Coalition and Iraqi Forces have sustained increased attacks in Iraq, particularly in Baghdad, Diyala, and Salah ad Din. Tough fighting should be expected through the summer as Coalition and Iraqi Forces seek to seize the initiative from early gains and shape conditions for longer-term stabilization.

Moving key legislation depends on deal-making among major players in a society deeply divided along sectarian, ethnic, and other lines. Meaningful and lasting progress on national reconciliation may also require a sustained period of reduced violence in order to build trust. For this reason, most of the major political benchmarks identified in the legislation-- i.e., final passage of monumental pieces of legislation through Iraq's Council of Representatives by consensus-- are lagging indicators of whether or not the strategy is succeeding or is going to be successful.

Iran and Syria have continued to foster instability in Iraq. As noted, Iran funds extremist groups to promote attacks against Coalition and Iraqi forces, and the Iraqi Government. We see little change in Iran's policy of seeking U.S. defeat through direct financial and material support for attacks against U.S. military and civilians in Iraq. Iran is engaging in similar activities in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, foreign fighters (especially suicide bombers) continue to use Syrian territory as their main transit route to Iraq. The Syrian Government also allows major insurgent organizers and financiers to operate in Damascus.

The economic picture is uneven. Key economic indicators paint a modestly improved picture— unemployment has eased slightly and inflation is currently abating. Government revenue is steady due to high oil prices, but the Iraqi Government has not yet made needed investments to increase oil and refining output. Private-sector activity is picking up in some areas, notably the more than $1 billion that have been invested in wireless telecoms, but investors remain wary due to poor security and the continuing need for a stronger legal framework.

On the Current U.S. Strategy - New Way Forward:

Current U.S. strategy -- the New Way Forward -- recognizes that the fulfillment of commitments by both the U.S. and Iraqi Governments will be necessary to achieving our common goal: a democratic Iraq that can govern, defend, and sustain itself, and be an ally in the War on Terror. The building of a strong strategic partnership with the Iraqi Government will be an important part of the effort to achieve this end state, which remains a long-term goal, and requires the application of all elements of national power, including especially diplomatic, economic, and political power.

While our overarching strategy continues to emphasize a transition of responsibility to the Iraqi Government and its security forces, the New Way Forward recognized that, in response to the upsurge in sectarian violence in 2006, it was necessary for Coalition Forces to temporarily play a greater role, in conjunction with the Iraqi Security Forces, in securing the Iraqi population. This is not meant to replace Iraqi efforts to provide security, but to help provide the necessary time and space with which the Iraqi Government can continue to build its own capacity, can intensify efforts against the accelerants of the violence, especially al-Qaida in Iraq and some segments of the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM), and can meaningfully address the all-important issue of reconciliation among the various segments of Iraqi society. The strategy recognizes that the levels of violence seen in 2006 undermined efforts to achieve political reconciliation by fueling sectarian tensions, emboldening extremists, and discrediting the Coalition and Iraqi Government. Amid such violence, it became significantly harder for Iraqi leaders to make the difficult compromises necessary to foster reconciliation.

At the same time, we have increased our efforts to help build the capacity of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF). Relying on lessons learned from our experience in training and equipping the ISF, we have significantly enhanced our training and mentoring commitment. We will continue this commitment through a combination of partnering Coalition units with Iraqi Army and Police organizations and embedding transition team personnel with the majority of ISF units. U.S commanders are committed to helping the Iraqi government expand the size of the ISF to make it a more capable counter-insurgency force.

We are also increasing our efforts to build Iraqi governmental capacity not just at the national level, but at the provincial and local levels as well. Most notably, this has required an expansion of our Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) program with 10new civilian PRTs paired with Brigade Combat Teams (BCTs), and giving PRT leaders and BCT commanders additional authorities, resources, and personnel. These leaders are charged with supporting moderate elements against extremists in their areas of responsibility and launching projects that have an immediate impact in areas cleared of terrorists and insurgents.

Expansion of the PRT program is not yet complete, with only about half of the approximately 300 additional PRT personnel deployed to date. The full complement of "civilian surge" personnel will be completed by December 2007. In addition, economic assistance funds provided by Congress in the Act for Iraq have yet to be released. As provided for in the Act, the President has waived certain restrictions on a portion of these funds in a determination, which is being provided to Congress separately.

For more on current U.S. strategy see Dave Kilcullen's SWJ post Understanding Current Operations in Iraq.

On the 18 Congressional benchmarks concerning the Iraqi Government:

1. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward forming a Constitutional Review Committee (CRC) and then completing the constitutional review.

2. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on de-Ba'athification reform.

3. The current status is unsatisfactory, but it is too early to tell whether the Government of Iraq will enact and implement legislation to ensure the equitable distribution of hydrocarbon resources to all Iraqis.

4. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward enacting and implementing legislation on procedures to form semi-autonomous regions.

5. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing an Independent High Electoral Commission (IHEC) Commission. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a provincial elections law. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing provincial council authorities. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward establishing a date for provincial elections.

6. The prerequisites for a successful general amnesty are not present; however, in the current security environment, it is not clear that such action should be a near-term Iraqi goal.

7. The prerequisites for a successful militia disarmament program are not present.

8. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward establishing supporting political, media, economic, and services committees in support of the Baghdad Security Plan.

9. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward providing three trained and ready Iraqi brigades to support Baghdad operations.

10. The Government of Iraq has not made satisfactory progress toward providing Iraqi commanders with all authorities to execute this plan and to make tactical and operational decisions in consultation with U.S. Commanders without political intervention to include the authority to pursue all extremists including Sunni insurgents and Shiite militias.

11. The Government of Iraq has not at this time made satisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraqi Security Forces are providing even-handed enforcement of the law; however, there has been significant progress in achieving increased even-handedness through the use of coalition partnering and embedded-transition teams with Iraqi Security Force units.

12. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress in ensuring the Baghdad Security Plan does not provide a safe haven for any outlaws, regardless of their sectarian or political affiliations.

13. The Government of Iraq— with substantial Coalition assistance— has made satisfactory progress toward reducing sectarian violence but has shown unsatisfactory progress towards eliminating militia control of local security.

14. The Government of Iraq -- with substantial Coalition assistance -- has made satisfactory progress toward establishing the planned JSSs (Joint Security Stations) in Baghdad.

15. The Iraqi Government has made unsatisfactory progress toward increasing the number of Iraqi Security Forces units capable of operating independently.

16. The Government of Iraq has made satisfactory progress toward ensuring that the rights of minority political parties in the Iraqi legislature are protected.

17. The Iraqi Government is making satisfactory progress in allocating funds to ministries and provinces, but even if the full $10 billion capital budget is allocated, spending units will not be able to spend all these funds by the end of 2007.

18. The Government of Iraq has made unsatisfactory progress in ensuring that Iraq's political authorities are not undermining or making false accusations against members of the ISF (Iraqi Security Force).

Much more at the link...

Discuss at Small Wars Council

Press Links:

White House: President's Press Conference

Washington Post: President Unbowed as Benchmarks Are Unmet

Washington Times: Bush Asks for More Time

New York Times: Firm Bush Tells Congress Not to Dictate War Policy

Los Angeles Times: Bush Quiets GOP Revolt over Iraq

Baltimore Sun: Bush Reports Progress on Iraq

Chicago Tribune: Sober Report on Iraq

Boston Globe: As Bush Stays Firm, House Votes Pullout

Miami Herald: Bush Cautiously Optimistic on Iraqi Forces

USA Today: House Votes Against War as Bush Defends It

Christian Science Monitor: Bush Report Sharpens Iraq Debate

Associated Press: Iraq War Report Implies Longer US Surge

Four years on in Iraq, the White House still portrays the war as a life and death struggle between the forces of good, the US led Multi-national forces, and the forces of evil, Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

With the advent of the new "surge" strategy, the media ledes have been triumphing the numerous coalition "anti-Al Qaeda" operations in Anbar province including the areas of Karmah, Baqubah and the Sunni neighborhoods of Baghdad. These operations have the intent to secure Baghdad and other major urban areas from insurgent terrorism. The strategy writ simple is to deny the insurgents an urban sanctuary and killing ground as well as to secure the Iraqi population from their sectarian attacks through a series of wide-area operations. But are we fighting the right enemy?

A better question is whom are we fighting? The response heard most often is that we are fighting Al Qaeda in Iraq. In May 2007 the President declared "Al Qaeda is public enemy number one in Iraq." The consensus opinion, from the Pentagon to the PFC, is that America is waging a desperate fight against Al Qaeda both in and out of Iraq and it will directly determine the national security on the streets of Europe and America. Additionally, for four years Abu Mussab Zarqawi, AQI's first leader, was portrayed as the commander of the insurgency. It was an easily consumable media narrative so effective that even the Iraqis believed it until his death.

There is no question that Al Qaeda is a real threat but are they the main threat? Has AQI has been catapulted to the top of the insurgency by virtue of the fact that they carry out the most dramatic and sectarian attacks or hard intelligence? In fact, listening to Washington one would think that the coalition forces are pretty much fighting "All AQI. All the Time." As with most things in Mesopotamia, this is not nearly so clear cut. The answer may or may not surprise you.

When I completed my most recent book "The Terrorists of Iraq: Inside the Strategy and Tactics of the Iraq Insurgency" many of my warfighting peers, both in and out of Iraq, insisted AQI was commanding the insurgency. When asked what gave them this impression they insisted that AQI was by far the smartest, most capable of the insurgent groups due to their car bomb (SVBIED) attacks. They argued that AQI had fostered a virulent, militant form of Islam among the formerly secular Sunni Iraqis. Some also point out that the formation of the Islamic State (Emirate) of Iraq and attempts to enforce Islamic law (Shari'a) on the population was the strategic error that pushed the Iraqi tribes of Anbar province into the arms of the coalition. In short: AQI was bad. Very bad. Having survived an AQI suicide bombing, I knew this to be true but does stopping the spectacular nature of their tactical weapons selection override the strategic mission to secure Iraq from all insurgents. In some minds, it had.

On the other hand, many advocates of immediate withdrawal, weary of the bloodletting, bank on the hope that the other groups of the insurgency will dispose of AQI as soon as the US forces withdraw and leave the battlefield. AQI is often described by administration opponents as a convenient smokescreen and boogeyman for the White House to use to keep American troops in Iraq. Knowing the particulars of AQI's strategy, who wants to take a chance on the insurgents doing our job once we leave?

Both sides of the argument have points but some of them are extreme and require a bit of myth-busting before any salient discussion of counterinsurgency strategy can occur.

We Really Don't Know Our Enemy That Well - It is well documented that the Sunni insurgency is composed of three wings of insurgents. It is composed of the nationalist Former Regime Loyalists (FRLs) and their former military elements (FREs). This force may be upwards to 29,000 active combatants carrying out over 100 unconventional attacks per day using improvised explosive devices, rockets and automatic weapons ambushes. The FRL-originated Jaysh al-Mujahideen is composed of former Saddam Fedayeen, Special Republican Guard intelligence officers, former-Ba'athists, Sunni volunteers and their families. The second wing is the nationalist Iraqi Religious Extremists (IREs). These are forces including the Islamic Army of Iraq, Ansar al-Sunnah and other smaller groups, which may total approximately 5,000 fighters, sprinkled throughout western, central and northern Iraq. On occasion come into the conversation when one of their attacks is particularly daring or when the coalition claims it is negotiating their departure from the battlefront. Inevitably these "lesser" insurgent groups are portrayed as bit players on the sidelines of the epic.

Finally, the foreign fighters of the Al Qaeda in Iraq and its umbrella group the Islamic Emirate of Iraq (aka Islamic State of Iraq) may be as few as 1,500 fighters and supporters and may also have direct links to the two other tiers.

Overwhelming evidence exists that that the FRLs have been waging the lion's share of the insurgency. Until 2004 they were considered a separate part of the insurgency but recently they have been called 'Al Qaeda-associated' because AQI was operating in their area of operations ... by 2007 it wasn't hard for Washington to make a semantic and rhetorical leap to refer to all insurgency forces as "Al Qaeda."

This is an error worth remembering. For over four years the FRLs (especially the paramilitary Saddam Fedayeen and Special Republican Guard) almost exclusively carries out IED, indirect fire (IDF), sniping, aircraft shoot downs and ambush attacks with conventional weapons with alarming regularity which account for the lion share of the US forces' 3,500 KIAs. The smaller IREs did the same type of attacks but occasionally peppered their missions with Suicide bombings. AQI almost exclusively perform carries out suicide car bombings and suicide vest bombings (SVBIED/SPBIED). They occasionally perform IED, rocket, MANPAD and even a few impressive massed infantry attacks on Iraqi Police and government buildings (such as the symbolic assault on Abu Ghraieb prison in 2005). In fact, AQI's impact on US forces is actually quite small in comparison to the FRLs and IREs.

When the first SVBIEDs of the post-war were launched against the Jordanian embassy, the UN's Canal Road HQ and Sheik Hakim in Najaf the mindset of our commanders was to associate all insurgent related terrorism events to Zarqawi and Al Qaeda. This group-think about the foreign fighters went on right up until Zarqawi was killed in 2006. Faced with an increase in IED and SVBIED attacks after his death, and because some minor groups were joining forces in resistance councils it became convenient to call everyone Al Qaeda in Iraq.

AQI Does Not Command the Insurgency - In November 2005 at a speech at the US Naval Academy the President once accurately described AQI as "the smallest, but the most lethal" insurgent force. Many claim that their size, intelligence, and history put them at the top tier of the resistance. To claim AQI leads the insurgency would have to allow that AQI has a more politically savvy guerilla military and political operation on the ground than the entirety of the former regime and the present Government of Iraq. This is giving them too much credit.

AQI is a microscopic paramilitary terror force that selects very specific weapons for very specific targets to meet strategic goals of their cultish reading of Islam. However, AQI itself has been subject to a significant degradation since January 2005. I believe that since mid-2003 AQI coordinated their SVBIED campaigns in 2004 and 2005 with the support of the FRLs networks. It hard to believe that foreign fighters can enter the Iraqi Sunni community, anywhere, without first kissing the ring of the local FRL or Iraqi religious extremist insurgents.

The AQI SVBIED is used almost exclusively as the basis of Zarqawis' anti-Shiite sectarian war strategy (to punish the Shiite community and encourage the Sunnis to fight together) and kills relatively few coalition soldiers compared to other weapons. Without question the number one killer in Iraq is the roadside IED, followed closely by automatic weapons fire - this is the tactical situation on the ground and it is an unambiguous indicator that a much larger force than AQI is performing these attacks. It is obvious that the FRL backed insurgent groups, with their massive all-Sunni pre-war intelligence and paramilitary apparatus remain intact in carrying out the traditional anti-coalition ambush operations they put into motion in 2003. Granted, in the dynamic and fluid terror-dome that is Iraq, our soldiers could be fighting AQI in the morning, FRLs in the evening and IREs all night but the most likely terror cells our soldiers will encounter in Iraq are the FRL's IEDs on the roads.

Still some classify any Iraqi insurgent support of AQI objectives, active or passive, is often pointed to as a reason to classify all insurgent groups as Al Qaeda. This reading of the enemy does not take into account the diverse strategies, goals, personalities and political linkages of the other insurgents. It lumps them all into one pot and uses the same hammer to try to smash them. Hammering this particular insurgency is like smashing a ball of mercury with your palm. You may get a little of it under your control (and the toxins that come with it) but the rest will disperse, roll away and reform as they please.

AQI has reached its tactical goals in a very limited sense, as they are on the ground fighting the Americans --this makes great video propaganda but beyond the attacks, there is nothing there but air. On the other hand, AQI has never been within sight of their stated political goal - to establish a base and safehaven for the spread of their Salafist variant of Islam into the heart of the Middle East.

On occasion, AQI has made feeble attempts to operate in the political sphere through armed force. Sunni Iraqis are Moslems but even they don't want to be told how to live their religious and social lives by foreign extremists. Each attempt, no matter how small, to radicalize and dictate to the Sunni community in Iraq failed miserably. Examples of these failures include the heavy losses in the Iraq-wide mini-Jihad of July 2004 where AQI forces rose up in several cities and tried to impose Islamic law in them; several attempts to impose Shari'a in Ramadi, sections of Mosul and Tel Afar, the 2005 Haifa street uprising in Baghdad and the multiple attempts to seize the Baqubah city government.

Their failures are why AQI manufactures its own reality. TV transmitted SVBIED attacks and Internet based AQI videos makes the insurgency appear wildly successful. This information operation has been far more successful than the attainment of any stated political goals. That is because they have managed to use their net-centric strategic information operation in such as way that they have credibility to their target audience. This has led to a thin but steady stream of manpower and money. Apart from that and the inspirational aspects of their news operation. AQI has not achieved any tangible support from the Iraqi people ... except those that need them to take the heat of coalition operations off of them.

On the other hand, the FRLs have a history of cold, calculated manipulation of the Iraqi people and events using selective intelligence collection, assassination and intimidation and propaganda. It must be remembered that Zarqawi's original AQ backed group Tawheed Wal Jihad came into Iraq just days before the invasion and set up in Fallujah under control of the Saddam Fedayeen. The Iraqi Baath party grew from a covert political organization and its current adherents still operate as "neo-Ba'athists" in Damascus and Latakia, Syria; Cairo, Egypt and even the UAE. The FRLs are operating as a covert intelligence and Fedayeen driven terrorist force, just as they were in the 1950 and 60s before they overthrew the government of Abd al-Karim Qasim and took power. Having had decades of experience researching the lives of the population, they are even more dangerous as their knowledge of the political and personal dynamics in Iraq runs deep. When necessary they have AQI, organized criminals and other forces to assist them.

AQI Did Not Bring the SVBIED, the SPBIED, the IED and Beheading to Iraq -- Many supporters of the 'All AQI. All the time.' meme have limited knowledge of Iraq before the war. The former regime intelligence and paramilitary forces were active for years prior to the war perfecting numerous types of unconventional weapons, which are used extensively throughout the insurgency. In each instance, these systems were first developed and deploy by the FRLs in both the invasion and post-war insurgency. Take beheading for example. Largely attributed to AQI and Zarqawi there was in fact an extensive use of it in 2000 and 2001 by the Saddam Fedayeen. They were tasked to carryout an "anti-prostitution" campaign that targeted against political opponents. They publicly beheaded over 200 wives and women family members of Saddam's enemies. Videos of the brutal beheadings could be found on the streets of Baghdad for less than .25 cents a full year before AQI carried out their first beheading.

The menu of post-war IEDs were found to have been developed by the regime's intelligence agencies under the title "The Ghafiqi project" and "Challenge project" months before the start of the war.

The first SVBIED and SPBIED attacks in Iraq were carried out during the invasion the war by an Army Sergeant and two women. Numerous other SVBIEDs greeted the 3rd Infantry Division during their Thunder Run into Baghdad. Not to mention that a large sophisticated Iraqi intelligence service-built VBIED was part of the plot to assassinate former President George H.W. Bush in Kuwait in 1993.

Is Iran Supporting AQI? -- Iran has created real friction with its involvement with the Shiite militias. In fact, the rise of the Jaysh al Mahdi/Mahdi Militia could be a regional threat unto itself that could eclipse Al Qaeda in the next few years (I will address in another blog). Yet there is little to no evidence that Iran is playing both sides of the fence. Although some advanced weapons such as EFPs, RPGs and mortars have undoubtedly found their way into the hands of the Sunni insurgents through black market arms sales and seizures of Shiite militia arms caches, the Iranians have little to gain for a Sunni insurgency to flourish with AQI at its helm. They have but to watch and let the Sunni insurgency play the game for them. This theme has taken residence in the minds of many who want to see Iran brought into the conflict as a way to take pressure off of Iraq. It's just not credible at this time.

The bottom line is that for US decision makers and commanders to win in Iraq they must to clarify exactly whom we are fighting and deal with them accordingly. There may be misgivings about switching gears from AQI to the FRLs at such a late date because that would openly require an acknowledgement that the strategy of "All AQI. All the time." was flawed from the beginning. Additionally any ceasefire with the former regime insurgents would require a broad political framework involving a regional approach that would have to include Syria, Saudi Arabia and the FRLs themselves. Many in Washington find this politically abhorrent.

In the end, mistaking the FRLs for AQI or AQI for the IREs or a mix of one or the other means that the strategies needed to defeat one specific group will be lost to the singular mindset of 'military destruction of AQI at all costs.' This myopia has lead the effort in Iraq for nigh four years now. Many have become so entrenched that the American people believe they are fighting no one else.

Defeating, disarming or buying out key insurgent groups could yield greater results and a lessening of combat losses through targeted military operations, negotiation, reconstruction, civil affairs projects and cash. From down here at the deck plates level this seems like common sense but it has yet to filter up to the policy makers.

If General Petraeus and his excellent counterinsurgency advisor David Kilcullen are to succeed then the hard reality of enunciating to the American public requires that the terms we use to label the opposition have to be changed. If this is part of an aggressive information operation, as some have suggested, to turn the Iraqi people against the Iraqi Insurgents by giving them all a bad name (AQI), then it's a desperate gambit as most Sunnis know who the real insurgents are in their neighborhood. This rhetoric has already had a negative operational effect by making our own soldiers believe that all of the Sunni insurgents and community supporters are Al Qaeda. This may have led to several instances of battlefield murder, torture and abuses of prisoners.

If the Petraeus strategy is to neutralize AQI first, he may eventually succeed, but he may also secure a rested, rearmed, refueled, retrained insurgency that are not AQI. The FRLs appear smart enough to let Petraeus do just this and may even cooperate a little all the while winking and supporting AQI suicide operations ... only time will tell who is the more clever bargainer at the camel bazaar.

Over the last weekend in June, three failed car bomb attacks in the UK signaled the potential resurgence of al-Qaeda and groups sympathetic to its global salifist jihadi network. First, on Friday, 29 June, two car bombs packed with propane gas canisters, gasoline and nails meant to be detonated by cell-phones—VBIEDs in current counterterrorism parlance—were positioned near a night club, poised for a "one-two punch" yielding mass casualties. The first unsuccessful car bomb was discovered by rescue workers and rendered safe, as was the second car bomb discovered nearby. The next day, two men drove a flaming SUV into the terminal at Glasgow's airport. These would be "martyrs" were captured by bystanders. It appears at least one sustained severe burns requiring treatment in hospital, an irony as the men were physicians themselves.

The men, Iraqi doctor Bilal Abdullah and Kahlid Ahmed, along with co-conspirators Mohammed Asha, a Jordanian-educated physician, and several others, are not the first British residents of a diaspora community to plot or carry out terrorist attacks. Two weeks prior to these attempts, seven men, including Dhiren Barot, were found guilty in an al-Qaeda linked plan to use limousines laden with gas canisters to attack soft targets by detonating the devices beneath buildings.

British counterterrorism officials assume that all three recent attempts are linked to al-Qaeda in motivation and ideology, if not direct control or support. The London and Glasgow attacks are linked, but the depth of the conspiracy and the exact nature of their links to the broader global jihad await the results of the fast-moving investigation. What is known thus far is that the investigation is yielding a treasure trove of forensic and human intelligence. This aids efforts to counter future attacks and understand the evolution and migration of terrorist tactics, techniques and procedures. Four immediate observations can be drawn from an assessment of these attacks.

• First, their timing coincides with the arrival of a new government. This reminds us that all terrorist attacks are instrumental in nature. These attacks were coordinated to yield maximum political influence as well as maximum casualties.

• Second, the "Martyrs of Mesopotamia" are inspiring "Global Martyrs." The use of car bombs demonstrates the migration of tactics employed in Iraq to other theatres of operation. As Sir John Stevens, the UK's senior counterterrorism official has warned, al-Qaeda has "imported the tactics of Baghdad...onto the streets of the UK."

• Third, while these attacks were unsuccessful in generating casualties or damage they can be viewed as a success from the jihadi standpoint. While the operational bombing technique has not been refined, the power of the message remains. Failed attacks still signal resolve and cause mass or systems disruption. Police and intelligence services can become swamped and distracted as failed attacks enhance the level of "noise" which they must assess to discern emerging threats. Failed strikes draw resources and attention serving as means of deception masking other conspiracies and clouding the indicators of pending attacks.

• Fourth, networked diasporas require attention. Diaspora communities can provide extremists with a permissive environment that can favor conditions that enable the emergence of extremist cells. Radical enclaves may emerge with diaspora communities and serve as catalysts for radicalization. When linked to lawless zones and other radical enclaves through social networks and Internet media a powerful "networked diaspora" results.

Britain is currently the vanguard of violent jihadism in Western Europe with adherents of extreme Islamist sects active in British cities. Members of these groups—separate and in concert—construct viable rationales that legitimize extremist narratives and actions. The threat is certain to extend beyond these current attempts—more London bombings are on the way—as reflected in the statements of British Islamist Anjem Choudary who led the banned Al Muhajiroun: "There is no doubt whatsoever that there will continue to be attacks against the British government...there are many in Britain who take their ideology from Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda and are ready to carry out many more attacks." Ultimately, this threat if unchecked will mature in the United States and elsewhere.

Countering the reach of the global jihad within networked diasporas is a global security priority. Police and intelligence services worldwide—especially in "Global Cities" with international political and economic importance and transnational connections—must develop relationships with diaspora communities. These efforts must build upon community policing and develop the cultural understanding and community trust required to recognize the emergence of extremist cells, radicalization, efforts to recruit terrorists, and efforts to exploit criminal enterprises or gangs to further terrorist activities. These efforts need to be linked to develop the intelligence needed to combat a global networked threat. This requires more than "information-sharing" and co-operation, it requires a multi-lateral framework for the "co-production" of intelligence so police and intelligence services can recognize global interactions with local impact and local activity with global reach.

John P. Sullivan is a senior research fellow at the Center for Advanced Studies on Terrorism, a member of the board of advisors for the Terrorism Research Center, Inc., and serves as a lieutenant with the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. He is also co-editor of Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a global counter-terrorism network (Routledge 2006).

First, let me say that we are working hard to get these out the door in volume 9, future volumes, and in some enhancements to our site that we should be rolling out in the fall. Our responsiveness to article submissions has not been where it needs to be, but that's a solvable problem and we're solving it.

I have just sent an e-mail to all the authors who have an article submission pending. If you thought you had one there, too, and didn't get that e-mail, then there is a problem. No doubt on my end. Maybe I've just messed up your e-mail address, maybe I've completely lost your submission, or perhaps that spam filter is a little over-zealous. Anyway, contact us to remediate me. Please note I'm talking here about submissions for SWJ Magazine. We've got some Reference Library update submissions hanging fire, too, but that's another list. If in doubt, ping us.

We have a fledgling peer review process in place, too. It adds some of the rigor that this community deserves.

Though we are stacked with great content to be published, let me encourage potential authors to send in still more. You'll be in good company. Our adustments to our publishing will really open up the flood gates in the fall, as we'll support online publishing of original articles one-at-a-time as soon as they pass the peer review process. We will still publish volumes of SWJ Magazine, but they won't be our only method of getting your good original word out.

To our readers, all I can say is patience is a virtue. And not to be too much of a leg humper, so is charity. We started this operation with a vision, not a business plan. And we have spent little effort at raising funds beyond some simple Google ads and a "donate" button. Well, we're about at the breaking point for where two unfunded guys working at night can deliver what the community needs, wants, and deserves, despite the great volunteer efforts of our SWC moderators, peer reviewers, technology mentor, etc. To really up the ante, we need to bring in some hired help (administrative, editorial, technical) and/or quit our day jobs.

MANY thanks to our donors. We greatly appreciate your generosity. We'd be happy to have more folks who gain value from Small Wars Journal and Small Wars Council join that elite club of supporters. You can also support us by making all your Amazon.com purchases (not just books) through the links at our site, here and in some of the sidebars. Amazon gives us a referral fee, and you pay the same low price, just be sure to access Amazon through our site and not straight in. Finally, if any of you have cracked the code on grants and fund raising, or have some pull with advertisers who might find SWJ a productive venue, we'd be glad to benefit from your wisdom and influence.

We have great expectations for the continued growth of this community at Small Wars Journal.

- Bill

Sunni insurgent groups that call themselves "the honorable resistance" rebelled against American occupation and rejected democracy with a Shiite majority. After four years of fighting, many of these rejectionists have reluctantly concluded they cannot wrest central power from the upstart Shiites. Knowing the Americans do not intend to stay, they now fear that Qaeda extremists will become their rulers. Many of these fighters supposedly can be reconciled.

Anbar illustrates this point of view. Even as insurgent Web sites persist in endorsing jihad, attacks against American forces have substantially declined. How to account for this gap between rhetoric and reality? In the judgment of Marine Brigadier General John R. Allen, who leads the effort to support the tribes in Anbar, "jihad rhetoric probably comes from a fairly finite collection of tech savvy jihadis both here in Iraq as well as across the Web... The tribes know what they have done (by attacking al Qaeda) and the risks they will face for years to come."

It's conventional wisdom now to say that Anbar improved because the Sunni tribes aligned against al Qaeda. True enough, but an incomplete explanation. With inadequate manpower, the Marines and Army National Guard and active duty soldiers persisted year after year with gritty, relentless patrolling that convinced the tribes the American military was, as one tribal leader said to me, "the strongest tribe". Hence the tribes could turn against al Qaeda, knowing they had the strongest tribe standing behind them.

But why join "the strongest tribe" if it is migrating back to the States? In Anbar, the Marines are trying to cement relations between the tribes, the police chiefs and the local Iraqi Army battalion commanders so that, with American advisers, they will support one another - and be supported by the Shiite-dominated central government. "They (the tribes in Anbar)," Allen wrote me recently, "expect their government to assist in rebuilding their cities and giving their children a better life. They expect security and expect to have their own young men and women incorporated into this security."