



Ordnance technicians with HMLA-167 load a Hellfire missile onto an AH-1W Super Cobra on the Al Asad flight line. See the [article on the Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron](#).

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SEPTEMBER 2007 NEWSLETTER

Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL)

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From the Director: Google Searches of Military and Government Websites

The U.S. Government website search capability provided by Google™ offers a convenient one-stop-shop for searching across U.S. government websites, including the option of searching all DoD and/or U.S. federal, state and local government websites or only selected sites. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is pleased that this capability has now been integrated into our own website, providing users with even

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greater flexibility and options for conducting their research efforts across many individual repositories. To access the Google U.S. Government search capability, simply click on the [GOOGLE TYPE SEARCH](#) on our home page and specify the extent of your search by clicking either the **MCCLL SITE SEARCH** or the **MILITARY/GOVERNMENT SEARCH BY GOOGLE** and the specific key word(s) for your search.

Comments on this or any other topics can be addressed to the MCCLL Director, Col Monte E. Dunard,

USMCR, at monte.dunard@usmc.mil Telephone: 703-432-1286 DSN: 378-1286

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) newsletter, like other MCCLL products addressing a variety of topics, is an "initial impressions" summary that identifies key observations and potential lessons from collection efforts. These observations highlight potential shortfalls, risk or issues experienced by units that may suggest a need for change. The observations are not service level decisions. Your comments on any topics addressed in this newsletter (or on our website) are welcome. Questions can be directed to: harry.t.johnson@usmc.mil or michael.jones@usmc.mil. Telephone: 703.432.1279 DSN: 312-378-1279

Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron

The Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron (HMLA) 167 deployed to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 05-07 from September 2006 to March 2007 to provide squadron operations in Al Asad, with a smaller detachment located at Korean Village. Although the current OIF tasking is for the deployment of only fifty percent of an HMLA from the east coast, HMLA-167 personnel indicated that more than half of the HMLA table of organization (T/O) is required since some work sections are only one or two deep and cannot satisfy the requirement for 24/7 operations in OIF at two different locations. As a result, the entire squadron deployed, with no personnel remaining in CONUS.

Following the squadron's return to MCAS New River, a collection team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) conducted interviews with key personnel in May 2007 and administered two surveys: one to the aircrew and one to aviation enlisted personnel. The results of this collection have been documented in the MCCLL "Quick Look" Report, [Marine Light Attack Helicopter Operations in OIF: Post-Deployment Lessons and Observations from HMLA-167](#). Unlike most other MCCLL reports, this quick look contains the detailed results of the two surveys, including many interesting comments from the individual participants.



An HMLA-167 crew chief instructor fires a GAU-17 weapon system from a UH-1N Huey during a training flight at Camp Lejeune. The GAU-17, a six barrel Gatling gun, can fire up to 3,000 rounds per minute.



An ordnance technician and ordnance line chief with HMLA-167 place a Hellfire missile back in its case during an aircraft download.

A few selected observations from the HMLA-167 staff were:

• Organization and Personnel

- ⇒ The current rotation of a 7-month deployment followed by 5 months at home station was sustainable for two deployments, but, afterwards, a longer dwell period at home is required.
- ⇒ The squadron Commander recommended a few changes to the T/O, including a master gunnery sergeant vice a master sergeant as the maintenance chief and the addition of an intelligence officer.

• Training

- ⇒ The limited time between deployments made it difficult for the squadron to qualify night systems instructors and to train all of its pilots in low-light night capabilities.
- ⇒ There are limited air-to-ground ranges on the east coast in which precision guided munitions such as "Hellfire" can be employed for training. HMLA-167 used training opportunities with Special Operations Command to gain access to additional ranges.
- ⇒ Pre-deployment training tended to be "ground centric" and interfered with the squadron's ability to conduct flight operations or improve a Marine's cutting score.
- ⇒ Desert Talon provided good training, but added flexibility is needed to support additional squadron training. For example, it would be desirable to have the ability to bring in other aircraft and crews to conduct squadron training flights in addition to the mandated Desert Talon training.

• Equipment

- ⇒ The Blue Force Tracker (BFT) needs to be fully integrated into aircraft.
- ⇒ A majority of the pilots indicated that the sensors on their aircraft were not well suited for the missions assigned in Iraq. Aircrew identified the need for improved forward looking infrared sensors.

• Combat Operations

- ⇒ Sustainment training during the deployment was critical in maintaining proficiency while deployed. For example, aircrews did not routinely employ ordnance, so sustainment training was needed to remain proficient in this area.
- ⇒ Several personnel indicated that ground commanders need better education on the capabilities and limitations of Marine aircraft and the ability of pilots to clear routes and identify threats.

HMLA-167 CO:

(The pre-deployment training program) "was somewhat ground centric and certainly focused on those Marines that were going to be outside of the wire interacting with the Iraqi population; the convoy ops, patrolling, clearing building and things of that nature, are a great training package . . . But from a flying squadron standpoint, I can't do all of that training and the aviation piece."

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Marine Fixed Wing Fighter Attack Squadron



Maintenance Marines with VMFA (AW) 242 pass through an aircraft hanger during a foreign object damage walk at Al Asad.

Marine Fixed Wing Fighter Attack Squadron VMFA (AW) 242 is one of several fighter/attack squadrons in a rotation to perform the following missions in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF):

- ⇒ Forward air controller airborne (FAC(A)),
- ⇒ Strike coordination and reconnaissance (SCAR),
- ⇒ Close air support (CAS),
- ⇒ Tactical reconnaissance, and
- ⇒ Non-traditional intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (NTISR).

The current rotation equates to seven months deployed and eleven months in CONUS. The latest deployment of VMFA (AW) 242 (with twelve aircraft in support of OIF 05-07) was from August 2006 to February 2007 at Al Asad Air Base.

After the squadron's return to MCAS Miramar, a collection team from the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) interviewed key staff in May and June 2007 and administered surveys to the air crew and enlisted personnel. The results of the collection effort have been documented in the MCCLL "Quick Look" Report, [Marine Fixed Wing Fighter Attack VMFA \(AW\) Operations: Post Deployment Lessons and Observations from VMFA \(AW\) 242](#).



Airframe mechanics from VMFA (AW) 242 remove a component from an F/A-18D Hornet at Al Asad. The squadron provides close air support for coalition forces in Iraq.

Among the key recommendations from the MCCLL topical paper are:

• Organization and Personnel

- ⇒ Squadron personnel indicated that a minimum of six months was required to properly train and stabilize the unit prior to deployment.
- ⇒ Additional ordnance personnel would be required to support operations in a higher threat environment.

• Training


- ⇒ Desert Talon training was judged to prepare personnel effectively for their OIF mission by a vast majority of the respondents.
- ⇒ The ability of maintenance personnel to conduct technical training during the deployment was limited and required a great deal of flexibility due to the requirement to support 24/7 operations.

• Equipment

- ⇒ Access to web-based programs was limited due to internet connectivity problems and limited bandwidth, resulting in difficulties performing normal administrative tasks.
- ⇒ Both operations and maintenance personnel indicated that parts availability in theater was problematic. Parts that had to be procured from CONUS took between 6 and 14 days to arrive at the squadron.
- ⇒ Additional portable radios and headsets were needed for communications between personnel working on the flight line, maintenance control and the operations duty officer.

• Operations

- ⇒ The high operational tempo and limited number of aircrew resulted in fatigue and complacency being concerns among squadron personnel.
- ⇒ The intelligence officer noted that insufficient training had been given to pilots on the Advanced Tactical Reconnaissance System (ATARS).
- ⇒ Aircrews indicated that Air Force aircraft did not always comply with lighting requirements near the airfield making visual deconfliction at night difficult. Squadron personnel noted that some of the air controllers were not experienced.



U.S. Secretary of Defense, Donald H. Rumsfeld, speaks with Marines and sailors from VMFA (AW) 242 at Al Asad near the end of his term in office (and near the end of their OIF 05-07 deployment).

VMFA (AW) Intelligence Officer:

"More emphasis needs to be given to those training flights in the Training and Readiness manual that specifically talk about knowing and using the ATARS system."

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Reserve Officer Professional Military Education

The challenges faced by reserve Marine Corps officers in balancing their civilian and military careers are daunting, with one of the most challenging requirements being scheduling professional military education (PME) courses. Although PME courses, including those provided by the Army, Naval and Air War Colleges, are considered to be essential to effective military performance (especially as officers progress to higher level staffs), they are still viewed as difficult to schedule by busy reserve Marines with many other responsibilities.

In an effort to broaden the awareness of PME opportunities for reserve officers and reinforce the value of participating in PME, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) distributed a questionnaire to selected reserve officers in August 2007 to solicit their comments on aspects of their PME experiences. Nineteen responses were received from reserve officers ranging in rank from Lieutenant Colonel to Major General. Their responses have been summarized in a MCCLL "Quick Look" report entitled, [Reserve Officer Professional Military Education: Observations from USMCR Officers on the Value of Their PME Experiences](#). The Quick Look report is proving to be particularly timely, as evidenced by two recent Marine Administrative Messages (MARADMINs):

- [MARADMIN 458/07](#) announced the upcoming Reserve Officer Professional Military Education (PME) Selection Board that will convene on 15 October and provide Reserve Officers with the opportunity to progress toward completion of their required PME in grade and then be considered for other courses. The MARADMIN sets a suspense of 8 October for all reservists to submit their application forms for full-length courses available at top level schools, intermediate level schools, or career level schools, as well as PME short courses or distance education opportunities.
- [MARADMIN 477/07](#) announced changes to the Joint Officer Management (JOM) program and the Joint Qualification System (JQS) designed to provide active and reserve officers with joint credit and a joint qualification. The JQS supplements the current Joint Specialty System, becoming effective on 1 October and replacing the previous designation of Joint Specialty Officer with the designation Joint Qualified Officer. Under the new system, officers may accrue points towards joint qualification through participation in joint education, joint training, or joint exercises/operations or assignment to a traditional joint billet.

Information furnished by respondents to the questionnaire included:



The Expeditionary Warfare School (EWS) Marine Air Command and Control System (MACCS) course is a self-paced course focusing on the MACCS and its agency. The online course is designed to support the EWS PME, with the intended target being a Marine Corps Captain.

- Over half of the respondents have held command billets, with 17 having served in multiple high-level staff positions.
- All but one of the respondents reported completing distance education or non-resident programs. Five reported attending resident courses, with one individual completing two resident courses.
- Those completing either the Army, Naval or Air War Colleges indicated that the courses were challenging, with the course content of value and relevance to future billets. Selectees for such courses must be prepared for plentiful and challenging coursework.

- Several commented that the value of PME includes the interaction that it provides with peers and instructors and the opportunity it offers for group discussions.

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LtGen James Mattis, Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces Central Command and Commanding General, I Marine Expeditionary Force:

"We can use folks who master this line of work (warfighting), not those who dabble in it. I'd rather have an aggressive junior officer who is pushing him/herself to stay current academically and ahead of the enemy . . . In this transforming time, we have no room at the top for those who are willing to learn lessons the hard way at the risk to the mission or to the lives of our trusting troops - troops who trust their seniors will not learn lessons at the cost in their blood, lessons that could have been uncovered beforehand by disciplined study . . ."

Col Monte Dunard, Director, MCCLL, (and graduate of the U.S. Army War College Distance Education Program) provides one reservist's perspective on reserve PME:

"I am a reservist; I have a full-time civilian job; I have a family with two very young children; I did drills, I did Active Duty Special Work (ADS); I was mobilized, deployed to Iraq and completed U.S. Army War College. It can be done. All it takes is hard work and determination, which is the same thing that has made you successful to this point in your careers . . . PME is not just a check in the box or a diploma to hang on the wall, or a reserve statistic to track. I believe challenging courses like the Army War College can save lives. We owe it to the Marines we are leading and to no one else; get your PME completed—for them!"

Counterinsurgency Infantry Battalion Operations

On a number of previous occasions, the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) has conducted lessons learned collection efforts with Marine infantry battalions during their deployment to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) or recently returned from OIF. The latest infantry battalion surveyed was the 3d Battalion 2d Marines (3/2) which MCCLL visited in May 2007 after its return from OIF 05-07. 3/2 had been deployed from July 2006 to January 2007 to an area of operations (AO) that extended, in general, between Ramadi and Fallujah. Initially, this AO was one of the most violent in Iraq, with essentially no Iraqi Police (IP) presence or functional civil government. Insurgents in the area included the families of insurgents operating in Ramadi and Fallujah as well as cells of Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

By the time 3/2 returned to Camp Lejeune, the security situation in the AO had improved greatly, with a significant IP presence and the beginnings of a civil government. The battalion was able to apply counterinsurgency (COIN) methods successfully to this region through the employment of intensive dismounted patrolling to maintain a presence among the population and acquire accurate human intelligence (HUMINT). The result was a major improvement in the security posture in the AO.

The collective recommendations and observations from key 3/2 staff have now been documented in a MCCLL "Quick Look" report entitled, [Counterinsurgency](#)

[Infantry Battalion Operations: Lessons and Observations from 3d Battalion 2d Marines.](#)



Marines and sailors with 3d Bn, 2d Marines, eat authentic Iraqi food while learning common phrases at one of the stations during an exercise at the Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT) training facility at Camp Lejeune, NC. This station simulates a typical market in Iraq in order to provide Marines the opportunity to experience Iraqi culture first hand before they deploy.



Marines from 3d Bn, 2d Marines and U.S. Army soldiers are briefed by a civil affairs officer with 3d Civil Affairs Group prior to their visit to a water treatment facility in Habbaniyah to discuss repairs to the facility.

Among the key observations from the 3/2 Battalion Commander were:

- **Measures of Effectiveness:** "... We were least effective when we were killing people and most effective when we were forcing them to quit fighting us, which was really what warfare is about; break the enemy's will."
 - **Information Operations (IO):** "Need to put out the IO campaign message to the locals that we don't want to destroy your country; we want people to stop fighting."
- "The only real intelligence we ever got was human intelligence (HUMINT) . . . collected on the battlefield by Marines from the battalion or by the Iraqi soldiers from the battalions that were around us."
- "We developed a number of questions. Questions that we would want to know about anybody's house: 'Who was the owner?' 'What family is he from?' 'What tribe?' 'The car he drove?' 'Where he works?' 'How long has he lived there?' Probably 25 to 30 questions."

"Over a three month period, you could collect a lot of information about the area. The drawback to that approach was you needed an interpreter or someone who knows the language to do it."

- **Language:** "Language is probably our biggest shortfall at the tactical level over there. It's the inability of the squads to have effective communications capability with the Iraqi people. You need a language capability that is resident in each squad, and it probably needs to be a Marine. That was a significant drawback for us because we were out engaging with the people in dismounted patrols, but it was difficult to talk with them. [The Iraqis] thought we should be able to learn Arabic. It was almost like a respect thing for them if you could learn their language. It's all about sitting down and talking with the people. The Iraqis are very social and gracious."

"Interpreter challenges to overcome: Wrong dialect, poor conditioning, lack of combat SOP knowledge, aversion to danger, periods of leave, trust, and accurate translation."

"Language capability at the squad level is essential. If we were allowed to have one per squad, I would be willing to lose that Marine for six months if that's what it took to get back an Arabic speaker."

- **Combined Operations:** "We did a lot of combined operations with [the Iraqis] . . . A lot of what they do is out of personal relationships. They understand their country a lot better than we do, so they really gave me a lot of good information about how we should do business in our AO. If I had a choice, every single patrol that went outside the wire would have Iraqi soldiers with them."

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Military Transition Team Resources

Numerous after action reports and other resources have been promulgated recently based on the experiences and observations of members of Military Transition Teams (MiTTs) deployed to provide training for the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) or Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) deployed with the Afghan National Army (ANA). Many of these resources have been added to the repositories of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) and are available for Marines who will be assigned to future MiTTs and ETTs. Although all transition teams (TTs) will obviously not have the same experiences, there are enough commonalities for these resources to be of general interest to most Marine and U.S. Army TTs. Among the recent documents added to the MCCLL repositories are:

- [**After Action Report of a Military Transition Team Supporting the 3rd Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division \(3-1\)**](#): This AAR provides a comprehensive summary of the experiences of this MiTT in team formation, deployment, and execution of its transition and training responsibilities. The team supported 3-1 for twelve months following its training at Mojave Viper, Camp Pendleton and the Phoenix Academy. Although the team provided support during a period of high operational tempo in Al Anbar Province that has now substantially subsided, many of its experiences are proving to be common throughout the theater.



A Marine with the Military Transition Team (MiTT) from 3d Battalion 6th Marines, checks the identification of an Iraqi civilian while on patrol with Iraqi soldiers from the 3d Battalion, 1st Brigade, 1st Iraqi Army Division.



An Iraqi Policeman carries a boxed-up desk into his police station in Ameriyah, Iraq. Regimental Combat Team 5 (RCT-5) provided desks, filing cabinets and wall lockers to the station. Up until then, the Iraqi Police furnished the station with items brought from their homes.

- [**Center for Army Lessons Learned Newsletter No. 07-28: Advisor Tactics, Techniques and Procedures**](#). Although this compilation is based primarily on the experiences of U.S. Army soldiers deployed in Iraq and Afghanistan, it should have general relevance for any adviser team, whether composed of Marines deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan or other military service members deployed in locations throughout the world. The nineteen articles in the compilation focus on cultural considerations, training, counterinsurgency guidelines, and building and advising foreign forces.
- [**A Transition Team in Contact: My Experiences and Thoughts as a Military Transition Team Member**](#). This report from a U.S. Army Major assigned to CALL is a more personal account of experiences faced by a transition team that arrived in western Baghdad immediately following the bombing of the Al-Askari Mosque in Samarra and the assassination of an Iraqi Army Division Commander. These events precipitated an escalation in sectarian tensions with which the transition team had to deal. By focusing on making a better Iraqi Army, rather than another U.S. Army, the transition team was able help the Iraqis to stand on their own effectively.

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
Correction: Lessons for Leaders

The third edition of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) [**Lessons for Leaders**](#) compilation of topical papers was developed as a resource for Marines at all levels in leadership roles or scheduled to assume such roles in the future. The third edition was published in March 2007 and featured in our [**May 2007 newsletter**](#). Since then, the compilation has proven to be very popular with over 500 copies mailed to Marines in hardcopy form in addition to the many electronic copies that have been distributed..

Among the comments that we have received on this compilation is the following feedback from LtCol Sean M. McBride, Commanding Officer 2d Radio Battalion:

"Just wanted to point out a minor error in one of your articles. I just finished reading **Lessons for Leaders, Revision 3**. In the article entitled, "Non-Kinetic/Counterinsurgency Operations: A Study in Command," the author refers to a Radio Battalion "Sensitive Site Team." The correct term for our SST is "SIGINT [Signals Intelligence] Support Team." We do assist with sensitive site exploitation, but we do much more. Keep up the good work!"

We always appreciate receiving feedback on our products. In particular, it is good to know that they are being read and are providing a basis for discussion. We will correct the original report, as well as the next version of the Lessons for Leader compilation.



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Update! Laser Optical Warning Device

The successful employment of non-lethal weapons has become of particular importance as our forces fight counterinsurgency operations in which the enemy hides among the civilian population; it is not always clear who is the enemy and who is not. In these circumstances, rules of engagement necessitate the use of non-lethal means to limit the exposure of the civilian population to the greatest extent possible. Last month's newsletter highlighted a Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) topical paper that addressed one capability that has proven to be an effective non-lethal weapon and is popularly known as the "laser dazzler". However, due to trademark issues associated with the use of this term, MCCLL has updated the report to eliminate references to the term. The updated report is entitled, [Laser Optical Warning Device Performance and Employment Update](#). Readers who have downloaded the earlier version of the report are urged to replace it with this updated version.

Readers may also be interested in other resources on non-lethal weapons, in particular the [website maintained by the Joint Non-Lethal Weapons Program \(JNLWP\)](#), which is designed to serve as a comprehensive resource for information on non-lethal weapons (NLW). This website provides a history of the JNLWP, outlines the purpose of the program and its organization, identifies ongoing and proposed programs to provide technologies for the JNLWP, discusses ongoing research efforts to ensure the safety of NLW, and provides a number of fact sheets and other reference materials for individuals researching the topic of NLW. In particular, the [JNLWP Fact Sheet on Non-Lethal Optical Distractors](#) identifies some of the specific capabilities of laser optical warning devices and the human testing that is being performed to ensure that they function safely and effectively.



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Update: Joint Lessons Learned Information System

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is proud of its participation in the ongoing program to develop a Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS). As mentioned in [last month's MCCLL newsletter](#), the Joint Staff J-7 and MCCLL signed a memorandum of agreement in March 2007 regarding the development support and management of the JLLIS and the Joint Lessons Learned Repository (JLLR). The [June 2007 Journal of the Joint Center for Operational Analysis](#) (JCOA) of the Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) provides a succinct statement of the current status of this program:

" . . . [JLLIS] is making progress towards becoming a viable tool for the entire Department of Defense (DOD) lessons learned program. JLLIS is a global information grid (GIG) compliant, net-centric, web-based collaborative tool that enables creation of an efficient and effective Joint Lessons Learned Program (JLLP). JLLIS will automate joint lessons learned collection, validation, distribution, and search processes for both action officers and planners in combatant commands, combat support agencies, and the Joint Staff. When completed, JLLIS will interface with all the Service lessons learned systems and will host a central repository of all lessons learned (joint and otherwise) for support to exercises, training, and continuing operations, including federal disaster response. In addition, JLLIS will feed information back to the assessment phase of the Joint Training Information Management System (JTIMS), and will interface with the Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS) and Joint Doctrine Education Information System (JDEIS). Physically residing on the U.S. Marine Corps server farm, users will access it through their organization's lessons learned home page. Published observations, issues, and lessons learned will be shared across the joint community for rapid infusion into joint training and research. Lastly, JLLIS information will be metadata tagged to Universal Joint Task Lists (UJTLS) and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists (JMETS) in order to share data with JTMS, DRRS, and JDEIS – and eventually other key DOD systems."

In further developments, the Joint Staff J-7 received \$1.5M in August 2007 in CJCS Initiative Funds to continue development of the JLLIS program. These interim funds will bridge the gap until JLLIS is funded in the FY09 POM. The Joint Lessons Learned Program community of practice will convene a working group during the Worldwide Joint Training & Scheduling Conference (WJTSC 07-2) at the National Guard Professional Education Center, Camp Robinson, North Little Rock, Arkansas, on 17 to 20 September to review the JLLIS implementation plan. Beginning with HQ USEUCOM, the MCCLL will install the JLLIS at the combatant commands, services and combat support agencies.

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Notice! Users of the MCCLL website may have noticed that a *Law of War, Rules of Engagement and Escalation of Force Guide* that had previously been posted to the site has been pulled for inclusion of additional material. The updated guide will be re-posted to the website shortly with additional scenarios and a Law of War Principles for Small Unit Leaders section. We regret any inconvenience this may have caused.

Battalion Command and Control

The Command and Control Training and Education Center of Excellence (C2 TECOE), in coordination with the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), has now conducted three separate collection efforts to document command and control training lessons and observations from units with Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) combat experience.

The first collection took place in October 2006 and was documented in the MCCLL Quick Look Report, [Infantry Battalion Command and Control Training: Lessons and Observations from 3d Battalion 3d Marines](#).

The second collection occurred in October and November 2006 and was documented in the MCCLL Quick Look Report, [Infantry Battalion Command and Control Training: Lessons and Observations from 2d Battalion 7th Marines, 3d Battalion 6th Marines, and Combat Logistics Battalion 2](#).

C2 TECOE has now concluded a third collection effort that took place in June and July 2007 with the same units that were visited during the second collection effort, all of whom were then deployed to OIF 06-08. The focus of this third collection was on the training and concept of employment for digital combat operations centers. A related survey was conducted with 50 Marines working in combat operations center (COC). The results of this collection and survey have been documented in the Quick Look Report, [Battalion Command and Control: In Theater Training and Operations, Lessons and Observations from 2d Battalion 7th Marines, 3d Battalion 6th Marines, and Combat Logistics Battalion 2](#).



Marines from 2d Battalion 7th Marines, move down Range 400 during their final live exercise at Mojave Viper prior to their Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 06-08 deployment.

Among the key findings of the latest C2 TECOE collection are:

- An increasing number of Marines are arriving at their units prior to deploying to Mojave Viper. This allows units to conduct their Block I and Block II Pre-deployment Training Program (PTP) prior to arriving at 29 Palms.
- The command and control systems training offered at the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF) Integrated Systems Training Centers (MISTCs) is beginning to manifest itself in the increased command and control readiness of units.
- Based on the survey data, almost one half of the Marines reported using the Command Post of the Future (CPOF) software in the digital COCs in theater. Most of the training was on-the-job. The majority of watch standers are using internet "chat" and other collaborative tools.
- All three units have developed a digital COC standard operating procedure (SOP), with the majority of the watch standers surveyed indicating familiarity with its contents.



Marines follow along during a classroom exercise during a Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) course, taught at Camp Courtney, Okinawa.

Battalion Commander, 3/6:

"[I recommend] training with [the] full [C2] suite during PTP at Camp Lejeune prior to and after Mojave Viper."

Operations Chief, 3/6:

"The computers we are using are on their last legs. They've been in Iraq for 18 months of continuous use, 24 hours a day, 7 days a week . . . Complete reliance on the system also means an over-reliance on tech support. I back up with hard copies of status boards and a central map, so when a system fails, we keep communicating and keep fighting."

- Deployed C2 equipment is aging, with most computers having been in continual use for over 18 months.
- Doctrinal systems such as the Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) are not being used due to units falling in on fixed locations with previously established non-doctrinal software programs that are not strictly C2 systems. (For example, Falconview, a planning and mapping tool was observed being used rather than C2PC, which has greater functionality, but is not generally considered to be as user friendly as Falconview.)
- A consistent message from Marines was that they needed more time to train on the actual C2 systems used in theater prior to deploying. In the event that this is not possible, the development of a C2 systems pocket guide or a computer-based training product was recommended.
- Most Marines expressed a desire to receive more training on emergency back-up procedures.

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Two Years of MCCLL Products and Other Accomplishments

As part of a recent two-year review of the accomplishments of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL), we were surprised at the number of products that we have produced and the activities that we have sponsored or been associated with during the past two years (see the statistics below). The selection of the MCCLL automated tools to be the basis for the information technology solution for the Joint Lessons Learned Information System (JLLIS) is also a source of pride and is (hopefully) evidence that we are doing something right (see the [update on the JLLIS program](#)).

Although these statistics may be impressive (especially considering the small MCCLL staff), they are significant only if it can be shown that these products and activities have contributed in a positive way to improvements in the support provided to our Marines in terms of training, equipment, organizations or tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs). Since MCCLL always works closely with many other Marine Corps organizations and often complements their programs and initiatives, it is generally difficult to assign credit to a particular idea or initiative. The [MCCLL January 2006 newsletter](#) identified several initiatives with which MCCLL has been a major participant that have resulted in "good ideas" being translated into program decisions.

MCCLL continues to strive to provide support to operational commanders in the development of emerging doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and facilities. Changes to Marine Corps pre-deployment training, equipping, and organization have been made as a result of input from lessons learned reports. Lessons learned are also being fed directly into Mojave Viper, Desert Talon and Marine Corps advisor training programs. Additionally, Urgent Universal Needs Statements have been supported by lessons learned products, and organizational changes have been made based on lessons learned reports. An example of the latter is the re-organization of infantry battalions with their own company intelligence cells for conducting counterinsurgency operations. MCCLL will continue to work to ensure that our products support the implementation of substantive improvements in Marine Corps operations. Your inputs and "good ideas" to the lessons learned process are key components to the success of these endeavors.

MCCLL Two-Year Statistics

- 86 Topical Papers
- 68 "Quick Look" Reports
- 21 MCCLL Monthly Newsletters
- 25 MCCLL Safety Corners
- 65 Classified Weekly Rollups of TTPs
- 8 Lessons Learned Conferences
- 35 CONUS collection efforts
- 31 OCONUS collection efforts.
- 9247 new users registered on the MCCLL NIPR website
- 2603 new users registered on the MCCLL SIPR website

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News

In the News: The MCCLL Liaison to 2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward)

The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) is proud of the work being done by our representatives deployed at commands throughout the Marine Corps, particularly the efforts of our men and women who are forward-deployed in Iraq. We were very pleased when one of our own was featured recently in an [article in Marine Corps News](#).

Few Marines have had as varied or as interesting a career as CWO5 Christopher Harty, our current representative at the 2d Marine Logistics Group (Forward) at Al Taqaddum, Iraq. After having enlisted in the Corps during the Vietnam era, CWO5

Harty served as a repair shop machinist for four years, then began serving as a Marine Corps reservist and police officer in New Jersey. Some of the highs and lows of his career are highlighted in the Marine Corps News article, including his 17 years with a SWAT team and his deployment during Desert Storm.

Retiring from the Corps and the police force in 2000, CWO5 Harty began working for the New Jersey Department of Treasury, Division of Taxation and Office of Criminal Investigation, as well as taking a position at Camden County College as a professor teaching Criminal Justice Studies.

He has now left these jobs twice to re-

turn to the Corps, first in 2003 and then again in 2004, the second time with the Logistics Resource Coordination Center, Installation and Logistics, at Headquarters Marine Corps. From there, he was asked by MCCLL in 2006 to deploy to Operation Iraqi Freedom with 2d MLG (Fwd) as the MCCLL lessons learned representative.

Few retirements have been as busy as that of CWO5 Harty, and we expect this trend to continue when he redeploys in October from Iraq and returns to his students as "Professor Harty".

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News (continued)

Infantry Squad Tactics in Fallujah

The Marine Corps is very fortunate to have outstanding NCOs and enlisted Marines in our infantry squads who epitomize the traits of effective small unit leaders. The Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) recently received an after action report (AAR) from four Marines who had served with the 3d Battalion, 5th Marines Scout Sniper Platoon during Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah and exemplify these traits. The AAR highlights the importance of small unit leaders understanding the enemy that they face, the environment in which they operate, effective tactics to be

employed in performing military operations in urban terrain (MOUT), and ongoing training requirements.

As stated in the AAR: "Training is continuous, whether in a combat zone or not. The responsibility of the squad leader is to ensure his squad is combat ready. The individual Marines in his squad must be continuously trained, otherwise the Marines will lose proficiency in MOUT skills learned through experience during the attack. Training does not have to be physical, it can be verbal. The most effective training in this environment is for the squad leader to sit down with his squad and

talk. The squad should run through combat scenarios and have individual Marines tell the squad what their jobs are . . . All Marines must exercise initiative during combat. Squad leaders must design training techniques in order to stress initiative . . . Constructive criticism should be encouraged. Every Marine debriefs each other . . ."

Read the complete AAR at: [Lessons Learned: Infantry Squad Tactics in MOUT During Operation Phantom Fury.](#)

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Resources for Planning Redeployment Operations

In the current operational and political environment, the drawdown of U.S. ground combat forces in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) is clearly a prospect at some point in the future. The contingency plans being developed by the Marine Corps and the other military services for the redeployment of forces and equipment promises to be a major undertaking. There are a number of resources available in the repositories of the Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned (MCCLL) to assist

in planning for such contingencies:

- The recently updated [Joint Publication 3-35, Deployment and Redeployment Operations](#), is one of the primary resources available for framing redeployment actions. As noted in the publication, the operational environment will dictate such factors as the required level of protection to ensure an uninterrupted redeployment flow.
- [Joint Publication 4-08, Joint Doctrine for Logistic Support of Multinational Operations](#) provides planning guidance

on the unique aspects of logistical support during multinational operations, including planning for redeployment and termination of operations.

- [Army Field Manual \(FM\) 100-9, Reconstitution](#), which includes among its reconstitution actions the removal of a unit from combat while at the same time reestablishing or maintaining the chain of command and unit cohesion.

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September Newsletter from the NOMLLC

The [September Newsletter from the Naval Operational Medical Lessons Learned Center \(NOMLLC\)](#) contains a number of articles that will be of particular relevance to Marine forces deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom. In particular, the [NOMLLC Quick Look Report on Medical Support of Marine Corps Infantry Battalion Operations in Iraqi](#) was mentioned in last month's MCCLL newsletter. Other articles in the NOMLLC newsletter address: (1) available

resources to address the treatment of chlorine gas attacks (such as those that occurred earlier this year in Al Anbar Province), (2) lessons learned by the 3d Battalion, 23d Marines during their annual medical training, (3) a report from the Center for Disease Control and Prevention concerning the requirement for a hospital surge capacity in response to a terrorist bombing, (4) the training curriculum for Navy corpsmen trained in Tactical Combat Casualty Care (TCCC), (5) a proposal for a Forward Resuscitative Capability that can

be deployed rapidly on surface assets of the U.S. fleet, and (6) a listing of lessons learned articles that have been published as reports in the medical literature. The latter have been identified as a result of the NOMLLC initiative to implement a Journal Watch to ensure that relevant articles from medical publications are captured.

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Reading Lists and Book Review

Beginning in 1988, the books included on the [Commandant's Reading List](#) have formed the basis for informal, self-paced professional development by Marines, incorporating many of the "classics" of Marine Corps history and doctrine. The current set of titles has been streamlined to five books and one capstone doctrinal publication per grade. Other reading lists augment the titles on the Commandant's list and include the [Reading List of the Commander, U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Central Command \(COMUSMARCENT\)](#) and the [II Marine Expeditionary Force \(MEF\) Forward \(Fwd\) Reading List for OIF 06-08](#). Readers may also be interested in other military-oriented reading lists, many of which are identified on the public website, [Military Reading List](#), including reading lists of the other military services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This month MCCLL is pleased to feature the following publications from the Commandant's and the MARCENT lists:

- **The Mask of Command**, by John Keegan. This book on the Commandant's list for Captains and Chief Warrant Officers 3, highlights the very different leadership styles of four historical commanders.
- **Tentative Manual for Counteracting Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations**, from the Marine Corps Combat Development Command (MCCDC) is on the COMUSMARCENT list for Staff NCOs, First Sergeants, Master Sergeants, Field Grade Officers, Colonels and General Officers deploying to the USCENTCOM AOR.
- **First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps**, by LtGen Victor H. Krulak. This is the "Capstone" book on the Commandant's list that is required reading for all Marines.

[The Mask of Command](#), by John Keegan

Review by Otto Friedrich, *Time Magazine Online*

"A military historian who had never seen combat, John Keegan distinguished himself a decade ago by writing ***The Face of Battle***, a vivid triptych on three epic British battles that had all taken place within about 100 miles of one another: Agincourt (1415), Waterloo (1815) and the Somme (1916). Keegan ignored many considerations of high strategy and concentrated instead on what the ordinary soldiers had encountered through the centuries: the recurring experience of pain, noise, terror, courage, exhaustion.

Now, while quoting Montesquieu's dictum that a "rational army would run away," Keegan has undertaken a kind of sequel that shrewdly explores the various ways in which a gifted commander can not only steel men for battle but lead them to victory as well. Once again he has chosen a few avatars to illustrate an evolution in leadership:

The heroic style. Here is Alexander the Great, who smashed the Persian Empire and led his devoted Macedonian phalanxes all the way to India. A fearless warrior, he was wounded eight times before succumbing to a fever at 32.

The antiheroic style. Here is the Duke of Wellington, who described his soldiers as the "scum of the earth" and often had them flogged. But his meticulous planning and preparation enabled his disciplined troops to defeat Napoleon at Waterloo.

The unheroic style. Here is Ulysses S. Grant, who rode into battle with a cigar in his mouth and was all too often drunk, but who became commander of the Union armies because President Lincoln said of him: "I need this man. He fights."

The false-heroic style. Here is Adolf Hitler, who indulged himself in late-night monologues to his adjutants about vegetarianism, the old days in the trenches and the "sapping effects" of Christianity while his armies plunged toward disaster on the Russian front."

Read the [complete review in Time Magazine Online](#).

[Tentative Manual for Counteracting Irregular Threats: An Updated Approach to Counterinsurgency Operations](#)

"In the early 20th Century, the debacle of Gallipoli convinced many military theorists that amphibious operations were impossibly difficult and inherently doomed to failure. Assessing the nature of the anticipated conflict in the Pacific, the Marine Corps concluded that the United States could not afford the luxury of avoiding that which was incredibly difficult. Rather than avoiding the problem, the Navy-Marine Corps team attacked it. The result was a ***Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*** published in 1934. Acknowledging that there was still much to learn, this manual would be refined through numerous exercises and experiences until 1940. This document provided a common framework for further exploration and refinement of the tactics, techniques and procedures that would be creatively—and successfully—applied on a global scale.

Today we face a similar situation in regard to irregular threats. The problems associated with countering irregular threats are complex, dynamic, and daunting. **Their solutions require a long-term, comprehensive approach** in the application of the instruments of national power and influence. While we are naturally predisposed toward quick and decisive conflict resolution, our conventional military preeminence virtually guarantees adversaries will resort to irregular means. The Marine Corps must **attack these problems in partnership** with the joint and inter-agency communities and our multinational allies. Marines must approach counterinsurgency prepared to combat armed adversaries as well as **influencing the environment through the use of information, humanitarian aid, economic advice and a boost toward good governance**.

As with any concept, this is a proposal of how Marines might operate in the future. . . ."

Read the [complete MCCDC Tentative Manual](#).

[Reading Lists discussion continued!](#)

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Reading Lists and Book Review (continued)

First to Fight: An Inside View of the U.S. Marine Corps by LtGen Victor H. Krulak.

Since this is the "Capstone" book on the Commandant's Reading List and is required reading for Marines of all ranks, the Marine Corps University (MCU) has prepared a [comprehensive discussion guide available online](#) as an assist to Marines in their group or independent studies of this important resource on the people and attributes of the Corps that have made it successful. The book is considered to be highly relevant to Marine leaders today, since they should know that the Corps exists because of the people that have gone before and that it will only survive if leaders of today and the future continue to convince the citizens of the United States that "when trouble comes to our country there will be Marines". The premise throughout is that the Marine Corps "is downright good for the manhood of our country".

Because of the importance placed on this book, MCCLL intends to include sections of the discussion group material in this and future newsletters. We hope that this proves to be an impetus for Marines to read this book and discuss it with their fellow Marines.

First to Fight: Part I Discussion Guide

1. Identify LtGen Krulak's mission (task and purpose) in writing this section?

Why did he write First to Fight?

He states in his own words the answer to this question on page xvi. "*This book, therefore, is an effort to set down what I perceive to be the qualities that have caused the Marine Corps to survive and to flourish...I aim through the amalgamation of fact, legend, anecdote, and interpretation to create a faithful image of what the Marine Corps is and a rationalization of the mystique of this altogether American institution.*"

Why should Marines read this book? Why do they need to learn about how the Corps was conceived? The historical nature of our present day Corps requires any Marine to know how the Corps came to be and the trials it has undergone as an institution. Part of what sets Marines apart from other services is how highly we value our own history and traditions. LtGen Krulak presents the information in Part I as a quick reminder of those men to whom the country and we owe a debt of gratitude for our continued existence as a service.

The primary argument or issue in chapters 1-3 was greater than the preservation of the Corps, rather the continued civilian control of the military via the new Office of the Secretary of Defense and what role the military leadership would play in the form of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Throughout this section, elements of the political-military machine struggle for power and authority over the armed forces. LtGen Krulak points out how the Marine Corps, more than any other service at the time, stood to gain or lose, as a direct result of this internal struggle. While the Office of the Secretary of Defense vied for greater control of the military in general, and the U.S. Army leadership conspired to do away with or absorb the Marine Corps.

"We saw by its testimony that the War Department was convinced that political thinking in military councils would enhance the country's ability to plan for, finance, and conduct war in the modern age. General Vandegrift had called it the 'extension of political-military control into fields of government that are essentially civilian in character.' We (the Chowder Society) believed that just the opposite was needed. We believed in undiluted military advice at the topmost civilian level; generals and admirals, if they were doing their jobs properly, would have no time to play politicians, too" (p.39).

2. What part of the book was the most effective in accomplishing LtGen Krulak's mission? What part of the book was least effective? (Does the author effectively explain his viewpoint? Does he justify/validate it?)

LtGen Krulak effectively explains in detail the opposing viewpoints of the executive branch, Secretary of Defense, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps leadership. While there is much more information available on this time period, LtGen Krulak concisely and clearly presents the primary issues of this time from his perspective as an experienced and savvy Marine Corps officer. The fact that he experienced many of the conversations and testimonies first-hand lend validity to his explanation of the events.

3. The part of the book that is most relevant to what I/we do is:

As a Marine leader, the most relevant part of The Thinkers was the common perspective that LtGen Krulak provides Marines. He describes the political tit-for-tat going on in Washington, D.C. from the Interwar Period through to post-WWII. The result, perhaps, is he fosters some "sensitive paranoia" (p.15) in the reader.

He writes of President Truman's distaste for the Marine Corps in December 1945 as follows: President Truman "...declared that the Marines 'should continue as an integral part of the Navy,' he privately described the Corps as a duplication, the Navy's 'own little Army that talks Navy and is known as the Marine Corps.'" (p.31) It could be paranoia, but the timing of such derogatory opinions of the Marine Corps is surprising to me. Just months earlier, Japan had surrendered to the Allies ending the Pacific Campaign, a victory that was due in no small part to the Marine Corps and its amphibious doctrine. This serves as a reminder to me that at any given time, efficiency and cost-benefit analysis may lead some to believe that the Marine Corps is redundant and too expensive. . ."

Review the [complete discussion guide from MCU](#).

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